The Organized Crime Index | ENACT
Year:
Colombia
x
    Mexico

    Profile

    Colombia

    Capital

    Bogota

    Gross domestic product (GDP)

    USD 314,464.00 million

    Income group

    Upper middle income

    Population

    51,516,562

    Area

    1,140,619 km²

    Geography type

    Coastal

    7.750.09

    Criminality score

    2nd of 193 countries 0

    1st of 35 countries in Americas0

    1st of 12 countries in South America0

    Criminal markets

    7.300.10

    An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.

    Human trafficking

    8.000.50

    Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.

    Human smuggling

    7.500.50

    Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.

    Extortion and protection racketeering

    8.50 n/a

    Crimes linked to exerting control over a territory/market including as a mediator and/or requesting a benefit in exchange for protection.

    Arms trafficking

    8.000.00

    The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.

    Trade in counterfeit goods

    7.50 n/a

    The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands.

    Illicit trade in excisable goods

    4.50 n/a

    The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits.

    Flora crimes

    7.001.00

    The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.

    Fauna crimes

    7.000.00

    The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.

    Non-renewable resource crimes

    9.000.00

    The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.

    Heroin trade

    5.000.00

    The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.

    Cocaine trade

    9.500.00

    The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.

    Cannabis trade

    7.00-1.00

    The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.

    Synthetic drug trade

    6.001.00

    The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.

    Cyber-dependent crimes

    7.00 n/a

    Organized crimes that rely solely on using information communications technology with the aim of obtaining a monetary/material benefit.

    Financial crimes

    8.00 n/a

    Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance.

    Criminal actors

    8.200.07

    An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.

    Mafia-style groups

    9.500.00

    Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.

    Criminal networks

    9.500.50

    Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.

    State-embedded actors

    7.500.50

    Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.

    Foreign actors

    7.500.50

    State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.

    Private sector actors

    7.00 n/a

    Profit-seeking individuals/entities who own/control a part of the legal economy free from the state, that collaborate with criminal actors.

    5.63-0.21

    Resilience score

    50th of 193 countries -10

    7th of 35 countries in Americas-1

    4th of 12 countries in South America0

    Political leadership and governance

    6.00-1.00

    The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.

    Government transparency and accountability

    5.500.00

    The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.

    International cooperation

    9.000.00

    A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.

    National policies and laws

    6.50-0.50

    A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.

    Judicial system and detention

    5.500.00

    Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.

    Law enforcement

    5.00-1.00

    The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.

    Territorial integrity

    4.500.00

    The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.

    Anti-money laundering

    6.000.00

    A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.

    Economic regulatory capacity

    5.000.00

    The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.

    Victim and witness support

    3.500.00

    Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.

    Prevention

    4.500.00

    Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.

    Non-state actors

    6.500.00

    The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.

    5.63 8.20 7.30 5.63 8.20 7.30

    Analysis

    01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11

    People

    Colombia is a country which is both a source of and a destination for human trafficking. Human traffickers operate within established networks of organized-crime and illegal armed groups. Sex work and sexual exploitation have come to the attention of authorities in some parts of the country, leading to campaigns against established sex tourism. Sophisticated human-trafficking networks, run by Colombians, traffic women into Asia and operate online. The situation has worsened with the mixed migratory flux crisis from Venezuela, with human-smuggling dynamics often correlated with exploitation dynamics. Venezuelans are being exploited at mines and at coca leaf crop and cocaine production sites, while women are being sexually exploited in the surrounding areas. Additionally, there have been cases of child exploitation for forced begging in major Colombian cities.

    Colombia has become a hub for human smuggling, especially since the situation in Venezuela has deteriorated and millions of Venezuelans have left their country. Young children and teenagers are especially vulnerable to human-smuggling and forced-labour practices within Colombia. Criminal actors also smuggle African, Asian, Haitian, Ecuadorian and Cuban nationals through the country, and state actors profit from the human-smuggling industry. In the northern region of the country, on the border with Panama, there is a well-established route for people seeking to reach the US. The human-smuggling criminal market is related to other illicit financial flows and money-laundering dynamics, such as moving illegal gold and cash from and to Panama. The situation has created a network of criminal markets operating the route and include transnational and local mafias.

    Colombian criminal violence is fuelled by extortion and protection racketeering perpetrated by organized-crime networks, especially in rural areas. Mafia-style groups engage in this illegal activity, charging merchants, landowners and businesses for protecting them against other criminal networks that might attack their territory. They also engage in cartel racketeering and use social-media platforms and digital strategies to intimidate and terrorize the population. In cities, smaller bands control streets and impose their taxation, extortion and security obligations on businesses that operate within their territories. These types of activities increase when conflicts break out among criminal groups. In rural areas, criminal groups charge landowners protection money or extort them to the point that they have to hand over their land rights. They also tax and extort illegal mining activities and drug transport in the territories they control. Their show of force indicates the amount of control these groups enforce on a territory, affecting businesses and even intimidating street vendors into paying them.

