People

The human trafficking market in Ukraine continues to be pervasive, with the country acting as a source, transit, and destination point for this activity. Trafficking victims of Ukrainian origin are exploited for sex trafficking and forced labour in Ukraine, Russia, Poland, and other parts of Europe, as well as the Middle East, and a small number of foreign nationals are exploited for forced labour in Ukraine. Human trafficking, which was already on the increase because of the country’s worsening economic conditions and resultant labour emigration, has been further exacerbated by the war waged by Russia in Ukraine. Although official data concerning human trafficking has become scarce since the Russian invasion, vast numbers of refugees have fled the country, especially women and children, as well as non-Ukrainians and non-EU citizens who were resident in Ukraine, and these people are extremely vulnerable to trafficking. Russian military personnel are reported to be actively involved in human trafficking, and Ukrainian children from occupied territories such as Donetsk and Luhansk have been taken to Russia.

Human smuggling activities have also been exacerbated by the Russian invasion, especially as non-EU citizens who were residing in Ukraine needed to make use of migrant smuggling networks in order to flee the country. This issue was resolved, however, by the introduction of temporary legal admittance into the EU. The legal framework banning Ukrainian men of military conscription age from leaving the country also created opportunities for smugglers. The smuggling of these Ukrainian men has become one of the most prevalent human smuggling activities in the country. The Russian invasion has made it difficult for people being smuggled from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria to enter Ukraine by air. Ukraine is on the migrant route from South East Asia and the Middle East towards Europe, and prior to the war large and well-developed human smuggling groups, made up of opportunistic individuals who were familiar with the paths across the borders and who collaborated with law enforcement officials, were active in the country.

Before the war, organized crime groups in Ukraine were involved in extortion and protection racketeering in various industries, including the mining sector, and these activities became part of a more widespread market after the start of the conflict. Ukrainian police have uncovered several gangs involved in various rackets and extortion.

Trade

With a substantial stockpile of weapons, few barriers to accessing arms, and millions of small arms and light weapons on the legal and black market, Ukraine is believed to have one of the largest arms trafficking markets in Europe. While it has long been a key link in the global arms trade, Ukraine’s role intensified after the 2014 conflict in the eastern part of the country. Seizures carried out in previous years indicated that most of the arms that proliferated throughout the country were Soviet-designed models; only a small percentage comprised recently produced firearms and ammunition. The current war is expected to have an adverse effect on this market, owing to the free circulation of arms among a population who took part in the response against the whole-scale Russian invasion, as well as increased additional supplies provided by European countries and the US. While evidence of the number of arms illegally circulating throughout the country is extremely limited, there are already signs that illegal guns are playing a greater role in crimes carried out both in Ukraine and in nearby regions in Russia.

Trade in counterfeit goods, including clothing, jewellery, luxury goods, and perfume, sourced from China and other Asian countries, is common in Ukraine. Rapid cash flows continue to be generated by this market, and the problem is exacerbated by the ongoing war, the lax enforcement of intellectual property rights, and the normalization of these products within Ukrainian society. However, the largest counterfeit goods markets, such as those in the surroundings of Odesa, where the main production and distribution points were situated, are currently not functioning because of the war. Ukraine has long been a transit country for illicit tobacco products being trafficked into Europe, and it is increasingly becoming a destination point as well, owing to the steady increase in excise taxes, record levels of inflation, and the effects of the ongoing war. A noticeable shift has been observed in this market, with greater volumes now entering through the western borders instead of the eastern ones. Smuggling routes connected to Russia and Belarus have decreased in significance, while those involving Poland, Romania and Moldova have seen an uptick in their involvement in illicit trade within Ukraine. Moreover, the temporary wartime ban imposed on alcohol sales resulted in an increased illicit market for these products, until the lifting of the ban.

Environment

Flora crime, primarily illegal logging, has long been a pervasive problem in Ukraine. In fact, prior to the war, the country was the main exporter of illegally logged trees to the EU. This illegal trade has been exacerbated by high levels of corruption, weak due diligence, and the country’s role as a transit point for illegal timber from Russia. Illegal logging was alleged to be carried out by Russian forces during the invasion of Crimea, and this activity is expected to increase during the ongoing war. Because of the current seaport blockade it has become difficult to transfer Ukrainian wood abroad by means of maritime routes, which has led traffickers to move these shipments by road.

