Criminal markets
6.400.13
An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.
Human trafficking
7.500.00
Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.
Human smuggling
8.000.00
Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.
Extortion and protection racketeering
5.500.50
Crimes linked to exerting control over a territory/market including as a mediator and/or requesting a benefit in exchange for protection.
Arms trafficking
9.000.00
The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.
Trade in counterfeit goods
6.000.50
The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands.
Illicit trade in excisable goods
6.001.00
The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits.
Flora crimes
7.000.00
The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.
Fauna crimes
4.500.00
The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.
Non-renewable resource crimes
7.500.00
The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.
Heroin trade
2.50-1.50
The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.
Cocaine trade
2.000.50
The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cannabis trade
6.500.00
The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.
Synthetic drug trade
8.500.50
The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cyber-dependent crimes
8.500.00
Organized crimes that rely solely on using information communications technology with the aim of obtaining a monetary/material benefit.
Financial crimes
7.000.50
Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance.
Criminal actors
6.50-0.20
An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.
Mafia-style groups
5.00-0.50
Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.
Criminal networks
7.500.00
Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.
State-embedded actors
8.000.00
Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.
Foreign actors
7.000.00
State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.
Private sector actors
5.00-0.50
Profit-seeking individuals/entities who own/control a part of the legal economy free from the state, that collaborate with criminal actors.
Political leadership and governance
5.000.00
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
4.000.50
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
7.500.00
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
4.500.00
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
4.500.00
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
5.000.00
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
1.500.00
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
4.500.00
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
4.50-0.50
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
4.000.00
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
4.000.00
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
5.500.00
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Ukraine continues to be both a source and transit country for human trafficking, with the ongoing war exacerbating existing vulnerabilities. Ukrainian victims, particularly women and children, are exploited both domestically and abroad. Citizens are trafficked primarily to Russia, Poland, Germany, China, Kazakhstan and Western Asian countries, with a rising number of cases reported in several EU states. The displacement crisis caused by the war has intensified these risks, as traffickers specifically target refugees at border crossings, offering fraudulent assistance in exchange for forced labour or sexual exploitation. Reports indicate a significant increase in online searches for Ukrainian women involved in sex work, suggesting a surge in demand for trafficked victims. In Russian-occupied territories, women and girls have been abducted and forced into prostitution. Ukrainian children, especially unaccompanied minors and those evacuated from care facilities, are at a heightened risk of trafficking. They have fallen victim to forced labour and sexual exploitation, with authorities identifying multiple cases linked to child pornography. Local criminal networks, along with Russian criminal groups and military personnel, are involved in these trafficking operations. The economic downturn and the ongoing war have further heightened vulnerabilities, pushing more individuals into exploitative labour situations.
Ukraine’s human smuggling market has grown substantially since the onset of the war. While Ukrainian citizens can legally enter the EU under temporary protection measures, men aged 18–60 are prohibited from leaving the country due to martial law. This restriction has given rise to a large-scale smuggling industry that caters to those seeking to evade military service. Smugglers employ falsified medical documents and facilitate illegal border crossings. Many smuggling networks operate through encrypted messaging platforms, boasting thousands of members. Over 21 000 men have been apprehended while attempting to cross borders illegally, and dozens have lost their lives in the process of trying to escape conscription, drowning, for example, in the Tisa River along the Romanian border. The removal of the ‘residence abroad’ exception in June 2024 has further compelled individuals to pursue illegal migration routes.
Extortion is a well-established crime in Ukraine, affecting various sectors, including mining and energy. The ongoing war has worsened the situation, with reports indicating that Russian forces are extorting the families of Ukrainian soldiers through threats, kidnapping and torture. Additionally, criminal organizations have targeted the families of fallen soldiers, demanding money under false pretences. Organized crime groups, such as the Korostyshiv gang, which has been active since 2014, have been implicated in severe forms of extortion, including blackmail and kidnapping. The economic hardship resulting from the war has rendered both individuals and businesses increasingly vulnerable to extortion schemes perpetrated by organized crime groups that exploit financial distress.
The war has resulted in a surge of illegal weapons, although large-scale smuggling operations out of Ukraine have not been extensively documented. Recently, organized smuggling networks have begun to emerge, raising concerns about military personnel selling high-grade arms, including anti-aircraft weapons. Seizures near EU borders indicate a shift toward more structured trafficking operations. Reports suggest that hundreds of thousands of weapons have been lost or stolen, mostly in the eastern regions. A key concern is the potential for long-term diffusion of weapons into civilian society. Sales conducted through encrypted messaging platforms have increased, and some criminal actors disguise themselves as volunteers in order to acquire weapons. While isolated seizures of high-grade weaponry have occurred, there is currently no systemic trafficking network exporting arms from Ukraine.
