The Organized Crime Index | ENACT
Year:
Sweden
x
    Poland

    Profile

    Sweden

    Capital

    Stockholm

    Gross domestic product (GDP)

    USD 635,664.00 million

    Income group

    High income

    Population

    10,415,811

    Area

    528,861 km²

    Geography type

    Coastal

    4.700.14

    Criminality score

    118th of 193 countries -2

    24th of 44 countries in Europe-1

    1st of 8 countries in Northern Europe0

    Criminal markets

    4.600.35

    An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.

    Human trafficking

    5.000.50

    Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.

    Human smuggling

    6.000.50

    Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.

    Extortion and protection racketeering

    4.50 n/a

    Crimes linked to exerting control over a territory/market including as a mediator and/or requesting a benefit in exchange for protection.

    Arms trafficking

    6.000.00

    The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.

    Trade in counterfeit goods

    4.00 n/a

    The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands.

    Illicit trade in excisable goods

    3.50 n/a

    The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits.

    Flora crimes

    2.500.50

    The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.

    Fauna crimes

    3.500.00

    The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.

    Non-renewable resource crimes

    2.000.00

    The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.

    Heroin trade

    3.00-1.00

    The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.

    Cocaine trade

    5.501.00

    The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.

    Cannabis trade

    5.500.50

    The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.

    Synthetic drug trade

    6.000.50

    The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.

    Cyber-dependent crimes

    6.00 n/a

    Organized crimes that rely solely on using information communications technology with the aim of obtaining a monetary/material benefit.

    Financial crimes

    6.00 n/a

    Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance.

    Criminal actors

    4.80-0.08

    An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.

    Mafia-style groups

    5.00-0.50

    Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.

    Criminal networks

    6.000.50

    Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.

    State-embedded actors

    2.500.00

    Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.

    Foreign actors

    6.500.50

    State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.

    Private sector actors

    4.00 n/a

    Profit-seeking individuals/entities who own/control a part of the legal economy free from the state, that collaborate with criminal actors.

    7.460.00

    Resilience score

    17th of 193 countries -1

    13th of 44 countries in Europe-2

    7th of 8 countries in Northern Europe-1

    Political leadership and governance

    6.50-0.50

    The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.

    Government transparency and accountability

    8.50-0.50

    The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.

    International cooperation

    8.500.00

    A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.

    National policies and laws

    7.500.50

    A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.

    Judicial system and detention

    7.000.00

    Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.

    Law enforcement

    6.500.00

    The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.

    Territorial integrity

    8.000.00

    The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.

    Anti-money laundering

    8.000.50

    A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.

    Economic regulatory capacity

    7.00-0.50

    The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.

    Victim and witness support

    6.000.00

    Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.

    Prevention

    7.500.50

    Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.

    Non-state actors

    8.500.00

    The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.

    7.46 4.80 4.60 7.46 4.80 4.60

    Analysis

    01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11

    People

    Sweden has a moderate human trafficking market. Cases of forced prostitution and abuse of smuggled individuals working under sub-standard conditions have been noted in the country. Sex trafficking remains the most prevalent form of trafficking: most cases involve women and children from West Africa and Eastern Europe. Victims of labour trafficking, who largely originate from Eastern Europe, East Asia, and West Africa, face exploitation in the service, cleaning, and construction industries, as well as in the agricultural sector. Additionally, the private delivery industry (messengers and food delivery drivers) has seen an increase in exploitative practices. Asylum-seekers from Africa, Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and South America (and many stateless individuals) are at risk of trafficking. Unaccompanied children are especially vulnerable: the majority of suspected child trafficking victims arrive in Sweden from Africa and the Middle East. Historically, most traffickers have the same nationality as their victims and have been part of criminal networks engaged in multiple criminal activities, but recent reports involve traffickers who are actual family members of their victims without any ties to organized crime groups.

