People

Turkey’s geographic location at the crossroads between Asia, the Middle East and Europe, combined with its long borders, makes it a prime transit and destination country for human trafficking and human smuggling. Human trafficking is becoming increasingly pervasive in Turkey, especially in the form of sexual exploitation and forced labour. Human trafficking is concentrated largely in tourist areas, metropolitan cities and border cities. As Turkey continues to host a large refugee population, traffickers are taking advantage of the vulnerability of such communities by pressuring women and children into being trafficked for sexual exploitation. Forced marriages of young girls through unofficial religious ceremonies have been increasing as an economic coping mechanism. Organ-trafficking networks have also been exploiting vulnerable communities, particularly refugees facing financial difficulties. In addition to the criminal networks, state-embedded actors are also involved in or at least facilitate human trafficking.

Turkey continues to be a key transit state for migrant smuggling towards Europe from countries such as Syria and Afghanistan. Smuggling from the latter has increased in recent years due to the takeover of the country by the Taliban. There has also been an increase in irregular migrants coming from African countries, which is facilitated by Turkey’s lenient visa requirements and good airport links to enter the country. Criminal networks active in the human-smuggling market are loosely connected and independent networks that cooperate with each other on a short-term basis where necessary. Networks facilitate the smuggling of refugees and other migrants via the falsification of documents and the subsequent transportation of these individuals. Similar to human trafficking, human smuggling is also facilitated by corrupt government officials. Reports allege direct involvement of state-embedded actors and legitimate businesses in this market.

Most extortion cases involve either individuals or small-scale criminal networks, working in specific areas of bigger cities in Turkey, that target small businesses or individuals to obtain money by using illegal firearms or other offensive weapons. Criminal networks created by migrant groups are also reported to be involved in this market. Racketeering is mostly carried out by mafia-style organizations working in specific areas claimed by them, which then threaten small shops in order to force them to make regular payments.

Trade

The arms-trafficking market in Turkey continues to be fairly prominent, with the country serving simultaneously as a source, transit and destination country to greater or lesser degrees. The players involved in the illegal-arms market can be classified broadly under three main types. First, there are criminal networks that supply handguns and shotguns to neighbouring Iraq, Syria and Iran, and across the world. Second, there is a much more sophisticated arms-trafficking coalition that works illicitly to supply more advanced and profitable weapons. Finally, state-embedded individuals as well as private-sector actors who are known to have close ties with the government are thought to be involved in illegally transferring weapons to groups fighting in Syria and Libya. The arms-trafficking market, therefore, is allegedly instrumental for the Turkish state’s external political objectives. There are also reports revealing Turkey’s role in the illegal trafficking of firearms through Bulgaria to the market in Europe.

Trade in counterfeit goods, especially textiles, luxury goods, cosmetics, pharmaceutical items and electronics in Turkey is common, and the products are easily accessible through online and offline platforms despite relevant regulations and law enforcement efforts in place. Due to the prevalence of counterfeit goods in the country, counterfeiting is usually perceived by Turkish citizens as a minor offence without a victim, and acceptable. Although there are no reports regarding the involvement of organized criminal groups in the counterfeiting market in Turkey, bribery of customs and law enforcement officials is a common occurrence. Private-sector actors, such as legitimate textile companies and freight companies, are also reported to be involved in this market. Trade in counterfeit goods manufactured in Turkey is not limited to the domestic market, as the country has been defined as the third-biggest origin country of counterfeit goods following China and Hong Kong.

The illicit trade of excise goods such as tobacco and alcohol is common and such goods are easily accessible in Turkey, and equally not perceived as a major crime by many Turkish citizens. Heavy taxation of excise goods and recent skyrocketing prices, coupled with unemployment and poverty in border regions, have been fuelling both the demand and supply of such goods, making the practice mainstream. Cigarette smuggling in Turkey provides a lucrative funding source for terrorist organizations and criminal groups, and causes a serious loss of tax revenue for the government. Criminal groups involved in this market possess the same characteristics as criminal networks with hierarchical structures. There is also heavy involvement of corrupt state-embedded actors in this criminal market. There are several routes used for the smuggling of excise goods in the country, with the main ones being through eastern and south-eastern Anatolia, where tobacco products especially are being smuggled from Iran, Iraq and Syria. Smuggling by means of maritime transportation is also common in both the Black Sea and Mediterranean regions.