Ukraine has a well-established market for counterfeit goods, driven by economic hardship and high consumer demand for cheap alternatives. Counterfeit tobacco, luxury items and pharmaceuticals remain prevalent. Criminal groups operate production hubs within the country, and large-scale raids have revealed significant quantities of counterfeit food, cigarettes and alcohol. These counterfeit products are smuggled into Ukraine through its ports and subsequently redistributed throughout Europe.
Illicit trade in excisable goods, particularly tobacco and alcohol smuggling, remains highly prevalent. The war has disrupted supply chains, leading to an increased demand for illegal excise goods. Smuggled tobacco and alcohol enter Ukraine and are then moved into Romania, Poland and Moldova. The illicit tobacco trade, in particular, has expanded, with Ukraine emerging as one of Europe’s largest sources of contraband cigarettes. Smuggling operations are sometimes concealed within military shipments. Authorities have seized vast quantities of contraband, including tons of alcohol and millions of packs of cigarettes. Additionally, increased taxation has further incentivized contraband markets, establishing Ukraine as a key regional hub for illicit excise goods.
Flora crimes in Ukraine involve illegal logging, which has surged due to weakened oversight in conflict-affected regions. Russian forces have also engaged in illegal logging and the smuggling of Ukrainian timber. Corruption remains rampant in the forestry sector, with officials facilitating the illicit export of timber. Recent reports have highlighted the involvement of state-owned enterprises in unauthorized deforestation activities. The absence of digital tracking systems allows for document falsification, further exacerbating the problem. The EU is contemplating designating Ukraine as a high-risk jurisdiction for timber trade violations.
Concerning fauna crimes, Ukraine functions as both a transit and source country for wildlife trafficking. Species such as bears, parrots, snakes and cheetahs are smuggled through Ukraine en route to the EU, Asia. Additionally, the country faces challenges with sturgeon poaching along the Danube River, despite ongoing enforcement efforts.
Non-renewable resource crimes in Ukraine encompass illicit amber mining, primarily concentrated in the north-western regions. Smuggled amber is typically laundered through Poland and sold mainly to China. Reports indicate that the war has significantly disrupted the illicit amber market due to stricter border controls and increased military oversight. However, coal and oil smuggling continue to be substantial issues, particularly in Russian-occupied territories where unauthorized extraction is rampant. Oil smuggling, in particular, has intensified, with Ukrainian networks collaborating with Balkan groups to distribute illicit fuel. Although gold smuggling is not as prominent, it persists at lower levels.
Heroin trafficking in Ukraine has decreased due to the ongoing war. Supply shortages have driven up prices, prompting many users to turn to methadone and synthetic opioids. Consequently, heroin is now sold in minimal quantities, leading to a significant decline of the domestic criminal market.
Ukraine was a transit hub for cocaine before the war, but disruptions in Black Sea port operations have reduced trafficking and led to a decrease in availability. Initially, cocaine prices surged but later stabilized as new routes emerged. Recent police operations suggest a resurgence in trafficking, with seizures increasing in the western border regions. Prices remain higher than those in Western Europe, reflecting ongoing supply constraints.
Despite disruptions caused by war, cannabis production and consumption have remained stable. Domestic cultivation has encountered challenges, but demand persists. Prices have risen sharply, reflecting a growing social acceptance of cannabis. Recently, parliament approved legislation for medical cannabis, signalling potential regulatory changes. Reports suggest that soldiers on the frontlines are using cannabis, occasionally mixed with stimulants.
The war has intensified the production and consumption of synthetic drugs, as amphetamine-type stimulants and synthetic opioids increasingly replace heroin. The prevalence of synthetic drugs has surged, accompanied by a rise in the seizure of precursor chemicals. Ukraine has emerged as a key regional producer, with clandestine laboratories expanding and online drug sales proliferating through encrypted messaging platforms and the darknet. Authorities have dismantled major synthetic drug networks, highlighting the growing domestic production and distribution of these substances.
Ukraine is a significant global hub for cybercrime, ranking among the top nations in terms of cyber threats. State-sponsored hacking campaigns target government institutions, infrastructure and financial entities. Pro-Russian cyber groups frequently launch attacks that disrupt digital systems. Additionally, Ukraine has seen an increase in ransomware groups targeting foreign victims. Despite ongoing efforts to combat cybercrime, the industry remains highly lucrative.
Financial crimes, including corruption, embezzlement, tax evasion and fraud, are systemic in Ukraine. The war has exacerbated these issues, creating an environment where illicit financial activities thrive. Corruption scandals involving high-ranking officials continue to emerge. Fraudulent procurement schemes have exploited military funds, with investigations revealing extensive misuse of defence budgets. Tax evasion costs Ukraine billions annually, with schemes involving VAT fraud and offshore tax havens contributing to systemic financial losses. Additionally, Ukraine is reportedly home to thousands of call centres engaged in fraudulent schemes, each employing between 15 and 200 staff members, with larger operations generating up to one million euros per week. While these scams initially targeted Russian citizens, they have increasingly expanded their focus to include EU and British nationals. As Ukraine navigates the challenges of war and economic recovery, authorities have increased enforcement efforts, but financial crimes continue to pose a pressing challenge.
