Nigeria
x
    Albania

    Profile

    Nigeria

    Capital

    Abuja

    Population

    232,679,478

    Gross domestic product (GDP - CURRENT $US MILLION)

    USD 187,640 million

    Area (KM²)

    923,770 km²

    7.320.04

    Criminality score

    8th of 193 countries 2

    3rd of 54 countries in Africa 1

    1st of 15 countries in West Africa 0

    Criminal markets

    7.33-0.04

    An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.

    Human trafficking

    8.000.50

    Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.

    Human smuggling

    6.500.50

    Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.

    Extortion and protection racketeering

    8.000.00

    Crimes linked to exerting control over a territory/market including as a mediator and/or requesting a benefit in exchange for protection.

    Arms trafficking

    8.00-0.50

    The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.

    Trade in counterfeit goods

    8.000.00

    The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands.

    Illicit trade in excisable goods

    6.50-0.50

    The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits.

    Flora crimes

    6.000.00

    The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.

    Fauna crimes

    7.500.50

    The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.

    Non-renewable resource crimes

    8.000.00

    The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.

    Heroin trade

    6.000.00

    The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.

    Cocaine trade

    7.500.50

    The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.

    Cannabis trade

    7.00-1.00

    The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.

    Synthetic drug trade

    8.500.00

    The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.

    Cyber-dependent crimes

    6.50-1.50

    Organized crimes that rely solely on using information communications technology with the aim of obtaining a monetary/material benefit.

    Financial crimes

    8.001.00

    Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance.

    Criminal actors

    7.300.10

    An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.

    Mafia-style groups

    6.501.00

    Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.

    Criminal networks

    8.00-0.50

    Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.

    State-embedded actors

    8.000.50

    Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.

    Foreign actors

    7.00-0.50

    State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.

    Private sector actors

    7.000.00

    Profit-seeking individuals/entities who own/control a part of the legal economy free from the state, that collaborate with criminal actors.

    5.46-0.33

    Resilience score

    56th of 193 countries 11

    5th of 54 countries in Africa 3

    3rd of 15 countries in West Africa 1

    Political leadership and governance

    5.500.00

    The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.

    Government transparency and accountability

    4.50-0.50

    The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.

    International cooperation

    7.500.00

    A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.

    National policies and laws

    7.00-0.50

    A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.

    Judicial system and detention

    4.50-0.50

    Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.

    Law enforcement

    5.500.50

    The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.

    Territorial integrity

    4.00-1.00

    The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.

    Anti-money laundering

    4.50-0.50

    A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.

    Economic regulatory capacity

    6.00-0.50

    The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.

    Victim and witness support

    4.50-0.50

    Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.

    Prevention

    5.500.00

    Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.

    Non-state actors

    6.50-0.50

    The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.

    5.46 7.30 7.33 5.46 7.30 7.33

    Analysis

    01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11

    People

    Nigeria is a major source, transit and destination country for human trafficking, driven by poverty, unemployment and insecurity. Traffickers primarily target women and children for sexual exploitation, forced labour and organ harvesting. Criminal networks operate domestically and transnationally, exploiting porous borders and corruption to facilitate movement. Child labour, including forced mining and domestic work, remains widespread despite legal prohibitions. Criminal groups, insurgents, such as Boko Haram and mafia-like organizations have a long history of trafficking women and children for sexual exploitation, which they use to finance their other activities. So-called ‘baby factories’ that deal in illegal adoptions are also becoming increasingly prevalent. Internal displacement, violence, growing poverty and inflation are all likely to exacerbate the vulnerability of trafficking victims and intensify trafficking activities.

    Nigeria has emerged as a major source of irregular migration from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe, North America and other regions, due to economic challenges and limited legal migration options. Human smuggling has surged since 2023, after the removal of fuel subsidies led to acute hardship. Smugglers in exploit migrants’ desperation, providing them with false documents through clandestine networks. Major routes pass northwards through hubs like Kano, a key transit point on overland routes through the Sahel towards Europe; southwards through Lagos, a key exit point by air and sea; and south-east via Cameroon. Although primarily a source country, Nigeria is also a destination for irregular migrants from within West Africa. These migrants often face exploitation, violence and the risk of being trafficked. Extortion and protection racketeering in Nigeria is pervasive, driven by the government’s inability to secure conflict-affected areas. Bandits in the north-west use extortion to finance their operations and buy weapons. They have taken control of vast swathes of agricultural land, which they farm by exploiting local communities through a mix of forced labour and protection racketeering. A constellation of armed insurgent and violent extremist groups across various regions of Nigeria also extort and exploit the communities under their influence. Kidnapping, including mass abductions, remains a major revenue source for extremist and bandit groups alike. Profits from extortion fund the acquisition of arms from the Sahel. Bandits also invest in local transport to consolidate their control. Although primarily concentrated in the north-west and north-east, the banditry phenomenon is spreading to north-central regions, reflecting the evolution of criminal tactics and the persistent challenge of maintaining government control.

