People

Ethiopia remains a source and, to a lesser extent, destination and transit country for men, women, and children subjected to forced labour and sex trafficking. Many trafficked individuals start their journey voluntarily but become vulnerable to abuses en route to the Middle East, Europe, or North America. Internal trafficking also occurs from rural to urban areas. The Ethiopia–Tigray conflict undermined the capacity of the federal government to maintain a state monopoly on violence. This has changed the dynamics of human trafficking in the country, and armed groups are proliferating with impunity. The war resulted in tens of thousands of Ethiopians seeking asylum in Sudan. In addition, more than 6 million Ethiopians are internally displaced, making them highly vulnerable to human trafficking and smuggling. This number has likely increased owing to the ongoing conflict in Oromia, Benishangul-Gumuz, border areas of Tigray, Amhara, and Afar, and the inaccessibility of these regions to the government. Thousands of children have been separated from their parents because of the conflict and are at risk of abuse, exploitation, and child labour.

Ethiopia is a country of departure and transit for individuals smuggled to countries in Southern Africa, as well as Europe and the Middle East. Smuggling occurs across borders to and from all neighbouring countries, with migrant smuggling networks often facilitating the flow of movement. Irregular migration out of Ethiopia generally follows three main routes: the eastern route towards Djibouti and Somalia for onward travel to Yemen, the western route into Sudan, and the southern route into Kenya for onward transit to Southern Africa. The number of refugees being smuggled to Ethiopia has decreased owing to the ongoing war in the country, but the number of Ethiopians smuggled to neighbouring and other countries is likely to increase. Saudi Arabia remains the primary destination for individuals smuggled from Ethiopia.

Protection racketeering has increased in urban areas, with criminal networks providing so-called security services and using violence to control territories. Abduction, rape, and extortion are now routine in the Amhara region owing to the actions of local Fano militias (an ethno-nationalist youth militia in Amhara region). Initially, the Fano were used to combat Tigray fighters. However, some segments are becoming extortionist. They demand ransom and other monetary payments from local people, including passing vehicles. Some Amhara investors in areas such as western Tigray and Benishangul-Gumuz have hired members of this group to intimidate other investors and ethnic groups. This group has also pillaged properties and businesses in Tigray.

Trade

Ethiopia, because of its position on the Horn of Africa, is both a source and transit route for arms trafficking. Weapons flow freely in both directions across long porous borders with Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya, South Sudan, and Sudan. The Ethiopian state has regularly violated the arms embargo imposed on Somalia by providing weapons to friendly regional and proxy forces. The civil war in Tigray has also led to an escalation in small arms and light weapons trafficking in the region. The demand for illicit small arms has increased owing to the destructive rhetoric of politicians, ethnic tensions, and conflict in other parts of the country. Illicit small arms are smuggled into Ethiopia from Türkiye and Houthi controlled territories in Yemen. Internally, firearms are smuggled easily from war-torn areas into other parts of the country, specifically Addis Ababa. Around Moyale, the main border crossing between Ethiopia and Kenya, local business owners finance both weapons and human smuggling, using revenue generated from one to facilitate the other. Corruption and unlawful power dynamics enable this local illicit economy to function.

Illicit imports and exports, including counterfeit and excise goods, are also a major challenge to Ethiopia’s economy. The number of contrabandists and tactics used have increased alarmingly. Sometimes these contrabandists are outfitted with sophisticated weapons and pose a threat to the country’s security forces. The Ethiopian National Tobacco Enterprise reported that illicit cigarettes account for most of the market, with an overwhelming share in the eastern part of the country. Excise tax collection on beer is also low, a sign of increased tax evasion by local companies. The conflict in the country provides an appealing environment for smugglers, who have strong relationships with individuals in public office.

