People

Colombia remains a major hub for human trafficking, serving as a source, transit and destination country. Criminal organizations such as Clan del Golfo and Venezuela’s Tren de Aragua operate extensive trafficking networks, exploiting vulnerable individuals for forced labour, sexual exploitation and criminal activity. Victims include Colombian nationals, Venezuelan migrants and individuals trafficked from other South American countries. Traffickers use deception, coercion and violence, with social media frequently employed to lure victims under false pretences. The hospitality, agriculture and mining sectors provide cover for these operations, with forced labour prevalent in the coffee, strawberry, palm, coal, gold and emerald industries. Forced recruitment of children by armed groups has escalated, with reports of child recruitment significantly increasing in recent years. Authorities rescued hundreds of children from criminal organizations in 2024, yet the actual figures are probably much higher.

Human smuggling has grown into one of the country’s most pervasive criminal markets, with the Darién Gap serving as a key transit corridor. The Clan del Golfo exercises near-total control over this region, charging high fees and forcing some migrants to carry drugs as payment. Tren de Aragua and other foreign criminal actors have expanded their operations, particularly along the Venezuela–Colombia border. Corrupt officials and private-sector actors in the transport and hospitality industries facilitate these smuggling networks. Migrants pay varying fees to cross Colombia, depending on their route, with many facing extortion upon arrival. Some criminal groups use human smuggling as a diversion for drug trafficking, utilizing the same maritime and overland routes. Alternative smuggling corridors are emerging, particularly through Medellín, Anorí, Montería and Necoclí.

Extortion is a pervasive criminal enterprise in Colombia, affecting businesses of all sizes, from small vendors to multinational corporations. Groups such as Clan del Golfo, the National Liberation Army (ELN) and dissidents from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) dominate this market, leveraging fear and violence to extract payments. Mafia-style networks extort businesses in mining, cattle ranching, construction, retail and other industries. In urban areas, small businesses and street vendors are frequently targeted by criminal organizations offering a degree of ‘protection’ in exchange for payments. In rural regions, where extortion is deeply embedded, certain communities consider it an unavoidable cost of doing business. Nearly half of extortion cases are orchestrated remotely, often from within prisons. Criminal actors employ encrypted messaging and digital payment methods to avoid detection. Government attempts to curb extortion by blocking mobile signals in prisons have largely failed. The Medellín extortion market alone is estimated to be worth millions annually, underscoring the profitability of this crime.

Trade

Colombia has a well-developed arms trafficking market, with weapons flowing in from the United States, Central America and neighbouring Venezuela and Brazil. Port cities such as Buenaventura serve as key transit points. Mafia-style groups, local gangs and state-embedded actors are all involved in arms trafficking. Corrupt officials facilitate the movement of illicit firearms, with some high-ranking figures accused of directly supplying criminal groups. The use of drones and explosive devices by guerrilla factions has escalated, reflecting a shift in warfare tactics and, by extension, in the procurement of illicit weapons. In addition to sales, small arms rentals for criminal activities have become increasingly common in recent years. The widespread availability of firearms has had a direct impact on Colombia’s homicide rate, with most murders committed using guns.

Counterfeit goods are a prevalent issue, with criminal networks trafficking fake pharmaceuticals, electronics and luxury items. Many of these products originate from China and South East Asia and are distributed through informal markets and online platforms. In Colombia, counterfeit products are sold openly in many settings – from San Andresito markets in major cities to streets, pharmacies and shopping centres in smaller towns – often in plain sight of authorities, who lack either the capacity or the will to address the issue. Criminal organizations also use the counterfeit trade to launder money. Despite enforcement efforts and significant annual seizures, which saw a notable increase during the reporting period, counterfeit goods remain widely available. The illicit alcohol trade also poses public health risks, with reported cases of poisoning from counterfeit spirits. Law enforcement actions have led to the arrest of key figures involved in this trade, but criminal networks continue to adapt and expand their operations. In addition to being a destination country, Colombia also acts as a source for counterfeit items entering neighbouring markets.

The illicit trade in excisable consumer goods, particularly cigarettes and alcohol, has expanded significantly. Smuggled items, particularly cigarettes, are primarily smuggled into Colombia from countries such as Uruguay, South Korea, the United Arab Emirates, China and India, with Maicao serving as a notable hub. In some regions, illicit cigarettes account for the bulk of market share. Mafia-style groups and smaller organizations exploit the illicit trade in cigarettes and alcohol to launder money and profits from smuggling. The trade is enabled by corrupt security officials, especially in customs and near sales points, and private-sector actors in ports and markets. Foreign groups like Tren de Aragua are also reportedly involved, coercing vendors in some cities to sell trafficked goods.

Environment

Flora crimes in Colombia, particularly illegal logging, are widespread and deeply entrenched. It is estimated that nearly half of the wood in circulation is of illicit origin, much of it laundered through falsified permits or collusion with corrupt environmental officials. Organized criminal groups coordinate the extraction, transport and laundering of timber, often in conjunction with other illegal activities such as land grabs and drug production. The trade feeds both domestic markets and international demand, particularly from China and the Western Asia. Although recent years have seen a reduction in deforestation, much of the improvement is attributed to temporary truces by armed groups during negotiations rather than state-led enforcement. Corruption within regional environmental authorities perpetuates impunity.