    Human smuggling is a prevalent issue in Sweden – especially when it comes to political discourse – and the practice has increased over the last few years. Sweden is a popular destination for refugees and asylum seekers due to favourable family reunification policies, support for integration and a generous welfare state. However, the growth of irregular migration and the failure of integration policies have strained social cohesion and created discontent within immigrant populations, causing rising levels of violence between immigrant and host communities. Criminals who are Swedish residents continue to provide a base for the human smuggling market, often aided by the foreign diaspora in the country. Extortion and protection racketeering are relatively limited in Sweden. Such activities are mostly carried out by gangs and family-based criminal networks. Victims of systematic extortion are often entrepreneurs and people with foreign backgrounds.

    Trade

    The impact of the arms trafficking market in Sweden remains significant. Organized gangs in major cities frequently use illegal arms and explosives. The increased availability of arms on the black market, and a rising demand for illegal firearms among criminal gangs, are evidenced by a growing number of police seizures and increased reports of illegal possession and gun crimes. Arms are trafficked into Sweden mostly from the western Balkans, albeit on a relatively small scale. Arms trafficking appears to be inextricably linked to drug trafficking. In late 2022, for example, gang conflicts in Stockholm arising from a drug turf war, evolved into a cycle of revenge attacks.

    The sale of counterfeit medicine via illegal online pharmacies is an increasing concern in Sweden. These fake drugs can be completely ineffective or they can contain substances that are dangerous to people’s health. Most imported counterfeit and pirated products come from China, followed by Thailand and Turkey. There is no evidence of a prominent market for the trade in excise goods in Sweden, but an increase in excise duty on alcohol and tobacco has created incentives to bring in these products illegally. There have been reports of cross-border smuggling of alcoholic beverages, often coming from Germany, but the relation of these operations to organized crime is uncertain.

    Environment

    The market for flora crimes in Sweden is limited, with exotic timber and other rare plant species being occasionally smuggled into the country, albeit on a limited scale. More importantly, there are allegations of Swedish companies failing in their due diligence and sourcing illegally harvested wood from Ukraine. Wildlife crimes, such as the theft and export of eels and protected bird eggs (including rare owl and falcon species) are the most prevalent fauna crimes in the country. Wolf poaching is also a persistent issue, which has caused a decline in wolf numbers. Fishing without permits and illicit hunting also occur. That being said, incidents pertaining to flora and fauna crimes are met with a strong state response.

    The illegal non-renewable resources market in Sweden is considered to be small. Oil is an important source of income for crime groups in the south. Illegal activities are mainly carried out by partly legitimate companies with open and legal operations. Furthermore, Swedish-owned companies have been accused of corrupt practices related to non-renewable resources, and involvement in illicit activities abroad.

    Drugs

    The heroin market has declined in the past few years as a result of synthetic opioid alternatives. This is part of a decreasing trend since 2018, and a consequence of Swedish law enforcement’s hardline approach to combat the heroin trade. Criminal networks that smuggle heroin hide their criminality behind seemingly legal companies and use their flow of goods for smuggling.

    The heroin trade might be in decline, but the trade of cocaine in Sweden has steadily increased. That said, the cocaine market is still relatively small compared to other countries in Western Europe. Cocaine is largely shipped into Sweden via the Netherlands, originating in South America. In ports like Rotterdam, the drugs are moved to smaller cargo boats that head to Scandinavian markets. Shipments are offloaded at destination ports like Gothenburg and Uddevalla or dropped overboard en route to be fished out of the water.

    Cannabis is the most commonly used drug in Sweden. Local cultivation has increased in recent years, but for the most part, the drug continues to be imported from abroad. The price of hashish and marijuana has remained relatively stable over time. Hashish is mainly smuggled from Morocco and the trade is estimated to generate between €1–1,5 billion per year. Profits from the illegal trade are claimed by organized criminal groups, with foreign actors controlling trafficking channels and smaller domestic groups handling the distribution.