Fauna crimes in general were moderately prevalent in Ukraine before the war. The country was a source and transit point for the illicit wildlife trade, as it was part of the trafficking route into the EU through the borders of Poland and Romania, with the former having been identified as a wildlife trafficking hotspot. Species seized included tigers, tarantulas, snakes, parrots, and corals, as well as elephant ivory. Prior to the war, Russian criminal groups were known to smuggle large quantities of illegal caviar into Europe via Ukraine, reflecting the country’s role as a transit point for illegal fish products. It is estimated that there has been an increase in poaching resulting from current insecurity and poor economic conditions.

Ukraine is a source of non-renewable resources, and a variety of these are illegally extracted, predominantly in the Rivne, Volyn, and Zhytomyr regions. The most pervasive of these markets is the illegal amber trade, with most of the demand coming from China, and a widespread criminal network carries out illegal mining of this resource in the north-west of Ukraine. Despite the ongoing war, these illicit activities continue, with law enforcement units unable to intercept the market. The illicit fuel market has also become more extensive, with the smuggling of large consignments of fuel to Ukraine from Belarus and Russia, as well as the presence of illegal filling stations that have been operating since the start of the war. Coal mining has increased, especially in the Donbas region, and illegal operations have been growing steadily. There are also reports indicating that Russian companies are illegally expropriating Ukraine’s national resources, such as anthracite, in occupied territories.

Drugs

Significant seizures made prior to the war indicate that Ukraine was a relatively important transit country for heroin. The drug entered Ukrainian territory along the Balkan and Northern routes, before being transported to Western and central Europe, mainly via the Black Sea. Because of its geographical position, Ukraine was naturally a transit country for Afghan heroin reaching Europe, but is considered a ‘spin-off’ of the more important Balkan route. Heroin trafficking has decreased during the war, as the high intensity of military hostilities has resulted in a diversion to alternative routes. However, the conflict and growing destabilization in the country may also boost attitudes of impunity in the illicit drug trade, leading to increased trafficking and production. Ukraine’s cocaine trade was limited, with a small consumer market, and has become close to non-existent following the start of the war, as most local consumers are believed to have moved to the EU. Prior to the war cocaine was moved through Ukrainian seaports and airports for both domestic use and transit to EU countries.

Before the Russian invasion, Ukraine’s cannabis market was extensive, with reports indicating the existence of numerous marijuana plantations across the country. Cannabis was produced locally as well as being smuggled in from Russia and Moldova. Ukraine was predominantly a destination country for synthetic drugs and psychotropic substances, particularly amphetamine-type stimulants, which were primarily trafficked from Poland, Lithuania, and the Netherlands, and the use of these substances had been growing consistently over the past decade. There was also evidence of clandestine local production, providing supply to the local market as well as, to some extent, neighbouring countries. Production carried out in clandestine laboratories located in the east of Ukraine was disrupted following the start of the war to a certain degree. This resulted in a subsequent shift in the location of laboratories, with an increased number of production sites in the centre and west of the country. It is important to note that because of a lack of data on the drug market, the effects of the war as well as current trends are difficult to assess. However, it is reported that the supply of both cannabis and synthetic drugs has not been affected by the war. On the contrary, local demand for such substances, especially cannabis and a designer drug called alpha-PVP, has been on the rise, in part because of extensive consumption among military personnel. Since the beginning of the war, Ukrainian authorities also reported notable seizures of mephedrone accross the country. The majority of these substances and their precursors are trafficked into Ukraine from China, the EU and the Middle East.

Cyber Crimes

Cyber-dependent crime is widespread in Ukraine, and the number of attacks has increased in recent years. Prior to the war, Ukraine had been used as a testing target for cyber warfare by countries such as Russia, Iran, North Korea, and China, as it had similar infrastructure to that found in Western Europe and North America, but limited resources to counter such attacks. Following the onset of Russian aggression, cyber-attacks targeting critical infrastructure, such as power grids and internet service providers, evidently aiming to undermine Ukraine’s ability to defend itself, have drastically increased. Russian hacking campaigns have also supported ground campaigns, and malware has been paired with missiles in several attacks, including against television stations and government agencies. The most common cyber-attacks used by hacker groups supporting Russia include data wiper malware, distributed denial-of-service attacks, and ransomware. Ukraine has also been a source for cyber-attacks targeting Russia. In addition to the ongoing cyber warfare, illegal activity around cryptocurrencies is also prevalent in the country, with these avenues mainly being used for money laundering purposes.