Fauna crimes are facilitated by Colombia’s rich biodiversity and the weak enforcement of environmental protection laws. The country functions primarily as a supplier of exotic animals, with species trafficked for fashion, cuisine, traditional medicine and the pet trade. Criminal networks engage in wildlife trafficking when the chance arises, often with the help of customs officials. Overall, the trade tends to be opportunistic rather than highly organized. High-profile arrests and international cooperation have intensified enforcement efforts, but the market persists due to high profits in destination countries such as China and the United States. The illegal wildlife trade intersects with other environmental and financial crimes. Species such as sharks, monkeys and frogs are targeted for export, with foreign nationals sometimes involved in their trafficking.

Non-renewable resource crime, particularly illegal gold mining, is a very pervasive and damaging illicit market. Mining is predominantly carried out by organized crime groups and smaller independent actors who operate with limited fear of prosecution. Illegal mining now affects most of Colombia’s mining areas, and more than half of it occurs in protected zones. Armed groups extract rent from legal mining operations or participate directly in illegal extraction, often using it to launder proceeds from drug trafficking. Mining techniques cause extensive environmental harm, including deforestation, river contamination and biodiversity loss. The use of mercury, particularly in Afro-Colombian territories, has had devastating consequences for local communities. The Colombian government has recognized the severity of the issue and plans to deploy thousands of military personnel, but entrenched corruption and high profitability continue to fuel the expansion of this market.

Drugs

Colombia remains the world’s leading producer of cocaine, with production continuing to expand despite fluctuations in coca prices and law enforcement efforts. The cocaine trade operates through a highly structured supply chain, beginning with coca leaf farming and culminating in international trafficking networks. Coca cultivation is concentrated in rural, conflict-prone areas where armed groups provide protection to farmers in exchange for allegiance. The drop in coca leaf prices has forced many small-scale farmers into economic hardship, but large-scale criminal operations remain largely unaffected. Colombia’s cocaine is transported through traditional routes to the United States and Europe, and to emerging markets in Asia, Africa and Oceania. Recent reports indicate increased diversification in smuggling methods, including the use of semi-submersibles, drones and shipments concealed in commercial exports. Criminal organizations like the Clan del Golfo, ELN guerrillas and FARC dissidents are heavily involved in the cultivation, production and export of cocaine, controlling the processing labs and trafficking routes. Smaller groups handle parts of the supply chain and micro-trafficking in cities. Foreign actors – including Mexican cartels and Venezuela’s Tren de Aragua – have expanded their presence in recent years. Corruption among security forces and government officials facilitates the trade. The private sector also contributes, with some businesses helping to export drugs concealed in legal shipments or launder proceeds through financial schemes.

The heroin trade, historically significant in Colombia, has declined due to the increasing presence of synthetic opioids such as fentanyl. However, poppy cultivation persists, particularly in mountainous regions where criminal organizations continue production. Neighbouring countries, such as Ecuador, and the United States remain primary destinations for Colombian heroin, but declining demand and increased law enforcement interdictions have weakened this market. Increased law enforcement pressure has forced traffickers to adopt more discreet smuggling methods, including micro-trafficking and the use of human couriers. As the heroin trade is less profitable than cocaine, some criminal groups have been driven to diversify into synthetic drugs and illicit gold mining.

The synthetic drug market, especially 2CB (‘pink cocaine’), has grown rapidly, with Medellín serving as a key production and distribution hub. Criminal groups produce synthetic drugs locally and import chemical precursors to maintain supply. The demand for synthetic drugs is increasing, particularly among younger urban consumers and in nightlife settings. Synthetic drugs are frequently sold in small-scale networks, often disguised as other substances to evade detection. Cannabis remains widely cultivated, particularly in Cauca, with high-potency strains exported to regional markets. The blurred legal framework for cannabis has allowed illicit actors to exploit loopholes, particularly in areas where regulatory enforcement is weak. Criminal organizations control significant portions of the cannabis supply chain, leveraging pre-existing smuggling routes to move high-potency varieties internationally. The ‘creepy’ variety, known for its potency, is particularly sought after in markets such as Brazil and Chile. While mafia-style groups such as Clan del Golfo, ELN guerrillas and FARC dissidents are involved in local and international distribution of cannabis, its cultivation and production are held by local communities. Violence is pervasive in this market. Criminal groups exert violent control over areas they operate in, targeting local communities, rival organizations, security forces and state representatives.

Cyber-dependent crimes

Cyber-dependent crimes have escalated in Colombia, with millions of attempted cyberattacks recorded in recent years. Criminal actors have engaged in ransomware, data theft and malicious software deployment. Ransomware attacks are particularly prevalent, with primarily foreign actors behind them. Nevertheless, local groups are noted to be increasingly involved in ransomware and cyber-dependent crime in general. Criminal organizations, including Clan del Golfo, have incorporated cybercrime into their operations, targeting businesses and state institutions. Attacks primarily target private companies, government institutions and the health sector, with Bogotá experiencing the highest concentration. Colombia ranks among the most at-risk countries for ransomware attacks in Latin America. Law enforcement agencies lack the resources to effectively counteract cybercriminal networks, and outdated legal frameworks hinder prosecution efforts.

