People

The human trafficking market in Ukraine continues to be pervasive, with the country acting as a source, transit, and destination point for this activity. Trafficking victims of Ukrainian origin are exploited for sex trafficking and forced labour in Ukraine, Russia, Poland, and other parts of Europe, as well as the Middle East, and a small number of foreign nationals are exploited for forced labour in Ukraine. Human trafficking, which was already on the increase because of the country’s worsening economic conditions and resultant labour emigration, has been further exacerbated by the war waged by Russia in Ukraine. Although official data concerning human trafficking has become scarce since the Russian invasion, vast numbers of refugees have fled the country, especially women and children, as well as non-Ukrainians and non-EU citizens who were resident in Ukraine, and these people are extremely vulnerable to trafficking. Russian military personnel are reported to be actively involved in human trafficking, and Ukrainian children from occupied territories such as Donetsk and Luhansk have been taken to Russia.

Human smuggling activities have also been exacerbated by the Russian invasion, especially as non-EU citizens who were residing in Ukraine needed to make use of migrant smuggling networks in order to flee the country. This issue was resolved, however, by the introduction of temporary legal admittance into the EU. The legal framework banning Ukrainian men of military conscription age from leaving the country also created opportunities for smugglers. The smuggling of these Ukrainian men has become one of the most prevalent human smuggling activities in the country. The Russian invasion has made it difficult for people being smuggled from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria to enter Ukraine by air. Ukraine is on the migrant route from South East Asia and the Middle East towards Europe, and prior to the war large and well-developed human smuggling groups, made up of opportunistic individuals who were familiar with the paths across the borders and who collaborated with law enforcement officials, were active in the country.

Before the war, organized crime groups in Ukraine were involved in extortion and protection racketeering in various industries, including the mining sector, and these activities became part of a more widespread market after the start of the conflict. Ukrainian police have uncovered several gangs involved in various rackets and extortion.

Trade

With a substantial stockpile of weapons, few barriers to accessing arms, and millions of small arms and light weapons on the legal and black market, Ukraine is believed to have one of the largest arms trafficking markets in Europe. While it has long been a key link in the global arms trade, Ukraine’s role intensified after the 2014 conflict in the eastern part of the country. Seizures carried out in previous years indicated that most of the arms that proliferated throughout the country were Soviet-designed models; only a small percentage comprised recently produced firearms and ammunition. The current war is expected to have an adverse effect on this market, owing to the free circulation of arms among a population who took part in the response against the whole-scale Russian invasion, as well as increased additional supplies provided by European countries and the US. While evidence of the number of arms illegally circulating throughout the country is extremely limited, there are already signs that illegal guns are playing a greater role in crimes carried out both in Ukraine and in nearby regions in Russia.

Trade in counterfeit goods, including clothing, jewellery, luxury goods, and perfume, sourced from China and other Asian countries, is common in Ukraine. Rapid cash flows continue to be generated by this market, and the problem is exacerbated by the ongoing war, the lax enforcement of intellectual property rights, and the normalization of these products within Ukrainian society. However, the largest counterfeit goods markets, such as those in the surroundings of Odesa, where the main production and distribution points were situated, are currently not functioning because of the war. Ukraine has long been a transit country for illicit tobacco products being trafficked into Europe, and it is increasingly becoming a destination point as well, owing to the steady increase in excise taxes, record levels of inflation, and the effects of the ongoing war. A noticeable shift has been observed in this market, with greater volumes now entering through the western borders instead of the eastern ones. Smuggling routes connected to Russia and Belarus have decreased in significance, while those involving Poland, Romania and Moldova have seen an uptick in their involvement in illicit trade within Ukraine. Moreover, the temporary wartime ban imposed on alcohol sales resulted in an increased illicit market for these products, until the lifting of the ban.

Environment

Flora crime, primarily illegal logging, has long been a pervasive problem in Ukraine. In fact, prior to the war, the country was the main exporter of illegally logged trees to the EU. This illegal trade has been exacerbated by high levels of corruption, weak due diligence, and the country’s role as a transit point for illegal timber from Russia. Illegal logging was alleged to be carried out by Russian forces during the invasion of Crimea, and this activity is expected to increase during the ongoing war. Because of the current seaport blockade it has become difficult to transfer Ukrainian wood abroad by means of maritime routes, which has led traffickers to move these shipments by road.

