People

The human trafficking market in Ukraine continues to be pervasive, with the country acting as a source, transit, and destination point for this activity. Trafficking victims of Ukrainian origin are exploited for sex trafficking and forced labour in Ukraine, Russia, Poland, and other parts of Europe, as well as the Middle East, and a small number of foreign nationals are exploited for forced labour in Ukraine. Human trafficking, which was already on the increase because of the country’s worsening economic conditions and resultant labour emigration, has been further exacerbated by the war waged by Russia in Ukraine. Although official data concerning human trafficking has become scarce since the Russian invasion, vast numbers of refugees have fled the country, especially women and children, as well as non-Ukrainians and non-EU citizens who were resident in Ukraine, and these people are extremely vulnerable to trafficking. Russian military personnel are reported to be actively involved in human trafficking, and Ukrainian children from occupied territories such as Donetsk and Luhansk have been taken to Russia.

Human smuggling activities have also been exacerbated by the Russian invasion, especially as non-EU citizens who were residing in Ukraine needed to make use of migrant smuggling networks in order to flee the country. This issue was resolved, however, by the introduction of temporary legal admittance into the EU. The legal framework banning Ukrainian men of military conscription age from leaving the country also created opportunities for smugglers. The smuggling of these Ukrainian men has become one of the most prevalent human smuggling activities in the country. The Russian invasion has made it difficult for people being smuggled from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria to enter Ukraine by air. Ukraine is on the migrant route from South East Asia and the Middle East towards Europe, and prior to the war large and well-developed human smuggling groups, made up of opportunistic individuals who were familiar with the paths across the borders and who collaborated with law enforcement officials, were active in the country.

Before the war, organized crime groups in Ukraine were involved in extortion and protection racketeering in various industries, including the mining sector, and these activities became part of a more widespread market after the start of the conflict. Ukrainian police have uncovered several gangs involved in various rackets and extortion.

Trade

With a substantial stockpile of weapons, few barriers to accessing arms, and millions of small arms and light weapons on the legal and black market, Ukraine is believed to have one of the largest arms trafficking markets in Europe. While it has long been a key link in the global arms trade, Ukraine’s role intensified after the 2014 conflict in the eastern part of the country. Seizures carried out in previous years indicated that most of the arms that proliferated throughout the country were Soviet-designed models; only a small percentage comprised recently produced firearms and ammunition. The current war is expected to have an adverse effect on this market, owing to the free circulation of arms among a population who took part in the response against the whole-scale Russian invasion, as well as increased additional supplies provided by European countries and the US. While evidence of the number of arms illegally circulating throughout the country is extremely limited, there are already signs that illegal guns are playing a greater role in crimes carried out both in Ukraine and in nearby regions in Russia.

Trade in counterfeit goods, including clothing, jewellery, luxury goods, and perfume, sourced from China and other Asian countries, is common in Ukraine. Rapid cash flows continue to be generated by this market, and the problem is exacerbated by the ongoing war, the lax enforcement of intellectual property rights, and the normalization of these products within Ukrainian society. However, the largest counterfeit goods markets, such as those in the surroundings of Odesa, where the main production and distribution points were situated, are currently not functioning because of the war. Ukraine has long been a transit country for illicit tobacco products being trafficked into Europe, and it is increasingly becoming a destination point as well, owing to the steady increase in excise taxes, record levels of inflation, and the effects of the ongoing war. A noticeable shift has been observed in this market, with greater volumes now entering through the western borders instead of the eastern ones. Smuggling routes connected to Russia and Belarus have decreased in significance, while those involving Poland, Romania and Moldova have seen an uptick in their involvement in illicit trade within Ukraine. Moreover, the temporary wartime ban imposed on alcohol sales resulted in an increased illicit market for these products, until the lifting of the ban.

Environment

Flora crime, primarily illegal logging, has long been a pervasive problem in Ukraine. In fact, prior to the war, the country was the main exporter of illegally logged trees to the EU. This illegal trade has been exacerbated by high levels of corruption, weak due diligence, and the country’s role as a transit point for illegal timber from Russia. Illegal logging was alleged to be carried out by Russian forces during the invasion of Crimea, and this activity is expected to increase during the ongoing war. Because of the current seaport blockade it has become difficult to transfer Ukrainian wood abroad by means of maritime routes, which has led traffickers to move these shipments by road.