Financial Crimes

Colombia faces persistent financial crimes, with tax evasion and corruption undermining the formal economy. Tax evasion is widespread, largely due to a high level of informality, ineffective collection mechanisms and corruption within financial oversight institutions. The formal financial sector is frequently exploited to disguise tax evasion schemes, with criminals leveraging front companies and real estate investments to move illicit funds. Cyber-enabled financial crimes have surged in recent years, exacerbating existing vulnerabilities. The number of financial fraud victims has significantly increased as well, with Colombia ranking among the weakest countries in financial-fraud security evaluations. The 2024 assassination of the brother of a former tax director highlighted the intersection of financial crime and violence, and the high risks associated with exposing illicit networks.

Criminal Actors

Colombia’s criminal landscape is shaped by four major mafia-style groups: the Clan del Golfo, the ELN, the FARC Estado Mayor Central (FARC EMC) and the FARC Segunda Marquetalia. The Clan del Golfo, the country’s largest criminal organization, operates a hierarchical structure, although recent leadership changes have led to internal disputes. The group dominates northwestern Colombia, engaging in drug trafficking, illegal mining and human smuggling. Despite peace negotiations with the Colombian government, the ELN maintains a decentralized command and is active along the Venezuelan border. The FARC EMC, a dissident faction of the 2016 Peace Accords, has expanded territorially, with negotiations for a ceasefire ongoing. However, internal divisions have led to fragmentation, limiting the reach of peace efforts. The Segunda Marquetalia, another FARC dissident group, remains engaged in drug trafficking and extortion along the Venezuelan border. These groups exert substantial territorial control and employ local criminal networks to enforce influence, creating persistent instability despite the government’s Total Peace initiative.

Colombia also hosts numerous smaller criminal networks that operate independently or under larger mafia-style organizations. Groups such as Los Pelusos, Los Puntilleros, La Oficina de Envigado, Espartanos and Shottas specialize in micro-trafficking, extortion, contract killings and smuggling. Many operate in urban centres, controlling drug distribution networks and influencing municipal politics. In Buenaventura, for instance, Shottas and Espartanos dominate port-related illicit activities. These networks are highly adaptable, collaborating with international partners to facilitate drug exports. The fragmentation of the cocaine trade has empowered smaller groups to gain prominence, often working with mafia-style organizations in a subcontracting model.

Criminal influence within Colombia’s state institutions is a long-standing issue, with actors infiltrating multiple levels of government. Corrupt officials within the police and armed forces have facilitated drug trafficking and illegal mining, providing critical logistical support for criminal operations. Local political figures in certain municipalities, as well as individuals from high-level political circles, have been linked to organized crime, securing electoral advantages through illicit financing. Recent efforts to combat this issue have led to a large-scale restructuring of the security forces. Nevertheless, entrenched corruption remains a major barrier to tackling organized crime.

Foreign criminal organizations, particularly Mexican and Venezuelan groups, play a crucial role in Colombia’s illicit economies. The Sinaloa Cartel and Jalisco New Generation Cartel finance and coordinate cocaine production, maintaining strong links with local actors such as the ELN and Clan del Golfo. Unlike domestic groups, these Mexican cartels avoid territorial control, acting instead as intermediaries in drug trade logistics. Venezuelan gangs, notably Tren de Aragua, have expanded into Colombian cities, specializing in human trafficking and extortion. Clashes with Colombian groups, particularly in Medellín and border regions, highlight their growing influence. Venezuelan state-linked actors, including the Cartel de los Soles, collaborate with ex-FARC members in transnational drug operations. Additionally, Brazilian groups such as the Primeiro Comando da Capital facilitate cocaine trafficking into international markets, establishing links with Italian mafias. These foreign influences complicate Colombia’s security environment and reinforce the country’s role as a hub for global organized crime.

The private sector is instrumental in facilitating organized crime, particularly in money laundering and asset control. Industries such as construction, tourism and agriculture provide infrastructure for illicit financial flows. Land ownership by mafia-style groups allows them to integrate criminal activities into legal markets, exerting influence over local economies. Financial institutions and business elites have faced investigations for complicity in laundering drug proceeds, though enforcement remains inconsistent. High-profile cases, such as the arrest of a fish industry businessperson linked to Mexican cartels, underscore the private sector’s entanglement with criminal networks.

Leadership and governance

Colombia’s government is pursuing its Total Peace initiative, which aims to engage criminal groups such as guerrillas and paramilitaries in dialogue. However, its implementation has encountered obstacles, including lack of coordination, ineffective ceasefires and congressional resistance to judicial reforms. Corruption investigations involving high-level officials have contributed to public distrust. Additionally, the government’s shift in drug policy toward interdiction rather than prosecuting coca growers has coincided with ongoing violence and the persistence of organized crime activities. Despite these efforts, many of these criminal structures remain relevant political actors, especially at the local level, actively participating in Congress, mayoral offices and other political spheres.