Financial Crimes

Financial crime in the form of tax evasion, embezzlement, and corruption has long been pervasive in Ukraine, predominantly because of the existence of the oligarch class. Since the 1990s, oligarchs have seized key industries and sectors, creating monopolies protected by political corruption. They are also known to commit tax evasion, through offshore companies, with impunity. Cyber-enabled financial fraud as well as credit card theft are widespread in Ukraine. For instance, there has been an increase in the creation of malicious websites that trick victims into believing they are applying for EU financial assistance in order to access their banking details and personal information. Perpetrators also use call centres as a common method to defraud their victims.

Criminal Actors

State capture by criminal actors is a pervasive issue in Ukraine, with state-embedded actors either being directly involved in criminal activity or facilitating criminal markets, including drug trafficking, human trafficking, non-renewable resource crime, and goods smuggling. Criminal actors are also embedded in high-level positions in the state apparatus in order to influence the democratic process, by buying votes during elections, supporting and financing certain parties and candidates, and influencing the courts. In addition to state-embedded actors, decentralized and flexible criminal networks are also highly active in Ukraine, mainly in opportunistic crime such as drug trafficking, theft of state property, and robbery. The Russian invasion altered the structure of organized criminal groups, and some began to attempt to obtain higher status in the criminal hierarchy. There have also been reports of local criminal networks cooperating with Russian troops in order to gain more power in occupied territories.

Ukraine is a transit country for various criminal markets, and transnational crime elicits a high level of interaction and cooperation between local and foreign actors. As a result, there are a number of foreign criminal actors, with some of them originating from the Caucasus region, active in Ukraine’s larger cities. Moreover, extortion activities have been carried out by foreign actors in the occupied regions of the country. Ukraine has a strong but declining presence of organized mafia-style groups, headed by approximately 40 criminal bosses, known as vory-v-zakone or ‘thieves in law’, most of whom reside outside the country. These groups are active in multiple markets with a focus on drug trafficking and extortion. There are anecdotal reports of collaboration between small local mafia-style groups and Russian troops to enable the continuance of certain criminal channels in occupied territories. Mafia-style groups continue to wield political influence and have access to all levels of state power in Ukraine, which grants them protection and support in both their illegal and legitimate business. Moreover, some group leaders have become politicians or prominent businesspeople.

As for the involvement of private sector actors in illicit activities, companies owned by oligarchs are known to benefit from corruption, which enables the creation of monopolies in key sectors such as gas, oil, and electricity, among others, and the amassing of fortunes. Ukrainian oligarchs have long been used to strengthen pro-Russian politicians in the country. As the war continues, some oligarchs directly linked to Russian political elite have fled to Russia. Many others have remained in Ukraine to help the war effort, financing military infrastructure and medical aid, among other activities, despite their former stance. Private sector actors are also known to be involved in illicit activities such as tax evasion and money laundering.

Leadership and governance

The war waged by Russia since February 2022 has further undermined Ukraine’s stability, which had already been challenged by regional conflict over the past decade. Although some legislation targeting organized crime was introduced by the leadership, the political and economic establishment in the country has resisted reform. Ukraine has a long history of flourishing organized crime supported by high levels of corruption. However, the current administration has shown a high level of efficiency in organizing the defence and economy of the country during wartime. Despite the ongoing conflict, the government has continued to work at all state levels and to fulfil many international obligations. Moreover, various surveys suggest that trust in government officials has increased. Before the conflict, the government had declared a war on corruption and an objective to reduce the influence of oligarchs through the enactment of legislation. In addition, during the ongoing war, the appointment of independent heads of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office is considered to have been a crucial move in the country’s fight against corruption. Despite these changes, however, Ukraine continues to be considered one of the most corrupt countries in Europe, owing to rampant cases of intervention in justice, as well as bribery and corruption at all levels of the state.

Ukraine has signed most of the relevant international treaties against organized crime and cooperates with several international organizations. Despite the war, Ukraine continues or is sincerely attempting to fulfil its international obligations. Politically, Ukraine has substantially increased its cooperation with the G7 countries, the EU, and NATO. The government has managed to move forward with Ukraine’s application for EU candidacy, and to establish an advanced dialogue with Western leaders and societies on several issues, ranging from the war effort to anti-corruption measures. On a national level, Ukraine has legislation to deal with all relevant criminal markets, criminalizing the acts and providing processes for investigation, prosecution, and penalties. Their implementation and effectiveness, however, have been questioned, a situation adversely affected by widespread corruption in the judicial system.

