People

Ukraine continues to be both a source and transit country for human trafficking, with the ongoing war exacerbating existing vulnerabilities. Ukrainian victims, particularly women and children, are exploited both domestically and abroad. Citizens are trafficked primarily to Russia, Poland, Germany, China, Kazakhstan and Western Asian countries, with a rising number of cases reported in several EU states. The displacement crisis caused by the war has intensified these risks, as traffickers specifically target refugees at border crossings, offering fraudulent assistance in exchange for forced labour or sexual exploitation. Reports indicate a significant increase in online searches for Ukrainian women involved in sex work, suggesting a surge in demand for trafficked victims. In Russian-occupied territories, women and girls have been abducted and forced into prostitution. Ukrainian children, especially unaccompanied minors and those evacuated from care facilities, are at a heightened risk of trafficking. They have fallen victim to forced labour and sexual exploitation, with authorities identifying multiple cases linked to child pornography. Local criminal networks, along with Russian criminal groups and military personnel, are involved in these trafficking operations. The economic downturn and the ongoing war have further heightened vulnerabilities, pushing more individuals into exploitative labour situations.

Ukraine’s human smuggling market has grown substantially since the onset of the war. While Ukrainian citizens can legally enter the EU under temporary protection measures, men aged 18–60 are prohibited from leaving the country due to martial law. This restriction has given rise to a large-scale smuggling industry that caters to those seeking to evade military service. Smugglers employ falsified medical documents and facilitate illegal border crossings. Many smuggling networks operate through encrypted messaging platforms, boasting thousands of members. Over 21 000 men have been apprehended while attempting to cross borders illegally, and dozens have lost their lives in the process of trying to escape conscription, drowning, for example, in the Tisa River along the Romanian border. The removal of the ‘residence abroad’ exception in June 2024 has further compelled individuals to pursue illegal migration routes.

Extortion is a well-established crime in Ukraine, affecting various sectors, including mining and energy. The ongoing war has worsened the situation, with reports indicating that Russian forces are extorting the families of Ukrainian soldiers through threats, kidnapping and torture. Additionally, criminal organizations have targeted the families of fallen soldiers, demanding money under false pretences. Organized crime groups, such as the Korostyshiv gang, which has been active since 2014, have been implicated in severe forms of extortion, including blackmail and kidnapping. The economic hardship resulting from the war has rendered both individuals and businesses increasingly vulnerable to extortion schemes perpetrated by organized crime groups that exploit financial distress.

Trade

The war has resulted in a surge of illegal weapons, although large-scale smuggling operations out of Ukraine have not been extensively documented. Recently, organized smuggling networks have begun to emerge, raising concerns about military personnel selling high-grade arms, including anti-aircraft weapons. Seizures near EU borders indicate a shift toward more structured trafficking operations. Reports suggest that hundreds of thousands of weapons have been lost or stolen, mostly in the eastern regions. A key concern is the potential for long-term diffusion of weapons into civilian society. Sales conducted through encrypted messaging platforms have increased, and some criminal actors disguise themselves as volunteers in order to acquire weapons. While isolated seizures of high-grade weaponry have occurred, there is currently no systemic trafficking network exporting arms from Ukraine.

Ukraine has a well-established market for counterfeit goods, driven by economic hardship and high consumer demand for cheap alternatives. Counterfeit tobacco, luxury items and pharmaceuticals remain prevalent. Criminal groups operate production hubs within the country, and large-scale raids have revealed significant quantities of counterfeit food, cigarettes and alcohol. These counterfeit products are smuggled into Ukraine through its ports and subsequently redistributed throughout Europe.

Illicit trade in excisable goods, particularly tobacco and alcohol smuggling, remains highly prevalent. The war has disrupted supply chains, leading to an increased demand for illegal excise goods. Smuggled tobacco and alcohol enter Ukraine and are then moved into Romania, Poland and Moldova. The illicit tobacco trade, in particular, has expanded, with Ukraine emerging as one of Europe’s largest sources of contraband cigarettes. Smuggling operations are sometimes concealed within military shipments. Authorities have seized vast quantities of contraband, including tons of alcohol and millions of packs of cigarettes. Additionally, increased taxation has further incentivized contraband markets, establishing Ukraine as a key regional hub for illicit excise goods.

Environment

Flora crimes in Ukraine involve illegal logging, which has surged due to weakened oversight in conflict-affected regions. Russian forces have also engaged in illegal logging and the smuggling of Ukrainian timber. Corruption remains rampant in the forestry sector, with officials facilitating the illicit export of timber. Recent reports have highlighted the involvement of state-owned enterprises in unauthorized deforestation activities. The absence of digital tracking systems allows for document falsification, further exacerbating the problem. The EU is contemplating designating Ukraine as a high-risk jurisdiction for timber trade violations.

Concerning fauna crimes, Ukraine functions as both a transit and source country for wildlife trafficking. Species such as bears, parrots, snakes and cheetahs are smuggled through Ukraine en route to the EU, Asia. Additionally, the country faces challenges with sturgeon poaching along the Danube River, despite ongoing enforcement efforts.