Environment

One of the most severe forms of environmental degradation in Turkey, the intentional burning of forests to open the way for commercial developments, continues to be a regular occurrence in coastal areas. It is a phenomenon in which government corruption and political interests are key factors. Certain wildfires that occurred in the eastern region of Turkey have been also linked to the terrorist group Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Turkey is also increasingly being considered a hub for the smuggling of illegal wood sourced from various regions of the world. Although there is insufficient data on these illicit activities, there are indications that Turkey is now serving as a transit point for the trade of teak from Myanmar, in order to evade sanctions imposed by the US and the EU. With regard to fauna crimes, seizures of traditionally trafficked illegal wildlife such as pangolins and products such as rhino horn suggest that, largely as a result of the country’s location and status as a global transport hub, Turkey plays an important role in the transnational illegal wildlife trade. Domestically, however, fauna crimes are not particularly pervasive, although the number of illegal wild animals confiscated demonstrates the increasing demand for exotic animals in Turkey.

The illicit trade in non-renewable resources continues to be a critical component of Turkey’s illicit marketplace. Oil-related and gold-related crimes are the two most significant non-renewable-resource crimes in Turkey. Oil smuggling is one of the more profitable sources of income for organized-crime groups in Turkey, which exploit a demand for cheaper oil and the opportunity to earn tax revenue from the sale of smuggled oil sourced primarily from Syria, Iraq and Iran. With the ongoing currency crisis and increasing fuel prices, fuel smuggling continued to be one of the major smuggling crimes in Turkey, with seizures significantly increasing in recent years. There are several types of oil smuggling, with changing volumes and criminal actors involved. For instance, while small-volume oil smuggling mainly occurs in border cities with small criminal networks running primitive operations, medium-volume oil smuggling is typically carried out by transportation companies and oil stations where companies are allowed to stockpile. At each level of oil smuggling, corruption and state-embedded actors play a pivotal role. As for the illicit gold market, Turkey continues to work with Venezuela in the gold trade, despite the sanctions imposed.

Drugs

Turkey has been a source, transit and destination country for the heroin trade, due to its geographic location on the Balkan trafficking route, where heroin originating from Afghanistan is imported into Western Europe. Turkish organised-crime gangs continue to maintain control over the wholesale importation of heroin into the continent, and historic records in heroin seizures have been attained in recent years. Moreover, acetic anhydride, a substance used in the manufacture of heroin, has continued to be smuggled into Turkey. This indicates increasing heroin production by laboratories scattered across the country. While terrorist organizations are reported to be closely related to drug trafficking on all levels, reports suggest the collusion as well as active involvement of state officials and politicians in all of the drug-trafficking markets. Although Turkey has not historically been on the transnational cocaine trafficking route, the increase in the amount of seized cocaine within the last couple of years is considered to be the result of a change in transportation routes due to the high numbers of seizures in America and Europe. Therefore, Turkey is becoming a more prominent transit country in cocaine trafficking targeted at south-eastern and Eastern Europe. Local criminal groups involved in the cocaine market are also known to cooperate with Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Sinaloa Cartel in Mexico and Sito Miñanco in Spain, as well as drug cartels in Colombia, Panama and Brazil.

Cannabis is the most commonly used substance within the Turkish community, with widespread cannabis cultivation concentrated predominantly in the south-eastern region of Turkey and controlled largely by the PKK and its associated groups. Despite local production mostly meeting local demand, cannabis is also trafficked into Turkey, primarily from neighbouring countries such as Iran, Iraq and Morocco, as well as Western Balkan countries. The prevalence of synthetic drugs, specifically methamphetamine, synthetic cannabinoids, Ecstasy (MDMA) and Captagon, continues to rise, which is largely caused by easy access and low prices. While there has been an increase in the production of methamphetamine in Turkey, which is indicated by high numbers of liquid methamphetamine and acetic anhydrite seizures, Turkey continues to be a transit country for synthetic-drug trafficking, specifically methamphetamine, Ecstasy and Captagon.