Environment

The trafficking of plants, illegal wildlife trade, and the illegal trade of non-renewable resources are relatively common in Ethiopia. The country has a moderate flora crimes market where plant species are trafficked for local drinks, food, and medicinal and fumigation purposes. Conflict and instability have resulted in a reduction in law enforcement against flora and fauna crimes, leading to an increase in deforestation and poaching. In the Tigray province, deforestation has reached an alarming level. Ethiopia is also a transit point on the Horn of Africa for illicitly traded ivory, rhino horn, skins, and live animals. Bole International Airport in Addis Ababa, which ranks among the largest airports on the continent and serves as a prominent international hub, continues to function as a key point for trafficked goods, including ivory and rhino horn. The demand for exotic pets among Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, has fuelled the growth in the capture and sale of cheetahs from Ethiopia, and the country’s borders have become important trafficking transit points for wildlife.

Ethiopia is also an exporter of gold, silver, gemstones, marble, and tantalum. The country is a source and transit route for smuggled non-renewable resources, particularly gold, which is smuggled from Sudan through Ethiopia to the United Arab Emirates. Nonetheless, gold exploitation in Ethiopia is modest. Fuel is heavily subsidized, a situation abused by illegal traders, leading to intensified trade of contraband fuel with neighbouring countries, mainly Kenya and Somalia, which causes irregularities and disruptions in domestic fuel distribution.

Drugs

Ethiopia’s primary role in the transnational heroin trade is that of a transit country. Even though the consumption of this drug remains moderate, it is important to note that domestic supply is growing. Heroin is primarily imported via air and is often in transit to West African markets. Heroin also transits Ethiopia on its way to European and American markets, coming from South East and south-west Asia. Bole International Airport is considered a major transit point, receiving cocaine shipments from initial West African points of continental entry. In 2021 and 2022, the Ethiopian Federal Police seized significant amounts of cocaine sent from São Paulo, Brazil.

The production of cannabis is relatively high and smuggling to neighbouring countries is common. Most of the production is concentrated in rural areas, mainly around the town of Shashemene, where a small community of Rastafarians reside. While much of what is produced is consumed locally, improvements to the Ethiopia–Kenya highway seem to have resulted in an increase in cannabis smuggling into Kenya, with several large-scale seizures reported in recent years. There is no violence associated with the cannabis trade in the country. Ethiopia does not play a major role in the production of synthetic drugs or the precursor chemicals associated with the synthetic drug trade. The emergence of Mandrax has become an issue in the region, with the diversion of licit drugs and essential chemical precursors into the illicit market becoming a more common practice.

Cyber Crimes

Despite being in the early stages of developing its information technology sector, Ethiopia has become increasingly vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Hackers targeted a wide range of entities, including financial institutions, government ministries, regional bureaus, academic institutions, and media houses. The most common types of attacks were website attacks, malware attacks, distributed denial of service attacks, basic infrastructure service interruptions, and the hacking of social media pages. Cyber-dependent crimes, mainly targeting financial institutions, are on the increase, causing significant damage to the economy and critical infrastructure.

Financial Crimes

Financial crime is becoming increasingly prevalent in Ethiopia, with fraud being the most common. The banking industry has lost billions of birrs to fraud in the past four years, with half of these losses affecting the state-owned Commercial Bank of Ethiopia. Banking customers are regularly targeted by scammers through SMS and email. Tax evasion and avoidance are also widespread in Ethiopia. Corruption is an emerging issue in Ethiopia, with officials being known to embezzle money from party and state coffers. The acute shortage of foreign currency, owing to the country’s trade deficit, is also a contributing factor to several types of financial crime.

Criminal Actors

Criminal networks, including those involved in human smuggling, arms trafficking, drug trafficking and wildlife trafficking, operate in Ethiopia, and many are connected to networks in neighbouring countries. African drug traffickers are very active in the country, while West Africans and Chinese nationals are involved the illicit trade of fauna. With regard to human smuggling, operations based in Ethiopia range from groups of criminal entrepreneurs and opportunists loosely linked to each other, to highly organized crime syndicates that span several countries. Several smuggling networks are also involved in arms trafficking and illicit financial flows.