Criminal justice and security

Corruption in the judicial system continues to be widespread in Ukraine, and recent reform initiatives have stalled or fallen short of expectations. In general, courts have historically failed to establish any meaningful independence, with judges being pressured or influenced for political purposes. Despite an increase in public trust in several governmental bodies and branches, trust in the country’s judicial system continues to be low. Regarding Ukraine’s penitentiary system, human rights violations occur, conditions are poor, and there are high levels of pre-trial detention. There are also allegations of illegal incarceration and torture in some detention centres in occupied territories such as Donetsk, Luhansk and Crimea.

The vast majority of law enforcement officers continue to defend Ukraine from Russian aggression; these agencies are continuing their regular duties as well as performing additional responsibilities such as road checkpoints and pursuing saboteurs, Russian agents and commandos. Since state resources are focused on defence, specialized units against organized crime are currently underfunded. Moreover, there are difficulties in the policing of de-occupied territories because of the presence of explosives and a lack of police training regarding these conditions. Ukraine suffers from low levels of trust in law enforcement, owing to widespread corruption, but police officers in some cities in eastern Ukraine have significantly improved this situation by adopting a more humanitarian approach.

The Russian invasion has undermined Ukraine’s territorial integrity, with certain regions in the east and south, such as Luhansk and Donetsk, being compromised. Although Russian troops were able to reach the outskirts of Kyiv at the start of the war, subsequent improvements in security and defence efforts have led to the retaking of certain areas, and Russian attacks have decelerated recently. Ukraine has proved to be resilient to cyber warfare and increased cyber-attacks targeting its critical infrastructure, and has rapidly built up its cyber defences.

Economic and financial environment

Before the Russian war, Ukraine was considered a high-risk country for money laundering, with widespread corruption and limited progress in modifying legislation and practices to tackle these issues. However, because of the wartime limits on money transfers abroad, there has been no recent evidence of notable money laundering activity.

Ukraine’s economic and business environments have been severely affected by the conflict. In response, immediately after the invasion, the Ukrainian state offered relief to the country’s crippled economy, operating under shelling and martial law; and eased the regulatory regime for job providers. The National Bank of Ukraine froze the exchange rate, restricted cash withdrawals, and limited most cross-border transactions. Despite international aid, Ukraine continues to face serious financial strain, since hostilities are taking place in territories that contribute 60% of the country’s GDP. Moreover, substantial damages to infrastructure such as airports, seaports, and bridges have crippled Ukraine’s ability to trade with other countries. Despite these issues, and the consequent rise in inflation and unemployment rates, the economic regulatory capacity of the Ukrainian administration has managed to prevent the complete collapse of the national economy. In fact, banks, factories, and businesses continue to function outside the occupied territories, and as most businesses, regardless of their specialization, have been supporting the military effort.

Civil society and social protection

Ukraine’s already insufficient system of victim and witness support, including medical, psychological, and legal assistance as well as temporary shelter, has considerably weakened following the start of the war. Victim support services are largely being directed to war victims, rather than victims of organized crime. Prior to the war, the government demonstrated mixed efforts in victim protection and relied on international organizations and NGOs to identify victims and provide protection and assistance. There have been no changes to organized crime prevention strategies in the country. However, Ukraine has been collaborating with international counterparts to prevent the cyber-attacks that form part of the ongoing warfare.

Ukrainian civil society remains vibrant, and since the onset of Russian aggression has been cooperating closely with public authorities and the government. In fact, civil society activities have sharply increased: a great number of NGOs provide support to victims, refugees, and the military, while also publicizing cases of corruption and violations of law. However, civil society representatives are currently at severe risk, as there are reports of the detention and torture of activists by Russian troops in the occupied territories. The Ukrainian media typically showcased a wide range of opinions. Wartime censorship has since been introduced that restricts coverage of the situation at the front, but there are independent media outlets that remain relatively free. Before the war, journalists were occasionally subjected to physical violence, especially during protests. This situation has worsened following the start of the war, as journalists have been purposefully targeted, resulting in an increase in the number of journalists killed or injured.

People

Russia continues to be a significant source, destination, and transit country for human trafficking. The trafficking of Russian women and children for the purposes of sexual exploitation in Europe, Asia, and North America continues to be extremely prevalent. The internal trafficking of victims from Russia and neighbouring countries also takes place, for the purposes of forced labour, sexual exploitation, and forced begging. Criminal organizations as well as private sector actors are involved in human trafficking, and state-embedded actors are also complicit. Criminal actors commonly use deception and debt bondage to trap trafficking victims. The exploitation of vulnerable communities, such as homeless individuals and foreign nationals, continues to occur. Children transferred from occupied areas of Ukraine to Russia are also at risk of human trafficking.