Cyber Crimes

Although the country is vulnerable to cyber-dependent crimes due to the high dependency on information technologies in both the public and private sectors, cyber-dependent attacks have been decreasing in recent years as a result of measures taken by the government. Despite the regulations, heavy fines and protective measures put in place in recent years, major personal data leaks continue to occur in the country. Turkey is the target of regular malicious software attacks and experienced one of the biggest cryptocurrency frauds in the history of blockchain in 2021, resulting in losses worth billions of US dollars.

Financial Crimes

Financial crimes, especially financial fraud, embezzlement and tax evasion, are highly prevalent in Turkey, with methods changing according to developing technology and financial instruments. Most of the large-scale incidents of financial fraud and embezzlement were carried out by well-equipped criminal organizations using communication technologies. The most common version of financial fraud is fraudulent calls made by criminal organizations introducing themselves as state officials and asking their victims to transfer certain payments. Other common forms of financial crimes include Ponzi schemes, banking fraud schemes through transferring phone numbers or the use of counterfeit devices attached to ATMs. While financial fraud and embezzlement activities require a lot of organization, networking and know-how, tax evasion is a criminal activity regularly carried out by individuals or small or medium-sized companies. Moreover, corruption and embezzlement of public funds with the collaboration of corrupt officials, bureaucrats and private-sector actors with close linkages to the government are also reported to be commonplace in the country.

Criminal Actors

Organized crime and state-embedded individuals have strong and complex links, dating back many decades. The Turkish government is often accused of leveraging certain criminal markets, such as the gold and oil trade, human smuggling and arms trafficking, for its own benefit and political purposes. Depending on the political circumstances and geopolitical relations with other countries, the Turkish government is reported to choose to either tighten or ease its control of organized criminal activity. Despite serious corruption allegations regarding government contracts or the involvement of state officials in criminal activities, judicial action or investigations rarely, if ever, take place. In addition to the political elite, law enforcement officials and customs officials are also believed to be involved in most of the above-mentioned criminal markets.

There are a significant number of mafia-style groups operating in Turkey, modelled on the traditional mafia system. Those that continue to exist in the country reportedly have developed close connections with the government and other politicians, making them immune to law enforcement or the judicial system, until they fall out of favour due to their actions. The PKK also has a long history of involvement in drug trafficking, and although it is a separatist militant group, it can be thought to operate as a mafia-style group with respect to its organized-crime activity.

A large number of loose criminal networks are active in certain parts of Turkey. These networks engage in a range of cross-border smuggling activities, ranging from trafficking narcotics to smuggling migrants. The capacity and influence of these criminal networks have increased in recent years, as have their links with criminal networks in neighbouring countries and beyond. With the growth and increasing diversity of illicit economies in Turkey, ad hoc networks are far more influential and more reflective of the nature of both licit and illicit trade than mafia-style groups. Similar to mafia-style groups, criminal networks also operate in security vacuums facilitated by endemic corruption.

Although organized crime in Turkey is dominated by domestic criminal individuals, foreign criminals also operate in the country, primarily in cross-border smuggling that includes migrants, drugs and weapons, as well as human trafficking. As such, their areas of operation are concentrated at the country’s land borders and there is strong collaboration between these foreign and domestic organized criminals. Foreign mafia groups and illegally armed groups, including terrorist groups that engage in organized criminal activity, are becoming increasingly visible in Turkey, exacerbated by the spillover effects of the conflict in neighbouring countries, which have begun to dominate trafficking and smuggling activities in Turkey.

Many criminal networks and state-embedded actors involved in the above-mentioned criminal markets own legitimate companies with the aim to launder the profits gained from these illicit activities and to cover their criminal activities. Some legitimate private-sector actors are also reportedly involved in certain criminal activities due to the possibility of quick and high profits.

Leadership and governance

Although combating organized crime has been an important aspect of the government’s policy in recent years, with several operations targeting illicit substance trafficking in particular, there is a general impression that enforcement is uneven in practice, with favouritism shown towards supporters of the ruling party and the president. Criminal scandals combined with a currency crisis have raised numerous questions in relation to the integrity of the government, affecting its popularity with the public. Recent allegations suggest a close connection between the government and organized-crime organizations active in Turkey. Government transparency and accountability is low, with the lack of transparency becoming more apparent following the financial crisis, which is ongoing. Concerns regarding back-door deals and the erosion of the central bank’s independence have increased. Alleged corruption and nepotism, coupled with allegations of bribery in public tenders regarding major projects, continued to increase in recent years. The enforcement of anti-corruption laws continues to be inconsistent, and Turkey’s anti-corruption agencies are generally ineffective, contributing to a culture of impunity.