Fauna crimes in general were moderately prevalent in Ukraine before the war. The country was a source and transit point for the illicit wildlife trade, as it was part of the trafficking route into the EU through the borders of Poland and Romania, with the former having been identified as a wildlife trafficking hotspot. Species seized included tigers, tarantulas, snakes, parrots, and corals, as well as elephant ivory. Prior to the war, Russian criminal groups were known to smuggle large quantities of illegal caviar into Europe via Ukraine, reflecting the country’s role as a transit point for illegal fish products. It is estimated that there has been an increase in poaching resulting from current insecurity and poor economic conditions.

Ukraine is a source of non-renewable resources, and a variety of these are illegally extracted, predominantly in the Rivne, Volyn, and Zhytomyr regions. The most pervasive of these markets is the illegal amber trade, with most of the demand coming from China, and a widespread criminal network carries out illegal mining of this resource in the north-west of Ukraine. Despite the ongoing war, these illicit activities continue, with law enforcement units unable to intercept the market. The illicit fuel market has also become more extensive, with the smuggling of large consignments of fuel to Ukraine from Belarus and Russia, as well as the presence of illegal filling stations that have been operating since the start of the war. Coal mining has increased, especially in the Donbas region, and illegal operations have been growing steadily. There are also reports indicating that Russian companies are illegally expropriating Ukraine’s national resources, such as anthracite, in occupied territories.

Drugs

Significant seizures made prior to the war indicate that Ukraine was a relatively important transit country for heroin. The drug entered Ukrainian territory along the Balkan and Northern routes, before being transported to Western and central Europe, mainly via the Black Sea. Because of its geographical position, Ukraine was naturally a transit country for Afghan heroin reaching Europe, but is considered a ‘spin-off’ of the more important Balkan route. Heroin trafficking has decreased during the war, as the high intensity of military hostilities has resulted in a diversion to alternative routes. However, the conflict and growing destabilization in the country may also boost attitudes of impunity in the illicit drug trade, leading to increased trafficking and production. Ukraine’s cocaine trade was limited, with a small consumer market, and has become close to non-existent following the start of the war, as most local consumers are believed to have moved to the EU. Prior to the war cocaine was moved through Ukrainian seaports and airports for both domestic use and transit to EU countries.

Before the Russian invasion, Ukraine’s cannabis market was extensive, with reports indicating the existence of numerous marijuana plantations across the country. Cannabis was produced locally as well as being smuggled in from Russia and Moldova. Ukraine was predominantly a destination country for synthetic drugs and psychotropic substances, particularly amphetamine-type stimulants, which were primarily trafficked from Poland, Lithuania, and the Netherlands, and the use of these substances had been growing consistently over the past decade. There was also evidence of clandestine local production, providing supply to the local market as well as, to some extent, neighbouring countries. Production carried out in clandestine laboratories located in the east of Ukraine was disrupted following the start of the war to a certain degree. This resulted in a subsequent shift in the location of laboratories, with an increased number of production sites in the centre and west of the country. It is important to note that because of a lack of data on the drug market, the effects of the war as well as current trends are difficult to assess. However, it is reported that the supply of both cannabis and synthetic drugs has not been affected by the war. On the contrary, local demand for such substances, especially cannabis and a designer drug called alpha-PVP, has been on the rise, in part because of extensive consumption among military personnel. Since the beginning of the war, Ukrainian authorities also reported notable seizures of mephedrone accross the country. The majority of these substances and their precursors are trafficked into Ukraine from China, the EU and the Middle East.