Fauna crimes in general were moderately prevalent in Ukraine before the war. The country was a source and transit point for the illicit wildlife trade, as it was part of the trafficking route into the EU through the borders of Poland and Romania, with the former having been identified as a wildlife trafficking hotspot. Species seized included tigers, tarantulas, snakes, parrots, and corals, as well as elephant ivory. Prior to the war, Russian criminal groups were known to smuggle large quantities of illegal caviar into Europe via Ukraine, reflecting the country’s role as a transit point for illegal fish products. It is estimated that there has been an increase in poaching resulting from current insecurity and poor economic conditions.

Ukraine is a source of non-renewable resources, and a variety of these are illegally extracted, predominantly in the Rivne, Volyn, and Zhytomyr regions. The most pervasive of these markets is the illegal amber trade, with most of the demand coming from China, and a widespread criminal network carries out illegal mining of this resource in the north-west of Ukraine. Despite the ongoing war, these illicit activities continue, with law enforcement units unable to intercept the market. The illicit fuel market has also become more extensive, with the smuggling of large consignments of fuel to Ukraine from Belarus and Russia, as well as the presence of illegal filling stations that have been operating since the start of the war. Coal mining has increased, especially in the Donbas region, and illegal operations have been growing steadily. There are also reports indicating that Russian companies are illegally expropriating Ukraine’s national resources, such as anthracite, in occupied territories.

Drugs

Significant seizures made prior to the war indicate that Ukraine was a relatively important transit country for heroin. The drug entered Ukrainian territory along the Balkan and Northern routes, before being transported to Western and central Europe, mainly via the Black Sea. Because of its geographical position, Ukraine was naturally a transit country for Afghan heroin reaching Europe, but is considered a ‘spin-off’ of the more important Balkan route. Heroin trafficking has decreased during the war, as the high intensity of military hostilities has resulted in a diversion to alternative routes. However, the conflict and growing destabilization in the country may also boost attitudes of impunity in the illicit drug trade, leading to increased trafficking and production. Ukraine’s cocaine trade was limited, with a small consumer market, and has become close to non-existent following the start of the war, as most local consumers are believed to have moved to the EU. Prior to the war cocaine was moved through Ukrainian seaports and airports for both domestic use and transit to EU countries.

Before the Russian invasion, Ukraine’s cannabis market was extensive, with reports indicating the existence of numerous marijuana plantations across the country. Cannabis was produced locally as well as being smuggled in from Russia and Moldova. Ukraine was predominantly a destination country for synthetic drugs and psychotropic substances, particularly amphetamine-type stimulants, which were primarily trafficked from Poland, Lithuania, and the Netherlands, and the use of these substances had been growing consistently over the past decade. There was also evidence of clandestine local production, providing supply to the local market as well as, to some extent, neighbouring countries. Production carried out in clandestine laboratories located in the east of Ukraine was disrupted following the start of the war to a certain degree. This resulted in a subsequent shift in the location of laboratories, with an increased number of production sites in the centre and west of the country. It is important to note that because of a lack of data on the drug market, the effects of the war as well as current trends are difficult to assess. However, it is reported that the supply of both cannabis and synthetic drugs has not been affected by the war. On the contrary, local demand for such substances, especially cannabis and a designer drug called alpha-PVP, has been on the rise, in part because of extensive consumption among military personnel. Since the beginning of the war, Ukrainian authorities also reported notable seizures of mephedrone accross the country. The majority of these substances and their precursors are trafficked into Ukraine from China, the EU and the Middle East.

Cyber Crimes

Cyber-dependent crime is widespread in Ukraine, and the number of attacks has increased in recent years. Prior to the war, Ukraine had been used as a testing target for cyber warfare by countries such as Russia, Iran, North Korea, and China, as it had similar infrastructure to that found in Western Europe and North America, but limited resources to counter such attacks. Following the onset of Russian aggression, cyber-attacks targeting critical infrastructure, such as power grids and internet service providers, evidently aiming to undermine Ukraine’s ability to defend itself, have drastically increased. Russian hacking campaigns have also supported ground campaigns, and malware has been paired with missiles in several attacks, including against television stations and government agencies. The most common cyber-attacks used by hacker groups supporting Russia include data wiper malware, distributed denial-of-service attacks, and ransomware. Ukraine has also been a source for cyber-attacks targeting Russia. In addition to the ongoing cyber warfare, illegal activity around cryptocurrencies is also prevalent in the country, with these avenues mainly being used for money laundering purposes.