Before the war, Ukraine had a strong but fragmented landscape of mafia-style groups, with varying degrees of influence across different cities. These organizations included traditional criminal hierarchies such as the vory v zakone (thieves-in-law) and avtoritety (criminal authorities who blend business with illicit activities). While some of these groups have suffered disruptions due to the war, such as losing key territories and members, others have adapted by shifting to new illicit activities or relocating their operations to safer regions. The vory maintain a deep connection to the criminal subculture, strictly adhering to a code of conduct, while the avtoritety leverage their influence through economic and political connections. Historically, these groups controlled various sectors of organized crime, including extortion, drug trafficking and illegal resource extraction. However, the war has forced many to restructure, resulting in a reduction of their overall dominance compared to pre-war levels.
Ukraine has long been home to more loosely structured and adaptable criminal networks, many of which lack strict hierarchical leadership. These networks typically operate through personal, familial or opportunistic connections, facilitating a broad range of illicit activities. Unlike traditional mafia-style groups, they are highly flexible, making them resilient to law enforcement pressure and the upheaval caused by war. Rather than halting criminal operations, the war has reshaped them. Some networks have capitalized on war-related opportunities, such as smuggling essential goods and exploiting supply chain disruptions.
State-embedded actors continue to be one of the most significant enablers of organized crime in Ukraine, characterized by a high prevalence of corruption among state officials, law enforcement and political figures. The country's public institutions have long been plagued by bribery, nepotism and financial crimes, which undermine anti-crime initiatives and regulatory oversight. Before the war, law enforcement officials were frequently implicated in drug trafficking, prostitution and resource exploitation, often monopolizing illicit markets instead of dismantling them. More recently, major corruption scandals have continued to surface. Notably, in January 2024, Ukraine’s Security Service uncovered that defence ministry officials and weapons suppliers embezzled millions of US dollars intended for military procurement. Similarly, high-ranking politicians have faced allegations of diverting funds from humanitarian aid and military spending. Despite wartime crackdowns on corruption, Ukraine remains vulnerable to state-embedded actors who manipulate legal and financial systems to facilitate organized crime. The Zelenskyy administration has taken steps to remove key officials linked to corruption. Still, systemic challenges persist, making it difficult to sustain reform efforts in the face of deeply entrenched criminal interests.
Foreign criminal organizations have long been involved in Ukraine’s illicit markets, particularly those from Russia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Türkiye. The war has further expanded opportunities for transnational crime, with foreign actors exploiting Ukraine’s instability to smuggle drugs, weapons and other contraband. One of the most influential transnational groups is Khimprom, a Russian–Ukrainian network specializing in synthetic drugs and chemical precursors. Operating across Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, Khimprom has established itself as a dominant player in Ukraine’s drug trade. The group utilizes online platforms, particularly encrypted messaging platforms and dark web marketplaces, to distribute narcotics. Despite increased scrutiny from law enforcement, Khimprom’s leadership has successfully relocated abroad while maintaining control over its operations. Between January and June 2024, Ukrainian authorities dismantled approximately 10 transnational criminal groups; despite this, foreign actors remain deeply entrenched. Their adaptability and cross-border networks render them formidable players in Ukraine’s criminal ecosystem, often outmanoeuvring local law enforcement efforts.
Ukraine’s private sector actors, particularly oligarchs, have historically played a significant role in organized crime. Before the war, oligarchs maintained near-total control over key industries, including gas, oil and banking, using their wealth to influence the political and judicial systems. The war has altered power dynamics, diminishing the direct political influence of oligarchs. With martial law in place, the government has consolidated power, reducing the ability of business elites to manipulate state institutions. However, this has not completely eradicated oligarchic influence. Many oligarchs have repositioned themselves as war financiers, donating resources to military efforts, whether out of patriotism, strategic reputation management or attempts to maintain influence in the post-war landscape. Since 2014, Ukraine has sought to curtail oligarchic power, and the ongoing conflict has accelerated these efforts. Key figures have faced unprecedented legal actions. Despite these crackdowns, private-sector actors continue to exert influence, particularly in finance, defence procurement and smuggling networks. While some have fled to Russia or been arrested, others remain embedded in Ukraine’s wartime economy, strategically positioning themselves for future political and economic leverage.
Ukraine’s political leadership has undergone significant transformations due to the ongoing war, which has impacted its resilience against organized crime. Despite the challenges posed by the conflict, the government has continued to implement measures aimed at countering criminal networks and corruption. However, longstanding issues such as patronage, clientelism and corruption persist, limiting the effectiveness of governance reforms. The country has a history of organized crime infiltrating politics, with some criminal figures gaining political influence over the years. While the war has diminished the hold of some oligarchs on politics, corruption remains deeply embedded in the political system. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s administration has taken steps to address these issues, particularly in the fight against smuggling and economic crimes. Public trust in the government has fluctuated significantly during the war, peaking at 90% in mid-2022 before stabilizing at around 59% in May 2024. While the government maintains democratic structures, concerns persist regarding political transparency and accountability, particularly in the context of wartime governance.