The country has implemented transparency mechanisms, but corruption and impunity continue to hamper their effectiveness. While there have been minor improvements in public perceptions of corruption, concerns persist regarding legislative proposals and the incomplete execution of anti-corruption strategies. Colombia is yet to implement the National Anticorruption Strategy outlined in its National Development Plan. This strategy includes measures to enhance public and journalistic access to information, improve government accountability, strengthen witness protection and increase the state’s capacity to prevent and punish corruption. These shortcomings combined with high-profile corruption scandals have also influenced perceptions of accountability.

Colombia actively participates in international treaties and agreements addressing transnational crime, including the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. However, the country has not ratified protocols related to migrant smuggling and firearms trafficking. In recent years, Colombia has continued to participate actively in transnational operations against organized crime. The country also maintains security partnerships, particularly with the United States and other South American countries, where extradition remains a tool in legal proceedings against organized crime. For example, in 2024, a binational council with Ecuador was established to address environmental and organized crime in border regions. That same year, the country also signed an agreement with Brazil to step up efforts against transnational crimes in the Amazon – including drug trafficking and illegal logging – through increased military presence and joint operations. However, corruption and information leaks within security institutions present challenges for international cooperation.

Colombia has a comprehensive legislative framework to address organized crime, with laws covering areas such as organized criminal activity, drug and firearm control and environmental protection, including provisions for significant penalties for environmental offences. However, some gaps and inconsistencies remain. For example, existing legislation on human trafficking does not fully align with international standards, as it omits key elements like force, fraud or coercion. Current laws also insufficiently address the influence of criminal groups in political processes, highlighting the need for stronger measures against corruption and the use of illicit resources in politics and the private sector. Recent initiatives to promote peace and demobilization offer alternatives to incarceration and seek to incentivize disengagement from criminal activity, though their implementation faces ongoing challenges.

Criminal justice and security

Colombia’s judicial system continues to face challenges in addressing organized crime. While the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) has processed high-profile cases, corruption and institutional inefficiencies persist. Reports indicate instances of judicial corruption, and some organized crime groups have operated from within detention facilities. Overcrowding and detention conditions have also been identified as areas of concern despite ongoing institutional reforms.

Law enforcement operations targeting organized crime have been affected by internal corruption and political considerations. Specialized units focus on drug trafficking, money laundering and other illicit activities, but their effectiveness has been reduced by internal scandals. Ceasefires under the Total Peace initiative have affected law enforcement strategies, and some reports suggest links between corruption within security forces and human trafficking networks.

Colombia’s territorial integrity is shaped by porous borders with Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru and Brazil which facilitate illicit cross-border activities. Armed groups continue to operate in border regions, at times engaging with foreign actors. Limited state presence in rural and border areas has allowed organized crime to exert influence, with indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities particularly affected. Security infrastructure constraints remain a factor in Colombia’s exposure to transnational criminal activities.

Economic and financial environment

Colombia has implemented measures to align its anti-money laundering (AML) framework with Financial Action Task Force standards. Financial crime enforcement has expanded, particularly concerning cryptocurrency transactions and cross-border illicit financial flows. However, Panama’s financial system continues to be used for money laundering by Colombian entities, and some business structures remain vulnerable to exploitation. International cooperation on AML efforts has improved, but domestic enforcement results have varied, particularly in high-profile financial crime cases.

Organized crime groups maintain a presence in economic sectors such as construction, transportation and entertainment. Money laundering networks have had an impact on financial markets, creating regulatory challenges. Informal economic activities, including loansharking, continue in some regions. In rural areas, criminal groups exert control over local economies through alternative governance models.

Civil society and social protection

Colombia’s victim and witness support systems have encountered challenges, particularly within the National Protection Unit, which has faced allegations of corruption and operational inefficiencies. Some key witnesses in criminal cases have been targeted. Legal frameworks exist for victim protection and reparations, but implementation has been inconsistent. In rural areas, communities are often reluctant to report crimes because of perceived links between criminal groups and law enforcement. For drug users, the country is developing an action plan centred on harm reduction, better access to care and treatment, and social inclusion to address the negative impacts of drug use. Its implementation and impact remain to be seen.

Crime prevention strategies include security and intervention programmes, but militarized approaches have influenced their application, overshadowing softer prevention measures. For example, drug crop substitution programmes designed to reduce the cultivation of drug-producing crops are losing momentum. There have also been attempts to implement non-police prevention strategies, including experimental approaches aimed at curbing criminal governance. Local governments have developed alternative policing models, while national prevention policies remain in development. The adoption of a ‘human security’ strategy has introduced additional space for prevention-focused initiatives, though implementation levels vary.

Independent media and civil society organizations continue to report on corruption and human rights issues. However, journalists and activists have faced threats and violence, particularly when covering organized crime. Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities have reported security concerns. Civil society organizations remain active, but targeted violence has affected their operational capacity.

People

Mexico remains a significant hub for human trafficking, fuelled by economic disparities, violence, migration and weak institutional frameworks. The southern states, including Chiapas, Oaxaca and Guerrero, have the highest prevalence, with indigenous populations often subjected to forced labour in agriculture, domestic work and the maquila (manufacturing) industry – consisting of foreign factories producing goods often for export. Kidnapping for forced labour is an emerging issue. Sexual exploitation is widespread, particularly in tourist centres like Cancún, Los Cabos and Playa del Carmen, where sex tourism drives demand. Criminal organizations, including the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) and the Sinaloa Cartel, have been increasingly involved in the human trafficking market. They have also diversified their operations, turning greater attention to online sexual exploitation and labour trafficking, though human trafficking remains a secondary activity. Despite an updated legal framework, enforcement remains weak and only a small percentage of cases reach judicial resolution. The issue is exacerbated by transnational links, as migrants from Southeast Asia, Africa and Central America are trafficked through Mexico towards the US.