    Trade

    Nigeria serves as a core destination and transit hub for illicit arms within West Africa and beyond the region. The trade is driven by a combination of political instability, conflict and organized crime. Corruption and porous borders are key enablers of the arms trade, while artisanal weapons manufactured in country further expand the market. Armed groups, including Boko Haram, Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and armed bandits, play a number of key roles in the arms trade – as traffickers, transporters and users of weapons. Law enforcement operations have made sporadic seizures and uncovered illegal arms factories, but their overall impact remains unclear. Arms trafficking fuels a range of issues like violent crime, human trafficking, illegal mining and civil unrest. Major smuggling routes through Nigeria include corridors from Libya, Mali, Niger and Cameroon, as well as maritime routes through the ports at Lagos and Onne. The trade in counterfeit goods is significant, driven by weak regulation, corruption, economic hardship and the declining value of the Naira. Nigeria functions as both a transit and production hub, with counterfeit items primarily imported from Asia, particularly China and India. Key products include pharmaceuticals, with substandard antibiotics and antimalarials posing significant health risks. Counterfeit electronics are also widespread. Local production, including of fake cosmetics products, is expanding due to demand for cheaper goods and often involves experienced manufacturers who leverage online platforms for distribution. Despite occasional large-scale seizures and factory closures, counterfeit goods continue to proliferate, facilitated by criminal networks and limited law enforcement capacity. Nigeria struggles with the illicit cigarette and alcohol trade, exacerbated by weak border controls and high taxation which is aimed at reducing consumption. Smuggling networks involve foreign importers and domestic distributors, with border crossings facilitated through bribing officials. Sporadic seizures of cigarettes – originating from China end entering via Benin – and alcoholic beverages have highlighted the popularity of smuggled excisable goods, particularly in border states. Although Nigeria primarily acts as a destination for illicit goods, there is a limited export of locally produced cigarettes. Social acceptance and minimal enforcement foster an open retail market, where single-stick sales are more profitable than pack sales.

    Environment

    Nigeria's illegal logging industry, driven by domestic and overseas demand for timber, is facilitated by corruption and weak forest governance, the prevalence of armed groups, including bandits, and economic challenges. Criminal networks, private sector actors and foreign players, particularly from Asia, make significant profits from illegal logging and charcoal production. Bandit groups also profit indirectly, by taxing the networks and local workers involved in logging for access to protected forested areas. The industry serves as a vital financial resource for low-income communities despite the risks. Violent confrontations, including armed clashes and targeted attacks by militants, highlight the industry's volatile nature. Despite government efforts, illicit logging persists. The loss of primary forests, as a key national resource, and substantial carbon emissions through deforestation has both an environmental and socio-economic impact.

    The country is also a major source and transit hub for illegal wildlife trafficking, particularly pangolin scales and ivory tusks destined for Asian medical markets. Weak enforcement, corruption and lack of public awareness facilitate trafficking, while illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing by foreign nationals threatens maritime resources. The growing demand for bushmeat endangers wildlife, with both physical and online markets evading detection. Recent investigations revealed the use of cryptocurrency in illicit transactions. Law enforcement operations since 2021 have led to significant seizures, including 11 tonnes of pangolin scales and ivory, and numerous arrests. Nigeria’s role as a source and transit point for West, Central and Southern African wildlife to Asia is contributing to the loss of biodiversity and destruction of ecosystems across the continent, including the extinction of giraffes, rhinoceros and cheetahs. Nigeria is also a source and transit point for non-renewable resources. Illegal mining and petroleum smuggling are widespread, and involve criminal networks and armed groups like Boko Haram. These activities finance armed conflicts and fuel violent rivalries between groups for control. Authorities have seized minerals and crude oil, and dismantled illegal refineries but enforcement is undermined by corruption and the significant involvement of foreign nationals. Oil bunkering (supplying fuel to ships) sustains low-income populations but leads to environmental damage, including oil spills and land degradation. Efforts to curb illegal activities are counteracted by socio-economic pressures.

    Drugs

    Illicit shipments of heroin arrive in Nigeria via East and Southern Africa from Asia. Although there is some, albeit limited, domestic consumption, shipments are largely for onward distribution to neighbouring states, Europe, Western Asia and North America. In late 2023, police operations dismantled a heroin trafficking network reaching across Africa, Europe and America, with record seizures at Lagos and Abuja airports. The heroin trade intersects with other illicit activities, including cocaine and cannabis trafficking, with proceeds being laundered through stock investments and real estate. This has led to asset seizures linked to the drugs trade. Nigeria is a major transit and emerging consumer hub for cocaine – strategically positioned between South America and the large consumer markets of Europe and, to a lesser extent, Western Asia. Nigerian traffickers collaborate with Latin American and European groups, utilizing airports, seaports and land borders to move cocaine through West Africa. Cocaine consumption (including in the form of crack) has risen significantly in major cities, and traffickers employ diverse money-laundering methods involving foreign companies, money couriers and financial institutions to hide the profits.

    Nigeria is a large source, transit and destination country for cannabis, locally known as ‘Indian hemp’ or ‘skunk’. Cultivation is concentrated in south-western states due to favourable growing conditions, and distributed throughout the country. Despite strict criminalization, domestic consumption remains high. Trafficking of cannabis from Ghana to Nigeria, usually via Benin, continues to be reported. Although authorities have reportedly destroyed hundreds of hectares of cannabis plantations in recent years, traffickers continue to smuggle the drug into and out of the country, often employing sophisticated concealment methods. Nigeria is also a manufacturing, transit and destination hub for an increasing variety of synthetic drugs. Tramadol and tapentadol are largely imported from overseas, particularly from India and Pakistan, by air and maritime routes. A proportion is trafficked north overland into neighbouring states. Domestic consumption is also significant. Methamphetamine production has traditionally been concentrated in the south, but may have spread to other areas as domestic consumption has increased, and is exported to international consumer markets. Ecstasy use is also reportedly on the rise, with imports from overseas. The range of synthetic drugs available on Nigerian retail markets is expanding, in line with regional trends.