Non-renewable resource crimes in Ukraine encompass illicit amber mining, primarily concentrated in the north-western regions. Smuggled amber is typically laundered through Poland and sold mainly to China. Reports indicate that the war has significantly disrupted the illicit amber market due to stricter border controls and increased military oversight. However, coal and oil smuggling continue to be substantial issues, particularly in Russian-occupied territories where unauthorized extraction is rampant. Oil smuggling, in particular, has intensified, with Ukrainian networks collaborating with Balkan groups to distribute illicit fuel. Although gold smuggling is not as prominent, it persists at lower levels.

Drugs

Heroin trafficking in Ukraine has decreased due to the ongoing war. Supply shortages have driven up prices, prompting many users to turn to methadone and synthetic opioids. Consequently, heroin is now sold in minimal quantities, leading to a significant decline of the domestic criminal market.

Ukraine was a transit hub for cocaine before the war, but disruptions in Black Sea port operations have reduced trafficking and led to a decrease in availability. Initially, cocaine prices surged but later stabilized as new routes emerged. Recent police operations suggest a resurgence in trafficking, with seizures increasing in the western border regions. Prices remain higher than those in Western Europe, reflecting ongoing supply constraints.

Despite disruptions caused by war, cannabis production and consumption have remained stable. Domestic cultivation has encountered challenges, but demand persists. Prices have risen sharply, reflecting a growing social acceptance of cannabis. Recently, parliament approved legislation for medical cannabis, signalling potential regulatory changes. Reports suggest that soldiers on the frontlines are using cannabis, occasionally mixed with stimulants.

The war has intensified the production and consumption of synthetic drugs, as amphetamine-type stimulants and synthetic opioids increasingly replace heroin. The prevalence of synthetic drugs has surged, accompanied by a rise in the seizure of precursor chemicals. Ukraine has emerged as a key regional producer, with clandestine laboratories expanding and online drug sales proliferating through encrypted messaging platforms and the darknet. Authorities have dismantled major synthetic drug networks, highlighting the growing domestic production and distribution of these substances.

Cyber-dependent crimes

Ukraine is a significant global hub for cybercrime, ranking among the top nations in terms of cyber threats. State-sponsored hacking campaigns target government institutions, infrastructure and financial entities. Pro-Russian cyber groups frequently launch attacks that disrupt digital systems. Additionally, Ukraine has seen an increase in ransomware groups targeting foreign victims. Despite ongoing efforts to combat cybercrime, the industry remains highly lucrative.

Financial Crimes

Financial crimes, including corruption, embezzlement, tax evasion and fraud, are systemic in Ukraine. The war has exacerbated these issues, creating an environment where illicit financial activities thrive. Corruption scandals involving high-ranking officials continue to emerge. Fraudulent procurement schemes have exploited military funds, with investigations revealing extensive misuse of defence budgets. Tax evasion costs Ukraine billions annually, with schemes involving VAT fraud and offshore tax havens contributing to systemic financial losses. Additionally, Ukraine is reportedly home to thousands of call centres engaged in fraudulent schemes, each employing between 15 and 200 staff members, with larger operations generating up to one million euros per week. While these scams initially targeted Russian citizens, they have increasingly expanded their focus to include EU and British nationals. As Ukraine navigates the challenges of war and economic recovery, authorities have increased enforcement efforts, but financial crimes continue to pose a pressing challenge.

Criminal Actors

Before the war, Ukraine had a strong but fragmented landscape of mafia-style groups, with varying degrees of influence across different cities. These organizations included traditional criminal hierarchies such as the vory v zakone (thieves-in-law) and avtoritety (criminal authorities who blend business with illicit activities). While some of these groups have suffered disruptions due to the war, such as losing key territories and members, others have adapted by shifting to new illicit activities or relocating their operations to safer regions. The vory maintain a deep connection to the criminal subculture, strictly adhering to a code of conduct, while the avtoritety leverage their influence through economic and political connections. Historically, these groups controlled various sectors of organized crime, including extortion, drug trafficking and illegal resource extraction. However, the war has forced many to restructure, resulting in a reduction of their overall dominance compared to pre-war levels.

Ukraine has long been home to more loosely structured and adaptable criminal networks, many of which lack strict hierarchical leadership. These networks typically operate through personal, familial or opportunistic connections, facilitating a broad range of illicit activities. Unlike traditional mafia-style groups, they are highly flexible, making them resilient to law enforcement pressure and the upheaval caused by war. Rather than halting criminal operations, the war has reshaped them. Some networks have capitalized on war-related opportunities, such as smuggling essential goods and exploiting supply chain disruptions.

State-embedded actors continue to be one of the most significant enablers of organized crime in Ukraine, characterized by a high prevalence of corruption among state officials, law enforcement and political figures. The country's public institutions have long been plagued by bribery, nepotism and financial crimes, which undermine anti-crime initiatives and regulatory oversight. Before the war, law enforcement officials were frequently implicated in drug trafficking, prostitution and resource exploitation, often monopolizing illicit markets instead of dismantling them. More recently, major corruption scandals have continued to surface. Notably, in January 2024, Ukraine’s Security Service uncovered that defence ministry officials and weapons suppliers embezzled millions of US dollars intended for military procurement. Similarly, high-ranking politicians have faced allegations of diverting funds from humanitarian aid and military spending. Despite wartime crackdowns on corruption, Ukraine remains vulnerable to state-embedded actors who manipulate legal and financial systems to facilitate organized crime. The Zelenskyy administration has taken steps to remove key officials linked to corruption. Still, systemic challenges persist, making it difficult to sustain reform efforts in the face of deeply entrenched criminal interests.

