How to measure organized crime?
A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.
Read more on globalinitiative.netCriminal markets
7.370.32
An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.
Human trafficking
7.500.00
Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.
Human smuggling
6.000.00
Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.
Extortion and protection racketeering
8.00 n/a
Crimes linked to exerting control over a territory/market including as a mediator and/or requesting a benefit in exchange for protection.
Arms trafficking
8.500.50
The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.
Trade in counterfeit goods
8.00 n/a
The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands.
Illicit trade in excisable goods
7.00 n/a
The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits.
Flora crimes
6.000.00
The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.
Fauna crimes
7.000.50
The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.
Non-renewable resource crimes
8.000.00
The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.
Heroin trade
6.000.00
The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.
Cocaine trade
7.000.50
The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cannabis trade
8.000.00
The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.
Synthetic drug trade
8.500.50
The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cyber-dependent crimes
8.00 n/a
Organized crimes that rely solely on using information communications technology with the aim of obtaining a monetary/material benefit.
Financial crimes
7.00 n/a
Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance.
Criminal actors
7.20-0.05
An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.
Mafia-style groups
5.500.00
Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.
Criminal networks
8.50-0.50
Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.
State-embedded actors
7.500.00
Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.
Foreign actors
7.500.50
State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.
Private sector actors
7.00 n/a
Profit-seeking individuals/entities who own/control a part of the legal economy free from the state, that collaborate with criminal actors.
Political leadership and governance
5.500.00
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
5.000.00
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
7.500.50
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
7.500.50
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
5.000.50
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
5.000.50
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
5.000.50
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
5.000.00
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
6.500.00
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
5.000.00
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
5.500.50
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
7.000.50
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Human trafficking is a significant issue in Nigeria, affecting men, women, and children. Networks operating from southern Nigeria, particularly Benin City in Edo State, specialize in sex trafficking within West Africa and Europe. Other networks focus on labour exploitation, especially involving children, for domestic work, begging, small commerce, mining, and farming within the country and the West African region. So-called baby factories, where pregnant, unmarried women from impoverished backgrounds are deceived and promised large sums of money in exchange for their babies, have also emerged, particularly in the south-east region. Trafficking for both sexual and labour exploitation, including of children, has been reported in the country’s largest cities, notably Abuja, Lagos, Kano, Port Harcourt and Onitsha. The socio-economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic worsened the scale of trafficking in the country, while increasing violence and insecurity have resulted in displacement and a loss of livelihood, leaving many children vulnerable to exploitation. Armed groups involved in the continuing conflict in north-east Nigeria, notably Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), are also known to recruit children and use them as child soldiers in various roles.
Human smuggling is also widespread in Nigeria, driven by factors such as population size, increasing levels of poverty, and porous borders. Nigerian human smuggling networks primarily target European countries, and often pass through North African nations such as Niger and Mali. Compared to other West African countries, human smuggling from Nigeria to North Africa and Europe tends to be more organized. Nigerian diaspora communities facilitate the process by assisting victims, and transnational criminal organizations are often involved as well. A desperation to leave Nigeria for education and work, combined with the economic downturn caused by falling oil prices, contributes to the widespread human smuggling in the country. While levels of violence are relatively low, corruption and a sense of impunity among state officials are endemic. Smugglers are often perceived as benefiting the community.
Kidnapping for ransom, extortion, and protection racketeering pose significant security challenges in Nigeria. Kidnappings often involve clashes between the perpetrators themselves, and have targeted foreign nationals residing in residential compounds, people travelling on public roads, as well as offshore and land-based oil facilities. Sometimes kidnapping for ransom is conducted as a non-violent transactional crime, but, on many occasions, it can involve lethal violence. The prevalence of ‘kito’, a crime whereby predators target and extort primarily LGBTQ+ individuals through dating apps, increased since the implementation of an anti-LGBTQ+ law, in January 2014. In northern Nigeria, the extremist group ISWAP has assumed quasi-governance functions within some communities, offering protection arrangements in insecure areas, in order to establish trust and support in local communities. Notably, where exercising an element of a governance function, ISWAP has opted to tax livelihood owners instead of engaging in cattle rustling activities in order to maintain a more favourable relationship with communities. However, the dynamics remain extremely violent.
Arms trafficking is a significant security concern in Nigeria, owing to the country’s geographical location and regional security dynamics. Nigeria is a transit and destination country for illicit weapons, which are smuggled through land borders, air borders, and the vast coastline. Arms trafficking is driven by various factors, such as armed violence, conflict with violent extremist groups, and banditry. Cross-border trade plays a notable role, with arms smuggling networks connecting conflict zones in Nigeria to other parts of West and North Africa, expanding the arms market beyond Nigeria’s borders. There is evidence of looted firearms from Libyan stockpiles flowing to Nigerian armed groups, and of weapons imported by extremist organizations being sold to organized crime groups in Nigeria and other conflict zones such as Libya and Yemen. As insecurity levels rise, local communities and vigilantes feel compelled to stockpile arms for self-defence, contributing to the demand and proliferation. Artisanal gun manufacturers also feed the domestic arms market, supplying local communities, self-defence groups, and criminal actors with cheaper, locally made firearms.