Turkey appears to have strong bilateral and multilateral cooperation frameworks in place, including having ratified all relevant international treaties and conventions pertaining to organized crime, but these are largely a relic of the country’s history as an ally of the Western world. Similarly, although extradition treaties are in place with a host of countries, there are serious concerns regarding the use of extradition processes and requests on the part of the Turkish government. Even though there has been an ongoing cooperation effort between international counterparts, it is also well known that for the last couple of years Turkey has submitted increasing numbers of requests for the issuance of red notices to INTERPOL, based on political reasons, to target journalists, activists and political opponents living abroad. Turkey selectively cooperates with international organized-crime investigations, mostly when the initiatives do not involve any political elites. Turkey has a robust anti-organized-crime legal framework, including legislation on most forms of organized crime. Increased efforts have been undertaken in recent years with regards to cybercrimes and financial crimes committed through electronic means. However, despite the strong presence of legislation pertaining to organized crime in Turkey, there is a major issue regarding the lack of enforcement of these laws.

Criminal justice and security

The systemic lack of independence of the judiciary and the political pressure on judges and prosecutors continues to cause problems in the judicial system. Judges and prosecutors are allegedly directed by politicians to control political dissent and prosecutors abstained from launching investigations that may implicate the government or the political elite. The problems around the independence of the judiciary are also caused by the existing structure of the selection process of the council of judges and prosecutors, and the lack of merit-based criteria for their recruitment and promotion. As for the penitentiary system, lengthy detention and pre-trial periods are increasingly common in Turkey, with severe overcrowding and poor prison conditions being major issues. While the judicial and detention systems are robust on paper, but their effectiveness is severely compromised by a lack of independence and the extraordinary degree of interference and control by the Turkish state.

Overall, law enforcement capacity to fight organized crime in Turkey continues to be fairly strong, with a well-trained and well-equipped police and border force, as well as increased numbers of special law-enforcement units focusing on organized crime. However, corrupt practices are commonplace in Turkey’s already highly politicized law-enforcement system, and police brutality is common.

Turkey’s extensive sea and land boundaries, combined with its position at the crossroads of Asia and Europe – located on the primary trafficking routes of a number of illicit economies – make control of the country’s borders challenging. Turkey’s ports are becoming more vulnerable, especially due to an increase in cocaine trafficking. A security wall was built along the border with neighbouring Syria, Iran and Iraq, with the aim to combat smuggling activities in the region.

Economic and financial environment

Turkey continues to be a regional financial centre for countries in Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Middle East and Eastern Europe, and faces major money-laundering risks. Although significant improvements have been made to its anti-money laundering framework in recent years, a number of shortcomings remain with respect to issues such as the proceeds of crime confiscation, managing frozen assets and the lack of restrictions on entering the country with substantial sums of cash. Although the current framework is considered to be adequate, there is little evidence to suggest the tools at the Turkish government’s disposal are being implemented successfully. Furthermore, the government’s money-laundering investigative activity has been criticized for being overtly politicized. The country’s central bank suffers from lack of independence, and state-owned banks operate according to the political agenda of the government, leading to a loss in credibility both domestically and on the international stage.

Civil society and social protection

Support for victims of human trafficking in Turkey continues to be moderately effective, although the need for increased capacity for supporting trafficking victims and an improvement in victim identification systems remains. Important steps have been taken to expand practices for the protection of victims’ rights in judicial processes. Drug treatment programmes are also available in the country.

Non-state actors are increasingly targeted if they are viewed as political opponents. The government has shut down several civil society organizations under the pretence of national security and terrorism concerns. The lack of media pluralism continues to be problematic, with most of the national media being controlled by the government, and investigative journalists facing lawsuits and detention.