Foreign criminal organizations have long been involved in Ukraine’s illicit markets, particularly those from Russia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Türkiye. The war has further expanded opportunities for transnational crime, with foreign actors exploiting Ukraine’s instability to smuggle drugs, weapons and other contraband. One of the most influential transnational groups is Khimprom, a Russian–Ukrainian network specializing in synthetic drugs and chemical precursors. Operating across Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, Khimprom has established itself as a dominant player in Ukraine’s drug trade. The group utilizes online platforms, particularly encrypted messaging platforms and dark web marketplaces, to distribute narcotics. Despite increased scrutiny from law enforcement, Khimprom’s leadership has successfully relocated abroad while maintaining control over its operations. Between January and June 2024, Ukrainian authorities dismantled approximately 10 transnational criminal groups; despite this, foreign actors remain deeply entrenched. Their adaptability and cross-border networks render them formidable players in Ukraine’s criminal ecosystem, often outmanoeuvring local law enforcement efforts.

Ukraine’s private sector actors, particularly oligarchs, have historically played a significant role in organized crime. Before the war, oligarchs maintained near-total control over key industries, including gas, oil and banking, using their wealth to influence the political and judicial systems. The war has altered power dynamics, diminishing the direct political influence of oligarchs. With martial law in place, the government has consolidated power, reducing the ability of business elites to manipulate state institutions. However, this has not completely eradicated oligarchic influence. Many oligarchs have repositioned themselves as war financiers, donating resources to military efforts, whether out of patriotism, strategic reputation management or attempts to maintain influence in the post-war landscape. Since 2014, Ukraine has sought to curtail oligarchic power, and the ongoing conflict has accelerated these efforts. Key figures have faced unprecedented legal actions. Despite these crackdowns, private-sector actors continue to exert influence, particularly in finance, defence procurement and smuggling networks. While some have fled to Russia or been arrested, others remain embedded in Ukraine’s wartime economy, strategically positioning themselves for future political and economic leverage.

Leadership and governance

Ukraine’s political leadership has undergone significant transformations due to the ongoing war, which has impacted its resilience against organized crime. Despite the challenges posed by the conflict, the government has continued to implement measures aimed at countering criminal networks and corruption. However, longstanding issues such as patronage, clientelism and corruption persist, limiting the effectiveness of governance reforms. The country has a history of organized crime infiltrating politics, with some criminal figures gaining political influence over the years. While the war has diminished the hold of some oligarchs on politics, corruption remains deeply embedded in the political system. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s administration has taken steps to address these issues, particularly in the fight against smuggling and economic crimes. Public trust in the government has fluctuated significantly during the war, peaking at 90% in mid-2022 before stabilizing at around 59% in May 2024. While the government maintains democratic structures, concerns persist regarding political transparency and accountability, particularly in the context of wartime governance.

Ukraine has made notable progress in enhancing transparency, particularly through anti-corruption initiatives and the implementation of digital governance tools. The National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine and the National Agency on Corruption Prevention have played crucial roles in pursuing high-profile corruption cases. However, these agencies have encountered internal leaks, political interference and credibility issues, which have undermined their ability to operate independently. Legislative measures have been implemented to strengthen accountability, including laws that expand the powers of anti-corruption agencies and reinstate public asset declarations. Despite these efforts, public officials in both the executive and legislative branches continue to misuse their positions for personal gain, as demonstrated by recent scandals. In August 2024, a Deputy Minister was arrested in connection with a corruption case in the coal industry, highlighting ongoing vulnerabilities. Public perception reflects a mix of progress and scepticism, with many Ukrainians viewing corruption as a significant obstacle to EU integration and post-war recovery.

Ukraine continues to prioritize international cooperation in combating organized crime and enhancing governance. The country is a signatory to major international treaties, including the UN Convention Against Corruption and the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. Since 2022, Ukraine has received extensive financial, military and humanitarian aid from the EU, NATO and allied states to sustain its war effort and governance reforms. In 2024, Ukraine signed bilateral security agreements with multiple nations, including the US, Japan and several European countries. Additionally, international law enforcement cooperation has been strengthened through partnerships with Europol and neighbouring EU states, particularly in efforts to combat arms and human trafficking. However, discussions on NATO membership remain stalled.

Ukraine’s national legal framework criminalizes organized crime, including human trafficking, smuggling, arms and drug trafficking, illegal logging, cybercrime and financial offences. However, enforcement is undermined by corruption, political interference, limited resources and the ongoing conflict. Although recent amendments have strengthened some policies, laws against child exploitation and abuse remain under-enforced due to gaps in detection, support and prevention. Martial law, imposed in 2022, introduced further restrictions on movement, assembly and media, constraining fundamental freedoms.

Criminal justice and security

Ukraine’s judicial system remains weak and vulnerable to corruption, with judges and prosecutors frequently implicated in bribery and political favouritism. Despite constitutional amendments aimed at strengthening judicial independence, political influence over judicial appointments persists in undermining fairness. Public trust in the judiciary remains low, with 73% of Ukrainians expressing distrust in 2024. The country’s penitentiary system faces severe resource shortages, which the ongoing conflict has exacerbated. Several prisons suffer from poor living conditions, inadequate medical care and delays in judicial proceedings, resulting in 36% of detainees being held in pretrial detention. In Russian-occupied areas, reports of torture and inhumane treatment within detention facilities further complicate the situation.