    Cyber-dependent crimes

    Local organized crime groups, sometimes with the help of state and private sector actors, are engaged in cyber-dependent crimes. Recent reports have shown that malware aimed at stealing banking credentials online has been used by local cybercriminals. Most criminal groups have demonstrated sophisticated new tactics to breach security measures. Importantly, there is evidence of a growing convergence between cyber-dependent and cyber-enabled crimes, since most of the criminal actors involved in cyber-dependent crimes, such as cryptocurrency fraud and hacking, are also perpetrators of identity fraud and mass marketing scams. The core driver appears to be economic hardship, as the removal of fuel subsidies and devaluation of the Nigerian currency have pushed many young people towards cybercrime as a source of income. Cyber-dependent attacks tend to intensify during electoral cycles, with both domestic and international actors using distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks and other sophisticated methods to target government systems throughout the election period.

    Financial Crimes

    Financial fraud and corruption among public officials in Nigeria thrive due to weak accountability and monitoring systems, which enables embezzlement and illicit collaboration with private sector companies, including financial institutions and construction firms. Embezzled funds are often transferred abroad, facilitated by a culture of impunity and weak judicial oversight. Internet fraud, known locally as ‘Yahoo Yahoo’, is prevalent, targeting victims abroad, and to a lesser extent domestically, through scams, often involving false identities on social media. Some fraud schemes are linked to cult and gang activity, as fraudsters use so-called ‘selectors’ to handle stolen funds in their bank accounts and hire local gangs to intimidate third-party collectors who fail to hand over funds. Real estate and bogus consultancy firms are utilized for money laundering, with public officials exploiting these channels to conceal illicit wealth.

    Criminal Actors

    Boko Haram and ISWAP operate primarily in north-eastern Nigeria, controlling areas on the shores of Lake Chad and Sambisa Forest. They impose taxes on residents, extort fishermen and farmers, and exploit non-renewable resources. Both groups engage in arms trafficking, human trafficking, child soldier recruitment, and orchestrate deadly attacks. Clashes between the two escalated in 2024, while their expansion into north-western regions has heightened the potential for alliances with local bandit groups, creating complex security challenges. These groups operate across northern Nigeria amid a growing constellation of ideologically driven groups that also partake in criminal activity. Armed bandit groups engage in various illicit markets, with kidnapping for ransom – now increasingly shifting from rural to urban areas – serving as a key source of revenue for diverse criminal networks. Bandit groups are also increasingly involved in artisanal gold mining, both directly, and more commonly by taxing mining communities. In the south-east, Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) militants mount attacks on both security forces and civilians. Some cultist groups also display mafia-style characteristics. Most operate in southern Nigeria and are involved in online fraud, human trafficking and drugs markets. For example, the Black Axe group, with its stronghold in Benin city, is deeply embedded in Nigerian politics and operates domestically and globally in trafficking, romance scams and other largely online fraudulent activities. Loosely structured criminal networks are also involved in various illicit markets such as drugs trafficking, arms trafficking, counterfeiting, extortion and exploitation of non-renewable resources. Corruption remains pervasive among political and corporate actors, particularly in public procurement. Financial misconduct is widespread in the public sector, involving senior civil servants, ministers and executives of state-owned companies. Common offences include embezzlement and procurement fraud, with stolen funds often transferred to foreign accounts to circumvent regulatory oversight. High-profile cases have revealed the complicity of public officials in laundering funds abroad, with repatriation efforts occasionally recovering substantial amounts. Corruption within law enforcement is a big factor in enabling organized crime, with some officials ignoring criminal activities or even directly participating in them. Media reports have highlighted the involvement of law enforcement and prison officials in drug trafficking. The role of state actors in organized crime thus continues to undermine governance and facilitate the entrenchment of organized crime in Nigeria. Foreign actors are also an important component of the criminal landscape, particularly as far as the non-renewable resources sector is concerned. Chinese nationals are heavily involved in illegal mining operations, leading to environmental degradation and community disruption. Their operations have been linked to mercury pollution and the destruction of farmland. Nigerien and Chadian actors also participate in illegal mining in the north-west. Foreign influence also extends to financial crimes, including grand corruption and fraudulent activities. The private sector, including real estate, financial institutions, transport and the stock exchange, is used by drug traffickers to launder illicit income. Meanwhile, terrorist financing is facilitated through Nigerian commercial banks, crowdfunding, betting platforms and faith-based charities, with funds channelled via online banking for ticket purchases, ransom payments and international crowdfunding.

    Leadership and governance

    The government has undertaken efforts to combat organized crime through law enforcement and policy development, but faces significant challenges from ethnic and religious tensions, political divisions, armed conflict and corruption. Security threats are exacerbated by transnational crime, particularly in areas significantly affected by conflict – such as the North West, North East and Niger Delta regions – where arms smuggling, drug trafficking and illegal mining are prevalent. Government officials have been linked to organized crime, and recent elections were marked by irregularities, widespread intimidation and political violence. Armed groups maintain control over large areas of territory, imposing informal governance, while citizens have little trust in government institutions. Despite government commitments, corruption is pervasive, especially in the petroleum sector, undermining public sector integrity. Nigeria’s legal framework contains penalties and other anti-corruption measures, but is undermined by a cultural acceptance of bribery and facilitation payments. Public procurement remains particularly vulnerable. The oversight of the auditor-general is limited, and state legislatures face undue executive influence. Wealthy political patrons manipulate decision-making through their support networks and patronage systems. The Freedom of Information Act has empowered civil society to expose misconduct, but corruption remains entrenched. Smuggling and bribery are widespread at border crossings, fuelled by collusion from public officials.