Russia is also a key hub for human smuggling. Irregular migrants are smuggled from Iran through Azerbaijan and Georgia into Russia. Non-regional human smuggling of certain ethnic communities, such as Afghans, Chinese, Koreans, and Vietnamese, also takes place. It is also possible that Russia serves as a source country for irregular migrants being smuggled to the Baltic countries, Belarus, and Ukraine. There is evidence that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine prompted thousands of Russians to flee the country in fear of political persecution as well as to avoid being drafted into the military. Many are seeking refuge in the US, facilitated by Russian and Uzbek-speaking smuggling networks operating in Turkey, Central America, and Mexico. Russia also plays a significant role as a transit country. The intensity of crimes associated with the smuggling market varies, but smuggled people are routinely subject to abuse, intimidation, coercion, and physical violence. Russians tend to be the leading regional facilitators of human smuggling into Europe, followed by Belarusians and Ukrainians.

Extortion in Russia is well entrenched and intrinsically connected to the operations of local criminal groups. Extortion and the payment of protection money are also common features of doing business in the country. Racketeering is also prevalent, carried out not only by criminal groups but also by actors operating in the legal economy.

Trade

Russia is not only the world’s second largest licit arms exporter, supplying major powers such as India and China, it is also host to a rampant and expanding illegal arms market. The armed conflict in Ukraine created new flows of arms trafficking in and out of the country, with a significant percentage of the total number of weapons exported from Russia emanating from black and grey markets. There are also concerns over illegal arms entering mainland Russia through its occupied regions, which has resulted in a substantial increase in crime committed with firearms in recent years. Although a lack of data makes is difficult to assess the situation in Donetsk and Luhansk, it is reported that there is a proliferation of illicit arms in these areas. Following the invasion of Ukraine and the imposition of international sanctions, Russia has been reportedly receiving munitions and military hardware sourced from Iraq with the help of Iranian weapons smuggling networks. In general terms, developments in the war in Ukraine are expected to have huge implications for the direction and volume of international arms trafficking.

The trade in counterfeit goods is widespread in Russia. An estimated 40% of all handbags, clothing, and accessories sold are thought to be counterfeit. Russia is not only a destination but also a source country for counterfeit goods sold worldwide. The control of this trade has become even more challenging with the rise in e-commerce. Moreover, because of the war in Ukraine and the consequent Western sanctions, the Russian state has authorized counterfeit Western goods in retaliation, enabling Russian companies to register trademarks confusingly similar to well-known international brands without legal consequence. The illicit trade in excise goods, the most common being alcohol and tobacco products, is also pervasive in the country, owing to high excise taxes, a lack of prosecution, as well as Western sanctions. The sale of contraband tobacco products and alcoholic beverages smuggled from countries in the Eurasian Economic Union is widespread, causing both health risks and extensive losses in tax revenue.

Environment

Russia has the largest area of forests and plantations in the world, and much of the country’s woodlands continue to be under threat from illegal deforestation and corruption. As a result, Russia is an important source country for the illegal timber trade in both Asia and Europe. Timber illegally logged in Russia is transported to China, from where it is sold to South East Asian countries. Organized crime groups, enabled by alliances with corrupt officials, are heavily involved in these activities, which continue to be highly profitable, as demand from China increased following the COVID-19 pandemic. Motorcycle gangs armed with axes and chainsaws are also complicit within the wider supply chain.

Russia also continues to be an important source, transit, and destination country in the illegal wildlife trade. While tigers, bears, wolves, and wildlife parts and products are systematically trafficked from Russia to China, other exotic species are also trafficked into Russia to supply a growing domestic demand. Poaching, as well as illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, is rampant across the Kamchatka, Far East, Dagestan, Volgograd, and Astrakhan regions, occurring on an industrial scale. This includes the IUU fishing of sturgeon carried out for the purpose of harvesting caviar. The trade of animals such as snakes and chameleons, illegally bred in nurseries in Russia, is growing, with local demand driving the market. Organized crime groups have established extensive networks and distribution channels for the illegal wildlife market and have forged ties with corrupt elements within environmental and law enforcement agencies. Reports indicate that rural residents, who are often amateur hunters, are also involved in poaching.