Despite the war, Ukraine’s law enforcement agencies continue to operate, maintaining a high level of public trust in the Armed Forces and National Guard. However, confidence in the National Police remains comparatively low, reflecting widespread concerns about corruption and abuse of power within civilian law enforcement structures. The war has stretched law enforcement resources, shifting focus from organized crime prevention to military defence. Specialised units responsible for tackling financial crimes and human trafficking are underfunded, which negatively impacts their effectiveness. OSCE

Ukraine’s territorial integrity remains significantly compromised due to the Russian occupation and ongoing military battles in several key regions. These areas have become hotspots for transnational organized crime, including money laundering, illegal gambling and arms smuggling. Corruption at border checkpoints further weakens territorial security, facilitating illicit trade. The war has also weakened state capacity, adversely affecting the monitoring of smuggling routes and border security operations.

Economic and financial environment

Ukraine has strengthened its anti-money laundering (AML) framework to align with international standards. The country has implemented customer due diligence measures and transaction monitoring systems. However, corruption within financial institutions and law enforcement agencies continues to pose a challenge. Although the Financial Action Task Force evaluation found Ukraine to be largely compliant with international AML regulations, concerns remain regarding the enforcement of financial crime laws and the effectiveness of asset recovery efforts.

The war has severely undermined Ukraine’s economic stability and regulatory capacity. In response, the government has implemented tax reforms and increased reliance on foreign aid; however, fiscal imbalances continue to pose challenges. Despite these disruptions, Ukraine’s economy demonstrates some degree of resilience. Nevertheless, inflation, infrastructure damage from missile attacks and declining purchasing power remain significant economic risks.

Civil society and social protection

Ukraine has maintained victim protection services despite budgetary constraints. The government has allocated funds for trafficking victims; however, most support is provided by NGOs and international organizations. Efforts to assist victims appear to have improved, but the lack of government-run trafficking shelters remains a challenge. Furthermore, Ukraine has increased anti-trafficking awareness campaigns with assistance from the OSCE and international donors, while also enhancing prosecutions against traffickers. Nevertheless, gaps in law enforcement training and victim identification remain.

Ukraine relies heavily on international organizations and NGOs for crime prevention and awareness campaigns, with these efforts strained by the ongoing war. While Ukraine does not fully meet minimum standards for eliminating trafficking, it continues to make significant efforts, including a new national action plan, resumed labour inspections, strengthened prosecutions and extensive awareness campaigns with international partners like the OSCE. However, challenges remain, such as lenient sentences. Additionally, the large veteran population poses risks of organized crime involvement, including drug use, arms trafficking and joining criminal groups, exacerbated by limited support and unclear policies. A comprehensive veterans’ strategy focusing on demobilization, disarmament and reintegration is needed to reduce these risks and support their return to civilian life.

Civil society plays a crucial role in Ukraine’s resilience, with NGOs supporting defence efforts and providing humanitarian aid. However, government regulations, including AML disclosure requirements for NGOs, have raised concerns about potential interference. Press freedom remains constrained, with journalists facing targeted discrediting campaigns and legal intimidation. Despite some progress, wartime censorship, media monopolization and legal restrictions continue to pose risks to independent reporting.

People

Human trafficking in Russia is a complex and entrenched market, involving multiple actors, including mafia-style groups, criminal networks, private-sector actors and state-embedded figures. Victims are trafficked both into and out of the country, with forced labour and sexual exploitation being the most prevalent forms. Despite the presence of anti-trafficking laws, enforcement remains inconsistent, and corruption within law enforcement and border control officials worsens the issue. Forced labour is particularly prevalent in industries such as construction, agriculture and domestic work, with victims primarily originating from Central Asia and South East Asia. Within Russia, ‘working houses’ operate as sites of forced labour, where individuals, often recruited under false pretences, are exploited without compensation. Additionally, there are also reports of individuals being trafficked into Russia from Europe and Africa, further complicating the transnational nature of the issue. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has intensified human trafficking concerns, with reports indicating that thousands of Ukrainian children have been relocated to Russia under questionable circumstances.

Human smuggling networks function on a considerable scale, with both domestic and foreign participants aiding irregular migration across Russia’s borders. Criminal networks, private-sector actors and state-embedded figures exploit legal loopholes to smuggle individuals into and out of the country. Russia has been accused of facilitating irregular migration into the EU, with Belarus also playing a role in orchestrating migration crises along European borders. Official figures indicate that deportations and expulsions of irregular migrants have surged, reflecting the extent of undocumented migration. Corruption within Russia’s immigration processes is pervasive, with reports of bribes being exchanged for work permits and visas, particularly among migrants from Central Asia. On the other hand, the war against Ukraine has prompted significant emigration from Russia, resulting in hundreds of thousands of Russian citizens leaving the country since February 2022. While most migration occurs through legal channels, some individuals resort to illegal methods to enter other countries, such as Georgia, Armenia, Türkiye and Central Asian countries.

Extortion and protection racketeering remain prevalent, with organized crime groups targeting businesses and demanding payments in exchange for protection. High-profile cases of extortion involving mafia-style groups demonstrate the systemic nature of the issue. Some businesses are compelled to incorporate political figures into their ownership structures as a means of protection. The illicit market for extortion and protection racketeering has a detrimental effect on legitimate sectors, particularly small businesses, entrepreneurs and investors.