Counterfeit goods are a significant issue in Nigeria, with organized crime playing a prominent role in the industry. Nigeria is among several African countries that have fallen short in terms of intellectual property protection. The market in Nigeria is flooded with low-quality counterfeit products that closely resemble or are identical to genuine items. This has resulted in a loss of profit for many registered brands, as fake products are particularly appealing to Nigerian consumers who cannot afford genuine items. Various types of products are commonly counterfeited in Nigeria, including packaged foods, automotive parts, footwear, clothing, and cosmetics. Counterfeit pharmaceuticals also pose a serious challenge, with antibiotics and drugs for treating malaria and pain being among the most frequently counterfeited.
The illicit trade of excise goods, particularly through land borders, is also problematic in Nigeria. The smuggling of commodities such as cigarettes and alcoholic beverages is prevalent owing to porous borders, corruption, and the inefficiency of border management agencies. It is worth noting that the securitized response by customs and immigration agencies has resulted in violence and instability in previously peaceful areas. In addition, second-hand car smuggling also occurs through the border between Benin and Nigeria. This activity is not perceived as criminal by local communities, as it has long been a vital source of livelihood for many people.
With regard to flora crimes, the illegal exploitation of timber, driven by demand from foreign timber merchants, is a notable concern in Nigeria. A considerable number of incidents of illegal logging have been reported across many states of the country, including Edo, Ondo, Cross River, Taraba, and Ogun states. The illegal logging of rosewood in Cross River State, for instance, continues to be a significant issue. There are also allegations that such activities benefit violent extremist groups. This illicit activity is on the decline, however, as tree stocks, particularly rosewood, have been drastically depleted, as a consequence of previous illegal overexploitation for export, especially to China. As a result, timber is being illegally logged in Cameroon and then trafficked to Nigeria, where it is shipped to Vietnam, ultimately ending up in China’s timber markets. Weak law enforcement, the lack of a bilateral response from Nigeria and Cameroon, and poor forestry governance contribute to the ongoing timber trafficking in the region, posing a threat to both the environment and the livelihood of small-scale loggers.
The illegal wildlife trade and a lack of effective control in Nigeria are leading to the destruction of the local fauna. Nigeria has become a significant transit country for wildlife trafficking, particularly for pangolin scales and ivory from Central Africa, destined for China and Vietnam. Criminal networks are able to traffic large volumes of ivory, facilitated by corruption and weak law enforcement. Despite laws criminalizing the killing and trading of protected animal species, traffickers and poachers often go unpunished. The COVID-19 pandemic, with its accompanying travel restrictions and reduced law enforcement capacity, had some impact on wildlife trafficking, with a decrease in seizures reported. However, the trafficking of ivory and pangolin scales continues, as evidenced by significant seizures in recent months. Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing has also increased in Nigeria’s coastal waters, leading to substantial economic losses for the government as well as environmental degradation. Nigeria is home to endangered species such as the West African lion, Cross River gorilla, and Cameroonian forest shrew, but their populations are declining owing to ineffective conservation measures and anti-smuggling efforts.
The theft and illegal trade of non-renewable resources poses a significant challenge in Nigeria. Widespread illegal oil bunkering results in substantial financial losses for the government. Despite efforts by Nigeria’s law enforcement and military officials to deactivate illegal refineries and arrest smugglers, the indirect involvement of security forces in these activities through the acceptance of bribes remains a concern. Oil facilities are frequently vandalized and targeted by militant groups, exacerbating the problem. Additionally, the Nigerian government has at times engaged known militants to protect oil pipelines, indicating a lack of capacity within the security forces to secure this vital infrastructure. Stolen Nigerian oil finds its way to markets such as China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Israel, and South Africa. While the COVID-19 pandemic temporarily disrupted illegal oil bunkering, the activity persists both on- and offshore. Furthermore, illegal mining, particularly in states such as Zamfara, Niger, and Kaduna, is linked to conflict and instability, and there have been instances of high-profile individuals being intercepted while attempting to smuggle significant amounts of gold out of the country.
Nigeria has emerged as a major transit point for the global heroin trade, with drug traffickers using the country to smuggle large quantities of heroin to Europe and North America. Nigerian trafficking groups collaborate with drug cartels in South America, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, and state corruption facilitates these operations. The country also experiences a relatively high rate of heroin use, driven by factors such as easy drug access, poverty, job insecurity, and unemployment. Nigeria also serves as a significant transit point for trafficked cocaine, destined for various global markets. Nigerian actors are prominent on the intra-African trade routes, particularly on air trafficking routes. Nigerian networks are also prominent in air trafficking of cocaine shipments primarily from Brazil to markets in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, utilizing a network of co-conspirators within the diaspora. Authorities have reported multiple large cocaine seizures and subsequent arrests.