Financial Crimes

Financial crime in the form of tax evasion, embezzlement, and corruption has long been pervasive in Ukraine, predominantly because of the existence of the oligarch class. Since the 1990s, oligarchs have seized key industries and sectors, creating monopolies protected by political corruption. They are also known to commit tax evasion, through offshore companies, with impunity. Cyber-enabled financial fraud as well as credit card theft are widespread in Ukraine. For instance, there has been an increase in the creation of malicious websites that trick victims into believing they are applying for EU financial assistance in order to access their banking details and personal information. Perpetrators also use call centres as a common method to defraud their victims.

Criminal Actors

State capture by criminal actors is a pervasive issue in Ukraine, with state-embedded actors either being directly involved in criminal activity or facilitating criminal markets, including drug trafficking, human trafficking, non-renewable resource crime, and goods smuggling. Criminal actors are also embedded in high-level positions in the state apparatus in order to influence the democratic process, by buying votes during elections, supporting and financing certain parties and candidates, and influencing the courts. In addition to state-embedded actors, decentralized and flexible criminal networks are also highly active in Ukraine, mainly in opportunistic crime such as drug trafficking, theft of state property, and robbery. The Russian invasion altered the structure of organized criminal groups, and some began to attempt to obtain higher status in the criminal hierarchy. There have also been reports of local criminal networks cooperating with Russian troops in order to gain more power in occupied territories.

Ukraine is a transit country for various criminal markets, and transnational crime elicits a high level of interaction and cooperation between local and foreign actors. As a result, there are a number of foreign criminal actors, with some of them originating from the Caucasus region, active in Ukraine’s larger cities. Moreover, extortion activities have been carried out by foreign actors in the occupied regions of the country. Ukraine has a strong but declining presence of organized mafia-style groups, headed by approximately 40 criminal bosses, known as vory-v-zakone or ‘thieves in law’, most of whom reside outside the country. These groups are active in multiple markets with a focus on drug trafficking and extortion. There are anecdotal reports of collaboration between small local mafia-style groups and Russian troops to enable the continuance of certain criminal channels in occupied territories. Mafia-style groups continue to wield political influence and have access to all levels of state power in Ukraine, which grants them protection and support in both their illegal and legitimate business. Moreover, some group leaders have become politicians or prominent businesspeople.

As for the involvement of private sector actors in illicit activities, companies owned by oligarchs are known to benefit from corruption, which enables the creation of monopolies in key sectors such as gas, oil, and electricity, among others, and the amassing of fortunes. Ukrainian oligarchs have long been used to strengthen pro-Russian politicians in the country. As the war continues, some oligarchs directly linked to Russian political elite have fled to Russia. Many others have remained in Ukraine to help the war effort, financing military infrastructure and medical aid, among other activities, despite their former stance. Private sector actors are also known to be involved in illicit activities such as tax evasion and money laundering.

Leadership and governance

The war waged by Russia since February 2022 has further undermined Ukraine’s stability, which had already been challenged by regional conflict over the past decade. Although some legislation targeting organized crime was introduced by the leadership, the political and economic establishment in the country has resisted reform. Ukraine has a long history of flourishing organized crime supported by high levels of corruption. However, the current administration has shown a high level of efficiency in organizing the defence and economy of the country during wartime. Despite the ongoing conflict, the government has continued to work at all state levels and to fulfil many international obligations. Moreover, various surveys suggest that trust in government officials has increased. Before the conflict, the government had declared a war on corruption and an objective to reduce the influence of oligarchs through the enactment of legislation. In addition, during the ongoing war, the appointment of independent heads of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office is considered to have been a crucial move in the country’s fight against corruption. Despite these changes, however, Ukraine continues to be considered one of the most corrupt countries in Europe, owing to rampant cases of intervention in justice, as well as bribery and corruption at all levels of the state.