Cyber Crimes

Cyber-dependent crime is widespread in Ukraine, and the number of attacks has increased in recent years. Prior to the war, Ukraine had been used as a testing target for cyber warfare by countries such as Russia, Iran, North Korea, and China, as it had similar infrastructure to that found in Western Europe and North America, but limited resources to counter such attacks. Following the onset of Russian aggression, cyber-attacks targeting critical infrastructure, such as power grids and internet service providers, evidently aiming to undermine Ukraine’s ability to defend itself, have drastically increased. Russian hacking campaigns have also supported ground campaigns, and malware has been paired with missiles in several attacks, including against television stations and government agencies. The most common cyber-attacks used by hacker groups supporting Russia include data wiper malware, distributed denial-of-service attacks, and ransomware. Ukraine has also been a source for cyber-attacks targeting Russia. In addition to the ongoing cyber warfare, illegal activity around cryptocurrencies is also prevalent in the country, with these avenues mainly being used for money laundering purposes.

Financial Crimes

Financial crime in the form of tax evasion, embezzlement, and corruption has long been pervasive in Ukraine, predominantly because of the existence of the oligarch class. Since the 1990s, oligarchs have seized key industries and sectors, creating monopolies protected by political corruption. They are also known to commit tax evasion, through offshore companies, with impunity. Cyber-enabled financial fraud as well as credit card theft are widespread in Ukraine. For instance, there has been an increase in the creation of malicious websites that trick victims into believing they are applying for EU financial assistance in order to access their banking details and personal information. Perpetrators also use call centres as a common method to defraud their victims.

Criminal Actors

State capture by criminal actors is a pervasive issue in Ukraine, with state-embedded actors either being directly involved in criminal activity or facilitating criminal markets, including drug trafficking, human trafficking, non-renewable resource crime, and goods smuggling. Criminal actors are also embedded in high-level positions in the state apparatus in order to influence the democratic process, by buying votes during elections, supporting and financing certain parties and candidates, and influencing the courts. In addition to state-embedded actors, decentralized and flexible criminal networks are also highly active in Ukraine, mainly in opportunistic crime such as drug trafficking, theft of state property, and robbery. The Russian invasion altered the structure of organized criminal groups, and some began to attempt to obtain higher status in the criminal hierarchy. There have also been reports of local criminal networks cooperating with Russian troops in order to gain more power in occupied territories.

Ukraine is a transit country for various criminal markets, and transnational crime elicits a high level of interaction and cooperation between local and foreign actors. As a result, there are a number of foreign criminal actors, with some of them originating from the Caucasus region, active in Ukraine’s larger cities. Moreover, extortion activities have been carried out by foreign actors in the occupied regions of the country. Ukraine has a strong but declining presence of organized mafia-style groups, headed by approximately 40 criminal bosses, known as vory-v-zakone or ‘thieves in law’, most of whom reside outside the country. These groups are active in multiple markets with a focus on drug trafficking and extortion. There are anecdotal reports of collaboration between small local mafia-style groups and Russian troops to enable the continuance of certain criminal channels in occupied territories. Mafia-style groups continue to wield political influence and have access to all levels of state power in Ukraine, which grants them protection and support in both their illegal and legitimate business. Moreover, some group leaders have become politicians or prominent businesspeople.

As for the involvement of private sector actors in illicit activities, companies owned by oligarchs are known to benefit from corruption, which enables the creation of monopolies in key sectors such as gas, oil, and electricity, among others, and the amassing of fortunes. Ukrainian oligarchs have long been used to strengthen pro-Russian politicians in the country. As the war continues, some oligarchs directly linked to Russian political elite have fled to Russia. Many others have remained in Ukraine to help the war effort, financing military infrastructure and medical aid, among other activities, despite their former stance. Private sector actors are also known to be involved in illicit activities such as tax evasion and money laundering.

Leadership and governance

The war waged by Russia since February 2022 has further undermined Ukraine’s stability, which had already been challenged by regional conflict over the past decade. Although some legislation targeting organized crime was introduced by the leadership, the political and economic establishment in the country has resisted reform. Ukraine has a long history of flourishing organized crime supported by high levels of corruption. However, the current administration has shown a high level of efficiency in organizing the defence and economy of the country during wartime. Despite the ongoing conflict, the government has continued to work at all state levels and to fulfil many international obligations. Moreover, various surveys suggest that trust in government officials has increased. Before the conflict, the government had declared a war on corruption and an objective to reduce the influence of oligarchs through the enactment of legislation. In addition, during the ongoing war, the appointment of independent heads of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office is considered to have been a crucial move in the country’s fight against corruption. Despite these changes, however, Ukraine continues to be considered one of the most corrupt countries in Europe, owing to rampant cases of intervention in justice, as well as bribery and corruption at all levels of the state.