Nigeria serves as a significant hub for the cannabis trade, being a country of origin, departure, and transit for the drug. The cultivation of cannabis is prevalent in Nigeria, particularly in the south-west region, with its favourable weather conditions. Notably, Nigeria experiences large-scale seizures of cannabis. This illicit trade is facilitated by institutional weaknesses, porous borders, and widespread corruption within the country. The Nigeria–Chad border, specifically through Maiduguri, is notorious for cannabis smuggling. Additionally, authorities have found evidence of a new type of cannabis trafficked from Ghana, believed to possess superior quality, processing, and packaging compared to locally produced cannabis.
Nigeria plays a significant role in the trade of synthetic drugs, including psychotropic substances such as tramadol and amphetamines. The smuggling of tramadol, in particular, is prevalent, with Lagos serving as a major market for the drug, which originates from other continents such as Asia and enters the country through Benin. Tramadol is distributed both legally and illegally from Lagos to various parts of Nigeria, notably Edo and Kano states. Nigeria’s porous borders and the complicity of government officials contribute to the ease with which tramadol and other substances are illicitly traded. Indian manufacturers are known to rebrand synthetic opioids extremely similar, or equivalent, to tramadol as ‘Tafrodol’ to avoid detection by customs officials at entry points in Nigeria.
Cybercrime poses a significant threat in Nigeria, targeting both Nigerian citizens and individuals from other countries. Instances of cybercrime have expanded beyond the large cities in southern Nigeria and are now prevalent in the northern region. Authorities recently raised concerns about new malware strains that infect mobile devices through malicious links. While cyber-dependent crime targeting individuals has experienced a significant rise, it is considered less severe than the more serious cyber-dependent crime committed to attack major organizational systems, national security, and critical infrastructure databases. Nonetheless, the prevalence of cybercrime remains a concern in Nigeria, and increased efforts are necessary to enhance cybersecurity measures and combat these illicit activities.
Financial crime, including electronic banking fraud, poses a significant challenge in Nigeria. The government’s implementation of a cashless policy, intended to promote digital transactions, inadvertently led to an increase in attempted cyber-enabled fraud through mobile channels, web platforms, and point-of-sale systems. Additionally, the country’s inconsistent exchange rate regimes and reliance on deficit spending and borrowing have reinforced rent-seeking behaviour and corruption. The financial policies of the Nigerian Central Bank are influenced by the government’s irregular approach, further exacerbating these issues. Organized crime groups, both within and outside Nigeria, are involved in cyber-enabled financial crime. Notorious local gangs have been implicated in internet scams resulting in substantial financial losses. Among the most prevalent financial scams committed by these groups are business email compromise, payment channel fraud, phishing, impersonation, and cyber fraud.
Organized crime groups in Nigeria typically differ from traditional hierarchical and permanent mafia-style groups. Instead, they often operate as smaller, loose criminal networks, organized along familial and ethnic lines. These include the Fulani armed bandit groups that have been involved in deadly acts of violence since 2011. Their activities encompass large-scale violence, cattle rustling, kidnappings for ransom, extortion, and various other criminal actions, contributing to insecurity and instability in the north-west region of Nigeria. Other groups primarily pursue economic and political objectives, with some involvement in the country’s oil-producing region. Recently, attention has been drawn to Nigerian gangs involved in human trafficking that are characterized by secret initiation rituals and highly loyal members. These gangs have infiltrated political structures and engage in scams and cross-border killings. Referred to as ‘cult groups’, they originated as university confraternities in the 1960s but have since transformed into well-organized gangs. Their activities mainly revolve around drug and human trafficking, especially from Nigeria to European countries such as Italy, Spain, and the UK. Other criminal networks in the country engage in crimes such as cyber-attacks, oil bunkering, extortion, and kidnapping, demonstrating a significantly large international reach in comparison to equivalent regions.
Foreign criminal actors operating in Nigeria are involved in various illegal practices, including illicit financial flows, maritime crime, fauna and flora crime, illegal mining, oil and gas activities, and drug trafficking. Many of these criminal actors originate from Asia. Lebanese networks are also known to operate in Nigeria and across West Africa, leveraging their contacts within the diaspora and import/export businesses to facilitate the trafficking of gold and drugs. Latin American actors have been known to engage in the drugs trade in Nigeria. Furthermore, foreign networks are involved in arms trafficking, and it is understood that Mexican cartels cooperate with Nigerian businesses to this end within Nigeria.
Corruption is prevalent in Nigeria, particularly in public procurement, and there is collusion between state-embedded actors and members of national and multinational corporate entities. Despite attempts to address these challenges, corruption remains pervasive at all levels of politics. In addition, the police force in Nigeria is widely perceived as corrupt, unhelpful, and untrustworthy. State-embedded actors in the country can be classified into two major types: those who collude with or sponsor individuals engaged in corruption and similar crimes, particularly in procurement, and those who protect criminals for economic or political reward, these commonly being law enforcement and judicial officials.