    The country’s synthetic drug trade is rapidly expanding. Drugs like crystal and 3-CMC have become increasingly common and can easily be bought on the internet. Most seizures have been made at the Toftanäs postage terminal in Malmö, but Swedish customs staff have also stopped large quantities of 3-CMC at terminals in Gothenburg, Jönköping, Västerås and Arlanda. The availability of amphetamines remains high and prices have been slightly declining over the past few years. Synthetic opioid use far exceeds heroin use; deaths attributed to heroin overdose and fentanyl overdose are approaching parity.

    Cyber Crimes

    Cyber-dependent crime is a considerable threat in Sweden; ransomware attacks are the most prevalent type of offence. Such attacks (comprising almost half of all severe cyber-attacks in the country) reportedly saw an increase in recent years. There has also been a growing tendency among cybercriminals to threaten the release of sensitive corporate data stolen during illegal cyber operations. Criminal actors are mostly foreigners operating in Russia, North Korea, China and Iran.

    Financial Crimes

    The market for financial crime in Sweden is continuously growing. Some of the most common types of financial crimes include attacks on the Swedish value added tax (VAT) system, seizing money in the form of subsidies, and tax evasion. Involvement of organized criminals is also on the rise – these criminals operate through tax-evading companies that use false claims on the national welfare system.

    Criminal Actors

    Most organized crime groups and gangs in Sweden are dominated by non-ethnic Swedes from the Balkans and the Middle East, among others. According to reports, foreign-born individuals and their offspring are significantly overrepresented in crime, while foreign groups not based in Sweden – predominantly from eastern Europe – enter the country to conduct burglaries and theft. Organized Roma groups are also increasingly prevalent. However, domestic criminal networks continue to dominate areas in Swedish cities, adding to growing insecurity about their influence in Swedish society. Loose networks mainly operate in larger cities but also maintain a strong foothold in disadvantaged rural areas and smaller cities. The escalation in shootings and explosions in the last few years indicates these groups’ propensity towards violence, which has led to a heightened risk for security services.

    Biker gangs in Sweden have a history of conflict and criminal activity – such gangs are the most prominent mafia-style group in the country. However, there are a number of other organized groups across the territory – some with ethnic, clan-type structures and others with recognised branding. State-embedded criminal actors are not a problem in Sweden. Corruption is present at municipal level and within central government, but it is limited and its connections to organized crime are questionable. Private-sector criminal actors are not very active in the country, but allegations of money laundering within Sweden’s banking sector cast a shadow on the country’s financial institutions.

    Leadership and governance

    Sweden is among the most stable countries in the world. However, the government has been criticized for its slow response to growing problems related to organized crime. Lack of strategies to prevent violence, shortage of police officers and a lack of resources to address low-priority crimes are some of the gaps that remain unaddressed. That said, the government recently expanded measures to combat gang crime by enhancing collaboration between various government agencies. Still, organized crime and violence are spreading across the suburbs of Sweden’s largest cities – a trend that shows little signs of abating. Similarly, although transparency and accountability in the Swedish state apparatus remains high, recent surveys suggest that corruption is increasing. Since organized crime was largely absent in Sweden’s history and has been identified as a recently expanding phenomenon, mechanisms to prevent corruption and the influence of organized crime remain largely underdeveloped compared to states that have a greater historical experience of dealing with such crimes.

    Sweden is considered a reliable and cooperative international partner. Since the recent increase in gang shootings, there is a growing willingness for international cooperation. Given the international characteristics of the crime areas in Scandinavia, and their links with other networks around the world, the role of INTERPOL’s National Central Bureau (NCB) is integral to maintaining national and regional security in Sweden. Sweden is also party to several international anti-corruption conventions, NATO policies and collaborative agreements that address data governance, privacy, digital security and cyber defence. Sweden’s legal framework, although strong, has some significant deficiencies. For example, there are no laws addressing racketeering, corruption and identity protection for witnesses. Additionally, the penal code only criminalizes acts by individuals, meaning that companies cannot be prosecuted. With low criminal sentences and limited historical experience of dealing with serious organized crime, Sweden is an attractive haven for organized crime groups. Updates were made to cyber security laws, which will hopefully translate national strategy into tangible actions. The majority of government measures aim to approach cyber security with a systematic and comprehensive approach: enhancing networks and system security; and boosting law enforcement’s capability to prevent, detect and manage cyber-attacks and other IT incidents.