Trade

The arms trafficking market in Russia is extensive, involving both domestic and transnational criminal networks. Underground workshops modify and produce illicit weapons, with smuggling routes extending to Europe, West Asia and Africa. Corrupt officials within law enforcement and the government facilitate the movement of these illegal arms. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has intensified this market, with reports indicating that arms are being smuggled from military zones into Russia for resale. Russia’s formal arms exports have suffered due to international sanctions, prompting criminal networks to expand the illicit arms trade. Additionally, clandestine deals with sanctioned states, such as Iran, have increased despite these restrictions.

The trade in counterfeit goods remains widespread, with varying degrees of social acceptability, and it affects industries such as pharmaceuticals, clothing and electronics. The legalization of parallel imports in 2022 has blurred the distinction between legal and illicit markets, resulting in an increase in counterfeit products. Reports indicate that counterfeit alcohol alone accounts for billions in lost revenue. The demand for counterfeit luxury goods has surged following the withdrawal of Western brands from the Russian market. Amid the conflict with Ukraine, Russian consumers are increasingly turning to counterfeit goods, particularly from Asia, to satisfy their demand for luxury items. Türkiye has thus become a key hub for importing counterfeit goods into Russia, capitalizing on strengthened trade relations between the two countries. Furthermore, counterfeit tobacco products dominate the illegal nicotine market, which is estimated to constitute a significant portion of overall tobacco sales.

Illicit trade in excise goods, particularly alcohol and tobacco, continues to flourish, with established smuggling networks. Online platforms and retail distributors contribute to the illegal distribution of these products, resulting in significant tax revenue losses. Reports indicate that illicit nicotine-containing liquids are increasingly being distributed without regulatory oversight. Furthermore, a substantial portion of the illegal alcohol and tobacco products entering Russia is believed to originate from countries within the Eurasian Economic Union, including Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Furthermore, despite corporate boycotts, alcohol brands continue to reach the Russian market through parallel imports via countries like China and Türkiye.

Environment

Russia’s vast forest resources position it as a major player in the global timber market, with substantial domestic production and consumption. The illicit timber trade is also widespread and frequent. Criminal networks and corrupt forestry officials enable these activities by using fraudulent documentation to transport illegally harvested timber. The EU’s ban on Russian timber imports has led to an increase in exports routed through Central Asia, allowing Russian timber to circumvent sanctions before entering European markets.

Fauna crimes encompass the illegal hunting and trafficking of protected species, including tigers, elk and rare birds. Smuggling networks, often linked to foreign actors, facilitate the transportation of animal products, such as skins and caviar, to international markets. Corrupt officials within wildlife agencies have been implicated in issuing fraudulent permits that enable this illicit trade. Destination countries for smuggled wildlife products include China and Western Asia, where the demand for exotic animal derivatives remains high.

Non-renewable resource crimes, particularly the smuggling of oil, gas and precious metals, have escalated due to geopolitical tensions. Russia has developed a fleet of tankers to circumvent international sanctions on oil exports, employing deceptive shipping practices, including disabling automatic identification systems, conducting ship-to-ship transfers and re-exporting through third countries. Türkiye has emerged as a crucial hub for rerouting Russian oil to Europe, while countries like India and China have become major buyers of Russian oil, complicating enforcement efforts. Reports indicate that illegal gold and amber mining operations are linked to organized crime groups, with smuggled minerals being routed through intermediary countries such as the UAE. These activities provide critical revenue streams, including funding for Russian military operations.

Drugs

The heroin trade in Russia remains significant despite geopolitical shifts. Trafficking routes have evolved, with Tajik criminal networks continuing to play a key role in mid-level heroin distribution. The darknet has emerged as a primary marketplace for heroin transactions, with Russia’s digital drug economy surpassing traditional street-level markets in revenue. The conflict in Ukraine has disrupted established trafficking routes, prompting criminal networks to adapt their supply chains.

The cocaine trade has expanded, with seizures indicating Russia’s role as both a transit and destination country. Large shipments of cocaine have been intercepted at Russian ports, reflecting the increased use of the country as a waypoint in international smuggling operations. The high cost of cocaine restricts domestic consumption to elite circles; however, the market is growing as new trafficking routes emerge.

The cannabis market is thriving, supported by both domestic production and international smuggling networks that cater to consumers. Cannabis ranks as the second most popular drug sold on Russia’s darknet platforms, following mephedrone. A significant quantity of cannabis is cultivated domestically in a network of makeshift factories, with darknet platforms and shops providing the essential knowledge, equipment and seeds to local producers. These platforms subsequently purchase the harvested crops to sell them on the darknet, thereby establishing a self-sustaining underground market for cannabis in the country.

The synthetic drug trade is expanding rapidly, with law enforcement agencies dismantling several large-scale production facilities. Darknet markets play a crucial role in the sale of synthetic drugs, with Russia emerging as a significant hub for online drug trafficking. The ongoing war in Ukraine has led to an increased use of synthetic stimulants, such as amphetamines, mephedrone, alpha-PVP and barbiturates among combatants, reflecting broader trends in wartime drug consumption. Major online platforms now oversee much of this trade, adapting to Russia's growing economic isolation.