Ukraine has signed most of the relevant international treaties against organized crime and cooperates with several international organizations. Despite the war, Ukraine continues or is sincerely attempting to fulfil its international obligations. Politically, Ukraine has substantially increased its cooperation with the G7 countries, the EU, and NATO. The government has managed to move forward with Ukraine’s application for EU candidacy, and to establish an advanced dialogue with Western leaders and societies on several issues, ranging from the war effort to anti-corruption measures. On a national level, Ukraine has legislation to deal with all relevant criminal markets, criminalizing the acts and providing processes for investigation, prosecution, and penalties. Their implementation and effectiveness, however, have been questioned, a situation adversely affected by widespread corruption in the judicial system.

Criminal justice and security

Corruption in the judicial system continues to be widespread in Ukraine, and recent reform initiatives have stalled or fallen short of expectations. In general, courts have historically failed to establish any meaningful independence, with judges being pressured or influenced for political purposes. Despite an increase in public trust in several governmental bodies and branches, trust in the country’s judicial system continues to be low. Regarding Ukraine’s penitentiary system, human rights violations occur, conditions are poor, and there are high levels of pre-trial detention. There are also allegations of illegal incarceration and torture in some detention centres in occupied territories such as Donetsk, Luhansk and Crimea.

The vast majority of law enforcement officers continue to defend Ukraine from Russian aggression; these agencies are continuing their regular duties as well as performing additional responsibilities such as road checkpoints and pursuing saboteurs, Russian agents and commandos. Since state resources are focused on defence, specialized units against organized crime are currently underfunded. Moreover, there are difficulties in the policing of de-occupied territories because of the presence of explosives and a lack of police training regarding these conditions. Ukraine suffers from low levels of trust in law enforcement, owing to widespread corruption, but police officers in some cities in eastern Ukraine have significantly improved this situation by adopting a more humanitarian approach.

The Russian invasion has undermined Ukraine’s territorial integrity, with certain regions in the east and south, such as Luhansk and Donetsk, being compromised. Although Russian troops were able to reach the outskirts of Kyiv at the start of the war, subsequent improvements in security and defence efforts have led to the retaking of certain areas, and Russian attacks have decelerated recently. Ukraine has proved to be resilient to cyber warfare and increased cyber-attacks targeting its critical infrastructure, and has rapidly built up its cyber defences.

Economic and financial environment

Before the Russian war, Ukraine was considered a high-risk country for money laundering, with widespread corruption and limited progress in modifying legislation and practices to tackle these issues. However, because of the wartime limits on money transfers abroad, there has been no recent evidence of notable money laundering activity.

Ukraine’s economic and business environments have been severely affected by the conflict. In response, immediately after the invasion, the Ukrainian state offered relief to the country’s crippled economy, operating under shelling and martial law; and eased the regulatory regime for job providers. The National Bank of Ukraine froze the exchange rate, restricted cash withdrawals, and limited most cross-border transactions. Despite international aid, Ukraine continues to face serious financial strain, since hostilities are taking place in territories that contribute 60% of the country’s GDP. Moreover, substantial damages to infrastructure such as airports, seaports, and bridges have crippled Ukraine’s ability to trade with other countries. Despite these issues, and the consequent rise in inflation and unemployment rates, the economic regulatory capacity of the Ukrainian administration has managed to prevent the complete collapse of the national economy. In fact, banks, factories, and businesses continue to function outside the occupied territories, and as most businesses, regardless of their specialization, have been supporting the military effort.

Civil society and social protection

Ukraine’s already insufficient system of victim and witness support, including medical, psychological, and legal assistance as well as temporary shelter, has considerably weakened following the start of the war. Victim support services are largely being directed to war victims, rather than victims of organized crime. Prior to the war, the government demonstrated mixed efforts in victim protection and relied on international organizations and NGOs to identify victims and provide protection and assistance. There have been no changes to organized crime prevention strategies in the country. However, Ukraine has been collaborating with international counterparts to prevent the cyber-attacks that form part of the ongoing warfare.

Ukrainian civil society remains vibrant, and since the onset of Russian aggression has been cooperating closely with public authorities and the government. In fact, civil society activities have sharply increased: a great number of NGOs provide support to victims, refugees, and the military, while also publicizing cases of corruption and violations of law. However, civil society representatives are currently at severe risk, as there are reports of the detention and torture of activists by Russian troops in the occupied territories. The Ukrainian media typically showcased a wide range of opinions. Wartime censorship has since been introduced that restricts coverage of the situation at the front, but there are independent media outlets that remain relatively free. Before the war, journalists were occasionally subjected to physical violence, especially during protests. This situation has worsened following the start of the war, as journalists have been purposefully targeted, resulting in an increase in the number of journalists killed or injured.