Ukraine has made notable progress in enhancing transparency, particularly through anti-corruption initiatives and the implementation of digital governance tools. The National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine and the National Agency on Corruption Prevention have played crucial roles in pursuing high-profile corruption cases. However, these agencies have encountered internal leaks, political interference and credibility issues, which have undermined their ability to operate independently. Legislative measures have been implemented to strengthen accountability, including laws that expand the powers of anti-corruption agencies and reinstate public asset declarations. Despite these efforts, public officials in both the executive and legislative branches continue to misuse their positions for personal gain, as demonstrated by recent scandals. In August 2024, a Deputy Minister was arrested in connection with a corruption case in the coal industry, highlighting ongoing vulnerabilities. Public perception reflects a mix of progress and scepticism, with many Ukrainians viewing corruption as a significant obstacle to EU integration and post-war recovery.
Ukraine continues to prioritize international cooperation in combating organized crime and enhancing governance. The country is a signatory to major international treaties, including the UN Convention Against Corruption and the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. Since 2022, Ukraine has received extensive financial, military and humanitarian aid from the EU, NATO and allied states to sustain its war effort and governance reforms. In 2024, Ukraine signed bilateral security agreements with multiple nations, including the US, Japan and several European countries. Additionally, international law enforcement cooperation has been strengthened through partnerships with Europol and neighbouring EU states, particularly in efforts to combat arms and human trafficking. However, discussions on NATO membership remain stalled.
Ukraine’s national legal framework criminalizes organized crime, including human trafficking, smuggling, arms and drug trafficking, illegal logging, cybercrime and financial offences. However, enforcement is undermined by corruption, political interference, limited resources and the ongoing conflict. Although recent amendments have strengthened some policies, laws against child exploitation and abuse remain under-enforced due to gaps in detection, support and prevention. Martial law, imposed in 2022, introduced further restrictions on movement, assembly and media, constraining fundamental freedoms.
Ukraine’s judicial system remains weak and vulnerable to corruption, with judges and prosecutors frequently implicated in bribery and political favouritism. Despite constitutional amendments aimed at strengthening judicial independence, political influence over judicial appointments persists in undermining fairness. Public trust in the judiciary remains low, with 73% of Ukrainians expressing distrust in 2024. The country’s penitentiary system faces severe resource shortages, which the ongoing conflict has exacerbated. Several prisons suffer from poor living conditions, inadequate medical care and delays in judicial proceedings, resulting in 36% of detainees being held in pretrial detention. In Russian-occupied areas, reports of torture and inhumane treatment within detention facilities further complicate the situation.
Despite the war, Ukraine’s law enforcement agencies continue to operate, maintaining a high level of public trust in the Armed Forces and National Guard. However, confidence in the National Police remains comparatively low, reflecting widespread concerns about corruption and abuse of power within civilian law enforcement structures. The war has stretched law enforcement resources, shifting focus from organized crime prevention to military defence. Specialised units responsible for tackling financial crimes and human trafficking are underfunded, which negatively impacts their effectiveness. OSCE
Ukraine’s territorial integrity remains significantly compromised due to the Russian occupation and ongoing military battles in several key regions. These areas have become hotspots for transnational organized crime, including money laundering, illegal gambling and arms smuggling. Corruption at border checkpoints further weakens territorial security, facilitating illicit trade. The war has also weakened state capacity, adversely affecting the monitoring of smuggling routes and border security operations.
Ukraine has strengthened its anti-money laundering (AML) framework to align with international standards. The country has implemented customer due diligence measures and transaction monitoring systems. However, corruption within financial institutions and law enforcement agencies continues to pose a challenge. Although the Financial Action Task Force evaluation found Ukraine to be largely compliant with international AML regulations, concerns remain regarding the enforcement of financial crime laws and the effectiveness of asset recovery efforts.
The war has severely undermined Ukraine’s economic stability and regulatory capacity. In response, the government has implemented tax reforms and increased reliance on foreign aid; however, fiscal imbalances continue to pose challenges. Despite these disruptions, Ukraine’s economy demonstrates some degree of resilience. Nevertheless, inflation, infrastructure damage from missile attacks and declining purchasing power remain significant economic risks.
Ukraine has maintained victim protection services despite budgetary constraints. The government has allocated funds for trafficking victims; however, most support is provided by NGOs and international organizations. Efforts to assist victims appear to have improved, but the lack of government-run trafficking shelters remains a challenge. Furthermore, Ukraine has increased anti-trafficking awareness campaigns with assistance from the OSCE and international donors, while also enhancing prosecutions against traffickers. Nevertheless, gaps in law enforcement training and victim identification remain.