    Nigeria has demonstrated a strong commitment to international cooperation in combating organized crime. It has ratified numerous international conventions related to corruption, drug trafficking, arms trading and wildlife crimes, and maintains bilateral agreements with multiple countries on human trafficking and extradition. Nigeria works actively with international partners, such as INTERPOL and several national governments, leading to major joint operations like Operation Jackal III in 2024, which targeted the Black Axe network. The country also contributes significantly to UN peacekeeping missions. There is a comprehensive legal framework to combat organized crime in place, which aligns closely with the relevant UN conventions. Despite capacity challenges in gathering financial intelligence, investigations and prosecutions, the government continues to introduce new policies and revise existing its frameworks. Recent developments include new legislation on data protection and ongoing revisions to cybercrime laws to incorporate emerging technologies like artificial intelligence and virtual assets. Efforts to address environmental crimes include the 2022–2026 national strategy on wildlife and forest crime, emphasizing multi-stakeholder collaboration. However, the effectiveness of these measures has been limited by capacity constraints and inconsistent implementation.

    Criminal justice and security

    The judicial system suffers with a complex court hierarchy, outdated legal doctrines, inadequate technology, limited resources and poor working conditions, leading to trial delays and prolonged pretrial detentions. Judges often lack standardized training, particularly regarding anti-trafficking laws, contributing to inconsistent legal outcomes and corruption. Political interference has eroded public trust, especially in electoral cases. Prisons suffer from overcrowding, corruption and poor conditions, leading to protests and violent incidents among inmates. Nigeria’s law enforcement system comprises federal and state agencies tasked with general and specialized policing. The Nigerian Police Force is the primary federal force, while various dedicated agencies address specific issues, including anti-corruption, trafficking and public safety. State governments have frequently established quasi-independent security forces that operate with minimal accountability, creating conflicts with federal jurisdictions and hindering unified security efforts. Challenges include inadequate remuneration, poor housing, corruption and human rights abuses. Despite these issues, collaborations between local and foreign enforcement agencies have led to successful operations against organized crime, including human trafficking rings and internet fraudsters. Nigeria’s porous and under-patrolled northern borders, particularly with Niger and Chad, have become hubs for organized crime and arms smuggling. The vast, forested and riverine terrain in these areas hampers enforcement, while only about half of approved international border points in the North East and North West regions are patrolled. Local authorities also cite border insecurity as enabling terrorism, kidnappings and communal violence.

    Economic and financial environment

    Nigeria remains on the Financial Action Task Force's (FATF) ‘grey list’ for increased monitoring, though progress has been noted in certain areas. The country has made strides in implementing some recommendations, including legislative improvements, enhanced risk assessments and the enforcement of targeted financial sanctions. Collaborative efforts, such as partnerships between the Central Bank and mobile money agents, aim to curb fraudulent transactions by integrating ‘know your customer’ measures into payment terminals. Authorities also examined illicit financial flows linked to drug trafficking. Discussions between key financial crime agencies have taken place to strategize an exit from FATF monitoring. Nevertheless, the widespread use of cryptocurrency in Nigeria, fuelled by the declining value of the Naira, has heightened the country’s vulnerability to money laundering.

    The business environment faces challenges from a lack of transparency and favouritism in licensing and public procurement processes. While recent reforms have improved credit access, registration processes and tax filing, bribery remains prevalent, which discourages business investment. High levels of inflation and currency depreciation continue to hold back the expansion of legitimate businesses, despite the Central Bank’s efforts to maintain exchange rates. Land ownership is undermined by constitutional ambiguities, customary laws disadvantaging women and pervasive corruption, which has facilitated land grabs and complicated compensation claims. Despite efforts to diversify the economy, oil remains the dominant industry, while regulatory burdens limit private sector growth. Labour is concentrated in the public and energy sectors, reflecting structural stagnation and constrained economic freedom.

    Civil society and social protection

    Nigeria has adopted protocols and minimum standards to improve the quality of care services for trafficked persons abroad and works with civil society to train authorities in victim support. Shelters, despite providing comprehensive care, face criticism for restricting residents’ freedom of movement and housing suspects in proximity to victims. Anti-trafficking laws exempt victims from punishment for forced crimes, but inadequate identification of trafficking victims has led to some arrests and deportations. Legal aid hubs have been established in key states, and repatriation support provided. Drug abuse victims receive care from hospitals and clinics. The National Drug Law Enforcement Agency operates a 24/7 addiction helpline and rehabilitation programmes for people with drug dependencies, including both facility-based treatment and community recovery initiatives. The agency continues to work with the government, private sector and NGOs to broaden access to rehabilitation services nationwide. There is no standalone law covering witness protection but it is incorporated in some legal provisions and procedural guidelines. Despite this, independent assessments note that practical implementation remains uneven. Trials are still undermined by witness intimidation, and many cases involving organized crime do not produce clear outcomes.

    The government cooperates with foreign counterparts and conducts awareness campaigns on trafficking in major languages through various media. Nevertheless, significant issues persist. Corruption is prevalent within anti-trafficking institutions, and regulatory measures for private employment agencies are inadequate and fail to curb exploitation. The authorities have introduced dedicated databases and training programmes to strengthen counterfeiting and cybercrime prevention. Drug prevention efforts were intensified during the reporting period, emphasizing sensitization campaigns in schools, religious centres and workplaces. Civil society in Nigeria remains active despite funding challenges and political obstacles. However, many initiatives lack sustainable local support. The government encourages partnerships with civil society organizations in combating organized crime, but political affiliations sometimes undermine the credibility of these efforts. Moreover, civil society groups, often supported by foreign donors often advocate for reforms but lack contextual understanding, limiting their effectiveness. Media freedom, although constitutionally protected, is often threatened by government interference, censorship and violence against journalists, particularly during elections and periods of economic hardship. Human rights violations persist, including unlawful killings, torture, arbitrary arrests and gender-based violence.