    Trade

    Colombia’s ongoing conflict with several armed groups has made it a destination country for illegally acquired arms. The economic collapse of Venezuela has also led to growing volumes of arms being diverted from the army into the hands of Colombian criminals. Each of these criminal actors has found their own methods for accessing arms from international networks. Firearms are the most common weapon used in murders in the country, which are often related to drug wars. Recently, traffickers have been bringing in arms shipments from Asia and the US into Chilean ports, which eventually reach Colombia through various routes. Despite the ongoing conflict, some authorities have called on Colombian civilians to arm themselves for protection, making the legal sale of weapons a risky enterprise. Colombia is currently among the countries in the world with the highest number of firearms used in homicides and suicides. Law enforcement is also concerned about artisanal firearms made by manipulating blank pistols, which are being sold and rented to criminals and gang members, including modified blank arms with bullets impregnated in cyanide.

    Colombia is a notable player in the global counterfeit goods market, both as a transit point for illegal goods and as a manufacturer of fake products for export. The consumption of counterfeit goods is deeply ingrained in Colombian society, particularly in the fashion industry, where everyone knows where to buy them and openly discusses the fake nature of the products. The COVID-19 pandemic, constraints on global market flows and the high dollar price have led to an increase in the local market of falsified local products, with cities like Medellin, Barranquilla, Cali and Bogota being the most affected. Criminal organizations involved in the counterfeit market are typically small, fragmented and dynamic, with some cooperating with larger, more hierarchical organizations that specialize in a particular market or product. The market also promotes the use of criminal networks called oficinas de cobro to solve contractual issues through violence.

    Due to the high dollar price, many products are being bought in Ecuador and Venezuela to avoid excise taxes in Colombia. In contrast, Colombian raw materials are seen as cheap for the dollarized Ecuadorian economy and are trafficked to support illegal manufacture. These products are then sold in both Colombia and dollarized or partially dollarized economies. The trade has shifted direction and adapted to more profitable dollar prices and better business opportunities. Cigarettes, car parts and alcoholic beverages are among the contraband goods most commonly seized by authorities.

    Environment

    Colombia’s criminal organizations engage in deforestation primarily through extortion practices. The COVID-19 crisis has exacerbated the situation, leading to thousands of hectares of jungle being deforested, particularly around national parks and protected areas. Illegal wood selling is also widespread, with communities engaging in it due to lack of incentives for legal production. Illegal armed groups control certain areas, with dissidents from FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and the National Liberation Army being the major players in deforestation. They clear land for other illegal economies such as mining, coca cultivation and cattle raising, which is used as a modality for money laundering. As a result, Colombia is the most dangerous place in which to be an environmental activist, with the assassination of civil society leaders who dedicate themselves to environmentalist activities not being uncommon.

    Colombia, one of the most biodiverse countries in the world, is plagued by wildlife trafficking, particularly of reptiles, which are traded for food and skins. Although efforts have been made to counter animal trafficking, the black market for animals is still thriving, with Europe being the primary destination. Birds are also heavily sought after as pets, especially on the Caribbean coast. The illegal trade is maintained by recruiting poor farmers to capture animals and resell them to organized-crime groups, which then take over the shipment and commercialization of the species. Environmental leaders, particularly those from indigenous communities who live in and protect their territories, are vulnerable due to impunity and lack of interest in prosecuting criminal organizations that control different territories.

    Illegal gold mining is the most common and lucrative non-renewable-resource crime in Colombia. Law enforcement mainly focuses on detaining small-scale miners and destroying equipment, but has failed to pursue large investors, related corporate crimes and corruption. Illegal gold is often laundered and exported with Colombian paperwork. Criminal groups are increasingly branching into illegal mining due to rising gold prices and weakened environmental control caused by the pandemic. Other metals, like coltan and tungsten, are also mined in places controlled by illegal groups. The emerald trade has historically been a stronghold of the mafia and widely used as a money-laundering tool. The illegal oil trade has resurged, with Colombian bands smuggling Venezuelan oil into Colombia. Oil and petrol are still sought-after products for cocaine production.

    Drugs

    Although smaller than the cocaine trade, the Colombian heroin trade still generates considerable income for domestic trafficking organizations and has negative effects on society. Criminal clans in Cali run the trade and supply high-end markets in the US in collaboration with Mexican cartels. Poppy cultivation is disputed by independent drug dealers, local mafia groups and Mexican cartels, and it provides income for local communities in the Nariño and Cauca provinces. Drug dealers pay indigenous communities for extracting poppy latex, which they resell in Cali and Bogota for profit. While police have made some progress in confiscating heroin, most of it still transits through the country.

    Colombia is the largest producer of cocaine in the world, which is trafficked to North American, European and Asian markets, as well as within the region, with Brazil being one of the largest consumer markets for cocaine worldwide. Colombia is producing more cocaine than ever before, and high levels of cocaine production are likely to persist in the short term. The Colombian government has attempted to push aerial fumigation again, despite warnings and evidence that this is not the most effective strategy to deal with coca plantations. There are indications that the country also exports cocaine base to other South American nations for further production. Local consumption has also increased, particularly in urban centres, where the sale of cocaine has become a major source of income for local mafia organizations.

    Cannabis is the second most lucrative and trafficked drug after cocaine, but its profitability within the country remains unclear. Production is resource-intensive, and Brazilian groups have been increasingly importing Colombian ‘creepy’ cannabis due to its growing popularity and strong effects. In fact, most Colombian cannabis exports are of this sub-product, which contains higher THC levels than normal marijuana and is mainly produced in the Cauca region. Adult recreational consumption is still punished by authorities, and cannabis use remains stable among Colombian adults due to high social stigma. Regarding local consumption, illegal sales and legal cultivators who grow for personal use make up the market distribution in the main cities. After the US and Paraguay, Colombia is the country with the highest number of cannabis seizures.