Ukraine relies heavily on international organizations and NGOs for crime prevention and awareness campaigns, with these efforts strained by the ongoing war. While Ukraine does not fully meet minimum standards for eliminating trafficking, it continues to make significant efforts, including a new national action plan, resumed labour inspections, strengthened prosecutions and extensive awareness campaigns with international partners like the OSCE. However, challenges remain, such as lenient sentences. Additionally, the large veteran population poses risks of organized crime involvement, including drug use, arms trafficking and joining criminal groups, exacerbated by limited support and unclear policies. A comprehensive veterans’ strategy focusing on demobilization, disarmament and reintegration is needed to reduce these risks and support their return to civilian life.
Civil society plays a crucial role in Ukraine’s resilience, with NGOs supporting defence efforts and providing humanitarian aid. However, government regulations, including AML disclosure requirements for NGOs, have raised concerns about potential interference. Press freedom remains constrained, with journalists facing targeted discrediting campaigns and legal intimidation. Despite some progress, wartime censorship, media monopolization and legal restrictions continue to pose risks to independent reporting.
Criminal markets
5.370.10
An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.
Human trafficking
6.000.00
Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.
Human smuggling
5.500.00
Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.
Extortion and protection racketeering
4.500.50
Crimes linked to exerting control over a territory/market including as a mediator and/or requesting a benefit in exchange for protection.
Arms trafficking
5.000.00
The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.
Trade in counterfeit goods
5.500.50
The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands.
Illicit trade in excisable goods
6.000.00
The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits.
Flora crimes
6.000.00
The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.
Fauna crimes
4.500.00
The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.
Non-renewable resource crimes
4.000.00
The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.
Heroin trade
5.00-0.50
The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.
Cocaine trade
5.500.00
The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cannabis trade
5.000.00
The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.
Synthetic drug trade
5.500.50
The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cyber-dependent crimes
6.000.00
Organized crimes that rely solely on using information communications technology with the aim of obtaining a monetary/material benefit.
Financial crimes
6.500.50
Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance.
Criminal actors
4.300.40
An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.
Mafia-style groups
3.500.50
Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.
Criminal networks
5.500.00
Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.
State-embedded actors
4.501.00
Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.
Foreign actors
4.000.00
State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.
Private sector actors
4.000.50
Profit-seeking individuals/entities who own/control a part of the legal economy free from the state, that collaborate with criminal actors.
Political leadership and governance
5.50-0.50
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
6.500.00
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
7.000.00
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
6.000.00
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
6.500.00
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
6.000.00
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
6.00-0.50
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
5.000.00
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
5.500.00
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
6.000.00
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
6.000.00
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
4.50-0.50
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Romania remains a major source country for human trafficking victims across Europe, with sexual exploitation as the predominant form, followed by labour exploitation and forced begging. Reports indicate that a substantial proportion of sexual exploitation victims in Europe are Romanian, highlighting the scale of the issue. Victims are predominantly women and young girls from economically disadvantaged backgrounds, who are recruited through deceptive job offers, the ‘Loverboy’ method or coercion. Men are mainly subjected to forced labour in industries such as construction and agriculture. Traffickers increasingly utilize the internet to recruit victims, employ specialized personnel for managing advertisements and customer interactions. Additionally, former convicted traffickers often reinvest their illicit profits into real estate and reorganize their operations. Law enforcement crackdowns have led to large-scale arrests, though corruption within police forces and among local officials continues to hinder effective prosecution.
Romania is a transit country for human smuggling, with migrants from Asia, Latin America and Africa attempting to reach Western Europe through its territory. Criminal networks facilitate these movements by providing illegal transportation, often utilizing hidden compartments in trucks or perilous routes across rivers. Although authorities have increased border surveillance, corruption among immigration officials continues to facilitate unauthorized entries. Recent investigations have uncovered extensive smuggling networks linked to former officials of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, revealing how fraudulent work permits are issued to extend the stays of migrants. Law enforcement agencies have dismantled smuggling rings that transported individuals through boats and cars, generating millions in illicit profits. Despite these crackdowns, the low number of prosecutions remains a challenge.
Extortion and protection racketeering are prevalent in Romania, involving both criminal gangs and white-collar networks. Organized groups employ violence, threats and usury, while corrupt officials facilitate financial extortion schemes aimed at businesses. In urban areas, hospitality businesses are particularly vulnerable, often coerced into paying ‘protection fees’ to evade legal repercussions. Rural communities also endure similar challenges, with criminal groups using intimidation tactics to take over properties or agricultural land. Victims frequently comply out of fear, and cases are rarely reported due to the deep entrenchment of these networks.