Private sector actors are involved in various criminal markets in Nigeria to a significant degree, facilitating crimes such as drug trafficking, fauna and flora crime, illegal mining, oil theft, illicit financial flows, and tax evasion. Often, they collude with or receive protection from public officials. In Nigeria’s north-east, logistics suppliers were also found to be working for Boko Haram fighters.
The Nigerian government has been faced with public dissatisfaction and protests – including protracted strike action by academic staff at public universities – exacerbated by growing insecurity, high inflation rates, and increasing poverty levels. Political leadership and governance in Nigeria face significant challenges in enforcing laws and delivering services effectively. In fact, insurgents are gaining control of ungoverned spaces, establishing their own forms of governance, and challenging the government’s monopoly on violence. Additionally, the democratic process is often undermined by vote buying, intimidation, and the influence of powerful economic interests. The divisive rhetoric used by the political elite deepens intergroup polarization and tension, further eroding public trust and legitimacy. Nigeria is widely regarded as one of the most corrupt countries in West Africa; people have little trust in the state and remain pessimistic about prospects for change. Although Nigeria has recorded a significant number of corruption complaints and convictions and undertaken various government reforms and initiatives, corruption is worsening rather than improving.
Nigeria has ratified many relevant international treaties and conventions to fight organized crime and has been a major contributor of troops and police to UN peace operations, serving in dozens of missions. In the face of capacity challenges, Nigeria has been making efforts to strengthen its laws, policies, and institutions to combat transnational organized crime. The country has incorporated international standards against organized crime into its national laws, positioning itself as one of the most compliant countries in Africa in this regard.
The Nigerian judicial system faces numerous challenges that significantly impact its effectiveness and credibility. While Nigerian judges are generally competent, the system is hindered by outdated practices, resistance to change, inadequate resources, poor working conditions, and corruption among some judges. These constraints contribute to trial delays and prolonged pre-trial detention, which the government has acknowledged as issues requiring reform. Corruption within the judiciary has eroded public trust and damaged its reputation. Overcrowded prisons and human rights violations exacerbate the situation. The lack of access to legal representation for detainees coupled with reports of torture and other ill-treatment underscore the systemic problems within the Nigerian criminal justice system. Additionally, funding remains a significant challenge, with ongoing disputes between the state-level judiciary, legislatures, and the federal government over financial autonomy.
Nigerian law enforcement comprises various agencies responsible for general and specialized policing duties. The Nigerian Police Force serves as the leading centralized federal force, while specialized agencies focus on areas such as road safety, drug control, anti-corruption, and human trafficking at federal and state levels. However, the country’s law enforcement agencies face significant challenges and require urgent reforms. Law enforcement agents endure poor remuneration and welfare, with many living in dilapidated housing. Corruption and extortion are widespread, with law enforcement personnel known to engage in unlawful practices such as extorting motorists and colluding with criminals. These factors contribute to a lack of public trust and a strained relationship between the police and the public. The surge in violence and instability across various regions of the country since 2011, coupled with the diminishing trust in state police forces, has led to the emergence of state-sponsored vigilante groups, like Amotekun, in the south-west. This development carries noteworthy implications for human rights norms, communal relations, and the state's monopoly over the utilization of force. In addition, the military has faced censure for extrajudicial killings and human rights abuses in operations against separatist movements and counterinsurgency efforts. Nigeria’s law enforcement agencies also grapple with capacity limitations and resource constraints. The police force, notorious for bribery, corruption, and impunity, operates under significant operational challenges and relies heavily on capacity-building projects and assistance from international organizations. The involvement of state security forces in the illicit economy further undermines their legitimacy as a regulatory body.
Nigeria’s territorial integrity faces challenges owing to porous land borders and criminal activity. The country shares borders with Benin, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger, and informal routes enable smuggling operations to go undetected by customs and immigration officials. The extensive length of the Niger–Nigeria border, and the rivers and dense forests that provide cover, makes effective border policing difficult. The area has also been heavily impacted by the Boko Haram insurgency, leading to cross-border refugee flows and a state of lawlessness. The presence of anti-government violent extremist groups, bandits, and separatist groups in many regions poses a significant threat to security. The government continues to equip the military and other security agencies while employing limited non-kinetic approaches to address this threat. There has been a decrease in attacks against major infrastructure and security formations in urban areas.
Nigeria has made efforts to improve its anti-money laundering framework, but the crime remains a significant concern. The most prevalent forms of money laundering predicate crimes are corruption, fraud, and cybercrime, particularly within the oil industry. Multiple agencies are responsible for investigating and prosecuting money laundering cases, and coordination is limited or lacking. As a result, many offences go unprosecuted, including foreign predicate offences. Nigeria also lacks effective legal and operational frameworks for international cooperation, asset recovery, and repatriation. Additionally, the country faces challenges in providing timely and accurate information on legal entities and offering constructive assistance to its international counterparts during money laundering investigations. The use of peer-to-peer transfers, especially by means of mobile payment services, is widespread in Nigeria, and transnational organized crime groups have adopted this technology for various illicit activities, including extortion, money laundering, terrorism, and the trafficking of wildlife, firearms, humans, and drugs.