    Synthetic-drug trafficking in Colombia appears to be a small domestic industry, mainly managed by small groups in the country’s urban areas. The consumption of synthetic drugs is increasing, particularly on the nightclub scene, and social-media networks have had an impact on consumption trends. The drug 2C-B, or ‘tusi’, has become popular due to social media influencers and platform users talking about its consumption, and its price has dropped considerably in recent years. However, experts warn that few samples were real 2C-B compounds, with most being ketamine with different mixes. Mexican cartels seem to control the market in the region, using Colombia as a transit route between several countries, and there is no evidence of local production.

    Cyber Crimes

    Colombia has become one of the most heavily targeted countries in the region for cyber-attacks, trailing only behind Brazil and Mexico. Cybercrime has surged in Latin America, especially during the pandemic when people increasingly relied on online resources for banking and government services. This dependence has made them more vulnerable to cyber-dependent crimes. In recent years, Colombia has seen a notable increase in cybercrime complaints, with most of the fraudulent activities being conducted on sites posing as official and government channels in order to mine information. Ransomware continues to be the biggest problem, especially for small and medium-sized businesses. Personal-data violations have become the fastest-growing criminal activity in Colombia, followed closely by forceful access to information. The most affected cities include Bogota, Medellin, Cali, Barranquilla, Cartagena and Bucaramanga.

    Financial Crimes

    Financial crimes are a pervasive issue in Colombia, with cyber-enabled financial fraud being a common occurrence. Small and medium-sized businesses are often targeted by scammers who impersonate other companies and deceive them into acquiring services which they are unable to provide. Tax evasion is also a significant problem, with the country having one of the highest rates of tax evasion in the world. Criminal organizations are suspected of profiting from these modalities, with some political groups and powerful clans implicated in tax evasion scandals also being investigated for drug trafficking, money laundering and acting as figureheads for others. Misuse of public funds has also been a long-standing problem in Colombia, with government administrations suffering from related scandals.

    Criminal Actors

    Colombia is home to many powerful and sophisticated mafia-style groups, paramilitary forces and guerrillas which are involved in long-standing and complex conflict fuelled by drug trafficking. These groups are involved in transnational organized crime and low-level activities such as extortion with a substantial social impact. They also exert social control and governance over certain areas, imposing norms, regulating civilian activity and providing social services in lieu of the state. The state’s decades-long fight against these groups continues to use up a large share of the country’s budget and military and police resources.

    Colombia’s organized-crime networks, while fragmented, remain highly structured and adaptable to changes in the transnational crime landscape. These groups are constantly searching for new ways to diversify their methodologies or work with smaller, more informal networks. These networks are responsible for a wide variety of criminal activities, including drug trafficking; trafficking of non-renewables, arms and flora and fauna; and human smuggling and trafficking. In addition, mafia-style groups are hiring criminal networks to operate and commit acts of violence in regions where they have no presence or control, which benefits these both parties.

    The drug trade in Colombia involves a number of foreign actors, including Mexican cartels, European mafia representatives and Venezuelan gangs. Mexican cartels have a significant presence in the country, but they do not seem to be trying to establish territorial control or form their own armies. Instead, they buy cocaine from various Colombian criminal organizations and then transport and resell it in the US. Venezuelan gangs are increasingly involved in the drug trade in Colombia due to the rising migration crisis. They also specialize in human trafficking and smuggling and operate at different stages of illegal land routes at the Venezuelan-Colombian border. Brazilian gangs have become middlemen, buying Colombian cocaine and then shipping it to European markets. They also appear to have links with Italian mafias.

    Corruption is rampant in Colombia at all levels of the state, but it is considered less systemic and violent than in other Latin American countries. However, corruption has grown in recent years, extending to sectors previously considered technical, and involving high-level public officials. The police and military have also been involved in various scandals, including collaboration with criminal networks and violent repression of social mobilizations, resulting in missing persons, deaths and impunity. Corruption scandals involving state actors have been exposed in exploitation around the Amazon, with complex networks including armed networks, private actors and state representatives acting against environmental leaders’ efforts. Despite efforts to address corruption and violence by transitional justice and truth commissions, state-embedded actors continue to undermine progress.

    Private-sector actors in Colombia are involved in a range of illegal activities, including offering bribes, aiding criminal organizations and engaging in money laundering. Criminal organizations continue to interfere with government institutions and private interests. Small-scale credits known as gota a gota are one example of illegal activities carried out by bankers, financial experts and business professionals. These loans are often controlled by larger criminal organizations and are acquired by individuals who are unable to access traditional banking or credit options. Some businesses and enterprises also profit from the grey area of lending money, offering their services through social media and apps. Additionally, there is a cohort of lawyers, accountants and legal professionals who assist drug dealers in negotiating deals with government authorities and negotiating extradition deals.