Russia’s abundant natural sources, including oil, natural gas, valuable metals, and minerals, continue to be exploited, largely by private sector actors owned by corrupt officials and organized crime groups, often acting in cooperation. Oil and gas reserves are largely controlled by state-affiliated corporations, leaving little room for organized crime involvement. However, the illegal trade in minerals and oil has increased significantly since the onset of the Russia–Ukraine conflict. Most of the illicit activity surrounding non-renewable resources in Russia involves corrupt state contracts. The top actors in this criminal market are bound in a complex entanglement of family and friendship connections that can be traced to the highest levels of government. The presence of Russian gold-mining operations and private military companies in West Africa, as well as the country’s relations with governments in the region, raises concerns that this sector could be an avenue to raise funds and launder gold to evade sanctions. There are also schemes involving the illegal trade of coal from occupied Ukrainian territories, specifically Donbas, to the self-proclaimed state of Abkhazia.

Drugs

Russia has long been a transit hub for heroin destined for the EU, with international criminal networks, in collaboration with European and Turkish traffickers and Central Asian criminal networks, being active in the market. The drug is mainly sourced from Afghanistan and enters Russia through Central Asia or the South Caucasus. This industrial-scale heroin trafficking through Russia or by Russian-based groups in the Middle East and Central Asia generates colossal revenues, which are ploughed into other criminal activities and used to corrupt police as well as judicial and political structures. However, sanctions and the closure of the passage through Ukraine has had a substantial impact on Russia’s role in the trade of heroin in the region.

Cocaine consumption, meanwhile, has increased in Russia, especially among young people. While demand for the drug was traditionally concentrated in a few large cities, such as Moscow, Sochi, Kazan, and Saint Petersburg, its availability across the country has increased in recent years. Cocaine is smuggled out of South America, mainly from Ecuador, and most arrives through the port of Saint Petersburg, after intermediate stops in Europe or Africa. Both Russian-based and foreign criminal networks, such as Ecuadorians, Serbs, and Lithuanians, are involved in the trafficking of cocaine into Russia by air or by land, using mules. The use of conventional dealers seems to be preferred to the use of the dark web in the domestic trafficking of cocaine. However, as for the heroin trade, the current situation has had an impact on the cocaine market, making transportation, also across borders, more difficult.

There is a mature and comprehensive national cannabis market in Russia, developed not only by considerable local demand but also demand among the legal and irregular migrant populations living in the country. While some cannabis is grown domestically – in grow houses as well as in fields in the Caucasus and Far East – most is smuggled in from the Middle East and North Africa, often by sea. The market involves multiple actors, both domestic and foreign. Illicit cannabis trade is increasingly carried out online to protect the anonymity of suppliers and clients.

The demand for synthetic drugs in Russia is steadily increasing, especially among young adults and Russian soldiers in Ukraine, owing to low production and purchase costs, as well as increased access to drugs and drug precursors used in local production. In addition to locally produced substances, synthetic drugs, especially methamphetamine, have also been smuggled into the country from the Czech Republic, Slovakia, the Baltic States, China, Iran, Belarus, and Ukraine. However, because of the impact on supply routes caused by Western sanctions, synthetic drugs smuggled from European countries have largely been replaced by Chinese imports and domestic production. The synthetic drug market is the largest drug market in the country, and its supply chain accommodates both local and foreign criminal actors. Similar to the cannabis trade, most of the distribution continues to be carried out online.

Cyber Crimes

Cyber-dependent crime is extremely prevalent in Russia. Cybercriminal groups are reportedly permitted to operate in the country with no fear of prosecution or imprisonment, and have been known to support the Russian government in the war against Ukraine. Moreover, it is reported that most of the money obtained through ransomware attacks worldwide is transferred to Russian-linked hacker groups. Although ransomware continues to be a significant threat to corporations around the world, the focus of these groups and individual Russian-backed hackers is reported to be cyber warfare, increasing denial of service attacks, destructive malware affecting critical infrastructure, and strategic geopolitical attacks such as data wipers. Although cybersecurity authorities in countries such as the US, Canada, and the UK have issued warnings about the potential increase in malicious cyber activity from state-sponsored or Russia-aligned cyber actors and groups, it has also been suggested that the capabilities of such groups are in fact limited to ineffective cyber weapons that cause minimal damage and are comparatively easy to contain and defend against. Following the declaration of war against Ukraine, government departments, aviation services, and online payment services in Russia also became major targets for cyber-attacks, at an unprecedented scale.