Despite the Ethiopian government’s recent anti-corruption efforts, including the conviction of multiple former government officials and executives of state-owned companies for mismanagement of public funds and/or involvement in arms trafficking, corruption in the country is increasing. The gradual process of economic liberalization in Ethiopia is providing new opportunities for misappropriation, particularly in the private sector. In fact, the latter is still not adequately regulated, with individuals and entities abusing their licenses to operate legal businesses and participating in various illegal activities. In addition, the country’s import and export business is vulnerable to trade-based money laundering owing to a limited understanding and the lack of resources to detect suspicious trade transactions, the intermingling of legitimate and illegitimate trade, and corruption among customs and law enforcement personnel. While there are no identifiable mafia-style groups in Ethiopia, there are community security groups that engage in illegal activities for economic reasons.

Leadership and governance

Ethiopia’s current leadership initiated ambitious reforms to combat various forms of organized crime, including human trafficking, contraband, arms smuggling, and illicit financial flows. However, the civil unrest that led to the former prime minister’s resignation and a surge of ethnic Ethiopian nationalism has significantly reduced the government’s ability to implement these initiatives, and state efforts predominantly focus on the war. In fact, the ongoing conflict involving the Tigray People’s Liberation Front and the Ethiopian federal government, supported by the Eritrean army and Amhara regional state forces, has led to millions of people facing starvation. In addition, ethnic tensions elsewhere in Ethiopia pose a severe threat to the country’s governability. Foremost among these are the conflicts in the Oromo and Benishangul-Gumuz regions. This situation has provided an ideal environment for the growth of organized criminal activities such as arms smuggling, human trafficking, and illicit financial flows. Corruption remains an issue in Ethiopia, but is considered less of a problem than in other countries in the region. Measures to combat corruption have been criticized for being instituted as part of a political strategy rather than with genuine intent.

Ethiopia has ratified several international treaties and conventions related to organized crime and has joined regional and international organizations to prevent and suppress organized crime, but challenges regarding the implementation of these initiatives, such as coordinated seizure actions with international partners, remain. Ethiopia has a robust legislative framework criminalizing various forms of organized crime and is consistently enhanced through amendments and new regulations. However, enforcement of these regulations remains a concern in the country.

Criminal justice and security

The judiciary in Ethiopia is theoretically independent, but it has not often opposed the government. However, the appointment of a new chief justice of the supreme court has given rise to hope for judicial reform. There is a special branch on organized crime in the Ethiopian judicial system, and several individuals have been convicted of human trafficking and migrant smuggling. Despite efforts to develop the country’s capacity to fight organized crime, the ability of the federal authorities to enforce laws has decreased in most of the federal states. Corruption and impunity remain major challenges faced by the police force in Ethiopia.

Ethiopia shares borders with six countries, and border control agencies have introduced policies to enhance their capacity to prevent irregular migration, but the borders are extremely porous and challenging to control. The territorial integrity of Ethiopia has been under threat owing to various armed conflicts. The most relevant is the civil war in Tigray, which resulted in the Ethiopian government accusing Sudan of invading its territory. Meanwhile, the Eritrean army has entered Ethiopian territory in support of the federal government and remains active in the war, controlling several borderlands. Besides the conflict in Tigray, several groups across Ethiopia are involved in political struggles. Foremost among these are the Oromo Liberation Army and the Benishangul People’s Liberation Movement. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front and the Oromo Liberation Army, in association with several other anti-government factions, recently created a new alliance with the aim of overthrowing the Ethiopian government. Overall, these incidents highlight the fragility of Ethiopia’s political and security situation, and the potential for organized crime to take advantage of the country’s weakened state. Regarding cyber-security, most cyber-attacks in Ethiopia have been thwarted before they could cause any significant harm. However, they are a cause for concern because of the vulnerability of the country.

Economic and financial environment

As a result of improving its anti-money laundering/countering financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime, Ethiopia has been removed from the Financial Action Task Force’s list of countries with strategic AML deficiencies. However, Ethiopia’s AML/CFT laws and regulations require further strengthening. The primary sources of illicit proceeds in Ethiopia are corruption, tax fraud/evasion, human trafficking and smuggling, arms trafficking, and contraband. Ethiopia’s Financial Intelligence Service has implemented several reforms, including a new software system to track and control criminals involved in money laundering and terrorist financing. Despite these measures, Ethiopia still faces a high threat of money laundering and terrorist financing.