Ukraine has signed most of the relevant international treaties against organized crime and cooperates with several international organizations. Despite the war, Ukraine continues or is sincerely attempting to fulfil its international obligations. Politically, Ukraine has substantially increased its cooperation with the G7 countries, the EU, and NATO. The government has managed to move forward with Ukraine’s application for EU candidacy, and to establish an advanced dialogue with Western leaders and societies on several issues, ranging from the war effort to anti-corruption measures. On a national level, Ukraine has legislation to deal with all relevant criminal markets, criminalizing the acts and providing processes for investigation, prosecution, and penalties. Their implementation and effectiveness, however, have been questioned, a situation adversely affected by widespread corruption in the judicial system.

Criminal justice and security

Corruption in the judicial system continues to be widespread in Ukraine, and recent reform initiatives have stalled or fallen short of expectations. In general, courts have historically failed to establish any meaningful independence, with judges being pressured or influenced for political purposes. Despite an increase in public trust in several governmental bodies and branches, trust in the country’s judicial system continues to be low. Regarding Ukraine’s penitentiary system, human rights violations occur, conditions are poor, and there are high levels of pre-trial detention. There are also allegations of illegal incarceration and torture in some detention centres in occupied territories such as Donetsk, Luhansk and Crimea.

The vast majority of law enforcement officers continue to defend Ukraine from Russian aggression; these agencies are continuing their regular duties as well as performing additional responsibilities such as road checkpoints and pursuing saboteurs, Russian agents and commandos. Since state resources are focused on defence, specialized units against organized crime are currently underfunded. Moreover, there are difficulties in the policing of de-occupied territories because of the presence of explosives and a lack of police training regarding these conditions. Ukraine suffers from low levels of trust in law enforcement, owing to widespread corruption, but police officers in some cities in eastern Ukraine have significantly improved this situation by adopting a more humanitarian approach.

The Russian invasion has undermined Ukraine’s territorial integrity, with certain regions in the east and south, such as Luhansk and Donetsk, being compromised. Although Russian troops were able to reach the outskirts of Kyiv at the start of the war, subsequent improvements in security and defence efforts have led to the retaking of certain areas, and Russian attacks have decelerated recently. Ukraine has proved to be resilient to cyber warfare and increased cyber-attacks targeting its critical infrastructure, and has rapidly built up its cyber defences.

Economic and financial environment

Before the Russian war, Ukraine was considered a high-risk country for money laundering, with widespread corruption and limited progress in modifying legislation and practices to tackle these issues. However, because of the wartime limits on money transfers abroad, there has been no recent evidence of notable money laundering activity.

Ukraine’s economic and business environments have been severely affected by the conflict. In response, immediately after the invasion, the Ukrainian state offered relief to the country’s crippled economy, operating under shelling and martial law; and eased the regulatory regime for job providers. The National Bank of Ukraine froze the exchange rate, restricted cash withdrawals, and limited most cross-border transactions. Despite international aid, Ukraine continues to face serious financial strain, since hostilities are taking place in territories that contribute 60% of the country’s GDP. Moreover, substantial damages to infrastructure such as airports, seaports, and bridges have crippled Ukraine’s ability to trade with other countries. Despite these issues, and the consequent rise in inflation and unemployment rates, the economic regulatory capacity of the Ukrainian administration has managed to prevent the complete collapse of the national economy. In fact, banks, factories, and businesses continue to function outside the occupied territories, and as most businesses, regardless of their specialization, have been supporting the military effort.

Civil society and social protection

Ukraine’s already insufficient system of victim and witness support, including medical, psychological, and legal assistance as well as temporary shelter, has considerably weakened following the start of the war. Victim support services are largely being directed to war victims, rather than victims of organized crime. Prior to the war, the government demonstrated mixed efforts in victim protection and relied on international organizations and NGOs to identify victims and provide protection and assistance. There have been no changes to organized crime prevention strategies in the country. However, Ukraine has been collaborating with international counterparts to prevent the cyber-attacks that form part of the ongoing warfare.