    Profile

    Albania

    Capital

    Tirana

    Population

    2,714,617

    Gross domestic product (GDP - CURRENT $US MILLION)

    USD 27,259 million

    Area (KM²)

    28,750 km²

    5.200.03

    Criminality score

    90th of 193 countries 3

    15th of 44 countries in Europe 0

    9th of 17 countries in Central and Eastern Europe 0

    Criminal markets

    4.900.07

    An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.

    Human trafficking

    5.500.50

    Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.

    Human smuggling

    6.000.00

    Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.

    Extortion and protection racketeering

    4.000.50

    Crimes linked to exerting control over a territory/market including as a mediator and/or requesting a benefit in exchange for protection.

    Arms trafficking

    4.500.00

    The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.

    Trade in counterfeit goods

    3.500.50

    The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands.

    Illicit trade in excisable goods

    3.000.00

    The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits.

    Flora crimes

    4.00-0.50

    The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.

    Fauna crimes

    3.500.00

    The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.

    Non-renewable resource crimes

    5.000.00

    The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.

    Heroin trade

    5.50-0.50

    The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.

    Cocaine trade

    7.000.50

    The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.

    Cannabis trade

    6.500.00

    The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.

    Synthetic drug trade

    4.000.50

    The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.

    Cyber-dependent crimes

    5.50-0.50

    Organized crimes that rely solely on using information communications technology with the aim of obtaining a monetary/material benefit.

    Financial crimes

    6.000.00

    Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance.

    Criminal actors

    5.500.00

    An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.

    Mafia-style groups

    6.500.00

    Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.

    Criminal networks

    7.000.00

    Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.

    State-embedded actors

    6.500.00

    Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.

    Foreign actors

    3.000.00

    State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.

    Private sector actors

    4.500.00

    Profit-seeking individuals/entities who own/control a part of the legal economy free from the state, that collaborate with criminal actors.

    5.170.04

    Resilience score

    75th of 193 countries 9

    32nd of 44 countries in Europe 2

    8th of 17 countries in Central and Eastern Europe 1

    Political leadership and governance

    5.000.00

    The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.

    Government transparency and accountability

    4.500.00

    The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.

    International cooperation

    7.000.00

    A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.

    National policies and laws

    6.000.00

    A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.

    Judicial system and detention

    5.50-0.50

    Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.

    Law enforcement

    5.500.50

    The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.

    Territorial integrity

    5.500.00

    The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.

    Anti-money laundering

    4.500.50

    A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.

    Economic regulatory capacity

    4.000.00

    The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.

    Victim and witness support

    4.500.00

    Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.

    Prevention

    5.000.00

    Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.

    Non-state actors

    5.000.00

    The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.

    5.17 5.50 4.90 5.17 5.50 4.90

    Analysis

    01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11

    People

    The criminal market of human trafficking in Albania is a well-established enterprise involving both domestic and foreign actors, with the country serving as a country of origin, transit and, to a lesser extent, destination for human trafficking. In some instances, Albanian women and children are trafficked for sexual exploitation, forced labour and coerced criminal activities across numerous European countries, including Italy, the UK, Germany, Greece and Switzerland. Children from the Roma and Balkan–Egyptian communities are particularly vulnerable, often being forced into seasonal labour and street begging. Albanian migrants seeking employment in Western Europe also face significant risks of labour exploitation, particularly in sectors such as agriculture and construction. At the same time, foreign migrants within the country are subjected to various forms of exploitation. International cooperation has facilitated joint operations with European law enforcement; however, traffickers continue to exploit gaps in employment regulations and social protection systems.

    Human smuggling continues to be a consolidated criminal market in Albania, characterized by highly organized networks that have connections to state-embedded actors. Albania serves as both a source country for Albanians being smuggled to the UK and a transit hub for migrants from West Asia, North Africa and South Asia who are attempting to reach the EU. Criminal groups exploit businesses and charities to facilitate smuggling operations, with Albanian nationals frequently serving as drivers. Corruption within law enforcement has allowed for the passage of irregular migrants, with reports indicating that officers accept bribes to facilitate illegal border crossings. Smuggling routes typically involve transportation by trucks and vehicles, with networks operating through Montenegro, Kosovo and Greece. Although recent crackdowns have resulted in arrests, the smuggling industry remains lucrative, with payments often exceeding several thousand euros per individual.

    Extortion and protection racketeering are prevalent in Albania, with organized crime groups employing intimidation tactics to control businesses. For example, in cities such as Shkodra, the situation is particularly dire, with many businesses compelled to make monthly payments in a structured manner to avoid being targeted by criminal groups. These payments are often framed as ‘protection’ money, further entrenching the influence of organized crime in these areas. It is believed that some large businesses are forced to pay substantial sums to organized crime groups. These activities are largely underreported due to fear of retaliation. While extortion is legally recognized and prosecuted, organized racketeering is not explicitly defined in Albania’s criminal code, which poses challenges for enforcement. Despite the limited data on the full extent of these activities, the ongoing violence associated with organized crime indicates that extortion remains a deeply entrenched criminal practice.

    Trade

    Arms trafficking is a persistent issue in Albania, exacerbated by a history of widespread civilian firearm possession and the availability of weapons from past conflicts. Criminal networks and mafia-style groups are deeply involved in arms smuggling, supplying both domestic markets and neighbouring countries such as Kosovo, Italy and North Macedonia. The smuggling of ammunition to North Macedonia and Greece is also a consolidated phenomenon. Law enforcement operations have uncovered illegal weapons depots, including caches of automatic rifles and explosives, highlighting the scale of the trade. The presence of military-grade weapons in the hands of criminals contributes to local violence, including homicides and armed robberies. While recent seizures have disrupted some networks, the trade remains a significant security concern, with transnational links to organized crime groups within the EU.