    Criminal justice and security

    While largely viewed as incorruptible, Sweden's law enforcement and judiciary bodies remain understaffed, which has contributed to a decrease in public trust in the police. To resolve this, judicial capacity is currently being expanded. There is a shortage of space in the prison system and the government remains committed to increasing resources. While structures focusing on organized crime are in place, the police seem to have problems exercising authority. More police officers have been hired in an attempt to address the issue of understaffed forces, but the ratio of police officers to inhabitants in Sweden remains low. This is amplified by a lack of interest among young people to be part of law enforcement.

    Sweden's control of its borders is relatively free from corruption. However, as part of the Schengen Area, there is free movement between member states and the very large border areas make it difficult to control illicit trafficking activities. To curb this, the Swedish government has reintroduced internal border controls based on existing threats to internal security and general order. Sweden’s high-income economy, advanced technological infrastructure and large-scale urbanization and digitalization make it more prone to cybercrime. In order to increase the protection of its digital endeavours, the government has established a national cyber security centre to coordinate efforts to prevent, detect and manage cyber-attacks and other IT incidents.

    Economic and financial environment

    Sweden is highly resilient against money laundering and terrorist financing. It complies with all relevant EU anti-money laundering (AML) directives and has a legal framework in place that requires identification and review of clients, and monitoring of ongoing mandates and separate transactions. This framework enables deviant activities to be uncovered and deepens the examination of circumstances that may indicate money laundering. A government committee has also been appointed to review the capacity of the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority (the information exchange between banks and government authorities) and whether the methods of cooperation and delegation of responsibilities are adequate. As technology changes and new instant payment apps and electronic identification systems are used to conduct fraud and money laundering, the government’s work to prevent these crimes is constantly being reinforced.

    According to research, over half of Swedish businesses see crime, unemployment and gang presence as a problem for their actives. Extortion in Sweden has grown over the last few decades: increasing incidents of bombings reported in the media are likely indicators of this problem. Criminals are increasingly starting companies to abuse the Swedish welfare system for money. They often move in a grey area between illegal and legal activities.

    Civil society and social protection

    Victim support is not a primary focus in Sweden. There are serious shortcomings in the government’s approach to supporting people with drug problems – as a result, the country has one of the highest proportions of overdose deaths in Europe. When it comes to decriminalization and the legalization of certain drug use, discussions are far less advanced than in most other Western European states; and these discussions tend to be more moralizing in nature rather than pragmatic. Witnesses show increasing unwillingness to participate in criminal court cases, which suggests shortcomings in witness protection measures. That said, the government has initiatives and institutions in place that offer the same witness support services usually given through local organisations, with offices in district and appeal courts throughout the country.

    Politically, the will to combat organized crime is high, even if the legislation still falls short. Positive developments include a range of new national initiatives aimed at addressing the issue of children and adolescents who commit crimes. In 2021–22, measures to support authorities and professionals involved with social care for children and young people were also introduced. Other preventive focus areas include the drug trade, the prevention of violence, economic crime and cybercrime. Measures to prevent cybercrime (sensitizing citizens to the risks, improving security measures in information systems and reporting incidents) are also in place. Additionally, Sweden has regulatory institutions to monitor and analyse economic crime trends, initiate joint action between authorities, and propose legislative changes to curb economic crime. The evasion of excise duties is taken seriously in Sweden: the government has various institutions and regulatory bodies to prevent the illegal handling of excise goods and improve existing legislation.