Romania serves as a transit hub for arms trafficking, with weapons smuggled from Türkiye and Eastern Europe into Western markets. Reports indicate that criminal networks operate across borders, using concealed compartments and bribery to facilitate movement through Romanian ports and border crossings. Although law enforcement has seized significant quantities of illegal firearms, widespread corruption among border officials enables traffickers to continue their operations. Blank-firing pistols, which can be easily modified into lethal weapons, remain in high demand among organized crime groups.
The counterfeit goods market in Romania is well established, with criminal networks smuggling counterfeit clothing, electronics and pharmaceuticals from China and Türkiye. The Port of Constanța serves as a major entry point, where corrupt customs officials facilitate illicit shipments. Counterfeit luxury goods are widely available in local markets and online, driven by consumer demand for low prices. Recent law enforcement operations have resulted in significant seizures, including millions of euros’ worth of counterfeit designer apparel and perfumes. Illegally produced tobacco products and alcoholic beverages are also widespread in the country, posing significant risks to public health. However, high levels of corruption and the profitability of this trade continue to sustain the market.
Illicit trade in excise consumer goods, particularly tobacco, is a lucrative market for organized crime in Romania. The country has one of the highest rates of contraband cigarette consumption in the EU, with smuggling routes originating from neighbouring Moldova, Ukraine and Bulgaria. Reports indicate that organized crime groups operate with the protection of political figures and law enforcement, ensuring minimal disruption to their activities. Record seizures in recent years highlight the scale of operations, but prosecutions remain low. Alcohol smuggling is another concern, with illicit production and tax evasion schemes further fuelling the underground market.
Illegal logging is one of the most pressing environmental crimes in Romania. Corrupt officials and criminal networks exploit regulatory loopholes to facilitate timber smuggling, often laundering illicitly sourced wood through the use of fake documentation. Bribes are commonly used to ensure minimal oversight, allowing illicitly sourced timber to be laundered through counterfeit documentation and shell companies. High-profile cases have implicated major timber companies in illegal deforestation, with bribes ensuring minimal oversight. The destruction of Romania’s forests has severe ecological consequences, including habitat loss for wildlife and increased soil erosion.
Fauna crimes, particularly poaching and illegal fishing, are persistent issues. The illegal caviar trade, driven by the poaching of wild sturgeon in the Danube for export worldwide, remains a significant threat to biodiversity. Despite a fishing ban, the demand for black-market caviar continues to incentivize poaching. Law enforcement agencies have seized large quantities of illegally caught fish; however, lenient penalties and corruption undermine their enforcement efforts.
Romania also plays a role in non-renewable resource crimes, particularly in the smuggling of petroleum products and coal. Recent investigations have uncovered large-scale fuel tax evasion schemes, with criminal groups operating illegal refineries and storage facilities. Additionally, the exploitation of coal mines without proper permits has also been reported, highlighting regulatory weaknesses.
Romania is a key transit country for heroin smuggling along the Balkan route. Heroin originating from Afghanistan is trafficked through Romania to Central and Western Europe. Criminal networks, including foreign actors, remain actively involved, using both overland and maritime routes through the Black Sea to transport shipments. Heroin flows originating from Afghanistan and Iran that transit through Romanian ports usually do not adhere to pre-determined paths; instead, they often mutate and split into sub-flows.
The country serves as a transit hub for cocaine smuggling, with the Port of Constanța playing a central role. Criminal organizations employ concealment methods, such as camouflaging cocaine within food shipments. A recent crackdown dismantled a sophisticated network that was smuggling large quantities of cocaine into Romania for distribution throughout Europe. Cocaine consumption is on the rise, particularly among young people, as organized crime groups increasingly target urban areas.
Cannabis remains the most widely used drug in Romania, with both domestic production and imports from Albania, Spain and the Netherlands. Authorities have discovered large-scale cultivation sites, often concealed within agricultural fields. Recent cases also indicate that cannabis sometimes being replaced by synthetic cannabinoids, which further complicates enforcement efforts.
Synthetic drugs, including MDMA and methamphetamine, primarily originating from the Netherlands and Belgium, are increasingly trafficked through Romania. Criminal networks operate sophisticated supply chains, utilizing dark web marketplaces and courier services to distribute these synthetic substances. Recent operations have uncovered large-scale synthetic drug trafficking networks, resulting in seizures of ecstasy, amphetamines and fentanyl-laced substances.
Romania has experienced a surge in cyber-dependent crimes, including DDoS attacks, ransomware incidents and hacking activities causing both public and private institutions, as well as political figures, thousands of dollars’ worth of financial losses. These offences are perpetrated by a mix of foreign actors and well-organized Romanian cybercrime groups that exploit security vulnerabilities to execute data breaches and ransomware schemes.