Ukrainian civil society remains vibrant, and since the onset of Russian aggression has been cooperating closely with public authorities and the government. In fact, civil society activities have sharply increased: a great number of NGOs provide support to victims, refugees, and the military, while also publicizing cases of corruption and violations of law. However, civil society representatives are currently at severe risk, as there are reports of the detention and torture of activists by Russian troops in the occupied territories. The Ukrainian media typically showcased a wide range of opinions. Wartime censorship has since been introduced that restricts coverage of the situation at the front, but there are independent media outlets that remain relatively free. Before the war, journalists were occasionally subjected to physical violence, especially during protests. This situation has worsened following the start of the war, as journalists have been purposefully targeted, resulting in an increase in the number of journalists killed or injured.

People

The human trafficking market is virulent and pervasive in Moldova, which is principally a source country for this trade. Victims are often trafficked to Russia, Türkiye, Italy, Cyprus, Germany and the UAE. The principal form of trafficking in the country is sex trafficking, while labour trafficking and forced begging occur to a lesser extent. Women and girls are exploited within sex trafficking circles, while men and boys mostly fall victims to labour trafficking. In addition, the undocumented or stateless population, including the Romani community, are vulnerable to exploitation, primarily in the agricultural sector. Child sex tourism remains a concern, with many children being exploited for online child pornography. The increase of Ukrainian migrants in the country due to the war in Ukraine and the higher inflation and resulting economic downturn in Moldova have created a larger group of vulnerable individuals who may be susceptible to human trafficking. Furthermore, corrupt high-level government officials are known to facilitate human trafficking activities.

Alongside the human trafficking market, criminal networks are known to be involved in cross-border human smuggling. These activities are facilitated through the use of fraudulent documents for victims who do not have the legal documents required for cross-border human smuggling. Smugglers are increasingly taking advantage of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent refugee crisis by enticing vulnerable refugees fleeing the conflict in Ukraine with the promise of ‘a better life abroad’. The human smuggling market in Moldova still fuels the trafficking trade and no other impact within the market can be found. Cross-border organized crime groups are known to be involved within the human smuggling market in Moldova. Extortion and protection racketeering practices are known to happen in the country, although there is limited information on them. These activities are reported to be mostly carried out by influential and infamous organized crime groups in the country. Intimidation and extortion are also part of Moldova’s prison subculture.

Trade

Moldova is a source and transit country for the arms trafficking trade in the region. The organized criminal groups that dominate the market run sophisticated and well-structured operations. Some of these groups are also reported to use legitimate companies as a front to mask their involvement in arms trafficking. Transnistria is also thought to have large quantities of surplus weapons and ammunition left over from the Soviet era, which has aided the trade. Efforts have been made to dismantle parts of this illicit market in cooperation with the EU, UN and Russia. However, despite these efforts there have been reports of alleged schemes to bypass EU sanctions and smuggle arms to Belarus and Russia. Moldova has also become an important route for arms trade in and out of Ukraine.

The trade in counterfeit goods has been on the rise in Moldova, as it remains the top source country producing packaging materials for counterfeit goods. The smuggling of illicit or counterfeit goods is particularly profitable through Transnistria. Counterfeit goods sold in Moldova generally include counterfeit clothing of famous brands, sewing machines and raw materials for sewing counterfeits. Moldova also continues to be an important source country for counterfeit alcoholic beverages smuggled into the EU. Organized crime group composed of Moldovan nationals are known to be involved in this market.

There is a pervasive market for illicit cigarettes in the Republic of Moldova largely due to an increase in excise taxes. This makes Moldova vulnerable to tobacco and cigarette smuggling and illicit production for internal consumption. Cigarette smuggling generates huge illicit cashflows and is considered to have a corrupting influence on the country’s economy and political system. The COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine, along with their associated socio-economic consequences, have also affected this market.