Cyber-dependent crimes

Russia is a major hub for cybercrime, with both independent and state-sponsored actors engaging in sophisticated cyberattacks. Ransomware operations orchestrated by Russian cybercriminals frequently target international corporations, financial institutions and government entities, often causing widespread economic and operational disruptions. Cybercriminal groups with ties to Russian intelligence services have conducted cyberespionage campaigns targeting critical infrastructure in the US, Europe and Ukraine. The Russian cybercrime ecosystem is highly transnational, characterized by collaborations between cybercriminal syndicates and state-affiliated threat actors. This nexus facilitates complex cyber operations, including large-scale data breaches, hacking schemes and advanced persistent threats. The illicit cyber market in Russia fuels global conflicts, particularly in the context of the ongoing war in Ukraine, where Russian-linked cybercriminals have executed ransomware attacks, disrupted essential services and stolen sensitive data from Ukrainian institutions. These cyberattacks aim to destabilize national security, erode trust in institutions and amplify geopolitical tensions. Russia's cybercrime infrastructure remains one of the most expansive and technically advanced globally, with its reach extending far beyond national borders.

Financial Crimes

Financial crime in Russia is deeply entrenched, driven by systemic corruption, large-scale embezzlement, tax evasion and fraudulent schemes. High-profile cases involving government officials and influential business figures underscore the pervasive nature of illicit financial activities. Ponzi schemes and investment fraud have seen a significant rise in recent years, with social media platforms serving as primary tools for deception. Fraudsters often employ sophisticated tactics, including social engineering, pyramid schemes and identity theft, to extract funds from unsuspecting victims. The Russia–Ukraine war has further exacerbated financial cybercrime, leading to a sharp increase in phishing attacks originating from Russia. Reports indicate that Russian-based phishing operations targeting European and US businesses have surged eightfold since the conflict began, posing a major cybersecurity and financial threat on an international scale.

Criminal Actors

Russia’s criminal landscape remains heavily influenced by mafia-style groups, particularly the ‘thieves-in-law,’ a highly structured organization with deep historical roots. Operating under a collective identity rather than named factions, they maintain a hierarchical structure led by recognized figures and follow a strict code of conduct marked by tattoos and rituals. Despite relatively small numbers, they wield significant influence over criminal enterprises in Russia and abroad. Their activities include extortion, drug trafficking, financial crimes, money laundering and the illicit trade of high-value goods, often in collaboration with international networks. They levy ‘taxes’ on businesses and control organized crime in prisons. Furthermore, they have established global networks in financial crimes and illicit trade, with their influence extending beyond Russia. Although law enforcement has targeted them, their ability to adapt and integrate into legitimate businesses complicates these efforts.

Other organizations, such as the Solntsevskaya and Tambovskaya groups, which possess increasingly decentralized and flexible structures, dominate various segments of the criminal underworld, ranging from narcotics distribution to extortion. Some of these syndicates have successfully integrated into Russia’s legal economy, using legitimate businesses as fronts for illicit activities. Domestic criminal networks in Russia generally operate as well-organized groups with fluid structures, enabling them to adapt to market demands and evade law enforcement efforts. Prominent cybercriminal organizations, including FROZENBARENTS and FROZENLAKE, have been linked to sophisticated cyberattacks targeting the energy, defence and financial sectors, particularly in Ukraine. These groups employ phishing campaigns, data theft and hack-and-leak operations, often coordinating their efforts with broader strategic interests.

State-embedded actors play a critical role in Russia’s organized crime ecosystem, where corruption is deeply entrenched at multiple levels of governance. From local law enforcement to high-ranking political figures, state officials frequently engage in criminal activities, leveraging their positions for financial gain and protection from prosecution. Corruption manifests in various forms, including bribery, embezzlement and abuse of authority, allowing state actors to extract resources and manipulate law enforcement mechanisms to their advantage. Notably, reports highlight instances of senior officials protecting criminal enterprises in exchange for financial kickbacks. Some government agencies are directly compromised, enabling large-scale corruption networks to thrive. Russian intelligence agencies have also been linked to organized crime, utilizing criminal networks for state-sanctioned operations, such as sanctions evasion, cyberattacks and covert financial transactions. The increasing fusion of state and criminal actors has blurred the lines between legitimate governance and illicit enterprise, with many criminal organizations operating under the implicit protection of political elites.

Foreign criminal actors play a notable role in Russia’s organized crime landscape, with groups from Central Asia, Georgia, Serbia, China and Vietnam engaged in a variety of illicit activities. Central Asian criminal groups, particularly from Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, dominate segments of the drug trade, including the trafficking of synthetic drugs in major urban centres. Georgian networks are active in extortion and cannabis trafficking, while Serbian groups maintain a stronghold in the arms trade. Chinese and Vietnamese criminal organizations operate extensively in the Russian Far East, controlling markets for counterfeit goods, illegal mining, timber smuggling and labour trafficking. These groups have established close ties with Russian criminal actors, facilitating cross-border smuggling and illicit trade networks that extend into Europe and Asia. Although Russian law enforcement has attempted to curb foreign criminal influence, many of these groups continue to operate with relative impunity due to corruption and political complicity.