Ethiopia’s economy is cash intensive, which contributes to the spread of corruption, illicit and informal trade, and illicit financial flows. To mitigate this vulnerability, the government has enacted laws limiting cash withdrawals and the amount of cash that can be held per individual and legal person. In addition, the central bank has outlawed local money transfer services and the depositing of cash into third-party accounts, allowing only account-to-account transfers. Transfers between accounts have also been restricted to five per week. The financial services sector remains closed to foreign investment.

Civil society and social protection

The Ethiopian government has made efforts to tackle human trafficking and prevent crimes related to it. The country recently passed legislation that incorporates a scheme to support, rescue, and rehabilitate victims of trafficking. Ethiopia has also made efforts to raise awareness about trafficking-related crimes and improve oversight in recruitment agencies. However, child sex trafficking has remained unattended and there are still no standard procedures to identify trafficking victims among vulnerable migrants. The government has conducted public awareness campaigns on cybercrime and cyber-attacks and worked with banks and the customs commission to reduce illicit trade.

Since the start of the conflict in Tigray, multiple press freedom violations – including shutting down media outlets and the arrest and even murder of journalists – have been recorded in the country. Civil society organizations are either silenced or forced to take the side of the government in support of the war. Journalists or media outlets that deviate from the official line are considered ‘pro-terrorist’. Even though foreign-funded civil society organizations are no longer prohibited from undertaking advocacy and human rights work in Ethiopia, in practice they remain weak and are unable to engage publicly in these activities. The Ethiopian government has suspended the work of many international aid organizations, accusing them of spreading misinformation.

People

Niger is a source, transit, and destination country for victims of human trafficking. The majority of identified victims are women and girls, both local and foreign nationals, with the latter being mainly Nigerian nationals. Sexual exploitation is the most common motivation for the crime. Sex trafficking is common near the border with Nigeria and along the main east-west highway, primarily between the cities of Birni-N’Konni and Zinder. Other networks, based in Zinder and Maradi, specialize in trafficking women and children for labour exploitation, mostly in the form of forced begging or agricultural and domestic work. In certain regions, particularly in the north, traditional practices associated with servitude persist. Migrants travelling through Niger on credit can be vulnerable to trafficking, as some traffickers use unpaid transportation fees as a form of debt bondage, coercing migrants who are unable to pay into forced labour or commercial sex. However, exploitation usually takes place once migrants reach Libya. The presence of artisanal gold mines in remote areas further contributes to the risk of human trafficking, as some goldminers are coerced or misled into labour exploitation.

Niger is a significant crossroad for trans-Saharan migration. Human smugglers – referred to as passeurs locally - operate at various degrees of organisation, ranging from highly sophisticated networks to individual transporters, depending on the route and the type of smuggling service offered. However, most passeurs work with coxeurs – intermediaries who put migrants in contact with passeurs. These networks typically facilitate northbound movements to destinations such Libya and Algeria, from where some migrants attempt onwards travel to Europe. Though the town of Agadez once served as a key departure hub for routes to Libya, the enforcement of the 2015 law banning human smuggling in Niger saw human smuggling activities in Agadez drastically reduce. Instead, human smuggling increasingly takes place on more remote clandestine routes to the east of Agadez, which involve higher risks and costs for both smugglers and migrants. The town of Tahoua has also gained prominence as a transit hub for travel to Algeria, which has gained in popularity compared to Libya and has been less targeted by anti-smuggling efforts than Agadez. Since the criminalisation of their activities, many passeurs in northern Niger also turned the transport of Nigeriens travelling to Libya as part of longstanding circular migration patterns, as well as transport and trade servicing goldmining areas.

In Niger, illicit activities such as kidnapping for ransom, extortion, and protection racketeering have been identified as sources of terrorism financing. These activities are carried out by violent extremist groups primarily in the cross-border area with Mali and Burkina Faso and the northern Tillaberi region.