    The counterfeit goods market in Albania is well established, with organized criminal networks involved in smuggling and distribution. Albania acts as a transit hub for counterfeit products originating from China and Türkiye, which are subsequently sold both domestically and in EU markets. These counterfeit goods encompass a range of items, including clothing, electronics, pharmaceuticals and luxury products. Despite ongoing enforcement efforts, counterfeit markets continue to thrive in urban areas. Additionally, social media platforms are increasingly utilized for the sale of fake branded goods, complicating law enforcement efforts. Despite its harmful impact on legitimate businesses, consumer demand for low-cost alternatives has perpetuated this illicit trade.

    While the illicit trade in excise goods, such as alcohol and tobacco, is relatively limited, it continues to impact Albania’s economy. Cigarettes smuggled from neighbouring countries constitute a substantial portion of the informal market, resulting in considerable tax revenue losses. Organized crime groups often exploit corruption within customs agencies to evade enforcement measures. Although Albania’s participation in regional anti-smuggling initiatives has led to arrests and product seizures, the involvement of state-embedded actors complicates efforts to dismantle these networks entirely. The illicit trade in excise goods remains a lucrative enterprise, particularly in border areas with well-established smuggling routes.

    Environment

    Illegal logging accounts for the majority of flora crimes in Albania. Despite government pledges to combat illegal logging, the practice persists, particularly in protected areas such as the Albanian Alps. The domestic market for illicit timber is mainly driven by demand for firewood and construction materials. Although some private sector and state-affiliated actors are involved, most of these crimes are carried out by individuals and do not involve organized crime groups.

    Fauna crimes in Albania primarily involve the illegal capture and trade of birds and other wildlife species. Bird trafficking is particularly prevalent, with tens of thousands of birds captured annually and sold domestically or trafficked to neighbouring countries. Despite existing regulations, illegal hunting remains widespread, often facilitated by weak enforcement. Reports indicate that ownership of exotic animals is becoming a status symbol among organized crime figures, with law enforcement struggling to curb this illicit trade.

    Non-renewable resource crimes, particularly oil smuggling, continue to pose a significant challenge. Smuggling operations exploit Albania’s maritime routes, allowing illicit fuel to infiltrate the market through seaports. The absence of stringent regulatory oversight facilitates the manipulation of fuel pricing and distribution. Corruption further exacerbates the issue, with government-affiliated individuals implicated in facilitating illegal transactions. Additionally, Albania’s chromium extraction industry suffers from corruption and poor labour conditions. The exploitation of non-renewable resources remains a pressing concern, as criminal groups leverage political connections to secure lucrative deals.

    Drugs

    The heroin trade in Albania is highly organized, with the country serving as both a transit and distribution hub. Albanian criminal groups play a crucial role in smuggling Afghan heroin into Europe through the Balkan route. Albania primarily functions as a transit country for heroin trafficked from Türkiye, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan along the Balkan route to Europe. Most heroin enters Albania by land through North Macedonia and Kosovo and several internal heroin-processing laboratories have also been uncovered by the Albanian police in the past. Although local consumption remains limited, heroin trafficking generates substantial profits for organized crime. Law enforcement efforts have resulted in periodic seizures; however, the market remains resilient due to transnational trafficking networks and corruption among border control personnel.

    Albania has emerged as a key player in the European cocaine trade, with organized criminal groups facilitating the movement of substantial quantities from Latin America. The Port of Durrës serves as a major entry point for these shipments, which are often concealed within cargo containers. Albanian traffickers maintain strong ties with suppliers in Colombia and Ecuador, enabling them to expand their influence in European cocaine markets. In addition to maritime shipments, organized crime groups are increasingly utilizing overland routes through Spain and the Netherlands to distribute cocaine across the continent. Despite notable arrests and drug seizures, cocaine trafficking continues to be a prevalent criminal activity.

    Cannabis remains the most prevalent illicit drug traded in Albania, with domestic cultivation continuing despite law enforcement crackdowns. The shift from outdoor to indoor cultivation has made detection more challenging, as greenhouses and hydroponic systems are employed to support year-round production. Albanian criminal groups dominate cannabis supply chains in Western Europe, particularly in the UK and Spain. Although Albania legalized medical cannabis in 2023, the illicit market persists, driven by high demand and established trafficking networks that utilize encrypted communication platforms to coordinate shipments.

    The synthetic drug trade, although smaller than other drug markets, has experienced growth in recent years. Substances such as MDMA, amphetamines and methamphetamine are becoming increasingly prevalent, particularly in urban nightlife and tourist hotspots. These synthetic drugs are often smuggled from neighbouring countries, with Albania primarily serving as a destination point. Albanian criminal groups have formed partnerships with producers based in the Netherlands and the Balkans to supply synthetic drugs to both local and international markets. Law enforcement efforts have concentrated on disrupting distribution networks; however, the rapid evolution of synthetic drug markets continues to increase availability and presents ongoing challenges for detection.

    Cyber-dependent crimes

    Cybercrime in Albania has expanded in recent years, with offences such as ransomware attacks and data breaches targeting individuals as well as the private and public sectors. Both international and local cybercriminal groups have targeted financial institutions, exploiting weak regulatory frameworks.

    Financial Crimes

    Financial crime continues to pose a significant challenge in Albania, characterized by notable instances of financial fraud, tax evasion and the misuse of funds. In certain cases, organized crime groups collaborate with public officials to engage in tax evasion and misinvoicing through a network of private entities associated with public concession and procurement contracts. The construction and real estate sectors are particularly vulnerable, being exploited for intricate tax fraud schemes and trade misinvoicing practices, further compounded by insufficient regulatory oversight. Furthermore, some microcredit companies, which have rapidly expanded in recent years to offer loans to those underserved by traditional banks with aggressive repayment practices, have been investigated for fraudulent schemes. Despite recent high-profile investigations and arrests, financial crime remains a widespread issue in Albania.