Environment

Illegal logging and deforestation are the main flora crimes that occur in Moldova, despite the country having very low forest coverage. This is because most forest thefts are almost never criminally punished due to the loopholes in the regulations and high levels of corruption. The fauna crime market is also limited in Moldova, although the country occasionally serves as a source and transit point for these types of crime. For instance, black caviar sourced in Russia is reportedly trafficked through Moldova into Italy. High levels of corruption in Moldova facilitate the activities of criminal smuggling rings involved in illegal wildlife trade in and out of the country. Non-renewable resource crimes are not prevalent in Moldova, although the country’s high dependency on oil imports creates an opportunity for criminal networks to become involved in oil smuggling. There is strong evidence to suggest that Moldova is a transit country for nuclear and/or radioactive materials sold to extremist groups in the region.

Drugs

Moldova operates as a transit country for heroin destined for countries bordering the Black Sea and throughout Eurasia. However, the heroin market in Moldova continues to be small in scope. Evidence suggests the involvement of foreign transnational organized crime groups in this illicit market. International crime groups are known to hide the illicit heroin trade under the guise of construction companies specializing in the export and import of construction materials. Additionally, Moldova is a source country for cannabis, which remains the most used drug in the country. The northern part of Moldova ranks first in terms of cannabis growing and trafficking, followed by the central part of the country. Profits are generated mainly by local demand, with limited demand generated by Ukraine and Russia. Corruption related to this crime appears to involve low-level officials and political leaders. Cocaine trade is limited with little presence of organized crime groups involved in the trade in Moldova.

Moldova is both a source and transit country for the synthetic drug trade, although the Russian invasion of Ukraine has altered some circumstances slightly. Ecstasy is the second most consumed drug, while synthetic stimulants, mainly amphetamines, remain the most produced drugs in Moldova. Furthermore, harm reduction programmes have recently reported higher rates of synthetic cannabinoid and synthetic cathinone use, indicating an increasing prevalence in Moldova. Even though COVID-19-related measures led to a dramatic decrease of synthetic cathinone trafficking, the trade in synthetic substances rose to almost pre-pandemic levels after the loosening of these measures and the opening of borders. Profits are accrued both to foreign and domestic actors. Social media platforms, including Odnoklassniki, Instagram and Facebook, are used to facilitate the sale of new psychoactive substances.

Cyber Crimes

Cyber-dependent crimes are prevalent in Moldova, with the risk of cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure remaining high due to technical, procedural and human vulnerabilities. Ransomware and malware attacks targeting the public sector as well as the private sector have increased recently in Moldova. The criminals’ modi operandi include social engineering and vulnerability scanning. The digitalization of all public spheres of government administration and communication adds to the risk of cybercrimes and digital leaks. Public institutions are also sometimes targeted by cybercrime, resulting in the destruction of public databases and audits. The war in Ukraine has resulted in an increase in geo-political cybercriminality in the region, resulting in higher vulnerability to cybercriminality in Moldova.

Financial Crimes

Financial crimes in Moldova have a negative effect on the country’s economy and society and are mostly perpetrated by wealthy individuals with political power. High-ranking public officials in collusion with the banking system in Moldova have been known to participate in high-level financial crimes, including embezzlement. Cash smuggling is of particular concern, as the country lacks efficient cash control and confiscation mechanisms. Furthermore, the Moldovan authorities are unable to deal with the illicit financing schemes conducted in the Transnistria.

Criminal Actors

State-embedded actors seem to be a prominent criminal actor type in the country, mainly involved in organized crime through corruption, money laundering and fraud. The situation involving state-embedded actors is worse in Transnistria, as prominent political figures participate in transnational drug trafficking and attempts to influence the democratic process. Furthermore, some politicians are sometimes involved in organized crime, with multiple cases reported of collaboration between Russian mafias and Moldovan politicians. Private sector actors are also heavily involved in a variety of criminal markets in the country, especially smuggling goods as well as financial crimes. Some of the criminal groups are also known to use legal entities as a front to disguise illicit activities. In addition, the banking sector plays a significant role in enabling financial crimes.