Mexico’s geographical position makes it a critical transit point for human smuggling. Migrants from Central America, Africa and Asia rely on smugglers to facilitate border crossings, often at great personal risk. Criminal organizations impose territorial fees on smugglers and exploit vulnerable migrants, forcing them into labour or criminal activities in exchange for passage. The recent tightening of US immigration policies has pushed migrants into more dangerous routes, increasing reliance on smuggling networks. Smuggling hotspots include Tijuana, Sonora, Coahuila, Veracruz and Tamaulipas, where corrupt authorities facilitate crossings. Despite enforcement efforts, human smuggling remains a profitable and deeply entrenched market.

Extortion is a pervasive crime in Mexico, affecting businesses, agriculture, unions and public officials. The CJNG, the Sinaloa Cartel and the Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel dominate this market, but smaller groups and individuals also engage in extortion by falsely claiming cartel affiliation. Agricultural sectors, particularly avocado and fishing industries, are heavily impacted. Urban centres such as Mexico City, Monterrey and Guadalajara face increasing digital and phone-based extortion. Despite law enforcement efforts, underreporting is common due to fear of retaliation.

Trade

The illegal arms trade in Mexico is fuelled by weapons smuggled from the US, with key entry points in Tijuana, Nogales, Ciudad Juárez and Manzanillo. Cartels rely on firearms for territorial control, with preferred weapons including Barrett .50 calibre rifles and AK-47s. The possession of unregistered firearms is widespread in Mexico, with estimates suggesting that over 13 million such weapons are in circulation. Corrupt officials facilitate smuggling, and former security personnel sometimes participate in the trade. Despite recent legal actions against US gun manufacturers, arms trafficking continues to drive violence in Mexico, contributing to high homicide rates. Moreover, the arms trafficking market is closely connected to drug trafficking networks and criminal groups engaged in human trafficking, extortion, kidnapping and armed robbery. Criminal groups employ highly specialized techniques for smuggling weapons across the border, with drug trafficking networks being their main clients. These groups also use ‘ant trade’ movements, smuggling weapons on a small scale to avoid detection.

Counterfeit goods represent a significant illicit market, with organized crime groups and corrupt customs officials facilitating entry. High-demand counterfeit products include tobacco, alcohol, clothing and pharmaceuticals. Tepito in Mexico City and markets in Jalisco and Monterrey serve as key distribution centres. The counterfeit goods industry generates billions in revenue, which contributes to expanding cartel power and is closely linked to money laundering. This market is fuelled by local demand, with a considerable share of the population buying counterfeit products such as footwear, clothing and medicines. The smuggling of excise goods, particularly tobacco and alcohol, is well-established, with organized crime groups operating independently of financial intermediaries. Free trade zones and corruption facilitate this market. The illicit trade in excise goods remains a major source of revenue for criminal organizations, particularly along the southern border.

Environment

Illegal logging in Mexico is driven by organized crime groups that control communal lands and extort forest communities. These groups, including drug cartels, exploit the timber trade to fund operations and launder money, targeting valuable species. Regions like the Sierra Madre mountains have seen expanded criminal control over both legal and illegal activities, exacerbating environmental and governance challenges. High-value timber, including rosewood and mahogany, is trafficked for export. Mexico serves as a source and transit country for regional flora products, with significant trafficking to China and the US. The rise in avocado demand has exacerbated deforestation, with cartels converting forests into plantations. Weak institutional enforcement and corruption hinder efforts to combat illegal logging. The fauna trafficking market is rapidly becoming one of the most robust illegal markets globally, with Mexico playing a pivotal role due to its vast biodiversity, strategic geographical location and accessible communication channels with various countries. Additionally, the trafficking of wild species, particularly jaguars, parrots, reptiles and sea cucumbers from Mexico to China is a significant and growing market, exacerbating threats to Mexican biodiversity. Organized criminal groups, state actors and civilians are heavily involved in animal trafficking networks. These networks are responsible for the extraction, distribution and sale of exotic species, driving some of them this to the brink of extinction. Corrupt officials issue fraudulent documentation to facilitate trade. The use of social media has expanded access to illegal wildlife markets, while seizures remain minimal. Cartels have increasingly entered the wildlife trade, using it for money laundering and status symbols.

Illegal trafficking of gasoline and diesel has become a serious issue in Mexico. Fuel theft, known as huachicol, is a major criminal enterprise, with criminal groups tapping into oil pipelines and hijacking fuel shipments. Despite crackdowns, fuel theft costs Mexico billions annually. The illegal fuel trade has also led to increased violence, particularly in states like Guanajuato and Puebla. Illegal gold and mercury mining are significant criminal activities, with criminal groups extorting mining operations and engaging in illicit exports. The involvement of organized crime in mining and fuel theft further destabilizes local economies. Drug cartels have gained a leading role within the non-renewable resource crimes market, seizing control over gangs involved in fuel theft or engaging in the mining sector by charging fees, forcing companies to use their services or directly exploiting mines. The Serra Gorda region relies heavily on mercury mining despite environmental concerns, with plans to phase it out by 2032 under the Minamata Convention unlikely to end illegal activity.