    Leadership and governance

    The Colombian government has taken a hard-line approach to organized crime, aiming to weaken criminal groups, particularly in light of the peace deal negotiated with FARC. However, the government’s focus on forced eradication of drug crops rather than softer crop-substitution programmes, and its iron-fisted approach to citizen security, have led to an increase in violence and criminal activity, particularly in rural areas and places controlled by armed groups and criminal networks. In 2021, Colombia experienced its highest number of violent homicides in seven years, with particularly chaotic situations in the Valle del Cauca department and Cali. The ongoing humanitarian crisis resulting from conflicts between non-state armed groups has further exacerbated the situation, with high levels of forced displacement and massacres. The government’s inefficiency in implementing peace deals and recommendations has also contributed to security concerns. Although Colombia ranks high in Latin America in terms of government transparency and accountability, corruption and impunity remain significant obstacles to public trust in state bodies. The government’s failure to deliver on transparency promises regarding the money intended for combating the COVID-19 pandemic, coupled with several high-profile corruption scandals in the last administration, have only heightened these concerns. Nevertheless, Colombia still performs above average in terms of access to information.

    Colombia has ratified most of the relevant international treaties, but is yet to ratify the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants and the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms. The US and the EU have been key partners and allies of Colombia, providing support and funding to address issues such as drug trafficking, armed groups, peace accords and migration crises. Colombia has a robust legislative framework for identifying and combating organized crime, with a variety of laws pertaining to organized crime, drugs, firearms and trafficking. However, there are ongoing debates regarding government inaction in avoiding state abuse during national mobilizations, as well as corruption and wrongdoing in businesses dealing with seized assets, even by government authorities.

    Criminal justice and security

    The judicial system in Colombia is considered stable and diverse, but it suffers from weak due process and a lack of adequate protection. Although the attorney general’s office has specialized divisions for dealing with organized crime, corruption and insufficient resources have been a persistent challenge in the judiciary, making it difficult for many Colombians to access the judicial system. The Supreme Court, the country’s highest court, has also been embroiled in corruption scandals. In addition, the system is often criticized for its high recidivism rate and inability to effectively punish criminals. Currently, a different judicial system is operating transitional justice as part of peace agreements with FARC guerrillas. As for the penitentiary system, there are constant scandals of contraband and other illicit activities inside prisons where personnel and other authorities appear to be accomplices. There have even been records of inmates extorting money from people from within prisons, apparently with the knowledge of authorities. Recently, the prison system situation has worsened.

    Colombia has specialized units to combat organized crime and one of the largest armed forces in the region. However, due to challenging terrain, corruption and inefficiencies within the system, security forces struggle to effectively combat criminal actors, leading to the consolidation of criminal control in some areas. While the country has the necessary resources and infrastructure to fight organized crime, it falls short on implementation. Police reform has become a major political issue following protests in response to police killings, but it is unlikely that legislation proposals will pass.

    Colombia’s borders with Venezuela and Ecuador are problematic and porous, allowing illegal armed groups to carry out operations and escape. The state has not been able to establish an effective presence for its law-enforcement bodies and state institutions and services in many areas, allowing criminal groups to exert territorial, social, economic and political control, especially in remote rural regions. In some areas, armed actors have taken over state responsibilities, such as imparting justice and territorial vigilance and control. This situation has led to the recycling of armed groups and the entry of new criminal organizations after the demobilization of FARC, although the Colombian state has made some marginal gains in regaining control of different regions.

    Economic and financial environment

    The country still faces challenges in enforcing anti-money laundering regulations, particularly in the virtual services sector. Additionally, Colombia is grappling with the issue of Panama, which is classified as a jurisdiction under increased monitoring due to its involvement in money-laundering activities. To address these challenges, Colombia is increasing its efforts to collaborate with the international community, particularly with the US.

    Despite economic volatility in neighbouring countries, Colombia has been successful in maintaining a strong hold on its economy. Urban areas have seen a decrease in informal activity, although it still remains a considerable part of the economy. Rural areas, on the other hand, continue to struggle with informality due to a lack of investment opportunities and financial services. However, the country is making progress in strengthening its economic regulatory environment. Colombia has also shown significant progress in anti-corruption efforts, with the attorney general’s office prosecuting several high-profile corruption cases.

    Civil society and social protection

    Colombia has legislation to protect victims of armed conflict, human trafficking and drug addiction, but the implementation of these laws often falls short, leading to delays and shortcomings. Government inefficiencies in investigating, prosecuting and convicting criminals highlight the need for improved crime-fighting strategies. Witness protection is also a concern, with individuals facing threats, especially from organized-crime networks. Rural and indigenous communities, as well as activists, lack sufficient protection from the government, making it difficult for them to seek justice through formal channels. The government’s failure to comply with protocols to convene the National Commission of Security Guarantees and its criticism of peace mandates and peace accord implementation have created an institutional impasse, leading to a high number of petitions for protection from the transitional justice body.

    Strategies to prevent organized crime in Colombia have been overshadowed by hard-line security initiatives, and drug-crop-substitution programmes are losing momentum. However, non-police prevention strategies such as deploying units in a preventative manner and hotspot policing are being implemented. Although the government has suspended gun permits, individuals can still acquire guns legally.

    Colombia’s civil society plays a vital role in analyzing and preventing organized-crime activities in the country. There are several crime-related observatories and NGOs working to help vulnerable youths escape gangs. Despite threats and violence against civil-society organizations and leaders, non-state actors continue to implement projects and initiatives to benefit vulnerable populations. However, Colombia remains one of the most dangerous countries for journalists and environmental activists, who are frequently targeted with death threats, physical attacks, abduction and murder. Moreover, conflict dynamics have not diminished in the last two years, leaving human rights defenders and activists vulnerable to violent threats. Privately owned groups dominate the country’s media landscape, and lack of transparency for media business interests and owners is a problem. During the 2021 social-mobilizations crisis, many journalists covering the protests were attacked, with the majority of incidents attributed to the police. The government and the armed forces also created blacklists of opposition leaders and activists to target their online activity.