Loose criminal networks appear to be prevalent in Moldova. These criminal networks are embedded in almost all illicit markets in the country including, but not limited to, human trafficking, the drug trade, cigarette smuggling, arms trafficking and financial crimes. According to reports, recent law enforcement operations have usually found and in most cases arrested smaller, loosely organized criminal networks involving Moldovan citizens. These networks are concentrated in Transnistria and other territories bordering Ukraine, as trafficking victims and illicit products are transported to the port of Odessa for wider distribution in Europe and Asia.

Local Moldovan mafias are purported to exist, but little is known about them. Group membership can be described as moderate, owing to the combined presence of both established mafia-style groups and smaller, local mafias in Moldova. Mafia-style groups are mainly confined to Transnistria and operate in human and drug trafficking and money laundering. Meanwhile, foreign criminal actors in Moldova participate in almost all criminal markets and exert significant influence on democratic processes in the country. Most of these actors are loosely organized criminal networks that often interact with local criminal groups. Foreign criminal actors in Moldova include the Russian mafia and, more loosely, the Georgian mafia. Most of the criminal activity involving foreign actors occurs along the border with Ukraine, with some exceptions within criminal markets such as drug trafficking. Foreign actors partly occupy the human trafficking and arms trafficking markets, but not to the extent that they control the markets. Furthermore, cybercrime activities involving foreign actors have also increased in Moldova.

Leadership and governance

The current government came to power on an anti-corruption campaign and has prioritized reforming the justice system and the prosecutor general’s office. However, corruption remains the focus of the Moldovan political scene with no reference to other criminal markets. When it comes to policy implementation, the current government has implemented several projects with an anti-corruption agenda, including a new anti-corruption body. However, trust in government has not improved in recent years, with only 20% of Moldovans showing confidence in political parties and politicians. Policy implementation against organized crime has also been inefficient in the country. However, the current government places cyber-security and cyber-governance high on the agenda of political and security priorities. In line with this agenda, the government has been increasing its efforts to establish legal frameworks and strengthen cyber-governance with its National Information Security Strategy. The government has shown limited efforts to fulfill their election campaign promises, leading to concern of state capture by powerful criminal groups.

As the new Moldovan government elected in 2021 ran on an anti-corruption campaign, several legislative proposals and oversight mechanisms were implemented shortly after the elections. Moldova’s Independent Anti-Corruption Advisory Committee was formed with members drawn equally from Moldovan civil society and the international community to examine corruption issues within the state’s own anti-corruption institutions. However, cooperation between public authorities and civil society continues to be limited, which hinders government transparency and renders anti-corruption efforts inefficient. Despite the government’s anti-corruption pledges, acts of embezzlement committed by public officials have not been investigated in line with the risks of diversion of property by public officials.

Within the last few years, Moldova’s international and transnational cooperation to fight organized crime has increased. It is a signatory to various international treaties focused on tackling organized crime. However, these conventions are only fully implemented in areas outside Transnistria, as the conflict still lacks resolution, and an autonomous government oversees the territory. Moldova is also a founding member of the Police Cooperation Convention for Southeast Europe, which allows the exchange of data related to individuals involved in organized crime, and intelligence on links between suspects and those under suspicion of committing criminal offences. Moldavian authorities have also cooperated with the Russian government, the EU and the UNDP on arms destruction programmes to destroy a stockpile of Soviet-era ammunition.

Moldova has also built collaboration with neighbouring countries and has been partnering closely with NATO to strengthen cyber-security. Moreover, international cooperation in Moldova in relation to cyber-dependent crimes increased significantly following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Moldova has a moderately comprehensive legal framework pertaining to organized crime. Even though Moldova has laws that cover the prosecution of human traffickers, it is does not distinguish between human smuggling and human trafficking. There are also minimal and poorly developed laws relating to fauna, flora and non-renewable resource crimes, although these crime markets are not well established in the country. However, Moldova continues to make efforts to establish a more comprehensive legal framework. For instance, the Parliament has approved a cyber-security strategy that aims to create an integrated system for reporting and assessing information security threats and developing rapid response mechanisms against such threats.