    Civil society in Sweden is free to operate. Moreover, in the wake of a recent increase in shootings, societal groups like religious and ethnic organisations have begun to play a more active role in helping to reduce violence. Local and international NGOs are active in supporting crime victims and promoting developments in crime prevention, such as Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design and various women's shelters. Media in Sweden is generally independent but private ownership is highly concentrated: six owners control more than 90% of the daily press. The government usually subsidizes daily newspapers regardless of their political affiliation. Reporters covering organized crime are usually subjected to intimidation, and during the pandemic Swedish authorities prevented the media from accessing state documents about how the crisis was being managed. Despite this, Sweden ranks very highly with regard to media independence – there is a media ombudsman to address complaints and ethical issues.

    Profile

    Poland

    Capital

    Warsaw

    Gross domestic product (GDP)

    USD 679,445.00 million

    Income group

    High income

    Population

    37,747,124

    Area

    312,710 km²

    Geography type

    Coastal

    4.480.47

    Criminality score

    125th of 193 countries 18

    28th of 44 countries in Europe4

    16th of 17 countries in Central & Eastern Europe1

    Criminal markets

    4.970.57

    An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.

    Human trafficking

    5.500.00

    Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.

    Human smuggling

    6.001.50

    Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.

    Extortion and protection racketeering

    2.50 n/a

    Crimes linked to exerting control over a territory/market including as a mediator and/or requesting a benefit in exchange for protection.

    Arms trafficking

    4.501.00

    The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.

    Trade in counterfeit goods

    4.50 n/a

    The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands.

    Illicit trade in excisable goods

    5.50 n/a

    The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits.

    Flora crimes

    2.500.50

    The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.

    Fauna crimes

    5.002.50

    The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.

    Non-renewable resource crimes

    5.500.00

    The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.

    Heroin trade

    4.000.00

    The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.

    Cocaine trade

    5.000.50

    The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.

    Cannabis trade

    5.500.00

    The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.

    Synthetic drug trade

    7.000.50

    The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.

    Cyber-dependent crimes

    5.50 n/a

    Organized crimes that rely solely on using information communications technology with the aim of obtaining a monetary/material benefit.

    Financial crimes

    6.00 n/a

    Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance.

    Criminal actors

    4.000.38

    An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.

    Mafia-style groups

    2.000.00

    Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.

    Criminal networks

    6.000.50

    Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.

    State-embedded actors

    4.501.00

    Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.

    Foreign actors

    3.500.00

    State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.

    Private sector actors

    4.00 n/a

    Profit-seeking individuals/entities who own/control a part of the legal economy free from the state, that collaborate with criminal actors.

    5.88-0.25

    Resilience score

    42nd of 193 countries -7

    27th of 44 countries in Europe-3

    5th of 17 countries in Central & Eastern Europe-3

    Political leadership and governance

    5.500.00

    The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.

    Government transparency and accountability

    4.000.00

    The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.

    International cooperation

    7.500.50

    A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.

    National policies and laws

    7.000.00

    A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.

    Judicial system and detention

    5.00-0.50

    Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.

    Law enforcement

    6.500.00

    The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.

    Territorial integrity

    7.500.00

    The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.

    Anti-money laundering

    6.50-0.50

    A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.

    Economic regulatory capacity

    6.50-1.00

    The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.

    Victim and witness support

    5.000.00

    Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.

    Prevention

    5.50-0.50

    Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.

    Non-state actors

    4.00-1.00

    The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.

    5.88 4.00 4.97 5.88 4.00 4.97

    Analysis

    01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11

    People

    Poland is a source, transit and destination country for human trafficking. Forced labour is the main form of trafficking and male foreigner nationals are usually targeted. Women and children, especially from Eastern and south-eastern Europe as well as South America, are mainly trafficked for sexual exploitation in the country. Criminal groups often recruit Polish, Ukrainian and Russian women through advertisements on the internet and then force them into prostitution. Polish victims are also forced into begging, stealing, or extorting credit and social benefits.