Financial crime remains a persistent challenge in Romania, characterized by sophisticated schemes and the growing use of technology. Large-scale tax evasion, VAT fraud and the embezzlement of EU funds remain prevalent, often facilitated by organized crime groups with strong ties to political and public institutions. These transnational offences frequently involve collusion among criminal networks, corrupt officials and private-sector actors. Cyber-enabled financial crimes are particularly prevalent, with Romanian organized crime groups recognized for their expertise in ATM and point-of-sale skimming. Phishing and spear-phishing attacks are common, along with other methods such as Remote Desktop Protocol exploitation, integration into bot networks and credential theft, including banking information. Spoofing, where fraudulent SMS messages or emails impersonate trusted entities to solicit sensitive information, also remains a prevalent tactic.
Mafia-style groups, commonly referred to as ‘Clanuri Interlope’ or ‘Brigazi,’ exert some influence over Romania’s criminal landscape. These groups, often comprising moderate to large memberships, have expanded their operations across the EU, particularly in Italy, Spain and the UK. Domestically, they maintain control over various cities and districts, operating under a hierarchical structure. While inter-group rivalries are prevalent, strategic alliances may form when advantageous. Although these groups use firearms selectively, their operations frequently involve violent crimes such as kidnappings, extortion, contract killings and targeted assaults. Mafia groups in Romania have been linked to real estate corruption, voter mobilization for local politicians and collusion with law enforcement, thereby ensuring their continued influence over legal and political structures.
Romania is home to a variety of loosely organized but highly active criminal networks, particularly along the northern Balkan trafficking route. These groups, primarily composed of Romanian nationals, engage in human smuggling, document forgery and money laundering, while concealing their activities behind investments in shell companies and real estate. Criminal subcontractors are often employed to handle illicit operations, allowing for greater flexibility and enhancing their ability to evade detection by law enforcement.
State-embedded actors play a significant role in organized crime in Romania, facilitating corruption that allows criminal groups to operate with impunity. Investigations have revealed instances where high-ranking officials obstruct law enforcement efforts, as seen in cases involving the General Directorate for Internal Security. Corrupt officials have been implicated in awarding public contracts to businesses with ties to organized crime, thereby bypassing established legal regulations. The customs sector, judiciary and procurement processes are particularly vulnerable to corruption, enabling organized crime to evade regulatory oversight. While the extent of intelligence agency involvement remains unclear, there is evidence suggesting that certain elements within the state apparatus engage in criminal activities.
Foreign criminal groups operate within Romania, contributing to both human smuggling and trafficking networks. Chinese criminal groups have been implicated in high-profile exploitation cases, such as the ‘Shanghai dossier,’ which involved the trafficking of underage girls. Reports indicate that law enforcement has failed to take action against key perpetrators, raising concerns about the systemic protection of such networks. Additionally, Turkish, Ukrainian and Western Asian criminal groups are active in Romania, capitalizing on the country’s strategic location. Italian mafia groups, including the ‘Ndrangheta, Camorra and Cosa Nostra, engage in money laundering, environmental crimes and cyber fraud. However, their influence in Romania is less pronounced compared to other Eastern European nations, as their operations focus more on financial crime than on territorial control.
Private-sector actors play a crucial role in facilitating organized crime in Romania, particularly within the real estate and financial services sectors. Reports have linked Romanian businesses and individuals to financial misconduct, including those implicated in the Panama Papers. The ‘timber mafia’ remains one of the most influential criminal enterprises in the country. Organized groups exploit weaknesses in the national tracking system to circumvent regulations, contributing to large-scale environmental crimes. Additionally, ties between officials and the timber industry enable illegal deforestation to persist despite official efforts to curb the practice. Real estate corruption is another significant issue, with criminal groups utilizing fraudulent construction permits and illicit land acquisitions to accumulate wealth. These cases highlight the deep entrenchment of business entities in Romania’s organized crime landscape.
Romania's government acknowledges the existence of organized crime, but efforts to combat it remain inconsistent. The Ministry of Justice has issued guidelines aimed at intensifying the fight against organized crime, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs has announced plans to strengthen cooperation with Italy on this issue. However, a lack of coordinated responses, coupled with persistent corruption and bureaucratic inefficiencies, undermines these efforts. The public remains largely distrustful of the government, with surveys indicating low levels of confidence in political institutions. Corruption is particularly evident in sectors such as healthcare, where funds intended for infrastructure improvements are often misappropriated by companies with political connections.
The National Anticorruption Directorate plays a crucial role in combating corruption, having successfully prosecuted high-level officials, including members of parliament, mayors and judges. Despite these efforts, high-profile corruption cases continue to surface, and concerns regarding transparency and accountability persist. The National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2021–2025 aims to enhance legal enforcement; however, gaps in addressing conflicts of interest and enforcing accountability persist as significant challenges.
Romania is actively engaged in international cooperation to combat organized crime, participating in extradition agreements and utilising the European arrest warrants. However, it lacks treaties with certain jurisdictions, which limits its ability to secure the return of fugitives. The country is a founding member of INTERPOL and has a long history of engaging in international police cooperation. Nevertheless, recent cases of failed extradition requests highlight existing limitations.