Doing business in Nigeria is rife with uncertainty. While the setting up of businesses could be expedited by easing certain registration regulations, to make doing business sustainable requires significant policy changes and substantial investment in infrastructure and institutions. However, it is important to note that organized crime groups do not seem to control any specific economic areas in the country.
Nigeria falls short of meeting the minimum standards for the elimination of human trafficking, although the government has made efforts to identify victims. However, the services provided to victims remain insufficient. While formal procedures are in place to guide law enforcement and social services personnel in proactively identifying trafficking victims, the resources available to the anti-trafficking unit are inadequate to provide specialized care for all victims. Nigeria also faces significant challenges in responding to the needs of victims of crime and violence. Many internally displaced people and those affected by violence lack access to basic social amenities, including healthcare, sanitation, and shelter. This indicates a broader problem, as the country is unable to support victims of crime and provide essential services to those affected by violence and displacement.
Prevention is a key mandate for all anti-corruption agencies in Nigeria, however, effective and measurable policy implementation is lacking. Local communities have implemented initiatives to respond to organized crime, but these have resulted mainly in the creation of vigilante groups, rather than advocacy or awareness programmes. The phenomenon of vigilantism appears to have arisen owing to ambivalence and discontent towards state authority. Various international organizations have implemented programmes with a specific emphasis on crime prevention among the youth.
Nigeria benefits from an active and diverse civil society ecosystem, comprising NGOs, media organizations, academics, and think tanks, which contribute to public discourse and policy implementation. However, the government has encountered resistance from civil society organizations in its attempts to introduce laws regulating the activities of NGOs and registered associations. While many of these organizations focus on good governance, gender issues, and development, their work is constrained by limited funding and unconducive political circumstances. There has been an increase in the number of pro-government NGOs since the current government came into power. Some of these organizations are seen as having personal and ethnic ties to the ruling party and may operate only briefly before disappearing. Nigeria’s media landscape is pluralistic, encompassing print, electronic, traditional, and new media outlets. Historically, the Nigerian media was known for its professionalism and its criticism of government policies. However, media professionalism has declined, leading to a perception of journalistic corruption. Fake news, hate speech, and political influence have become more prevalent, contributing to a significant level of distrust between the media and the government. Journalists in Nigeria face dangers such as surveillance, physical attacks, arbitrary arrests, and even killings. Overall, press freedom has declined in the country.
Criminal markets
4.83-0.42
An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.
Human trafficking
5.000.00
Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.
Human smuggling
6.00-0.50
Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.
Extortion and protection racketeering
3.50 n/a
Crimes linked to exerting control over a territory/market including as a mediator and/or requesting a benefit in exchange for protection.
Arms trafficking
4.500.00
The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.
Trade in counterfeit goods
3.00 n/a
The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands.
Illicit trade in excisable goods
3.00 n/a
The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits.
Flora crimes
4.500.00
The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.
Fauna crimes
3.500.00
The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.
Non-renewable resource crimes
5.00-0.50
The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.
Heroin trade
6.000.00
The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.
Cocaine trade
6.50-0.50
The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cannabis trade
6.50-0.50
The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.
Synthetic drug trade
3.500.50
The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cyber-dependent crimes
6.00 n/a
Organized crimes that rely solely on using information communications technology with the aim of obtaining a monetary/material benefit.
Financial crimes
6.00 n/a
Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance.
Criminal actors
5.50-0.50
An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.
Mafia-style groups
6.50-0.50
Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.
Criminal networks
7.00-0.50
Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.
State-embedded actors
6.50-0.50
Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.
Foreign actors
3.000.50
State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.
Private sector actors
4.50 n/a
Profit-seeking individuals/entities who own/control a part of the legal economy free from the state, that collaborate with criminal actors.
Political leadership and governance
5.00-0.50
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
4.500.00
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
7.000.50
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
6.000.00
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
6.001.00
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
5.00-0.50
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
5.500.00
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
4.000.00
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
4.000.00
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
4.500.00
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
5.000.00
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
5.000.50
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Albania is a source, transit, and destination country for human trafficking. Albanian criminal actors are allegedly responsible for a large number of trafficking victims in Western Europe, especially in the UK, with the majority of women and children transferred from Albania. Sexual exploitation of Albanian victims in Western European countries remains the most prevalent form of this crime. Albania is a destination country for human trafficking, with some irregular migrants from Asia subjected to forced labour and domestic servitude in the country. Domestic trafficking of women and children for sexual exploitation continues, and increases during tourist seasons. There are also reports indicating the exploitation of Roma children in street begging within the country.