People

The human trafficking market in Ukraine continues to be pervasive, with the country acting as a source, transit, and destination point for this activity. Trafficking victims of Ukrainian origin are exploited for sex trafficking and forced labour in Ukraine, Russia, Poland, and other parts of Europe, as well as the Middle East, and a small number of foreign nationals are exploited for forced labour in Ukraine. Human trafficking, which was already on the increase because of the country’s worsening economic conditions and resultant labour emigration, has been further exacerbated by the war waged by Russia in Ukraine. Although official data concerning human trafficking has become scarce since the Russian invasion, vast numbers of refugees have fled the country, especially women and children, as well as non-Ukrainians and non-EU citizens who were resident in Ukraine, and these people are extremely vulnerable to trafficking. Russian military personnel are reported to be actively involved in human trafficking, and Ukrainian children from occupied territories such as Donetsk and Luhansk have been taken to Russia.

Human smuggling activities have also been exacerbated by the Russian invasion, especially as non-EU citizens who were residing in Ukraine needed to make use of migrant smuggling networks in order to flee the country. This issue was resolved, however, by the introduction of temporary legal admittance into the EU. The legal framework banning Ukrainian men of military conscription age from leaving the country also created opportunities for smugglers. The smuggling of these Ukrainian men has become one of the most prevalent human smuggling activities in the country. The Russian invasion has made it difficult for people being smuggled from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria to enter Ukraine by air. Ukraine is on the migrant route from South East Asia and the Middle East towards Europe, and prior to the war large and well-developed human smuggling groups, made up of opportunistic individuals who were familiar with the paths across the borders and who collaborated with law enforcement officials, were active in the country.

Before the war, organized crime groups in Ukraine were involved in extortion and protection racketeering in various industries, including the mining sector, and these activities became part of a more widespread market after the start of the conflict. Ukrainian police have uncovered several gangs involved in various rackets and extortion.

Trade

With a substantial stockpile of weapons, few barriers to accessing arms, and millions of small arms and light weapons on the legal and black market, Ukraine is believed to have one of the largest arms trafficking markets in Europe. While it has long been a key link in the global arms trade, Ukraine’s role intensified after the 2014 conflict in the eastern part of the country. Seizures carried out in previous years indicated that most of the arms that proliferated throughout the country were Soviet-designed models; only a small percentage comprised recently produced firearms and ammunition. The current war is expected to have an adverse effect on this market, owing to the free circulation of arms among a population who took part in the response against the whole-scale Russian invasion, as well as increased additional supplies provided by European countries and the US. While evidence of the number of arms illegally circulating throughout the country is extremely limited, there are already signs that illegal guns are playing a greater role in crimes carried out both in Ukraine and in nearby regions in Russia.

Trade in counterfeit goods, including clothing, jewellery, luxury goods, and perfume, sourced from China and other Asian countries, is common in Ukraine. Rapid cash flows continue to be generated by this market, and the problem is exacerbated by the ongoing war, the lax enforcement of intellectual property rights, and the normalization of these products within Ukrainian society. However, the largest counterfeit goods markets, such as those in the surroundings of Odesa, where the main production and distribution points were situated, are currently not functioning because of the war. Ukraine has long been a transit country for illicit tobacco products being trafficked into Europe, and it is increasingly becoming a destination point as well, owing to the steady increase in excise taxes, record levels of inflation, and the effects of the ongoing war. A noticeable shift has been observed in this market, with greater volumes now entering through the western borders instead of the eastern ones. Smuggling routes connected to Russia and Belarus have decreased in significance, while those involving Poland, Romania and Moldova have seen an uptick in their involvement in illicit trade within Ukraine. Moreover, the temporary wartime ban imposed on alcohol sales resulted in an increased illicit market for these products, until the lifting of the ban.

Environment

Flora crime, primarily illegal logging, has long been a pervasive problem in Ukraine. In fact, prior to the war, the country was the main exporter of illegally logged trees to the EU. This illegal trade has been exacerbated by high levels of corruption, weak due diligence, and the country’s role as a transit point for illegal timber from Russia. Illegal logging was alleged to be carried out by Russian forces during the invasion of Crimea, and this activity is expected to increase during the ongoing war. Because of the current seaport blockade it has become difficult to transfer Ukrainian wood abroad by means of maritime routes, which has led traffickers to move these shipments by road.