Drugs

Mexico remains a primary heroin supplier to the US, with the Sinaloa Cartel dominating the market. Poppy cultivation has declined due to the rise of synthetic opioids like fentanyl, but heroin remains a significant drug trade component. The destruction of poppy fields and law enforcement seizures have limited impact. However, despite increased enforcement, heroin trafficking persists, with smugglers adapting to tighter border controls by using concealed transportation methods and alternative smuggling routes. Cocaine remains a lucrative trade for Mexican cartels, primarily serving as a transit route for Colombian and Ecuadorian cocaine bound for the US. The CJNG and the Sinaloa Cartel control major distribution networks. Increased coca cultivation in Guerrero and Michoacán suggests Mexico is emerging as a minor producer. High levels of corruption facilitate cocaine smuggling. Cocaine trafficking operations involve sophisticated smuggling techniques, including concealed compartments in vehicles and the use of maritime routes. Overall, the impact of cocaine trade within Mexico is significant, fuelling corruption, violence and crime, contributing to thousands of homicides annually. Mexico has a long history of cannabis production, but legalization in the US has reduced its profitability. Organized crime groups continue to control cultivation and distribution, particularly in rural areas, though demand has shifted towards synthetic drugs. Cannabis remains a domestic market staple, with legal reforms impacting the illicit trade structure.

Synthetic drug production, particularly methamphetamine and fentanyl, remains extremely pervasive. Mexico is a leading fentanyl supplier to the US, with clandestine labs producing vast quantities. Cartels source precursor chemicals from China and India. The profitability of synthetic drugs surpasses that of traditional narcotics, and seizures have increased, though production remains high. Fentanyl and methamphetamine production is often conducted in remote rural laboratories, where authorities face challenges in detection and dismantling. The environmental impact of synthetic drug production is severe, with chemical waste contaminating land and water sources. Cartels continually refine production techniques, making synthetic drugs increasingly potent and addictive, exacerbating the social impact of drug abuse in Mexico and the US.

Cyber-dependent crimes

Cybercrime is rising in Mexico, with ransomware attacks being a prevalent form of crime. Criminal organizations exploit digital platforms to break into security systems and steal sensitive data. Various actors are involved in executing cyber-dependent crimes in Mexico, including individual hackers and cybercriminals with specialized computer knowledge, as well as organized crime groups that leverage technology for illicit activities. Investigations into cybercrimes, including cyberattacks, have been carried out, with Mexico City, Jalisco and the State of Mexico having the highest incidence. Cyber-dependent crimes like hacking and malware attacks significantly impact financial markets, causing financial losses, data breaches and economic disruptions. Operational disruptions also occur due to these cyber-attacks, temporarily affecting banks and public sector institutions’ activities. Cryptocurrencies are widely used to obscure illicit transactions. One notable group involved in these activities are the ciberburreros, mainly young people who are recruited by organized crime to massively acquire cryptocurrencies. Law enforcement capabilities remain limited, and under-reporting of cybercrime is common.

Financial Crimes

The market for financial crimes in Mexico is highly consolidated, representing a significant threat to organizations, governments and individuals. These crimes, including fraud and tax evasion, are deeply embedded in Mexico's economy, facilitated by corrupt officials and financial institutions. Organized crime groups, such as the Sinaloa Cartel and the Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel, are heavily involved in these activities. However, various actors, such as corrupt government officials, entrepreneurs and private sector organizations, exploit their positions to commit fraud and other financial crimes. Scammers and common criminals engage in schemes such as debt collection scams, Ponzi schemes and fake prizes. The financial intelligence unit has increased efforts to track illicit transactions, but enforcement remains inconsistent. Cartels use real estate, shell companies and trade-based laundering to legitimize profits. Customs fraud and tax evasion further contribute to the financial crime landscape.