Albania is a transit zone for smuggled individuals, asylum seekers, and refugees in the region, especially for individuals smuggled from the Middle East and North Africa who travel through Greece and Montenegro on their way to Western or Northern Europe. However, the number of irregular crossings recorded on this route towards the end of 2022 is slightly lower than previous years because of tighter border controls by Greece. Albanian organised crime groups are involved in international and domestic human smuggling operations in cooperation with human smugglers in surrounding countries, specifically in Western Europe where they have been consolidating their activities. Albania serves as a source country for irregular migration headed for the UK, where an increase in the activity of Albanian criminal groups who are involved in human smuggling has been recorded.
With regards to the extortion and protection-racketeering criminal market, there are reports that extortion is carried out by criminal groups who use compromising materials to target businesspeople and high-level officials. It is alleged that, in some cases, these criminal activities are employed by media companies to extort businesses and high-level state officials.
Arms trafficking in Albania remains relatively more limited, than in other Balkan states, as the country is not a producer of weapons or ammunition. Arms from the 1997 civil unrest in Albania are still in circulation, creating the foundation for a limited criminal market in small arms and light weapons (SALWs), and dismantled weapon parts. Many of these SALWs are destined for other European markets, but some appear to be sold on the domestic market. Arms trafficking routes from Albania to EU countries are either inland, moving north through the Balkans or Greece, or seaborne to Western Europe. Corrupt police and army officers are involved in arms trafficking, either by assisting or playing a leading role in these criminal operations. Illegal modification of convertible weapons as well as the 3D printing of firearms are increasingly being recorded in the country.
Albania is a destination and transit country for counterfeit goods from China and Türkiye. It is also a source country, but to a lesser extent. Counterfeit items including clothing, accessories, and makeup can be found in shops and online marketplaces. Furthermore, smuggled and counterfeited pharmaceutical products are increasingly becoming widespread in the country. There are instances of informal cultivation and smuggling of tobacco products, e.g. sometimes Albanian farmers do not report their entire yield and illicitly sell some of the product to domestic or foreign producers in neighbouring countries (mostly Montenegro), but trade in tobacco products and other excise goods remains a negligible criminal market in Albania and has limited bearing on society.
Albania is a source and transit country for illegal timber in Europe. Illegal logging is particularly widespread in the north-eastern district of Elbasan and the southern district of Vlora. A 10-year export ban was imposed in 2016 and successfully curbed some illegal logging. However, it created opportunities for small, well-organized criminal groups in Kosovo and Montenegro to smuggle illicit timber into and from Albania, causing illegal logging in border areas where the mountainous terrain makes it difficult for the police to contain the activity. Corruption, the shadow economy, and the violence used by organized crime groups to protect the timber business complicate attempts to curb illegal logging. There are instances of smuggling of specific trees from Albania, such as old olive trees, although to a lesser extent. Illegal trade in birds, brown bears, and wolves continues to be a relatively common form of fauna crime in Albania, with many protected species and other wildlife traded online or in physical shops. Furthermore, although a nationwide hunting ban has sought to limit poaching, such activities continue to be prevalent because of the inadequate implementation of this ban. Illicit online trafficking of donkey skin has become widespread in recent years.
The illegal extraction of natural resources, such as oil and chrome, remains an issue. As an oil-producing country, Albania is home to a small but notable market for illegal oil extraction, which is facilitated by corrupt practices on the part of state officials. While the market itself may not involve major organized crime groups, reports have indicated the presence of organized crime in certain segments of the oil industry that are still under state control. The illicit extraction of stone and marble has also been identified in the Tomorr mountain range, despite its special protected status.
Albania is a transit country for heroin trafficked from Türkiye, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan through the Balkan route to Europe. Trafficking is undertaken by organized criminal actors who are known to cooperate with other criminal actors involved in the heroin supply chain. Most heroin is trafficked into Albania by land through North Macedonia, but heroin-processing laboratories have been uncovered internally by Albanian police. Despite the continuing role of the country in transnational heroin trade, its local consumption remains limited. Albania is a transit country for cocaine trafficked from Latin America to Europe. Albanian criminal groups involved in the cocaine market in Western Europe carry out trafficking as well as storage and distribution activities across EU countries. Albanian mafia-style groups are known to create Albanian-speaking satellite communities abroad that recruit fellow citizens, with an aim to expand drug trafficking in major cities across the UK, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany, among others. Albania is also a destination country for cocaine but to a lesser extent because domestic consumption is relatively low.
Albania has been one of the largest producers of cannabis in Europe for at least a decade, making the cannabis market more widespread than other drug markets in the country. However, police intervention, the destruction of plantations, and state efforts to change the business model have caused a drastic decline in cannabis cultivation since 2016. Despite the decline in cannabis production, Albania remains a source country for cannabis specifically for the EU, with sea and land routes being used to traffic the drug. The production of cannabis in the country has shifted from outdoor cultivation to indoor methods. Moreover, Albanian criminal networks are increasingly carrying out the production, processing, and distribution of cannabis in foreign countries such as the UK and Spain. While the synthetic drug market in Albania is the smallest drug market in the country because of the lack of production and low levels of consumption of such drugs, it has been expanding in recent years. Synthetic drugs are imported into Albania primarily from neighbouring countries, such as Serbia and Bulgaria, as well as various EU countries.