    Criminal Actors

    Well-established mafia-style groups characterize Albania's criminal landscape, although the exact number remains unknown due to the lack of public documentation. Some of these groups have gained notoriety for their transnational operations, while others primarily operate within Albania. These groups are highly organized and exhibit hierarchical structures, with a defined leadership directing their criminal enterprises. Over time, family-based criminal groups have evolved into consolidated mafia-style organizations, exerting significant control over economic and political structures. Despite their extensive reach, Albanian mafia-style groups are generally smaller than their Italian and Russian counterparts. Their modus operandi often involves smaller, adaptable factions that engage in temporary alliances based on emerging criminal opportunities. Many members frequently break away to establish their factions, resulting in an increase in the number of groups rather than an overall increase in size. These groups have strong ties to international criminal networks, particularly those originating from Italy. Initially providing logistical support to these groups, Albanian mafias have become increasingly autonomous. Their activities encompass large-scale money laundering, drug trafficking and contract killings, often employing extreme violence, such as car bombings and targeted assassinations, to assert control over their territories.

    Albanian criminal networks are among the most influential in the region, operating both domestically and internationally. They engage in a variety of illicit activities, including drug trafficking, arms smuggling, contract killings and human trafficking. Recent findings indicate that Albanian criminal networks dominate the cocaine trade in Europe, maintaining strong connections with suppliers in Latin America. Additionally, these groups have established deep-rooted connections to Turkish and Kosovar criminal organizations, further strengthening their influence in both regional and transnational markets. Violence continues to be a prominent feature of Albanian criminal networks. Several cases of contract killings and targeted assassinations have been reported, particularly in urban areas. The widespread availability of firearms and explosives in these regions intensifies the levels of violence. Recent law enforcement crackdowns have revealed the existence of ‘killing squads’, often comprised of former military personnel, who enforce territorial control and eliminate rivals. In addition to violent crimes, Albanian criminal networks are heavily engaged in money laundering, primarily through investments in the construction and tourism sectors, fuelling economic informality and corruption.

    Corruption within Albania’s political and law enforcement institutions continues to facilitate organized crime. Investigations utilizing encrypted communication platforms have revealed deep ties between high-ranking officials and criminal actors. Several police officers and judicial officials have been implicated in aiding criminal networks, with some directly engaging in illegal activities. The involvement of state-embedded actors extends to public tenders and government contracts, where criminal groups employ bribery and blackmail to secure lucrative deals. Efforts by the Special Prosecution Against Corruption and Organized Crime (SPAK) have led to the arrest of several senior government officials; however, entrenched corruption within other prosecutorial and law enforcement agencies continues to hinder investigations. Concerns have been raised about the level of police collusion with organized crime, highlighting cases where internal leaks have undermined operations. Some high-ranking officers within specialized units have been implicated in facilitating or even leading criminal groups.

    While Albanian criminal groups dominate the country’s organized crime landscape, foreign actors maintain a presence, particularly in human smuggling and drug trafficking. Reports indicate that Palestinian, Iraqi, Iranian and Moroccan criminal groups are active in human smuggling operations. Turkish criminal organizations control heroin trafficking routes into Albania, while Italian mafia groups maintain influence in southern Albania and Tirana. Additionally, the Russian criminal underworld has been linked to Albanian criminal organizations, although their cooperation appears to be limited compared to other foreign networks. Intercepts of encrypted platforms indicate that Albanian criminals have also employed foreign operatives for contract killings.

    The private sector in Albania, particularly the construction, real estate and gambling industries, plays a role in money laundering and illicit financial flows. Criminal organizations exploit these sectors to launder proceeds from drug trafficking and other illegal activities. While the government has imposed partial bans on gambling, criminal infiltration remains pervasive, especially in urban and tourist areas. Reports indicate that several businesses in these areas have direct ties to criminal groups, with hotels and resorts often serving as fronts for money laundering operations. The prevalence of informality in the private sector exacerbates these issues, enabling illicit financial flows to circulate within the formal economy. Furthermore, some financial institutions, including banks and foreign exchange offices, have been implicated in facilitating money laundering schemes. The rise of online fraud has further exposed the vulnerabilities of the private sector. Call centre fraud has been linked to criminal networks, with operations targeting foreign nationals through elaborate scams. While some private-sector actors actively engage in criminal enterprises, others unwittingly facilitate financial crimes due to weak oversight mechanisms. The increasing use of cryptocurrency for money laundering presents new challenges, as regulatory frameworks struggle to keep pace with evolving criminal tactics.

    Leadership and governance

    Albania's political leadership has prioritized the fight against organized crime and corruption, allocating sufficient resources to the SPAK. However, opposition parties frequently criticize the government, alleging ties to criminal entities. Despite the government's efforts to implement justice reform, accusations persist that elements within the political system have been infiltrated by organized crime, resulting in low public trust in government institutions. Opposition parties and civil society have raised concerns about criminal interference in elections and economic activities, although the government denies these allegations. Although governance in Albania has seen some improvements, political polarization remains a significant challenge. Tensions escalated in late 2024 following the house arrest of the opposition leader on corruption charges, which led to violent protests in Tirana. This unrest underscores the country’s deep political divisions and raises concerns about the integrity of its democratic processes.