People

Romania is a major country of origin and destination for human trafficking and remains among the top five in the EU for the number of victims concerned. People who become involved in human trafficking rings are usually exploited in the sex industry, agriculture, construction, domestic service, hotels, or for forced begging and theft, in Romania as well as other European countries. However, in recent years, owing to efforts by the government to investigate more cases and convict more traffickers, the impact of the market has slightly decreased. Nevertheless, the involvement of complicit low-level officials in trafficking cases continues to be an issue. Furthermore, children of Romani origin continue to be vulnerable, particularly to sex trafficking, forced begging, and forced stealing. Push factors, such as extreme poverty and a lack of education in rural areas, enable human trafficking to remain among the most prolific criminal markets in Romania.

Romania is part of the Eastern European border route used by criminal networks for human smuggling. These networks smuggle migrants from Ukraine, Türkiye, and Afghanistan into or through Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, Bulgaria or Poland. Most smugglers hail from Southern and Eastern Europe, and a large number of the trucks involved are registered in the name of Turkish companies. The western border of Romania has seen increased activity by organized crime groups intent on smuggling migrants from Asian countries, such as India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, to countries in Western Europe. These groups usually comprise Romanian and foreign nationals, although most facilitators of migrant smuggling by land are of Romanian nationality. The extortion and protection racketeering market in Romania is limited in scope. However, some instances of groups operating transnational businesses have been detected, as in the recent case of a criminal network, primarily composed of Romanian nationals, found to be involved in extortion targeting elderly men in Italy. Extortion in the form of blackmail targeting institutions and companies has also been reported.

Trade

Romania is a transit hub in Eastern Europe for illegal arms destined for the wider continent. The geographical position of the country makes it vulnerable to firearms trafficking, especially from the south and the east. Seizures usually involve low-calibre weapons such as Flobert firearms or gas pistols. Recent firearm seizures in Romania suggest an increase in trafficking activity. For the most part weapons are sourced from Türkiye. Romania is also becoming part of one of the main routes for weapons being brought in and out of Ukraine. Albanian-speaking organized crime groups, along with Balkan, Russian, Georgian, and Turkish organized crime groups, are known to have trafficked weapons into Romania. In organized crime group transactions, firearms can be exchanged for other expensive and lucrative goods such as drugs and grenade launchers.

Romania is an entry point into the EU for counterfeit goods such as automotive spare parts and accessories, toys, clothing and fashion goods, and cosmetics. Counterfeit clothes and auto products predominate in the Romanian counterfeit market, while fake luxury goods, such as watches or perfumes, are found on a lesser scale. Some counterfeit goods are also sold in Romania through resale platforms. In terms of the illicit trade of excise goods, illicit tobacco products are widespread in Romania. In fact, there is a high demand for these products, as the country has a significantly low-income population, and the price of smuggled cigarettes is up to three times cheaper than those on the legal market. That results in a significant annual loss in tax revenue. There has also been an increase in the online trade of illicit cigarettes, beginning at the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Many of the cigarettes produced in Romanian-based factories are sold to territories affected by war or civil unrest.

Environment

Illegal logging continues to take place on a large scale in Romania. The Environmental Investigation Agency has stated that more than half the wood harvested in Romania each year is done so illegally. This illicit market is probably one of the most substantial in the EU, given that the country is home to one of the largest remaining forests in the region. Most of Romania’s forests are in private ownership, and the involvement of private corporations in the illegal logging industry, often in collusion with organized crime groups, has been documented. Additionally, the forestry sector is plagued by corruption, with the police working with illegal loggers and rangers in a system of blind complicity.

Romania is an important destination, transit, and source country for wildlife trafficking, a situation confirmed by seizures of wildlife products by customs officials in other countries. The illegal trade in caviar and sturgeon from Romania is highly profitable. Some illegal caviar is laundered into captive bred legitimate caviar. Sturgeon poaching is facilitated by corruption, while organized crime and a lack of alternative means of income for fishing communities add to beluga sturgeon poaching. In 2021, Romania has banned the fishing and sale of wild sturgeons indefinitely to ensure their conservation and prevent their extinction. Additionally, the illegal bird trade in Romania is significant, typically facilitated by Italian networks that hunt the birds and smuggle them into Italy.