Financial Crimes

The most common forms of financial crime in Russia are embezzlement and the misappropriation of public funds, crimes related to corruption and the abuse of power, fraud in the financial sector, and tax evasion. Most of the country’s wealth is held by oligarchs who have profited from corruption without facing any consequences. With a decrease in income being one of the socio-economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, Ponzi schemes have become more prevalent in the country. Moreover, the increased popularity of contactless payments and online money transfers has resulted in a rise in phone scams, with criminal groups impersonating police or bank officials to gain access to victims’ personal financial information. The criminal groups carrying out these phone scams are reportedly often based outside Russia.

Criminal Actors

A complex and varied ecosystem of criminal actors continues to operate within Russia. State-embedded actors engage in and facilitate criminal markets in the country, with collusion occurring at the political, economic, and business level. Most of the major criminal markets are controlled by mid- to high-level members of the security forces, under the tacit supervision and control of high-level political elites, both at the local and federal level. Additionally, the state deals with large and violent criminal groups by allowing some crime bosses to operate, both in the black market and legitimate business, on the condition that they do not draw public attention to their operations through violence. Private sector actors, specifically corporations owned by Russian oligarchs known to have close links with the state, are involved in tax evasion, through the use of offshore companies or collusion with tax inspectors, and corruption schemes, in which the government is overcharged in public procurement projects in exchange for kickbacks offered to state officials.

Most criminal networks emerged from mafia-style gangs that expanded by incorporating other groups and adapting to a more decentralized and flexible form of organization. Some of these groups exhibit extremist characteristics, and in addition to being involved in general and hate crimes also take part in organized crime, especially arms trafficking. Many of the leaders of these criminal networks are also now acting as businesspeople under the protection of the Russian state. Most of the mafia-style groups active in Russia continue their operations confined to particular cities or regions. Modern so-called ‘thieves in law’ are becoming increasingly adept at integrating themselves into non-criminal communities and participating in the licit economy. These criminals also hold considerable sway over illegal markets within prisons. Russian mafia-style groups also carry out various criminal activities in other parts of the world, such as money laundering in Cyprus and the Cayman Islands, financial scams in New York, and car theft rings in Europe.

Several foreign criminal groups continue to operate in the country. Azerbaijani organized crime groups are concentrated in the market squares and hotels of large cities and are often active in extortion and protection racketeering, while Georgian gangs are especially active in extorting from their own diaspora communities. Central Asian gangs operate primarily in labour trafficking, but also in drug trafficking, particularly opiates and marijuana. Chinese organized crime groups are involved in a variety of criminal markets, including human trafficking, the production and trade of counterfeit goods and non-renewable resources, and flora and fauna crimes, especially in Russia’s Far East and Central regions. Chinese organized crime groups are also the main suppliers of synthetic drugs and the precursors for their manufacture. The extent of the connections between local gangs and those in Europe has declined markedly, but there is still considerable involvement from elsewhere in Eurasia.

Leadership and governance

Power in Russia’s authoritarian political system is concentrated in the hands of President Vladimir Putin. With loyalist security forces, a subservient judiciary, a controlled media environment, and a legislature consisting of the ruling party and pliable opposition factions, the government is able to manipulate elections and suppress genuine dissent, activities which were reportedly observed during the recent elections. Although the government frequently asserts that combating organized crime is a national priority, it rarely demonstrates this through its actions. In fact, it is rampant corruption that facilitates the links between state-embedded actors and organized crime groups. Moreover, ties to criminal entities are also present in the multiple conflicts Russia is currently engaged in, such as the war in Ukraine. The invasion of Ukraine, combined with the Western sanctions imposed on Russia, has created a condition of fragility in the country. Corruption remains a common problem within all areas of the state. Corrupt schemes have also been widespread during the war in Ukraine – for instance, a new regulation waives the obligation to submit income declarations for military personnel and bureaucrats relocated to occupied Ukrainian territories. Even though anti-corruption has been identified as a top priority by the state, transparency and accountability in the day-to-day workings of the government are still limited, with decisions being adopted behind closed doors by small, overly influential groups. It has been reported that Western sanctions have driven the state to end many of the initiatives that were enabling some level of transparency.