Trade

Arms trafficking poses a significant threat to Niger’s stability and security. While historically it has been a transit country for weapons destined for conflict zones in the region, the deteriorating security situation within Niger has led to a rise in the domestic demand for firearms, particularly small arms and ammunition. The country’s vast desert territory and a lack of state control over border areas make it challenging for authorities to combat trans-border insecurity effectively. Weapons circulating in the illicit market in Niger originate from various sources, including leftover munitions from former internal armed conflicts, diversions from national stockpiles, and smuggling from neighbouring countries such as Chad, Libya, Mali, and Nigeria. The activities of arms brokers and intermediaries are not specifically regulated by law, which contributes to the proliferation of weapons in the country. Arms trafficking in Niger is closely linked to other illicit activities, such as drug trafficking, rather than being driven solely by violent extremist groups or militias.

Counterfeit goods pose a significant problem, with pharmaceutical products being the most commonly traded of these. Niger relies heavily on imported medicines, which makes it challenging to monitor and control the influx of counterfeit products effectively. The illicit trade of excise goods, specifically contraband tobacco products, is also prevalent in the country.

Environment

Niger has minimal tree cover, and unregulated logging has long been a problem owing to the widespread use of traditional biomass resources. Wood and charcoal are the primary cooking fuels used in almost all households throughout the country. However, unregulated logging is not associated with organized crime groups.

In terms of fauna crimes, local poachers, particularly Nigerien gangs, target the Niger W National Park during the dry season to hunt for ivory, big cat skins, and wild meat. For several years there has been an absence of traditional forest rangers in the park, resulting in a potential threat to the West African giraffe population. Efforts have been made to halt the decline of the giraffe population in the Koure Giraffe Reserve, but a lack of funding for protection and conservation has led to concerns about a potential resurgence in poaching. Niger also serves as a transit country for trafficked animals, with smugglers transporting African grey parrots and chimpanzees from Central Africa through Niger to Libya.

Illicit activities linked to non-renewable resources, particularly those related to gold mining, continue to present significant challenges in Niger. In northern Niger, most gold mining is artisanal and small-scale gold mining (ASGM), and remains informal in nature. While providing a key livelihood for many Nigeriens and foreign miners, in a context where alternative economic activities are scarce, ASGM also bears significant risks for those involved, including labour trafficking and exploitation risks. Armed banditry targeting gold convoys has also been on the rise in recent years.

Drugs

While not a major consumer or producer country, Niger is known as a transit point for northbound heroin flows. Niger is also a transit point for cocaine flows heading to Algeria and Libya, and onwards to towards markets in Europe and the Middle East. Key trafficking routes from Mali pass through Niger, with Malian non-state armed groups being heavily involved in this trade, particularly along the route from Mali to Libya via Niger. The trafficking of cocaine through Niger has also fuelled a steady rise in consumption within the country, with crack cocaine increasing in urban areas since 2020.

Niger plays a significant role as a transit point for cannabis resin, particularly along the west to east trafficking route for Moroccan kif. The country serves as a passage for kif convoys from Mali to Libya, making it an essential part of this trade.

The illicit trade and local consumption of synthetic opioids, particularly tramadol, has become a considerable problem in Niger in recent years. Weak oversight of the pharmaceutical industry in the country and the ease with which it is possible to import tramadol from India and China to neighbouring Nigeria have positioned Niger as a crucial transit point for traffickers. The demand for the drug in the wider region fuels the trafficking trade, with smugglers capitalizing on the higher price it commands in Libya as compared to Niger. Tramadol consumption is also fuelled by challenges faced by the Nigerien population in access to healthcare and appropriate pain management and is widespread among groups involved in arduous physical labour, such as agricultural workers and goldminers.

Cyber Crimes

There have been no relevant incidents of cyber-dependent crime related to organized crime groups in recent years.

Financial Crimes

Financial crime and corruption are major concerns in Niger. In recent years, billions of CFA francs of public funds have been misappropriated through manipulated defence procurements. Fraudulent practices including false delivery notes, inappropriate orders, and contracts for non-existent or unfulfilled services have been the primary methods facilitating financial crimes. Notably, there have been some high-profile embezzlement cases, primarily involving state-owned companies, which have led to the imprisonment of public officials and even ministers.