Romania’s key natural resources include petroleum, gas, coal, salt, and uranium. Although sporadic cases of fuel theft occur, there is no evidence of the widespread involvement of organized crime. Romania is potentially vulnerable to the development of shadow economies, as cases of corruption have come to light involving big gas reserves.

Drugs

Romania forms part of the north Balkan route that is used for heroin smuggling. Heroin is trafficked from Georgian ports on the Black Sea by ferry to Odessa, or other destinations in the EU such as Romania or Bulgaria, after which it enters the eastern branch of the main Balkan route for trafficking onward to the Netherlands and other countries in West and central Europe. High-profile criminal networks are known to establish legal logistical trade infrastructure to facilitate their large-scale drug trafficking activities, indicating criminal infiltration of legitimate business structures. A number of companies across the EU have been used to conceal these illicit activities.

Romania has also become a highway for drugs from South America. The criminal infrastructure that was developed to traffic large amounts of heroin or synthetic drugs is now also used to traffic cocaine. This infrastructure is disguised as legal in order to analyze the risk and scrutiny of authorities. Romanian citizens living in South America, as well as South Americans in Romania, create stable links for organized crime groups interested in developing new alternative routes. In recent years, Balkan criminal groups, such as Albanian, Serbo-Montenegrin and Bulgarian groups, have been increasingly involved in smuggling cocaine on maritime routes and into Black Sea ports in Bulgaria and Romania. Although the country serves as a transit hub for the cocaine trade, there is not a large domestic market; local demand is low owing to the drug’s high street price.

While cannabis is imported into Romania from Spain and the Netherlands, most of the substance seized in the country is domestically produced. Cannabis is trafficked from Serbia to Romania near the Vatin/Stamora Moravita border crossing. There has been a recent upward trend in cannabis trade, and it continues to be the most commonly used drug in the country, mainly by young adults. There is an ongoing debate in Romania over the legalization of cannabis and cannabinoid substances for medical purposes. However, the government and the Ministry of Health are openly opposed to the suggestion. Moreover, the synthetic drug market in Romania is expanding. There has been an increase in the production of amphetamines and ecstasy in recent years, and a decrease in prices, although data shows that these drugs are still more expensive in Romania than in Western Europe. An increase in synthetic drug use has been reported in locations such as university centres and the capital, Bucharest. Ecstasy (MDMA) is mainly trafficked to Romania from Germany and the Netherlands, and amphetamines from Germany, Belgium, and Bulgaria.

Cyber Crimes

Cyber-dependent crime in Romania has been on the rise in recent years. The latest cyber threats faced by the country are malware distribution and ransomware attacks. Ransom-type attacks tend to target a certain profile of victim in order to maximize profit. For instance, government and private sector organizations, including critical infrastructure as well as hospital services, are increasingly being targeted. Cybercrime is relatively low profile for perpetrators and results in huge gains, making it especially appealing for organized crime groups. Shortly after Russia invaded Ukraine, Romania experienced a spike in the number of cyberattacks on infrastructure.

Financial Crimes

Although Romania is not a major financial centre, it is vulnerable to financial crime. Cases of online financial fraud have been reported in the country, and the number of organized crime groups specialising in direct and complex attacks of ATM or banking systems is trending upwards. Phishing scams as well as tax evasion are also increasingly becoming prevalent in the country.

Criminal Actors

Numerous domestic organized crime groups operate within Romania, many of them increasing in hierarchical structure, specialization, and the ability to recruit highly professional members, but very few fit the definition of mafia-style groups. In the capital city, there are criminal groups, some of which exhibit mafia-style traits, that control real estate. Loose criminal networks seem to be widespread and present at the country’s entry and exit points, especially along the north Balkan trafficking route, and are suspected of being involved in human smuggling and trafficking. These groups are made up of Romanian nationals, and have a hierarchical structure with clear tasks and competencies. They tend to conceal their activities behind investments in screen companies or real estate, and operate through corruption, document forgery, and money laundering. They are also known to outsource illicit operations to criminal subcontractors. The foreign diaspora is involved in facilitating human trafficking and smuggling activities in and out of Romania. Criminal networks specializing in the smuggling of migrants are extremely diverse, and typically consist of members from both source and transit countries. In addition, Balkan, Russian, Georgian, and Turkish organized crime groups have been active in Romania’s arms trafficking market. A recent study also revealed the presence of Italian mafia groups in the country. Italian mafia clans have established legitimate businesses and exercise socio-economic rather than territorial influence in Romania.