National policies and laws have been amended to increase penalties for human trafficking offences, particularly those involving child victims. However, inconsistencies in legal definitions between trafficking and related crimes, such as pimping, have resulted in the misclassification of cases. Additionally, recent legal amendments that decriminalize tax evasion under certain conditions have raised concerns about potential loopholes that could be exploited. Furthermore, Romania also lacks comprehensive legislation addressing wildlife crime, with penalties often limited to illegal possession rather than trafficking offences.
Romania's judicial system is hierarchical; however, it faces challenges such as understaffing, slow case processing and bureaucratic inefficiencies. While specialized courts and prosecutors are designated to handle organized crime cases, heavy caseloads and administrative hurdles often result in significant delays. The Council of Europe has criticized Romania's detention facilities for issues such as overcrowding, poor conditions and inadequate prisoner welfare. While some lower-security prisons offer work programs, systemic problems persist within the broader penitentiary system. Law enforcement is organized into specialized units, such as the Directorate for Investigating Organized Crime and Terrorism and the General Directorate for Countering Organized Crime. These agencies focus on combating human trafficking, drug trafficking and cybercrime. However, reports indicate that corruption within law enforcement continues to be an obstacle, with allegations of police complicity in trafficking cases and misconduct. Instances of police brutality and negligence have also been reported, leading to ongoing investigations into abuses within law enforcement. Furthermore, the early retirement policy for law enforcement officials resulted in a wave of retirements, contributing to significant staffing shortages within the force. The Border Police and cybersecurity agencies are responsible for overseeing Romania’s territorial integrity. Despite advancements in cyber defence strategies, vulnerabilities persist, and the country continues to encounter challenges in preventing illegal border crossings. Reports indicate that corruption within border agencies has allowed smuggling networks to operate with impunity, resulting in the arrest of multiple border officers on bribery charges. Furthermore, key drug entry points for both the country and the EU – such as the Port of Constanța – lack effective and up-to-date surveillance systems, limiting their ability to address the growing volume of drug trafficking through these gateways. Although efforts to modernize border surveillance systems are underway, enforcement gaps persist.
Romania’s anti-money laundering framework has been strengthened through legal and institutional measures; however, enforcement remains inconsistent. Although authorities have enhanced their capacity to freeze and seize criminal assets, prosecutions related to money laundering remain limited. Investigations primarily concentrate on predicate offences such as corruption and tax evasion, rather than specifically targeting the laundering of proceeds from human and drug trafficking. The Financial Action Task Force and other oversight bodies have urged Romania to enhance its financial investigations and improve the monitoring of illicit financial flows. Additionally, cryptocurrencies remain largely unregulated, with few cases involving virtual assets being prosecuted, despite their increasing use in illegal transactions.
Economic regulatory capacity has been strengthened through the adoption of EU-aligned financial standards. However, corruption remains a significant concern, particularly regarding land and property rights, where local authorities have been accused of enabling illegal deforestation for financial gain. Multiple high-profile scandals have plagued the financial sector, raising concerns about the effectiveness of regulatory oversight. Tax evasion continues to lead to significant revenue losses, with ongoing efforts to modernize the fiscal administration agency’s IT infrastructure making slow progress.
Victim and witness support services in Romania are present, with reports indicating an increase in the protection for victims testifying in organized crime cases. The European Court of Human Rights has criticized Romania for its failure to protect child victims of sexual abuse. Although emergency voucher systems and victim assistance programs have been introduced, their availability remains limited. Human trafficking victims receive inconsistent support, and drug rehabilitation services are severely lacking, with few state-funded treatment facilities.
Prevention efforts in the country include national anti-trafficking awareness campaigns, though the messaging tends to be punitive rather than supportive. Police have increasingly conducted awareness programs on organized crime and related offenses in schools and universities. However, prevention remains fragmented and lacks coordination across institutions. Recent campaigns have focused more on vulnerable communities, yet significant challenges persist, including limited resources, weak enforcement, insufficient support for vulnerable groups and inadequate data to evaluate impact. While some initiatives aim to deter drug use, they offer little focus on harm reduction or rehabilitation.
Investigative journalism is vital for exposing corruption and organized crime, yet journalists frequently encounter legal harassment and intimidation. Civil society organizations function in a restrictive environment, with many NGOs struggling to secure funding and facing pressure from authorities. The media landscape in Romania is shaped by political and economic pressures, with journalists investigating corruption and organized crime frequently facing defamation lawsuits and physical threats. Instances of intimidation against journalists highlight the risks encountered by independent media. Although legal protections for press freedom are in place, their enforcement is inconsistent, resulting in self-censorship and a decline in investigative reporting. Despite these challenges, Romania boasts a robust network of investigative journalists and civil society organizations dedicated to transparency and anti-corruption initiatives.
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The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to 10. The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel.
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