Criminal Actors

Government officials at various levels are suspected to be significantly involved in drug trafficking and other forms of organized crime. This includes officials ranging from local government council members to members of Parliament. Although high-level government officials are implicated, the extent of their involvement remains unclear. The government, both at the national and local level, maintains close ties with organized crime groups in order to minimize violence. This often involves informal and tacit agreements aimed at keeping the environment safe for daily business activities. While Nigerien military units are aware of criminal group operations, they avoid direct confrontation with heavily armed bandits, possibly owing to insufficient equipment and isolated postings.

Currently, there is no substantial evidence that large mafia-style groups are operating in Niger. By contrast, there are smaller criminal networks that engage in illicit activities, with smuggling and drug trafficking being prominent. These groups facilitate cross-border trade, including the smuggling of contraband such as weapons, drugs, fuel, vehicles, and humans. Smuggling operations predominantly occur through the Sahara Desert, often by means of caravans of trucks.

The criminalization of human smuggling has pushed what was once a licit and crucial livelihood underground, encouraging smugglers to use more remote bypass routes involving greater risks. Armed banditry has increased in the country, especially in the south-western and northern regions.

Foreign criminal actors contribute significantly to illicit activities in Niger, particularly in the drug and smuggling trades. Latin American and Asian cartels, as well as African diaspora and Maghreb mafia-style groups, are involved in the drug economy. Foreign nationals are also involved in human smuggling. With regards to gold smuggling, foreign actors with connections in Sudan and Dubai are increasing their influence, making Niger an important hub for illicit gold smuggling. Nigerian trafficking networks also play a significant role in arms trafficking in the country, particularly in the transportation of weapons sourced from northern Mali and then moved through Niger and Benin. Malian non-state armed groups exert significant control over the smuggling routes between Mali and Niger, and maintain connections with influential political figures in Niger. Chadian armed groups are also becoming increasingly involved in criminal activities, particularly in northern Niger and the Chad–Niger–Libya triangle. Niger also faces security threats from violent extremist groups, including IS Sahel and JNIM, as well as Nigeria-based groups such as Boko Haram. In the private sector, there have been instances of local companies across different fields reportedly engaging in illicit activities, specifically fraud, forgery, and money laundering, but the frequency of these cases seems to be rare. Corruption in businesses is a concern but not thoroughly investigated at present.

Leadership and governance

The government of Niger has demonstrated some attempts to combat organized crime, although its effectiveness in practice is limited. Its primary focus is addressing violent extremism as well as irregular migration, under pressure from international partners. While Niger is no longer the regional irregular migration hub it once was, due to the implementation of stricter measures introduced by the government on migratory routes and the effective enforcement, under EU pressure, of a 2015 Law on illegal trafficking of migrants, human smuggling dynamics still remain a significant component of illicit economies in the country as they continue to adapt and respond to demand for mobility.

Despite the small strengthening of governance that has been witnessed, Niger’s political elite and security apparatus have been regularly suspected of involvement in the illicit economy and concerns regarding political rights and civil liberties have not been addressed by the government. Transactional corruption is prevalent across state institutions and law enforcement, although solid evidence of state involvement in organized crime is difficult to obtain. Anti-corruption agencies have faced criticism for their lack of independence and their financial dependence on the executive branch. The government often fails to act on their recommendations or pursue corruption cases in court.

Niger has ratified various international legal instruments aimed at combating organized crime, including those related to corruption, illicit drug trafficking, the arms trade, and the protection of endangered species. The country relies heavily on international assistance to enhance its capacity to combat organized crime, with several countries providing security assistance, training, and troops on the ground. Niger has incorporated many international standards against organized crime into its national legislation with international cooperation. However, the capacity for effective implementation remains low. In terms of corruption, although the Constitution contains some provisions, Niger’s anti-corruption framework is inadequate and underdeveloped.