Organized crime in Russia is deeply intertwined with the private sector, particularly in industries susceptible to financial manipulation, such as real estate, retail and finance. Criminal groups use legitimate businesses as fronts for money laundering, with shell companies and offshore accounts playing a central role in concealing illicit funds. The construction, hospitality and entertainment sectors are particularly vulnerable to criminal infiltration due to weak regulatory oversight. Oligarchs and politically connected business elites are instrumental in facilitating financial crimes, leveraging their wealth and connections to secure favourable government contracts and evade regulatory scrutiny. These individuals maintain extensive offshore holdings, enabling large-scale tax evasion and money laundering operations. Their close ties to Russian political elites allow them to operate with relative impunity, often benefiting from state-backed financial schemes that protect them from legal scrutiny. Many of Russia’s wealthiest individuals hold assets offshore, evading domestic taxes and channelling funds through international financial systems. Furthermore, private-sector actors engaged in government contracts frequently exploit corruption networks to secure favourable deals, often at the expense of public funds. Although some efforts have been made to regulate these sectors, entrenched corruption and weak enforcement mechanisms continue to facilitate the deep integration of organized crime into Russia’s economy.

Leadership and governance

The Russian government has taken steps to combat organized crime by establishing interdepartmental working groups and coordinating with law enforcement agencies. However, these measures have faced widespread criticism due to allegations of collusion between the government and criminal networks. The prioritization of suppressing political dissent over tackling organized crime, particularly in the context of the ongoing war in Ukraine, has further undermined these efforts. The death of Alexei Navalny while in prison in 2024 underscored the repression faced by opposition figures and heightened concerns regarding state involvement in criminal activities. The operations of the Wagner Group exemplify the intersection of organized crime and state interests. Following the death of its former leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, the group has continued to operate under the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia), raising concerns about state affiliations with paramilitary groups engaged in illicit activities. Reports also indicate that migrants, particularly ethnic minorities and newly naturalized Russian citizens, have been subjected to forced military recruitment, further exposing vulnerabilities in governance and human rights protections. Additionally, Russia's alleged state-sponsored cyber activities, including cyber warfare and espionage, complicate regulatory and enforcement efforts. International scrutiny of Russia’s ties to organized crime has intensified, particularly due to its involvement in conflicts such as the war in Ukraine. Western sanctions have targeted financial networks linked to criminal enterprises, while the economic strain from these measures has fuelled internal instability. The International Criminal Court has issued arrest warrants for Russian officials implicated in the forced deportation of Ukrainian children, further highlighting the intersection of criminal activities and state policies.

Efforts to enhance transparency and accountability in Russia have been significantly undermined by systemic corruption and political interference. The presidential decision to exempt government officials, particularly those involved in the conflict in Ukraine, from disclosing their assets has raised concerns that anti-corruption measures are designed to protect political elites rather than combat illicit financial flows. The government has also restricted the activities of independent oversight organizations, labelling groups as ‘undesirable organizations.’ Although technical measures, such as e-payment systems, have been introduced, access to government spending data remains severely limited, with only 60% of expenditures being publicly disclosed. Increased secrecy in procurement processes and the closure of the land cadastre to public access have further hindered efforts to increase transparency. The role of the Russian judicial system in combating corruption remains highly compromised. While high-profile corruption cases may suggest an official crackdown on financial crimes, reports indicate that enforcement has been selective, often targeting political opponents rather than addressing systemic corruption. Russia’s state corporatism enables politically connected individuals to benefit from government contracts while ensuring impunity for illicit financial activities.

Russia has ratified several international agreements aimed at combating organized crime, including treaties that address financial crimes, drug trafficking and money laundering. However, its adherence to these agreements has been called into question, particularly due to its involvement in transnational criminal activities and conflicts, such as those in Ukraine and Syria. Allegations of human rights abuses and violations of international law further undermine Russia’s standing in global law enforcement cooperation. Despite being a signatory to multiple extradition treaties, Russia has been accused of manipulating the extradition process for political purposes, targeting activists and opposition figures rather than focusing on suspects involved in organized crime. The country’s cooperation with international law enforcement agencies, such as INTERPOL and Europol, has significantly deteriorated due to geopolitical tensions, especially with Western nations. Nevertheless, Russia has continued to strengthen its ties with countries in the Asia-Pacific region, the West Asia, Africa and Latin America, engaging in security agreements and law enforcement partnerships that align with its strategic interests.

Russia’s legal framework encompasses provisions aimed at combating various forms of organized crime, including drug trafficking, arms trafficking, fraud, money laundering and terrorism. Although legislative reforms have been implemented to enhance prosecutions against criminal organizations, the political climate has increasingly influenced the enforcement of these laws. Recent amendments that criminalize participation in organized crime meetings seek to mitigate illicit activities; however, selective enforcement remains a concern, as authorities tend to prioritize cases that align with state interests. Furthermore, existing laws permitting construction in wildlife reserves and the exploitation of natural resources have raised concerns regarding the state’s potential complicity in environmental crimes. Additionally, there has been a noticeable tolerance for cybercriminal groups operating within Russia, with these entities reportedly serving the state’s interests in cyber warfare. Likewise, counterfeit goods are tolerated to ease the impact of scarcity and isolation on the population.