Cyber-dependent crimes are prevalent in the country, increasingly targeting private and public sectors and rendering websites and services unavailable. Most common cyber-attacks targeting Albanian infrastructure involve viruses and malware such as Trojan horses and ransomware. Recently, many private companies have been targeted through ransomware and forced to pay fines. Albania is a source country for cyber-dependent crimes in Europe which are carried out by domestic and foreign perpetrators, accounting for more than 10% of all cyber-attacks occurring in Europe. Financial fraud using cryptocurrency trading is on the rise in the country despite the relevant legislations being in place. Crypto activities, largely controlled by well-known organized crime groups, and fraudulent financial cyber-activities are becoming major concerns.
Financial crimes, including telephone scams, tax evasion and VAT fraud, pyramid schemes, embezzlement, misuse of public funds, as well as corruption carried out by criminal organizations, private sector actors, and state-embedded actors are widespread in Albania. These crimes are facilitated by the large informal economy in the country. Technology has enabled sophisticated scamming operations, often involving fraudulent online investment platforms or call centres. Other methods used for fraud are the foreign exchange market and taking advantage of the VAT scheme. Financial crimes, specifically tax evasion carried out by private sector actors, are enabled by corruption in the state administration.
Even though Albanian mafia-style groups are facilitated by family ties, they are mostly organized in smaller pragmatic and flexible groups with temporary relationships, differing from other major mafia groups such as the Italian mafia. Nonetheless, Albanian groups have a clear structure and members exhibit loyalty to a single leader. These groups are mainly involved in drug trafficking, human smuggling, and human trafficking. Mafia-style groups influence politics and public procurement in the country, especially in towns where they maintain a strong presence. Albanian mafia-style groups are prevalent in other countries, where they have integrated themselves into local criminality. In recent years, Albanian mafia-style groups have gone from providing the Italian mafia with logistical assistance in drug trafficking, to managing the resources and means to run this trade on their own throughout the harbours of Italy and greater Europe. Mafia-style groups in Albania allegedly create smaller, looser criminal networks that gravitate around them. These networks reportedly have a fluid organizational and operational structure with three to four members who take a pragmatic approach by seizing any opportunity for profit. They are responsible for most of the criminal activity, especially the distribution of narcotics in Albania and Western European countries. They are highly violent but cooperate with corrupt police and judiciary officials as well as with foreign actors, particularly the Italian mafia, including 'Ndrangheta and Sacra Corona Unita as well as Turkish organized crime groups. They are known to have links to Kosovar and Montenegrin criminal networks and have a strong presence in Belgium, the Netherlands, and the UK, among others. There is also evidence that Albanian organized crime groups interact with South and Central American crime groups. Because of socio-economic factors such as the lack of employment and education opportunities in Albania, a worrying trend of youth involvement in day-to-day criminal operations in various roles as part of criminal networks is being observed. Albanian criminal networks continue to be heavily involved in drug trafficking, especially the cannabis trade. They often pose as legal businesses and different members are responsible for specific tasks within the organization, such as securing, transporting, and distributing drugs. These networks are connected by temporary and occasional opportunities for illegal activities, especially human smuggling, hence adapting rapidly to needs and circumstances.
State-embedded actors continue to be heavily involved in Albania’s criminal landscape. Members of criminal groups have reportedly been appointed to political positions at various levels of the state apparatus. Criminal networks are highly embedded in local- and regional-level structures, operate with the police, and receive political protection. Infiltration by organized crime of the state apparatus is evidenced by the protection of drug trafficking through bribery and corruption, specifically among border police. There are allegations indicating high-level state actors’ involvement in corrupt transactions. Moreover, politicians reportedly use large criminal groups and networks to control the electoral behaviour of citizens through pressure, blackmail and vote buying.
Private sector actors, specifically ones involved in real estate and tourism, are increasingly linked to organized crime. Furthermore, the increasing informality of the private sector is fuelling the black market and illicit financial flows. Some segments of the financial services industry and some public-private partnerships demonstrate the interwoven nature of the relationship between organized crime and the private sector. Foreign actors function within Albania but are less influential than domestic groups. For example, Turkish crime groups are mainly involved in heroin trafficking, while Italian groups are influential in the southern part of the country. There are reports of Palestinian, Iraqi, Iranian, and Moroccan organized crime groups’ involvement in human smuggling in the country.
Even though the trust of most stakeholders was regained following the 2021 elections, political polarization and corruption continue to be key issues in the governance of the country. Albania continues to struggle with criminal influence, which creates mutual dependence between political parties and criminal groups, and which reduces the state’s ability to combat organized crime. The transformation and governance of the country is hindered by the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic as well as corruption, informal power held by organized crime groups, and political nepotism. In recent years, efforts have been made to combat corruption in the country by increasing transparency of public service delivery, procurement, and recruitment procedures, as well as public participation in local decision-making. Despite these efforts, high levels of corruption and a lack of transparency in many aspects of public and private life persist. Moreover, prominent political members allegedly take part in corrupt or unethical practices with impunity.