Criminal justice and security

The judicial system in Niger is characterized by a certain level of independence, as mandated by the Constitution. However, concerns persist regarding executive interference, and corruption remains a significant issue within the judiciary. Factors such as low salaries, inadequate training, and limited resources contribute to the prevalence of corruption. The judiciary often fails to hold high-ranking politicians criminally accountable, resulting in a lack of public trust. Nepotism is also widespread at lower levels of the judiciary, leading to inefficiency and an overwhelming caseload. Furthermore, arbitrary arrests and prolonged pretrial detentions are commonplace in Niger. In certain regions, states of emergency have been declared, granting the military the power to carry out mass arrests and detain individuals suspected of having ties to terrorist organizations.

Law enforcement structures in Niger continue to grapple with corruption, despite being perceived as a strong deterrent for many types of crimes. Although the police force enjoys one of the highest levels of public trust in Africa, security forces frequently accept bribes from intercepted smugglers to let them proceed, or from smugglers seeking release from jail.

Niger also faces significant challenges in maintaining its territorial integrity, owing to its extensive and porous land borders. Moreover, foreign violent extremist groups continue to pose a threat by infiltrating Niger and directly targeting the military. The destabilization of northern Chad and its border areas with Niger and Libya has further exacerbated the security situation. The return of rebel and mercenary groups from Libya following the 2020 Libyan ceasefire has contributed to increased banditry and insecurity. Over the course of 2022, the security situation continued to deteriorate, especially in the south-western regions of Tillabéri and Tahoua, bordering Mali and Burkina Faso, as well the south-eastern Diffa region, bordering Nigeria and Chad.

Economic and financial environment

Anti-money laundering efforts in Niger focus primarily on combating terrorism financing. However, the financial oversight infrastructure remains weak and ineffective. The informal economy represents a significant portion of the country’s economic activity, leading to low levels of formal financial inclusion, which hinder effective anti-money laundering measures. As a result, Niger is considered a medium-high-risk country for financial crimes. The prevalence of cash-based transactions in the informal sector and the widespread use of informal remittance services further complicate efforts to combat money laundering. Law enforcement agencies in Niger have limited success in prosecuting money laundering cases, mainly due to the difficulty of detecting suspicious transactions conducted in cash.

Niger faces significant challenges in its economic regulatory environment. The presence of violent extremist groups, criminal organizations, and rebel groups has negatively affected the country’s attractiveness to business. Foreign nationals and companies have been targeted, leading to a decline in foreign investment, particularly from major investors such as China and Europe. Additionally, factors such as food insecurity, limited industrialization, high population growth, a weak education sector, and a lack of employment opportunities beyond subsistence farming and herding make Niger an economically poor nation. The government relies heavily on foreign donor resources to support a significant portion of its fiscal budget. Taxation policies for the extractive sector continue to be insufficient in mobilizing and managing domestic resources for economic recovery. Although the COVID-19 pandemic initially exacerbated these economic challenges, Niger's economy recovered in 2022, after two years of weak growth.

Civil society and social protection

Human trafficking victim and witness support in Niger receives significant support from international organizations. The country recently introduced a national referral mechanism and established a government-operated shelter to provide care for identified trafficking victims. There has, however, been a decrease in the number of identified victims in comparison to the previous reporting period. While authorities have increased trafficking investigations, prosecutions, and convictions, they have not taken action to address the demand for commercial sex. Training in anti-trafficking measures is provided to armed forces personnel deployed on international peacekeeping missions, but cases of sexual exploitation involving Nigerien peacekeepers have been reported without adequate investigation or disciplinary action. Niger has implemented various prevention measures with international support to combat trafficking and address radicalization, and is also participating in regional initiatives to enhance border security, although these efforts have not yet yielded significant results.

The role of civil society in combating organized crime in Niger is limited, with only a few UN-sponsored initiatives in place. Civil society members have expressed concern about repression, alleging that the government has exploited the COVID-19 pandemic to arrest or silence them. The country’s cybercrime laws have also faced criticism, as individuals have been imprisoned for expressing their opinions on social networks. While there have been some positive developments, such as a bill removing the penalty of imprisonment for journalists accused of defamation and insult through electronic communication, challenges persist. Limited independent information is available through state-owned and privately owned media outlets. Investigative journalism is discouraged, and journalists can face prosecution resulting from allegations of defamation or the dissemination of information that may disturb public order.