Fauna crimes in general were moderately prevalent in Ukraine before the war. The country was a source and transit point for the illicit wildlife trade, as it was part of the trafficking route into the EU through the borders of Poland and Romania, with the former having been identified as a wildlife trafficking hotspot. Species seized included tigers, tarantulas, snakes, parrots, and corals, as well as elephant ivory. Prior to the war, Russian criminal groups were known to smuggle large quantities of illegal caviar into Europe via Ukraine, reflecting the country’s role as a transit point for illegal fish products. It is estimated that there has been an increase in poaching resulting from current insecurity and poor economic conditions.

Ukraine is a source of non-renewable resources, and a variety of these are illegally extracted, predominantly in the Rivne, Volyn, and Zhytomyr regions. The most pervasive of these markets is the illegal amber trade, with most of the demand coming from China, and a widespread criminal network carries out illegal mining of this resource in the north-west of Ukraine. Despite the ongoing war, these illicit activities continue, with law enforcement units unable to intercept the market. The illicit fuel market has also become more extensive, with the smuggling of large consignments of fuel to Ukraine from Belarus and Russia, as well as the presence of illegal filling stations that have been operating since the start of the war. Coal mining has increased, especially in the Donbas region, and illegal operations have been growing steadily. There are also reports indicating that Russian companies are illegally expropriating Ukraine’s national resources, such as anthracite, in occupied territories.

Drugs

Significant seizures made prior to the war indicate that Ukraine was a relatively important transit country for heroin. The drug entered Ukrainian territory along the Balkan and Northern routes, before being transported to Western and central Europe, mainly via the Black Sea. Because of its geographical position, Ukraine was naturally a transit country for Afghan heroin reaching Europe, but is considered a ‘spin-off’ of the more important Balkan route. Heroin trafficking has decreased during the war, as the high intensity of military hostilities has resulted in a diversion to alternative routes. However, the conflict and growing destabilization in the country may also boost attitudes of impunity in the illicit drug trade, leading to increased trafficking and production. Ukraine’s cocaine trade was limited, with a small consumer market, and has become close to non-existent following the start of the war, as most local consumers are believed to have moved to the EU. Prior to the war cocaine was moved through Ukrainian seaports and airports for both domestic use and transit to EU countries.

Before the Russian invasion, Ukraine’s cannabis market was extensive, with reports indicating the existence of numerous marijuana plantations across the country. Cannabis was produced locally as well as being smuggled in from Russia and Moldova. Ukraine was predominantly a destination country for synthetic drugs and psychotropic substances, particularly amphetamine-type stimulants, which were primarily trafficked from Poland, Lithuania, and the Netherlands, and the use of these substances had been growing consistently over the past decade. There was also evidence of clandestine local production, providing supply to the local market as well as, to some extent, neighbouring countries. Production carried out in clandestine laboratories located in the east of Ukraine was disrupted following the start of the war to a certain degree. This resulted in a subsequent shift in the location of laboratories, with an increased number of production sites in the centre and west of the country. It is important to note that because of a lack of data on the drug market, the effects of the war as well as current trends are difficult to assess. However, it is reported that the supply of both cannabis and synthetic drugs has not been affected by the war. On the contrary, local demand for such substances, especially cannabis and a designer drug called alpha-PVP, has been on the rise, in part because of extensive consumption among military personnel. Since the beginning of the war, Ukrainian authorities also reported notable seizures of mephedrone accross the country. The majority of these substances and their precursors are trafficked into Ukraine from China, the EU and the Middle East.

Cyber Crimes

Cyber-dependent crime is widespread in Ukraine, and the number of attacks has increased in recent years. Prior to the war, Ukraine had been used as a testing target for cyber warfare by countries such as Russia, Iran, North Korea, and China, as it had similar infrastructure to that found in Western Europe and North America, but limited resources to counter such attacks. Following the onset of Russian aggression, cyber-attacks targeting critical infrastructure, such as power grids and internet service providers, evidently aiming to undermine Ukraine’s ability to defend itself, have drastically increased. Russian hacking campaigns have also supported ground campaigns, and malware has been paired with missiles in several attacks, including against television stations and government agencies. The most common cyber-attacks used by hacker groups supporting Russia include data wiper malware, distributed denial-of-service attacks, and ransomware. Ukraine has also been a source for cyber-attacks targeting Russia. In addition to the ongoing cyber warfare, illegal activity around cryptocurrencies is also prevalent in the country, with these avenues mainly being used for money laundering purposes.