    Albania's government transparency and accountability continue to face scrutiny. SPAK has initiated high-profile investigations, resulting in the prosecution of senior government officials. Although the international community has acknowledged some progress, corruption remains widespread, particularly within the judicial system. The effectiveness of oversight institutions is limited due to allegations of political influence. While the country’s anti-corruption framework has led to certain improvements, unresolved high-profile cases continue to erode public trust. The government has promoted digital governance initiatives, such as the E-Albania platform, to enhance transparency; however, critics argue that political impunity persists.

    Albania actively participates in international efforts to combat organized crime, maintaining extradition agreements and partnerships with institutions such as Europol and INTERPOL. The country has ratified key UN conventions on transnational organized crime and corruption and collaborates with the European Judicial Network. Albania’s cooperation with regional bodies, including the Southeast European Law Enforcement Centre, enhances intelligence sharing. However, corruption within law enforcement agencies hinders effective international cooperation.

    Albania’s national policies and laws incorporate stringent measures against organized crime, imposing penalties of five to fifteen years for individuals in leadership roles within criminal organizations. Recent justice reforms and legal amendments, including modifications to the Criminal Procedure Code and the Anti-Mafia Law, have enhanced investigative efficiency. The country has adopted several strategies to combat various forms of organized crime. However, challenges in implementation persist, as enforcement mechanisms often falter due to political interference and inadequate institutional coordination.

    Criminal justice and security

    SPAK has intensified investigations into corruption and organized crime, with improved efficiency in prosecution and asset confiscation. However, overall, judicial independence remains a concern, with reports of selective prosecutions and undue political influence. While high-profile convictions have been secured, systemic corruption within the judiciary continues to erode public confidence. Frequent harsh sentences for minor offences and lenient ones for organized crime figures or officials undermine public trust in the justice system, which remains perceived as corrupt. Although citizens’ confidence has not improved significantly, the strong political will for reform is notable. Additionally, Albania's prison system faces significant challenges, with some facilities experiencing overcrowding and concerns regarding criminal activity within prisons. Reports indicate that some organized crime leaders continue to direct operations from behind bars, undermining the effectiveness of the judiciary.

    Operations led by SPAK have successfully dismantled various criminal networks; however, entrenched corruption within police ranks undermines overall effectiveness. Reports suggest that some high-ranking police officers are directly involved in organized crime, further complicating efforts to combat illicit activities. While international collaborations have strengthened Albania’s crime-fighting capabilities, local law enforcement faces challenges due to limited resources and internal corruption. Nevertheless, during the reporting period, law enforcement’s capacity to investigate complex organized crime cases has improved, supported by stronger institutional integrity. In fact, SPAK has pursued high-level corruption cases, including investigations into the deputy prime minister and other current and former officials. At the same time, SPAK and other bodies have worked to remove law enforcement’s links to crime, leading to the arrest of several police officers, the chief state prosecutor of Vlora and other officials.

    Albania faces significant border security challenges, particularly along its porous land borders with Kosovo and Montenegro. These vulnerabilities have been exploited for human smuggling and drug trafficking. Although maritime security has improved, previous allegations of misuse of the Integrated Sea Surveillance System have raised concerns about potential collusion between officials and traffickers. Furthermore, Albania has been the target of cyberattacks, highlighting weaknesses in its national cybersecurity infrastructure. Despite government claims that border security has been enhanced, illicit activities persist, casting doubt on the effectiveness of current measures.

    Economic and financial environment

    Albania continues to be a prominent destination for money laundering, with criminal organizations exploiting the real estate, tourism and construction sectors to legitimize illicit profits. Authorities have made notable progress in investigating financial crimes, with a record €50 million in assets seized in 2024. However, detecting money laundering remains challenging due to high levels of economic informality. The construction sector, in particular, is heavily infiltrated by illicit funds, resulting in market distortions. While Albania was removed from the Financial Action Task Force’s grey list in 2023, reports indicate that the country still faces significant challenges.

    A moderately free market characterizes Albania’s economic regulatory environment, though bureaucratic inefficiencies and corruption hinder sustainable growth. Private businesses face challenges due to unfair competition from criminal enterprises linked to corrupt government officials. The high level of informality in financial transactions further complicates efforts to combat illicit financial flows. Weak contract enforcement and deficiencies in the rule of law deter foreign investment. Additionally, criminal organizations continue to exert influence over key economic sectors, particularly construction, hospitality and energy.

    Civil society and social protection

    Albania has made progress in strengthening support mechanisms for victims and witnesses, particularly for survivors of human trafficking. The government collaborates with civil society organizations to provide services; however, funding constraints hinder their overall effectiveness. Although Albania has established a national referral mechanism for victims, gaps still exist in victim identification, particularly among irregular migrants. While witness protection programs are in place, they have faced criticism for lacking adequate resources to ensure long-term security.

    Efforts to combat organized crime encompass national strategies and regional cooperation initiatives. However, local-level crime prevention measures remain weak, as law enforcement agencies often lack the capacity for proactive investigations. Corruption within police ranks further undermines these preventive efforts.

    Non-state actors play a crucial role in combating organized crime; however, their effectiveness is frequently compromised by financial reliance on the government and donors. The media serves as an essential watchdog, yet political and criminal threats often constrain investigative journalism. Journalists reporting on organized crime encounter intimidation, and instances of self-censorship are becoming increasingly prevalent. Although press freedom in Albania is generally recognized, concerns remain regarding editorial independence and government influence over media outlets.

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    The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to 10. The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel.

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    This project was funded in part by a grant from the United States Department of State. The opinions, findings and conclusions stated herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State.

    ENACT is funded by the European Union and implemented by the Institute for Security Studies and INTERPOL, in affiliation with the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.