Criminal justice and security

Russia’s judicial system includes specialized units tasked with prosecuting organized crime cases. However, political interference and corruption have a severe impact on judicial independence. Judges’ career advancements are often tied to their compliance with the directives of political elites, and courts are frequently used to target political dissidents rather than genuine criminal enterprises. Pressure on independent lawyers and the judiciary’s handling of high-profile cases raise further concerns about independence. Additionally, the quality of legal education, especially outside major cities, affects the judiciary’s effectiveness. The penitentiary system is deeply flawed, characterized by overcrowding, human rights abuses and pervasive corruption within prisons. Organized crime networks continue to exert control over various aspects of the prison system, facilitating illicit activities behind bars. The mistreatment of political prisoners has garnered widespread international condemnation. Reports of extrajudicial violence, human rights abuses and mistreatment in custody highlight challenges to the systemic issues within the justice system. Russia’s law enforcement agencies, including the Federal Security Service, the Federal Protective Service and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, possess extensive resources to combat organized crime. However, personnel shortages, political interference and a focus on suppressing dissent rather than addressing criminal activities have hindered their effectiveness. Reports of corruption among law enforcement officials, including the extortion of migrants, further exacerbate public distrust. Furthermore, reports of extrajudicial violence, human rights abuses and a lack of accountability further undermine the credibility of the law enforcement system and significantly impact public trust in these agencies.

Territorial integrity continues to be a significant challenge, especially in light of the ongoing war in Ukraine. The vastness of Russia’s borders, coupled with the state’s inability to maintain effective control, has enabled illicit trafficking. Additionally, geopolitical tensions have complicated efforts to secure these borders. Resource constraints and the expansiveness of the border pose additional significant challenges to surveillance and enforcement. Moreover, corruption among border control personnel undermines the effectiveness of enforcement mechanisms. In the cyber domain, the conflict between Russia and the West has escalated since the invasion of Ukraine, with Russia increasingly becoming a target rather than merely a source of attacks. What began as reciprocal DDoS campaigns has evolved into more innovative and sustained operations against Russia, leveraging crowdsourced tools and hacktivist efforts that have exposed sensitive data and disrupted systems. Although DDoS attacks have limited strategic impact, Ukraine’s IT Army has effectively countered Russian cyberattacks on critical infrastructure, significantly undermining the integrity of Russia’s cyberspace.

Economic and financial environment

Russia has established an anti-money laundering (AML) framework, with the Federal Financial Monitoring Service (Rosfinmonitoring) serving as the primary authority overseeing financial investigations. However, systemic corruption and political interference have undermined the effectiveness of these measures. Russia’s suspension from the Financial Action Task Force in 2023, a consequence of its war in Ukraine, raises concerns that efforts to uphold international AML standards may be compromised.

The country’s economic regulatory environment is hindered by corruption, state interference and restrictive business conditions. Organized crime continues to exploit vulnerabilities in financial regulations, particularly in money laundering and smuggling activities. Sanctions imposed by western nations have prompted Russia to seek alternative financial channels, including informal economic networks and transactions with sanctioned states, to mitigate economic restrictions.

Civil society and social protection

Support for victims of organized crime, particularly human trafficking, remains inadequate in Russia. The absence of a comprehensive legislative and administrative framework has left many trafficking victims vulnerable to deportation or prosecution. Victims are often not identified at the outset of investigations, allowing trafficking to remain largely undetected. Even when victims are recognized, protection measures are insufficient, lacking substantial assistance, security provisions and long-term support. NGOs play a critical role in providing services to victims, but increasing government restrictions and funding shortages have severely weakened their capacity. While there are efforts to address drug addiction through prevention programs and rehabilitation initiatives, the stigma surrounding drug use remains pervasive. Crime victims also face significant barriers in accessing support services due to societal prejudices, bureaucratic inefficiencies and inconsistent legal protections.

Efforts to combat organized crime in Russia remain inadequate, particularly concerning human trafficking and drug-related offences. The criminalization of assistance to smuggled individuals has exacerbated vulnerabilities, making it challenging for humanitarian organizations to operate effectively. Furthermore, the government lacked both a designated lead agency to coordinate anti-trafficking efforts and a body to monitor or assess its performance. Public awareness campaigns aimed at preventing organized crime are limited, with government initiatives primarily focused on law enforcement rather than proactive community engagement. Although the Ministry of Internal Affairs has reported progress in reducing criminal markets, corruption and resource shortages continue to hinder a meaningful impact. Key areas such as community outreach, social intervention and whistle-blower protection remain largely overlooked. Furthermore, local communities typically do not view the fight against organized crime as a collective responsibility unless they are directly affected.

Civil society organizations and independent media in Russia operate under severe restrictions. Journalists and activists investigating organized crime and corruption frequently face harassment, imprisonment or forced exile. The government has expanded its use of ‘foreign agent’ laws to target NGOs and media outlets, effectively curbing independent oversight efforts. In addition to state repression, independent journalists and media organizations encounter threats and intimidation from organized crime groups, further constraining their ability to report freely. Attacks on journalists, media institutions and civil society activists by both state and non-state actors remain widespread, fostering a climate of fear and self-censorship. Despite these challenges, some organizations continue to provide victim support services, albeit under growing pressure and significant operational risks. The government maintains control over all national television networks, as well as many print and radio outlets and a substantial portion of the media advertising market, either directly or through state-owned enterprises and affiliated business elites. A small number of independent media platforms persist, primarily operating online and headquartered outside of Russia.