Financial Crimes

Financial crime in the form of tax evasion, embezzlement, and corruption has long been pervasive in Ukraine, predominantly because of the existence of the oligarch class. Since the 1990s, oligarchs have seized key industries and sectors, creating monopolies protected by political corruption. They are also known to commit tax evasion, through offshore companies, with impunity. Cyber-enabled financial fraud as well as credit card theft are widespread in Ukraine. For instance, there has been an increase in the creation of malicious websites that trick victims into believing they are applying for EU financial assistance in order to access their banking details and personal information. Perpetrators also use call centres as a common method to defraud their victims.

Criminal Actors

State capture by criminal actors is a pervasive issue in Ukraine, with state-embedded actors either being directly involved in criminal activity or facilitating criminal markets, including drug trafficking, human trafficking, non-renewable resource crime, and goods smuggling. Criminal actors are also embedded in high-level positions in the state apparatus in order to influence the democratic process, by buying votes during elections, supporting and financing certain parties and candidates, and influencing the courts. In addition to state-embedded actors, decentralized and flexible criminal networks are also highly active in Ukraine, mainly in opportunistic crime such as drug trafficking, theft of state property, and robbery. The Russian invasion altered the structure of organized criminal groups, and some began to attempt to obtain higher status in the criminal hierarchy. There have also been reports of local criminal networks cooperating with Russian troops in order to gain more power in occupied territories.

Ukraine is a transit country for various criminal markets, and transnational crime elicits a high level of interaction and cooperation between local and foreign actors. As a result, there are a number of foreign criminal actors, with some of them originating from the Caucasus region, active in Ukraine’s larger cities. Moreover, extortion activities have been carried out by foreign actors in the occupied regions of the country. Ukraine has a strong but declining presence of organized mafia-style groups, headed by approximately 40 criminal bosses, known as vory-v-zakone or ‘thieves in law’, most of whom reside outside the country. These groups are active in multiple markets with a focus on drug trafficking and extortion. There are anecdotal reports of collaboration between small local mafia-style groups and Russian troops to enable the continuance of certain criminal channels in occupied territories. Mafia-style groups continue to wield political influence and have access to all levels of state power in Ukraine, which grants them protection and support in both their illegal and legitimate business. Moreover, some group leaders have become politicians or prominent businesspeople.

As for the involvement of private sector actors in illicit activities, companies owned by oligarchs are known to benefit from corruption, which enables the creation of monopolies in key sectors such as gas, oil, and electricity, among others, and the amassing of fortunes. Ukrainian oligarchs have long been used to strengthen pro-Russian politicians in the country. As the war continues, some oligarchs directly linked to Russian political elite have fled to Russia. Many others have remained in Ukraine to help the war effort, financing military infrastructure and medical aid, among other activities, despite their former stance. Private sector actors are also known to be involved in illicit activities such as tax evasion and money laundering.

Leadership and governance

The war waged by Russia since February 2022 has further undermined Ukraine’s stability, which had already been challenged by regional conflict over the past decade. Although some legislation targeting organized crime was introduced by the leadership, the political and economic establishment in the country has resisted reform. Ukraine has a long history of flourishing organized crime supported by high levels of corruption. However, the current administration has shown a high level of efficiency in organizing the defence and economy of the country during wartime. Despite the ongoing conflict, the government has continued to work at all state levels and to fulfil many international obligations. Moreover, various surveys suggest that trust in government officials has increased. Before the conflict, the government had declared a war on corruption and an objective to reduce the influence of oligarchs through the enactment of legislation. In addition, during the ongoing war, the appointment of independent heads of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office is considered to have been a crucial move in the country’s fight against corruption. Despite these changes, however, Ukraine continues to be considered one of the most corrupt countries in Europe, owing to rampant cases of intervention in justice, as well as bribery and corruption at all levels of the state.

Ukraine has signed most of the relevant international treaties against organized crime and cooperates with several international organizations. Despite the war, Ukraine continues or is sincerely attempting to fulfil its international obligations. Politically, Ukraine has substantially increased its cooperation with the G7 countries, the EU, and NATO. The government has managed to move forward with Ukraine’s application for EU candidacy, and to establish an advanced dialogue with Western leaders and societies on several issues, ranging from the war effort to anti-corruption measures. On a national level, Ukraine has legislation to deal with all relevant criminal markets, criminalizing the acts and providing processes for investigation, prosecution, and penalties. Their implementation and effectiveness, however, have been questioned, a situation adversely affected by widespread corruption in the judicial system.