    Profile

    Mexico

    Capital

    Mexico City

    Gross domestic product (GDP)

    USD 1,272,840.00 million

    Income group

    Upper middle income

    Population

    126,705,138

    Area

    1,964,375 km²

    Geography type

    Coastal

    7.570.00

    Criminality score

    3rd of 193 countries 1

    2nd of 35 countries in Americas0

    1st of 8 countries in Central America0

    Criminal markets

    8.130.13

    An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.

    Human trafficking

    8.000.50

    Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.

    Human smuggling

    9.000.50

    Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.

    Extortion and protection racketeering

    9.00 n/a

    Crimes linked to exerting control over a territory/market including as a mediator and/or requesting a benefit in exchange for protection.

    Arms trafficking

    8.500.50

    The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.

    Trade in counterfeit goods

    8.50 n/a

    The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands.

    Illicit trade in excisable goods

    7.00 n/a

    The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits.

    Flora crimes

    7.500.00

    The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.

    Fauna crimes

    7.000.00

    The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.

    Non-renewable resource crimes

    7.500.00

    The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.

    Heroin trade

    8.000.00

    The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.

    Cocaine trade

    9.000.00

    The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.

    Cannabis trade

    8.000.00

    The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.

    Synthetic drug trade

    9.000.00

    The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.

    Cyber-dependent crimes

    7.50 n/a

    Organized crimes that rely solely on using information communications technology with the aim of obtaining a monetary/material benefit.

    Financial crimes

    8.50 n/a

    Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance.

    Criminal actors

    7.00-0.13

    An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.

    Mafia-style groups

    9.000.00

    Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.

    Criminal networks

    9.000.00

    Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.

    State-embedded actors

    7.500.50

    Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.

    Foreign actors

    3.500.00

    State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.

    Private sector actors

    6.00 n/a

    Profit-seeking individuals/entities who own/control a part of the legal economy free from the state, that collaborate with criminal actors.

    4.21-0.25

    Resilience score

    124th of 193 countries -12

    25th of 35 countries in Americas-1

    3rd of 8 countries in Central America0

    Political leadership and governance

    3.000.00

    The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.

    Government transparency and accountability

    3.00-1.00

    The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.

    International cooperation

    6.50-0.50

    A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.

    National policies and laws

    5.50-0.50

    A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.

    Judicial system and detention

    4.000.00

    Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.

    Law enforcement

    5.000.00

    The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.

    Territorial integrity

    3.000.00

    The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.

    Anti-money laundering

    4.000.00

    A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.

    Economic regulatory capacity

    5.000.00

    The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.

    Victim and witness support

    3.500.00

    Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.

    Prevention

    4.000.00

    Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.

    Non-state actors

    4.00-1.00

    The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.

    4.21 7.00 8.13 4.21 7.00 8.13

    Analysis

    01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11

    People

    Mexico plays a crucial role in human trafficking between Central and North America, acting as a transit hub primarily for north-bound Central American victims who may face various forms of exploitation, including forced sex work and labour. Sex trafficking is widespread near the US-Mexico and Guatemala-Mexico borders, while forced agricultural labour is more common in Guerrero and Oaxaca where indigenous communities and people of African descent are exploited. Vulnerable irregular foreign nationals and middle-class Mexicans are at risk of being trafficked, with the socio-economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbating these risks. An increase in criminal territorial control across Mexico, combined with increasingly rampant corruption, impunity, and institutional weakness in Mexican law enforcement agencies, have facilitated the expansion of Mexico’s human trafficking market in recent years.

    Mexico’s human smuggling market remains active, driven by poverty, insecurity, and criminality across Central America, especially in the Northern Triangle countries of Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic has worsened these factors, causing a further increase in north-bound irregular migration towards the US through Mexico. Although smugglers in north-eastern Mexico are linked to transnational organized crime groups, drug cartels, and corrupt officials, those in southern Mexico are often locals living along key smuggling routes. Women and children are also involved in facilitating irregular migration. The impact of Mexico’s human smuggling market is localized, with notable demand in overcrowded Mexican border towns and southern cities such as Villahermosa, Palenque, Tenosique, Comítan, and Tapachula.

    Mexican criminal groups rely heavily on extortion as a source of revenue, targeting individuals as well as small, medium, and large businesses. The rate of extortion has substantially increased in some Mexican states while declining in others. Extortion can also involve private citizens who falsely claim membership in criminal groups to obtain small extortion payments. Territorial extortion, known as cobro de piso, has become a low-cost revenue source for criminal groups. The food industry has been increasingly targeted, leading to food crises and supply chain disruptions. Extortion remains a significant concern in nearly all Mexican cities, with municipalities in the states of Michoacan, Guanajuato, Zacatecas, Morelos, Nuevo Laredo, and México experiencing the highest rates.