Additionally, state-embedded actors have a limited, but functional, influence on Romanian society and state structures. State-embedded actors are known to have been involved in financial crime and corrupt practices at border areas controlled by the Romanian Border Police. However, Romanian authorities have been increasing efforts to investigate these illicit activities. Private sector actors are allegedly involved in illegal logging in the country. Although there is no indication of transnational links between private sector actors when it comes to environmental crime in Romania, the private industry operating in the forestry sector is susceptible to corruption and illicit activities. Private entities, especially in certain sectors such as real estate, are known to be used by organized crime groups to conceal their illicit activities and revenue.

Leadership and governance

Organized crime in Romania does not seem to exert power or influence on the democratic process, either at the national or local level. However, corruption within the government and political parties, proceeding from the economic and moral degradation of the state that occurred after the fall of communism, is the main issue occupying national debate. Over the years, confidence in authority has been corroded, evolving from fear during dictatorship to disrespect during the process of rebuilding the state. During the war in Ukraine, many voices have raised doubts about Romanian authorities’ capacity to deal with the substantial number of refugees and to protect people from traffickers and criminal networks. That being said, the country has seen a strong improvement in its overall governance in recent years. In terms of corruption, one of the most vulnerable areas over the past year was public procurement and the country is still ranked among the most corrupt in the EU. However, while serious concerns remain, both nationally and internationally, Romania has made significant progress in this field. Recently, some major political figures were ousted from their positions following investigations that proved they had misused their power to serve their own interests. In addition, after 20 years of activity, during which time its impact has been perceived as sorely inadequate, the Anti-Corruption Directorate, the country’s core institution for tackling corruption that weakens state power, has looked reinvigorated. Moreover, the Romanian government adopted a 2021–2025 National Anti-Corruption Strategy, which aims to enhance measures to combat corruption in a number of areas, particularly the health sector and environmental protection, as well as a National Strategy Against Human Trafficking for 2018–2022.

Romania has ratified several international conventions related to criminal activities. Additionally, the country has and abides by extradition treaties with both the EU and other countries. In recent years, the country has made efforts to strengthen international cooperation in the fight against organized crime, specifically human smuggling, financial crime, and cybercrime. Romania’s domestic legal framework includes legislation covering most criminal activities, including drug trafficking, human trafficking, the smuggling of migrants, arms trafficking, money laundering, tax evasion, and cyber-dependent crime. More importantly, the country has adopted the complete set of legal dispositions criminalizing the main offences derived from and related to organized crime and organized criminal activity at the national level, and continues in its law-making efforts to combat organized crime. Though a legal framework exists for each type of criminal activity related to organized crime, the impetus of political will to address challenges remains of the utmost importance.

Criminal justice and security

Romania’s judicial system imposes severe penalties for involvement in illicit markets, and law enforcement agencies have demonstrated success in disrupting smuggling activities. The courts dealing with organized crime contain experienced judges. Despite judicial reforms, there have been concerns raised over the independence of the Romanian judiciary and the compatibility of these reforms with EU law in recent years. Where the detention system is concerned, the European Convention on Human Rights regularly condemns the country’s inadequate detention conditions and inhumane treatment of prisoners, including continuing harsh conditions and overpopulation. Pre-trial detentions are common, and their length is still well above the European average.

The responsibility for tackling organized crime lies with a range of agencies, each dedicated to a specific area. Although law enforcement officers, especially within the Border Police, are still perceived as largely inefficient and susceptible to corruption, partly due to their low salaries, among other things, there have been considerable efforts made to combat organized crime. For instance, a dedicated unit for prosecuting human trafficking crimes began its operations in April 2021, and a growing commitment to the fight against cyber and financial crimes has been noticed, with more investigations and follow-up actions.