Criminal justice and security

The judicial system in Moldova is reported to be ineffective and prone to political interference. While increasingly well protected in law, outdated structures and widespread corruption have undermined judicial progress in recent years. The independence of judges has been a priority on Moldova’s agenda and some legislation to achieve independence has been enacted. However, public trust in judges in Moldova remains among the lowest in Europe because of serious allegations of corruption, vested interests and other ethical issues. As for the penitentiary system, there have been continuous reports of violence, informal hierarchies, low staffing levels and a lack of adequate health-care services in Moldovan prisons.

There have been multiple cases of Moldovan police showing neglect toward victims of crime and actively abusing their powers, and law enforcement officials have been known to facilitate and actively participate in human trafficking. The police also take small-scale bribes from civilians, which probably facilitates an environment in which organized crime can thrive. The Moldovan government has implemented some changes in recent years to its law enforcement apparatus, although widespread corruption is still present, making it one of the least trusted institutions in the country.

The continuing conflict with Transnistria and the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine are the main predicaments facing Moldovan territorial integrity. The volatile situation on the Moldovan border enables organized crime groups to flourish while posing great difficulties for the already weak law enforcement apparatus in the country. The Transnistria state is known to have extensive links with organized crime and holds large quantities of firearms and ammunition, stored there since the end of the Soviet era, making it a hub for arms trafficking. A large proportion of the funding for Moldavan border control and protection comes from outside parties such as the EU, the US and, most recently, the UN, because of the refugee crisis. These funds, together with increased border protection efforts, seem to have slightly improved the country’s territorial integrity levels. However, weak cyber-defence systems represent another threat to Moldova’s internal stability, as systems are outdated and inefficient to prevent potential cyber-attacks. In the presence of weak critical infrastructure security efforts, such systems remain vulnerable to cybercrime infiltration.

Economic and financial environment

Money laundering has been an issue at the forefront of Moldova’s corruption problem for years. Moldova does not have effective anti-money laundering measures in place, and it is rated as a high risk for money laundering and terrorism financing. Moreover, the Moldovan government is unable to monitor money flows in the breakaway region of Transnistria or enforce the relevant laws in this territory, which makes Transnistria highly susceptible to money laundering schemes. The economic regulatory environment in Moldova is not conducive to businesses, as bribery for services and money laundering have been rampant in the recent past. Even though a legal framework aiming to prevent criminal involvement in legitimate businesses is in place, its enforcement has been lacking, something which has led to several financial scandals in recent years.

Civil society and social protection

Overall, Moldova has a moderately efficient framework in place to provide support to victims of modern slavery. In recent years, Moldova has tried to increase victim support and provide protection from re-victimization by establishing standards within its legislation, particularly for human trafficking crimes. Practically, however, little has changed for the victims of such crimes, as they still do not receive adequate support from the state and remain vulnerable to intimidation by traffickers. The government relies to a certain extent on NGOs and other non-state actors to fund victim support. However, Moldova was among the first countries in the region to implement harm-reduction programmes in the country’s prisons, where opioid-substitution therapy and needle-and-syringe programmes are available to varying degrees in its numerous detention institutions Although a witness protection programme exists in Moldova, it is not particularly effective in practice. Overall, the law enforcement system remains riddled with corruption and there is no effective system for protecting former members of organized criminal groups who testify against their bosses.

Although the government of Moldova made increasing efforts to prevent human trafficking over the past two years, several recent developments have complicated the overall trafficking situation in the country, including the Ukrainian refugee crisis created by the war. The Moldovan authorities continue to implement their strategies and action plans against organized crime. The plans include prevention methods to combat arms trafficking as well as drug smuggling in the country. However, these prevention methods largely depend on international partners for funding because of Moldova’s unfavourable economic situation.

Non-state actors and civil society in Moldova mainly focus on countering human trafficking and drug trafficking, both preventatively and by providing support to victims and by funding government initiatives. The media in Moldova are highly polarized and vulnerable to external influences, which results in editorial censorship. In general, media outlets rarely present critical views, as journalists follow the political line of the party with which they are affiliated. Independent media rely on funding from foreign donors and are often overshadowed by large media outlets tied to powerful political figures. Cyber-harassment against journalists has also been documented.