    Trade

    Mexico’s arms trafficking market is highly consolidated, driven by ineffective arms legislation and the inflow of weapons from the US. Although the vast majority of seized illicit arms can be traced back to US manufacturers, there is a notable flow of grenades and RPG-7s from Central America. Legal purchases of firearms in the US by criminal and civil entities contribute to the accessibility of weapons and high levels of violence and criminality in Mexico. Although Mexican authorities are working to combat the issue, there is a lack of comprehensive policy and coordination between state and federal law enforcement agencies and with US authorities, which may allow the arms trafficking market to continue to expand domestically and regionally. This issue has been a point of contention in US-Mexico bilateral relations, with Mexican authorities launching civil lawsuits against US arms manufacturers. Although there has been an increase in weapons seizures along the US-Mexico border, this has not significantly reduced the vast supply of illicit weapons to domestic criminal groups in Mexico.

    Counterfeiting and piracy have become some of the most profitable crimes in Mexico, with the country being one of the largest producer and consumer of counterfeit and pirated products in both Latin America and the world. The sale of inexpensive counterfeit goods is widespread across the country. It is estimated that more than 10% of all US-sourced counterfeit and pirated products sold worldwide are destined for Mexican markets. Despite severe damage to the Mexican economy caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the distribution of counterfeit pharmaceutical products was not affected and was even exacerbated by increased demand. However, despite some efforts being made, the convergence of criminal groups and customs authorities at various points of entry continues to complicate the fight against this crime. Additionally, the changing of labels in the illicit textile goods trade poses challenges for authorities in detecting counterfeit goods.

    Mexico has become a key destination for the global illicit cigarette trade, with Chinese-sourced illicit cigarettes accounting for most of the consumption of illicit cigarettes not produced domestically. The COVID-19 pandemic worsened the situation, as declining income and rates of social interaction among Mexican citizens led to a notable drop in legal cigarette sales and a rise in low-priced cigarette brands. This trend provided organized criminal actors with an additional source of revenue and a means of laundering other criminal proceeds. Illicit trade in excise goods extends beyond cigarettes, with more than a third of the alcoholic beverages consumed in Mexico being smuggled into the country.

    Environment

    Mexico’s illegal trade in timber has become a highly lucrative industry, with criminal groups relying on it as a major source of revenue. The domestic and transnational trafficking of rosewood is a considerable issue, with Chinese mafia-style groups controlling the trade, which is facilitated by local Mexican criminal networks. Mexican authorities seize dozens of illicit rosewood shipments along Pacific ports and the Yucatan Peninsula annually, primarily destined for the Chinese furniture market. This market generates hundreds of millions of dollars in annual profits and has severe consequences for local communities, including extortion fees linked to protection quotas, kidnapping, and forced disappearance. With state regulation of Mexico’s legal logging industry remaining limited, corrupt Mexican law enforcement officials have been known to engage in violence against local populations related to the market.

    Mexico acts as a source, transit, and destination country for wildlife trafficking. The illegal wildlife trade in Mexico is closely linked to other organized criminal markets, particularly drug trafficking, posing a challenge for law enforcement authorities. Although Mexico has previously served as a transit country, Mexican wildlife species such as jaguars, golden eagles, totoaba fish, parrots, macaws, and reptiles are increasingly being trafficked to diverse destinations including North America, Europe, and Asia. The illicit totoaba fish trade, largely facilitated by Chinese mafia-style groups, generates hundreds of millions of dollars annually and is the most prominent wildlife trafficking operation in Mexico. The involvement of corrupt authorities in wildlife trafficking operations and market-related violence exacerbates the issue.

    Theft of non-renewable resources such as oil and minerals is common, with criminal groups and corrupt officials within state-owned companies playing major roles. The Mexican government’s efforts to combat the illicit oil trade have been minimally effective, with oil theft remaining a highly lucrative source of revenue for criminal groups. Fuel theft has been linked to tax evasion, and smuggling foreign-sourced fuel into Mexico has become a common practice. The involvement of criminal groups in fuel theft has triggered a rise in violence across the country, especially in states like Guanajuato and Puebla. In addition to oil theft, criminal groups have been engaging in illicit mineral extraction, particularly gold, silver, copper, lead, zinc, and iron. Territorial disputes between cartels have created an atmosphere of violence for legitimate mining companies and local communities. Mexican drug trafficking organizations have also become involved in the trafficking of Mexican-sourced mercury to South American countries that have prevalent illicit gold mining markets.

    Drugs

    Mexican drug trafficking organizations dominate the US’s heroin market, with almost all heroin seized and analyzed in the US originating in Mexico. Heroin production and trafficking occur primarily in north-western Mexico, in states such as Baja California, Sonora, Jalisco, Guanajuato, Queretaro, Colima, Michoacán, and Guerrero. However, in recent years, drug trafficking groups have shifted their focus to fentanyl trafficking, as it is cheaper and less labour-intensive to produce than heroin.

    Mexican drug trafficking organizations are major players in the global cocaine trade, acting as brokers and transporters of the drug worldwide. Mexico is a significant transit country for cocaine from South America to the US and increasingly to the EU. Criminal groups have become more active in Central American and Colombian cocaine trafficking markets, and territorial disputes between them over control of north-bound cocaine shipment routes to the US have resulted in high levels of violence across Mexico.