Criminal Actors

Mexico’s criminal landscape is dominated by powerful mafia-style groups, primarily drug cartels that have evolved into multi-faceted criminal organizations. The Sinaloa Cartel and the CJNG exert influence nationwide, engaging in drug trafficking, extortion, human trafficking, illicit fuel sales and robbery. These groups maintain hierarchical structures with distinct leadership factions, including the CJNG’s centralized command under Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes and the Sinaloa Cartel’s decentralized power blocs. Recent arrests, such as the capture of Ismael ‘El Mayo’ Zambada in 2024, have triggered violent power struggles within the Sinaloa Cartel. Similarly, the Gulf Cartel has expanded operations into US waters, engaging in drug trafficking, human smuggling and illegal fishing. Extortion is rampant, with at least 30 of Mexico’s 32 states affected. Symbols of narco culture, such as tactical uniforms and social media propaganda, reinforce the identity and influence of these groups. Cartels employ a vast workforce – comparable to Mexico’s largest corporations – highlighting their deep-rooted societal presence. Additionally, cartel control over certain prisons underscores their extensive reach within the state apparatus. Beyond hierarchical cartels, Mexico hosts flexible criminal networks that operate primarily in financial crimes, such as money laundering and embezzlement. These networks often involve collusion between private-sector actors and government officials. Notable cases include the ‘Estafa Maestra’ scandal, which exposed systemic corruption through fraudulent government contracts. These criminal networks operate primarily in major urban centres like Mexico City, Guadalajara and Monterrey, focusing on white-collar crimes rather than violent activities. Nonetheless, their economic impact is substantial, eroding trust in financial and governmental institutions. Corruption within Mexico’s government facilitates the entrenchment of organized crime. Municipal governments, with limited resources and capacity, are particularly susceptible to criminal infiltration. Many law enforcement agencies in Mexico are infiltrated by organised crime, making it difficult to combat the influence of cartels. Corruption at various levels of government has allowed cartels to operate with relative impunity, often receiving protection or even direct assistance. At the state level, governors from regions like Tamaulipas and Sinaloa have faced allegations of cartel ties. At the federal level, high-profile cases such as Genaro García Luna’s conviction for colluding with the Sinaloa Cartel illustrate systemic corruption. Financial crimes within public administration remain a significant issue. The Segalmex scandal, involving billions of pesos in irregular transactions, underscores the pervasiveness of fraud within state institutions. Leaks such as the Panama Papers have also revealed widespread tax evasion by Mexican elites, further highlighting the blurred lines between legitimate governance and criminal activity.

Although Mexico’s organized crime is primarily domestic, foreign actors have begun establishing criminal networks. Colombian groups operate in major cities, engaging in home invasions and fraud. The Chinese diaspora has been linked to financial crimes, particularly predatory lending schemes via smartphone applications. Additionally, Chinese operatives have been implicated in the trafficking of totoaba maw, a lucrative black-market wildlife trade connected to the Sinaloa Cartel. Transnational criminal organizations such as the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) have attempted to penetrate Mexico but remain marginal. Meanwhile, international criminal groups, including Russian-speaking smuggling networks, have reportedly become active along the Mexico–US border, driven by increased migrant flows from regions such as Russia and Central Asia. Mexico’s private sector plays a complex role in organized crime, particularly in financial crimes and illicit resource extraction. Investigations, such as those from the Panama and Paradise Papers, have exposed prominent Mexican entrepreneurs involved in money laundering through offshore tax havens. The mining sector, in particular, is deeply entangled with organized crime. Cartels, including Los Zetas and the Caballeros Templarios, extort mining companies and, in some cases, directly control mining operations. During President López Obrador’s administration, corruption scandals linked to high-profile figures, including his son, have raised concerns over corporate–government collusion. Despite these revelations, few legal actions have been taken against business elites. Mining companies often admit to cooperating with criminal groups for operational security, further illustrating the normalization of cartel influence in Mexico’s economic sectors.

Leadership and governance

Mexico’s political landscape remains heavily influenced by organized crime, with criminal groups exercising significant control over political institutions. Although the government has taken a strong public stance against organized crime, including ongoing operations and military interventions, challenges persist. The increasing militarization of public security, particularly under the administration of Andrés Manuel López Obrador, has seen the military assume a dominant role in law enforcement, raising concerns over human rights abuses and democratic governance. Opposition parties highlight the need for policies beyond direct confrontation, advocating for long-term solutions to address root causes. However, organized crime continues to influence elections through voter intimidation, campaign financing and violence against political figures. The fragility of democratic institutions is evident in cases of high-level corruption, such as the Ayotzinapa case and the conviction of former officials for cartel affiliations.

Despite efforts to combat corruption, including the presence of the national anti-corruption system, Mexico continues to struggle with widespread impunity and a lack of transparency. The national anti-corruption system has faced political resistance and underfunding, undermining its effectiveness. Investigative journalism and civil society play key roles in exposing corruption, but journalists and activists face threats, with Mexico ranking among the most dangerous countries for the press. Government opacity remains a significant issue, exemplified by the withholding of public information under the pretext of national security. Mechanisms such as CompraNet provide some transparency in public procurement, yet corruption persists in contracting processes. The dissolution of autonomous oversight agencies threatens further setbacks in accountability. Although international organizations provide recommendations for improving governance, compliance remains weak.

Mexico is a signatory to multiple international agreements against organized crime, including the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Extradition treaties, particularly with the US, have led to the transfer of high-profile criminals. Furthermore, Mexico collaborates with regional counterparts, particularly with the US on human smuggling and drug trafficking through various initiatives, including law enforcement partnerships, information sharing and joint task forces. However, challenges in implementation and coordination persist, as seen in cases where Mexico was not informed about major law enforcement actions, such as the capture of cartel leaders abroad. The fight against fentanyl trafficking remains a priority in US–Mexico relations, with both countries enhancing enforcement efforts. Mexico’s lawsuit against US gun manufacturers also reflects regional concerns over arms trafficking.

Mexico has an extensive legal framework addressing organized crime, including a federal law against organized crime. Recent reforms have expanded protections against labour exploitation and human trafficking. However, enforcement remains a challenge due to systemic corruption and inefficiencies within the judiciary. The government has taken steps to strengthen customs regulations, but organized crime continues to exploit weaknesses in enforcement. Cybercrime legislation remains fragmented, and Mexico has yet to adopt the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, limiting international cooperation in this area. Intellectual property enforcement is another weak point, with high rates of counterfeiting and piracy.