Albania’s legal framework on international judicial cooperation in criminal matters is well established, and Albanian law enforcement has partnered with various institutions at international and regional levels. Albania is a member of INTERPOL and a partner of the European Judicial Network; it has signed a strategic cooperation agreement with Europol; and is part of various regional law enforcement networks. The country has several extradition agreements in place and has ratified nearly all relevant organized crime treaties. It continues to pursue a foreign-oriented and EU-focused strategy, thanks to which the country benefits from great provisions of technical assistance and allocations of funding, not only from the EU but also from Türkiye and the UAE. As for the national framework, Albania has a fairly robust legislative framework to address organized crime. However, enforcement of this framework often falls short, especially because of the justice system’s lack of independence, efficiency, and professionalism.
Positive results have been observed in recent years following the implementation of a comprehensive reform aimed at strengthening the judicial system and bolstering the fight against corruption. Nevertheless, internal and external interference with the judicial system continues to be a concern. The perception of corruption in the justice system remains high, which is based on continual reports of heavy sentences for non-serious criminal offences committed by ordinary citizens and light sentences for members of organized crime groups or corrupt state officials. Furthermore, implementation of this justice reform, including the vetting process, resulted in increased backlogs and decreased technical ability, hence affecting the efficiency of the judicial system. The detention system in Albania continues to record the highest proportion of prisoners in pre-trial detainment of all Western Balkan countries, despite a decrease in recent years.
Even though positive results have been achieved by law enforcement agencies, especially in the fight against drug trafficking, and some criminal groups have been effectively dismantled, investigations and prosecutions often fail to target the upper echelons of criminal organizations, and the number of convictions is limited. Overall, this translates into little progress being made in the fight against organized crime.
The smuggling of illicit goods and people in and out of the country through its land borders, particularly those shared with Kosovo and Montenegro, continues to persist, posing a notable challenge to the country’s territorial integrity. Even though the integrity of Albania’s long coastline is constantly being challenged by criminal organizations, the country manages its coastline more effectively because of efforts made to strengthen the state’s control over its borders in recent years. Albania lacks the necessary cybersecurity infrastructure and technical and logistical capacities to protect its digital infrastructure.
The limited ability to enforce the law, combined with corruption, weak institutions, and a significant informal economy, renders Albania vulnerable to money laundering despite recent efforts to strengthen the anti-money laundering system in the country. These efforts include the introduction of temporary preventative measures such as confiscation of assets, limiting the movements of suspected criminals, and restricting their economic activities. Albania has become an important destination for money laundering and the preferred sectors are the construction, service, and tourism industries. Despite the prevalence of such activities, the number of money seizures and convictions remain low.
At least a third of the country’s GDP is thought to come from the informal economy, which, besides the loss of tax revenue, makes the introduction of labour protection and competition rules difficult. Weaknesses in contract enforcement, high levels of informality in financial intermediation, unclear property rights, and widespread corruption are major constraints to private sector development. Business-relevant regulations remain cumbersome, and shortcomings in the rule of law continue to hamper businesses and deter investments.
The Albanian government has made notable progress in passing legislation on the status and treatment of victims of crime that meets international standards. But challenges persist at the implementation level. There is a lack of support programmes that provide medical, psychological, and social assistance to victims of crime, and only a limited number of public and private actors are involved in offering such services. The country lacks an integrated victim support system, and victim and witness assassinations are not unheard of. Strong ties between mafia-style organizations and the Albanian legislature and law enforcement agencies often put witnesses in danger. As a result, many witnesses have been forced to skip court hearings and refrain from testifying. Civil society organizations with donor support, as opposed to support from government agencies, remain the primary providers of aid for most cases involving vulnerable groups. Nonetheless, there have been some improvements in victim and witness support in recent years, including access to an interpreter, inclusion of additional rights for victims of sexual exploitation and human trafficking, and the creation of a web-based reporting helpline.
The culture of crime prevention in Albania is relatively less developed than in other Western Balkan countries. Although legislation and law enforcement mechanisms do exist, prevention mechanisms are ineffective and lack creativity regarding how citizens are engaged with to prevent criminal activity from occurring in the first place. Corruption in the ranks of police and the justice system contributes to the lack of efficient crime prevention. Nonetheless, new action plans and strategies have been adopted by the country which aim to implement awareness-raising campaigns to prevent organized crime with the involvement of central and local institutions, civil society, business, media, and other actors.
Even though civil society organizations play a prominent role in providing support to trafficking victims, civil society and media engagement in countering organized crime remains limited. Many civil society organizations are dependent on external donors for financial support while public funding for civil society organizations is minimal and not yet legally regulated. Press freedom is generally respected, but few media outlets in Albania enjoy financial and editorial independence, and many politicians use rhetoric that is not conducive to a free and independent media environment. There have been instances in which journalists have been threatened with violence and intimidation in recent years.
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The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to 10. The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel.
A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.
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