    Despite the legalization of cannabis in multiple US states and Canada, Mexico continues to constitute the US’ largest foreign provider of cannabis. Moreover, Mexican drug trafficking organizations are heavily involved in the production and transportation of synthetic drugs, including fentanyl and methamphetamine. Although fentanyl can be sourced directly from China through clandestine online platforms and subsequently trafficked into the US, Mexican groups have increased their activities in fentanyl production in the country. Additionally, rising demand for various forms of synthetic opioids among US drug consumers has resulted in a considerable increase in the import of synthetic opioid components into Mexico, primarily smuggled into the country through seaports in Michoacán, Campeche, and Sinaloa. Mexican cartels are involved in methamphetamine trafficking to EU ports for further distribution inside and outside the EU.

    Cyber Crimes

    Mexico is currently facing a surge in cyber-dependent crimes, with a large number of cyber-attacks launched through malicious software programs detected by the national guard. In recent years, federal institutions have experienced cyber-attacks, with their information systems being compromised or hijacked by criminal actors. These attacks have led to adverse reputational impacts on these institutions and have resulted in the leaking of terabytes of confidential information. Given the increasing use of technology and the internet, it is highly likely that cybercrime will continue to grow in Mexico.

    Financial Crimes

    Financial crimes are a major issue in Mexico, affecting state institutions, private companies, and citizens. State institutions are allegedly involved in financial crimes such as tax evasion, which is associated with the embezzlement of hydrocarbon exports and/or imports. Private companies are often victims of fraud and corruption, resulting in significant financial losses. Finance-related cybercrime has increased significantly since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Allegations of corrupt practices related to public contract appointments exist at both the federal and local government levels, elevating the risk of embezzlement and other financial crimes.

    Criminal Actors

    Mexico’s drug trafficking organizations are some of the most sophisticated mafia-style groups globally. They have substantial territorial control throughout the country and co-opt state institutions through bribery and intimidation. In addition to drug trafficking, these organizations engage in other criminal activities such as oil theft, human trafficking, kidnapping, and extortion, earning billions of dollars annually. Mexican drug trafficking organizations fuel violence across the country using a variety of firearms, including military-grade weapons, resulting in brutal territorial conflicts with competing drug trafficking organizations and state security entities. The state’s no-confrontation policy and perceived impunity exacerbate retaliatory attacks against law enforcement initiatives. Despite internal fragmentation reducing the number of drug trafficking organizations engaging in transnational forms of organized crime, the remaining drug trafficking organizations continue to exert significant influence across the Americas, collaborating with foreign counterparts in Asia, South America, North America, and Europe.

    Smaller Mexican criminal networks have mainly emerged from crises of violence and tend to cooperate with larger mafia-style groups. Internal fragmentation within Mexican drug trafficking organizations has led to the creation of numerous loosely structured criminal networks, making them difficult to track. In recent years, state efforts to capture and kill criminal leaders have increased because of the emergence of community self-defence groups in Guerrero and Michoacán. These criminal networks engage in various forms of local criminal activity, including extortion, auto theft, oil theft, human trafficking, human smuggling, illicit mining, and drug sales. Organized crime factions are also believed to be partly responsible for the uptick in disappearances witnessed in recent years. Moreover, they still play crucial roles in the transnational drug trafficking market by providing transportation and security services to well-established drug trafficking organizations and engaging in proxy wars between dominant groups.

    Mexico is plagued by state-embedded corruption, with officials at various levels facilitating organized criminal activities such as drug trafficking, oil theft, and extortion. This collusion not only funnels substantial amounts of illicit revenue to high-ranking officials but also undermines law enforcement agencies, hindering the country’s fight against organized crime. There are also reports suggesting the persistence of corrupt practices within federal institutions tasked with combating organized crime. However, corruption at the local level, including among state and municipal officials, remains a more significant concern because of the lower financial cost of collusion with low-level officials and their deeper knowledge of the territories they govern. Drug trafficking organizations have been successful in exerting notable influence over Mexico’s democratic process, allegedly going to great lengths to ensure the election and/or re-election of key political allies, including murdering politicians perceived as threats.

    Private sector actors in Mexico, large and small businesses, engage in criminal activities such as tax fraud and money laundering to generate illicit revenue. Internal fraud is prevalent among private sector businesses. These actors also commit environmental crimes, including illicit mining. Private sector actors are known to engage in corrupt practices in an effort to either obtain services, permits, and licences, or to avoid sanctions. Foreign criminal actors have a limited presence in Mexico, largely because of extreme territoriality among Mexican criminal groups. Those present primarily engage in business dealings and other forms of collaboration with Mexican drug cartels. However, a notable number of criminal actors from Eastern Europe, Italy, and Asia have been arrested in the Riviera Maya and on the Yucatan Peninsula in recent years, and Salvadoran mafia leaders seeking refuge from strict regulations in El Salvador have been known to operate from inside Mexico.

    Leadership and governance

    The Mexican government has relied on militarization to combat organized crime, but with little success. Its efforts to fight state-embedded corruption and organized crime have been symbolic, and there is no comprehensive strategy against organized crime. Corruption and collusion between criminal groups and state-embedded actors exacerbate criminal impunity, and state initiatives to combat criminality and violence across the country have not been successful. The country’s homicide rate remains high, and cases of femicide, violence against journalists, and other crimes have increased. Political violence has also become common, with criminal groups threatening and assassinating political candidates. The current leadership won the elections with an anti-corruption campaign but has since consolidated power, reducing state transparency and accountability. Although laws and policies aim to curb corruption, criminality and impunity persist, and implementing federal transparency legislation is a substantial challenge. Concerns have been raised over corruption and autonomy with the military’s control over ports and customs activities. Conflicts have arisen between autonomous bodies and state institutions over the latter’s failure to provide information about excessive use of force and human rights violations committed by its officers.