Criminal justice and security

Mexico’s judiciary includes specialized units dedicated to organized crime prosecution, yet the system faces severe challenges due to corruption, inefficiency and political influence. The specialized prosecutor’s office against organized crime leads investigations into criminal networks, but its effectiveness is hampered by a lack of resources and widespread impunity. The judiciary’s budget has been significantly reduced, limiting its capacity to address organized crime effectively. The judicial reform allowing the election of judges has sparked concerns over potential cartel influence. Corruption and bribery within prisons remain widespread, with criminal organizations maintaining influence inside facilities. Although some prisons have achieved accreditation under international standards, conditions remain dire, with overcrowding, corruption and cartel influence undermining rehabilitation efforts. Organized crime groups maintain control over several penitentiaries, using them as operational bases.

Mexico’s law enforcement agencies include specialized units targeting organized crime, yet their effectiveness is hindered by corruption and inadequate oversight. Although military involvement in law enforcement has expanded, public trust in police remains low due to allegations of abuse and criminal collusion. In particular, the national guard, created to address security challenges, has seen increased militarization, raising concerns over human rights violations. Intelligence-sharing programmes with international partners, particularly the US, have enhanced cross-border enforcement efforts, yet significant gaps remain. Community policing initiatives have shown some success in certain regions, but their scalability is uncertain.

Mexico’s borders remain highly vulnerable to organized crime, with drug trafficking, human smuggling and arms trafficking being persistent challenges. The US–Mexico border is a major focal point for drug interdiction efforts, while the southern border remains porous, facilitating irregular migration and illicit trade. Customs corruption further exacerbates security risks. Maritime ports, particularly along the Pacific coast, have become key trafficking hubs for precursor chemicals used in synthetic drug production. Recent seizures indicate an escalation in cartel activities in these regions. The discovery of smuggling tunnels and the use of drones for cross-border trafficking highlight the evolving tactics of criminal organizations.

Economic and financial environment

Mexico’s anti-money laundering framework includes stringent financial regulations and participation in international oversight bodies such as the Financial Action Task Force. Nevertheless, its compliance with anti-money laundering standards remains inconsistent. The financial intelligence unit plays a crucial role in tracking illicit financial flows, but corruption and lack of enforcement weaken its impact. Although Mexico has avoided the Financial Action Task Force’s high-risk classification, the US continues to identify Mexico as a primary concern for money laundering, particularly due to its ties to drug cartels. Legislative reforms have strengthened financial oversight, but illicit financial flows remain significant.

The economic regulatory environment presents both opportunities and risks for legal businesses. Corruption and organized crime infiltration in industries such as mining, agriculture and transportation distort market dynamics. Cartels exert control over certain supply chains, imposing unofficial taxes and extorting businesses. Efforts to promote regulatory transparency have been undermined by political favouritism and weak institutional enforcement. Despite these challenges, Mexico has undertaken initiatives to support small and medium-sized enterprises through regulatory reforms and economic stimulus programmes. However, the infiltration of criminal actors into legal markets continues to pose significant obstacles to economic stability. Furthermore, high levels of distrust in the public sector, fuelled by corruption and impunity, drive many Mexicans to evade taxes and operate in the informal sector.

Civil society and social protection

Mexico lacks a comprehensive institutional strategy for victim and witness protection. The general law for victims mandates state support, yet implementation is weak due to insufficient funding and political will. Programmes designed to protect individuals involved in criminal proceedings face budgetary constraints and operational inefficiencies. Civil society organizations play a crucial role in providing legal and psychological assistance. Witness protection programmes face significant challenges, with many witnesses being removed due to resource constraints or security concerns.

Prevention efforts have focused on addressing the root causes of organized crime, such as poverty and lack of opportunities. The national public security strategy emphasizes prevention, yet results have been limited. Although some efforts have been made to address human trafficking and environmental crimes, enforcement gaps persist. Militarized policing strategies have led to human rights violations, undermining public trust. Community policing initiatives have emerged as an alternative, yet they often operate outside formal legal frameworks. Government welfare programmes aim to prevent cartel recruitment among vulnerable youth, yet their effectiveness remains uncertain.

Non-state actors, including civil society organizations and investigative journalists, play a crucial role in documenting organized crime and advocating for policy reforms. However, they face increasing government restrictions and security threats. Mexico remains one of the most dangerous countries for journalists, with frequent attacks on media professionals. Government officials have been implicated in nearly half of the reported cases of violence against journalists, highlighting the risks faced by those reporting on corruption and crime. Despite these challenges, civil society organizations continue to push for greater transparency and accountability. Human rights defenders and grassroots movements remain active, though they frequently encounter government resistance and threats from criminal groups. The government’s relationship with NGOs is often adversarial, with recent efforts to restrict funding and limit their operational scope. Attacks on journalists, activists and political candidates are also a critical issue, with formal protection mechanisms often failing to prevent violence. Nonetheless, the new administration appears to be less confrontational towards non-state actors than its predecessor.