The Russian Federation is a signatory to almost every relevant international organized crime treaty. Its cooperation in combating transnational crime covers drug trafficking, arms trafficking, fraud and theft, money laundering, human trafficking, and human smuggling. Nevertheless, the Russian government is also occasionally obstructive when it comes to international cooperation, particularly in corruption cases involving high-ranking state officials and their assets abroad. Moreover, there was a sudden cease in law enforcement cooperation between Russia and Western countries following the aggression against Ukraine. Cooperation between Russia and non-aligned or neutral countries, however, is being maintained. At the national level, Russia has a robust legal framework pertaining to organized crime, which is regularly revised to address specific criminological concerns, to deal with confusions and contradictions, and for political reasons. Despite its comprehensive regulatory framework, the Russian state continues to allow criminal activities that align with its political interests to operate with impunity, indicating preferential treatment in the enforcement of these policies.

Criminal justice and security

Although Russia’s judiciary is constitutionally independent, in practice it remains susceptible to a high level of executive interference, with judges’ career advancement being tied to their compliance with the state’s preferences. The judiciary is used to suppress political dissent perceived to be a threat to the interests of political leadership and its allies. Corruption within the judiciary remains a problem, especially in business disputes and low-level organized crime prosecutions. Despite numerous prosecutions of corrupt officials and organized crime group members, senior figures in these areas still appear to be untouchable, unless a political decision is made to pursue them. Prisons in Russia remain overcrowded and unsanitary, and inmates lack access to healthcare. There have also been reports of torture and inhumane treatment in detention centres, as well as in the temporarily occupied territories in Ukraine.

Russia has an extensive law-enforcement apparatus, which has considerable resources at its disposal. Although the country’s considerable size poses a number of challenges, law enforcement is broadly capable of maintaining control. However, in some areas law enforcement is wielded as a political instrument of the state, which decreases its ability to counter organized crime. Extortion by police officers, especially with regards to unregistered migrants, is commonplace, and actions such as this have fuelled nationwide distrust in the policing system. While the invasion of Ukraine has caused multiple threats to Russia’s territorial integrity, the war has not posed any serious challenges to the state’s capacity to control its territory. However, the size of the country continues to affect its ability to protect its borders, especially given the fact that the war is forcing the government to concentrate all its efforts in the west, leaving the rest of the territory without adequate protection in some areas.

Economic and financial environment

Russia is still considered to be at high risk for money laundering and terrorist financing. Criminal elements are known to use Russia’s financial system to launder money by various means, including virtual currencies, precious metals, and real estate, among others. Although Russia has developed a relatively robust AML/CFT legal framework, serious weaknesses in banking supervision and enforcement persist. These weaknesses, combined with political obstacles in the sharing of intelligence between agencies, mean that Russia continues to be a source, destination, and hub for money laundering activities. Moreover, there are allegations of state-sponsored money-laundering schemes facilitated by Russia’s financial intelligence unit, which is under heavy influence of the Russian state.

The Ukraine war has resulted in various sanctions being imposed on Russia and many foreign companies leaving the country, causing problems to do with currency and supplies across different industries. Despite efforts to create a free market – mostly at the expense of legal frameworks such as environmental impact, workers’ rights, and common market access – corruption, clientelism, and state support for its own companies, or those owned by allies, undermine and exploit this environment, specifically in strategic sectors such as energy resources, foreign trade, and manufacturing. There have, however, been efforts to formalize the informal sector by strengthening and modernizing the taxation mechanism.

Civil society and social protection

Russia does have laws that provide protection for victims, witnesses, and other participants in criminal proceedings, but witness protection is undermined by corruption within the agencies responsible for its provision, and support for victims is often plagued by a lack of facilities or poor conditions. Moreover, there is no formal system for the identification of victims and their referral to available services. Charities and other NGOs, which attempt to bridge these shortcomings, are inadequate and increasingly hobbled by laws controlling donations from abroad. Having said that, these organizations remain the primary provider of protection services. Additionally, the government has not attempted to raise public awareness or change negative attitudes towards drug users or victims of human trafficking. Although the country continues to create and operate regional migration centres, with the aim of preventing human trafficking in the region, their effectiveness is unclear. The government provided no funds to NGOs to carry out prevention and awareness campaigns. Moreover, efforts to prevent organized crime have become nominal in recent years owing to the ongoing war against Ukraine.

Civil society organizations have played a significant role in combating organized crime, especially human trafficking and drug use, but increasing persecution by the government has forced many activists and organizations to leave the country to avoid incarceration. In addition, the Russian state continues in its oppressive approach towards civil society organizations that work in the field of human rights, through measures such as ‘foreign agent’ laws and the revoking of licenses for foreign NGOs such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and Memorial International. The media environment is mostly controlled by the state, with just a handful of independent outlets operating online, amid threats of prosecution, bans, and fines, which result in self-censorship or the replacement of their management by individuals favoured by the state.