Criminal justice and security

Corruption in the judicial system continues to be widespread in Ukraine, and recent reform initiatives have stalled or fallen short of expectations. In general, courts have historically failed to establish any meaningful independence, with judges being pressured or influenced for political purposes. Despite an increase in public trust in several governmental bodies and branches, trust in the country’s judicial system continues to be low. Regarding Ukraine’s penitentiary system, human rights violations occur, conditions are poor, and there are high levels of pre-trial detention. There are also allegations of illegal incarceration and torture in some detention centres in occupied territories such as Donetsk, Luhansk and Crimea.

The vast majority of law enforcement officers continue to defend Ukraine from Russian aggression; these agencies are continuing their regular duties as well as performing additional responsibilities such as road checkpoints and pursuing saboteurs, Russian agents and commandos. Since state resources are focused on defence, specialized units against organized crime are currently underfunded. Moreover, there are difficulties in the policing of de-occupied territories because of the presence of explosives and a lack of police training regarding these conditions. Ukraine suffers from low levels of trust in law enforcement, owing to widespread corruption, but police officers in some cities in eastern Ukraine have significantly improved this situation by adopting a more humanitarian approach.

The Russian invasion has undermined Ukraine’s territorial integrity, with certain regions in the east and south, such as Luhansk and Donetsk, being compromised. Although Russian troops were able to reach the outskirts of Kyiv at the start of the war, subsequent improvements in security and defence efforts have led to the retaking of certain areas, and Russian attacks have decelerated recently. Ukraine has proved to be resilient to cyber warfare and increased cyber-attacks targeting its critical infrastructure, and has rapidly built up its cyber defences.

Economic and financial environment

Before the Russian war, Ukraine was considered a high-risk country for money laundering, with widespread corruption and limited progress in modifying legislation and practices to tackle these issues. However, because of the wartime limits on money transfers abroad, there has been no recent evidence of notable money laundering activity.

Ukraine’s economic and business environments have been severely affected by the conflict. In response, immediately after the invasion, the Ukrainian state offered relief to the country’s crippled economy, operating under shelling and martial law; and eased the regulatory regime for job providers. The National Bank of Ukraine froze the exchange rate, restricted cash withdrawals, and limited most cross-border transactions. Despite international aid, Ukraine continues to face serious financial strain, since hostilities are taking place in territories that contribute 60% of the country’s GDP. Moreover, substantial damages to infrastructure such as airports, seaports, and bridges have crippled Ukraine’s ability to trade with other countries. Despite these issues, and the consequent rise in inflation and unemployment rates, the economic regulatory capacity of the Ukrainian administration has managed to prevent the complete collapse of the national economy. In fact, banks, factories, and businesses continue to function outside the occupied territories, and as most businesses, regardless of their specialization, have been supporting the military effort.

Civil society and social protection

Ukraine’s already insufficient system of victim and witness support, including medical, psychological, and legal assistance as well as temporary shelter, has considerably weakened following the start of the war. Victim support services are largely being directed to war victims, rather than victims of organized crime. Prior to the war, the government demonstrated mixed efforts in victim protection and relied on international organizations and NGOs to identify victims and provide protection and assistance. There have been no changes to organized crime prevention strategies in the country. However, Ukraine has been collaborating with international counterparts to prevent the cyber-attacks that form part of the ongoing warfare.

Ukrainian civil society remains vibrant, and since the onset of Russian aggression has been cooperating closely with public authorities and the government. In fact, civil society activities have sharply increased: a great number of NGOs provide support to victims, refugees, and the military, while also publicizing cases of corruption and violations of law. However, civil society representatives are currently at severe risk, as there are reports of the detention and torture of activists by Russian troops in the occupied territories. The Ukrainian media typically showcased a wide range of opinions. Wartime censorship has since been introduced that restricts coverage of the situation at the front, but there are independent media outlets that remain relatively free. Before the war, journalists were occasionally subjected to physical violence, especially during protests. This situation has worsened following the start of the war, as journalists have been purposefully targeted, resulting in an increase in the number of journalists killed or injured.