    Mexico has a history of cooperating with the US in fighting organized crime along the border. The current administration has continued this partnership, working with US authorities to combat issues like irregular migration. However, uncertainty surrounds the government’s approach to organized crime and security. The arrest of a former secretary of the Ministry of National Defence for alleged collusion with organized crime in the US led to the administration imposing strict limits on foreign agents’ interactions with Mexican authorities, preventing US Drug Enforcement Administration agents from operating in the country. Mexico has ratified several international treaties linked to fighting organized crime, demonstrating its commitment to international cooperation. However, Mexico’s legislative apparatus has significant structural deficiencies that hinder law enforcement authorities’ ability to combat various forms of organized crime.

    Criminal justice and security

    Mexico’s judicial system is plagued by corruption and inefficiency, which have weakened anti-organized crime efforts. High levels of pre-trial detention and major judicial backlogs are a result of the inefficient processing of court cases. There are also concerns about judicial autonomy, given the appointment of Supreme Court of Justice judges with close political ties to the executive. Additionally, the country struggles with investigating and prosecuting serious crimes despite recent judicial reforms. Overreliance on single eye-witness testimonies makes the outcomes of criminal cases relatively easy to manipulate.

    The Mexican government has made efforts to improve law enforcement and combat organized crime, including through US-funded trainings, improvements in intelligence infrastructure and strategy planning. However, corruption and human rights abuses continue to hinder these initiatives. Public trust in law enforcement is low, and the replacement of the federal police with the national guard has been criticized for focusing on policing undocumented people, and for excessive force and human rights violations. The national guard is perceived as ineffective in reducing criminality and violence. The fight against organized crime is seen as a federal responsibility, limiting investments in local public security structures. The Mexican and US governments have agreed on a mechanism to increase collaboration in the fight against organized crime, with the US focusing on synthetic drug trafficking and Mexico on arms trafficking.

    Mexico shares land borders with the US, Guatemala, and Belize, making it a crucial transit point for illegal activities such as drug and arms trafficking. Despite collaboration with the US Customs and Border Protection Agency, the National Customs Agency of Mexico is weak because of a lack of funding and institutional capacity. Many border crossings are controlled by organized crime groups engaged in cross-border activities with impunity. In some regions, organized crime has entirely replaced the state’s territorial sovereignty, leading to the absence of the rule of law. Mexico’s national guard has shifted its focus to containing migration flows, neglecting efforts to combat organized criminal elements who are exploiting migratory patterns and border porosity.

    Economic and financial environment

    Mexico’s legislative framework for anti-money laundering (AML) has proven ineffective because of corruption and a lack of institutional capacity. Investigations and prosecutions of money laundering cases, particularly those of a transnational nature, are rare, resulting in low conviction rates. The conflict between Mexico’s Financial Intelligence Unit and the Attorney General is alleged to have hindered the development of a comprehensive AML framework. Illicit drug revenue generated from transporting drugs across the US-Mexico border is a key source of criminal revenue, with laundered funds passing through Mexican financial institutions. Organized crime groups in Mexico invest in financial and physical assets such as property and businesses, using various strategies such as forging invoices or misrepresenting the value of goods or services to facilitate money laundering.

    Mexico’s commission for economic regulation is responsible for economic regulatory activities aimed at preventing illicit business practices. However, the government’s reluctance to propose new commissioners in various institutions has reportedly impaired their capacity to fulfil their respective duties. This situation has affected the implementation of up-to-date legal frameworks addressing foreign investments and cryptocurrencies.

    Civil society and social protection

    Mexico’s victim and witness support mechanisms are lacking, with little attention paid to supporting victims of human rights violations, human trafficking and forced disappearances. Although the Mexican government has made efforts to prosecute traffickers and identify victims, it has failed to allocate sufficient funds to victim assistance. Overall authorities did not consistently employ a victim-centered approach and the services made available and provided to victims were inadequate.

    The Mexican government’s current policies for preventing criminal activity are ineffective because of limited law enforcement capacity and a lack of comprehensive strategies. Despite claiming crime prevention as a priority, the government’s impact on record-high levels of violence remains uncertain. Efforts to prevent low-income people from turning to organized crime, such as community engagement initiatives and social programmes, have had limited success, and a specific comprehensive strategy aimed at preventing human trafficking is lacking.

    The weakness of Mexican civil society can be attributed in part to the limited resources available to independent media and NGOs. Journalists and media employees are at high risk of violence and homicide, and the government has been hostile towards civil society actors, freezing federal funding for hundreds of non-profit organizations. The government’s failure to condemn or combat violence against journalists and media employees has been seen as tacit approval of these crimes, exacerbating high levels of violence and impunity across the country. Collusion between organized criminal actors and corrupt state officials further threatens the safety of journalists, media employees, and civil society actors who frequently receive threats or are subjected to violence.

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    The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to 10. The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel.

    How to measure organized crime?

    A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.

    Read more on globalinitiative.net
    How to measure organized crime?

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    This report was funded in part by a grant from the United States Department of State.

    ENACT is funded by the European Union and implemented by the Institute for Security Studies and INTERPOL, in affiliation with the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.

    The opinions, findings and conclusions stated herein are those of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State.