Romania has approximately 3,150 kilometres of borders, a sizeable area that presents a wide variety of problems related to illegal cross-border activities. Romania is an EU member state but is not part of the Schengen Area. There is also a risk associated with its borders with Ukraine and Moldova, both being fragile states with high levels of organized crime. Romania’s geographical position, at the crossroads of major trade routes from Eurasia towards Western Europe, also increases its vulnerability to organized crime, especially smuggling. Where cybercrime is concerned, the Romanian government has made efforts to improve its infrastructure and resilience to infiltration. The CyberEast project, funded by the EU and the Council of Europe and implemented by the latter through its Cybercrime Programme Office, based in the Romanian capital of Bucharest, aims to strengthen the cyber resilience of countries in the Eastern Partnership region.

Economic and financial environment

Although Romania has made efforts to increase its resilience to money laundering and terrorist financing, certain gaps remain in its AML/CFT regulations. With the support of the European Commission, Romania has been conducting a money laundering and terrorist financing national risk assessment. However, taking into consideration the large amount of money obtained by organized crime groups through criminal activity, the number of money laundering cases is estimated to be much higher than those recorded. Recently, the European Commission initiated an infringement procedure against Romania for incorrectly implementing its Fourth AML Directive, emphasizing that the country failed to address the proper exchange of information with financial intelligence units, the requirements of customer due diligence, and the transparency of the beneficial ownership registers.

Romania’s position at the edge of the EU makes it a target for illicit financial flows. When added to possible VAT fraud (specifically missing trader intra-community fraud) and other emerging financial crimes, the country’s treasury suffers serious losses. Furthermore, the cash-intensive nature of Romania’s economy facilitates the injection of illicit proceeds and the purchase of goods and services for money laundering purposes. Romania has, however, limited the permitted number of cash payments made or received by professional entities, with the introduction of a threshold on business-to-business transactions. Favourable investor residency and citizenship schemes, so called ‘golden visas’, also increase the attraction for criminals from developing countries keen to inject illicit money into the economy.

Civil society and social protection

Victims of crime in Romania are entitled to free legal aid, financial compensation from the state, and the right to protection, including physical protection. Victims who provide decisive information for the identification and conviction of perpetrators may also be entered into the country’s witness protection programme. Social service providers in the public or private sectors, or both in partnership, assist victims by providing information and social counselling, accommodation in shelters administered by NGOs or the state, support for basic needs, healthcare, psychological and professional counselling, judicial assistance, and financial and material assistance. Overall, although several shortcomings exist within the system, there is a robust framework in place to support vulnerable people who have been victim to various types of crime in Romania. Among the gaps, there appears to be a lack of adequate protection of child victims of trafficking, especially poor specialized training in psychological trauma, and insufficient measures in place to ensure the right to the protection of personal data for victims of organized crime. Moreover, according to certain NGOs, authorities continue to fine or charge people involved in commercial sex without screening for trafficking indicators. Despite that, the country has consistently demonstrated overall increasing efforts, even considering the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity. These efforts included investigating more trafficking cases, prosecuting and convicting more traffickers, and implementing a pilot program that authorized funding at the local level to an NGO for victim services. Romania has also taken steps to enhance the protection of whistleblowers over the past year.

The country's preventive approach aims to raise public awareness and reduce demand, as well as to reduce the vulnerability of target groups, enhance their capacity to protect themselves and promote relevant hotlines through which people can report their suspicions and/or receive support. The state often implements its preventive activities in partnership with the private sector and civil society organizations. A number of civil society organizations are involved in tackling organized crime, including human trafficking as well as flora and fauna crimes, and assisting victims. However, their effectiveness is diminished by three factors: the lack of freedom to operate, an inability to sustain themselves financially, and frequent attacks on their public image. Even though they are free to operate without major formal restrictions, civil society organizations are often intimidated by politicians and other actors, and also suffer from funding shortages. NGOs have hardly any access to EU structural funds, primarily owing to poor fund management by the government. Press freedom is characterized by growing political censorship as well as an increase in self-censorship, and there is little government consideration for journalists and the media. The media is often denounced as a propaganda tool, media ownership information is hidden from the public, and funding mechanisms are often corrupt. Assaults on journalists, forest rangers, and environmental activists have become a systematic problem in Romania in recent years.