    Human smuggling in Poland has become a significant source of income for organized crime groups and funds received from such activities are often used for other criminal practices. Smuggling routes usually cross the Belarussian and Ukrainian borders to Poland, to continue further west. On the Belarusian border, massive pushbacks of migrants coming from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan and lack of cooperation between the two countries, combined with the involvement of state actors in these practices, have increased opportunities for human smugglers. In addition, the war in Ukraine brought millions of Ukrainians to Poland and the sudden influx and chaotic humanitarian operations in the first months of the crisis made the refugees vulnerable to smugglers and traffickers. Extortion and protection racketeering are recorded in the country, although such criminal activities are limited to rare incidents and are carried out in an opportunistic and unorganized manner.

    Trade

    Although still relatively modest in scale, arms trafficking is increasing in and through Poland, despite the strict regulations and the military’s control of the arms market. The southern border, with its well-established trafficking routes, is a particular source of concern for Poland. There is a small but steadily developing illegal arms market in the country, with guns being trafficked from Slovakia and Czechia. There is also an emerging trend of the illegal transport of firearms out of Poland, mainly to Ukraine and Libya. Furthermore, arms trafficking is linked to other forms of trafficking, mainly drugs and excise goods. Illegal weapons are smuggled from the US to Poland and other European countries though the darknet. There is also an emerging market in 3-D-printed weapons, with illegal workshops set up across the EU.

    Counterfeit goods in Poland are a growing challenge and are either produced locally or, more often, imported from China. A good percentage of Polish consumers accept that they buy counterfeit goods, predominantly clothes, leather goods and cosmetics as well as toys, games, sport equipment, food, medicine and electronics. The COVID-19 pandemic increased trade in counterfeit products, as many consumers started to use e-commerce websites, while highly specialized criminal networks adjusted their marketing and production strategies.

    Trade in excise goods in Poland is carried out along with trade in counterfeits. However, it is seen as an opportunistic activity in the country, while international trade is more organized. Poland is a popular destination for illegal trade in cigarettes and alcohol without excise. The market for cigarettes is, for the most part, fed by products produced in illegal factories. Nevertheless, occasional attempts to smuggle large quantities of cigarettes occur both by road transport, mainly from Belarus, and by sea. This illicit market is mostly operated by Polish citizens and those from neighbouring countries.

    Environment

    The market for illicit trade in flora is not well developed in Poland. There is, however, a growing concern about the illegal flora trade on the internet. In the last two years, an increase in illegal logging across the entire country has been noted. There have been cases in which crime groups are reported to supply illegally logged timber to sawmills where timber is converted into planks. Furthermore, since the war in Ukraine, Polish companies are reported to circumvented EU sanctions by paying Belarusian companies to import timber with false documents, which claim that the wood comes from Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan instead of Russia.

    Poland is both a destination and transit point for wildlife trafficking, which is increasingly expanding in the country. Live birds, reptiles and caviar are some of the most illegally traded wildlife and wildlife-derived products. Crime groups involved in this market distribute produce though courier networks to Western European countries. This indicates the presence of structured criminal supply chains involved in the illegal wildlife trade in Poland. The country’s border with Ukraine has been identified as a critical wildlife trafficking hotspot. In addition, some organized crime groups are involved in illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing in Poland. This is a lucrative business and the crime groups involved sometimes use violence against law enforcement officials.

    Poland has a pervasive market for the illegal extraction and smuggling of natural resources. The country’s key non-renewable resources include coal, silver, natural gas, amber, copper and salt. Organized criminal networks, mafia-style networks and private sector actors participate in illegal trade of non-renewable resources in Poland, predominately fuel. Polish criminal groups are also involved in the illegal trade of coal and amber. Due to the coal crisis and high heating fees in Poland, there is a resurgence in the phenomenon of illegal mining. In addition, diesel, mainly imported from the east, is laundered and sold as a biofuel in Poland. The perpetrators of the crimes take advantage of the differentiation of excise tax rates for diesel and heating oil, as well as the tax exemptions for other fuels. Smugglers use land and maritime routes; source countries are based in Western, southern and Eastern Europe, as well as the Black Sea region.

    Drugs

    Poland is a source, destination and transit country for heroin. However, while domestic heroin is mostly produced for the Polish market, heroin arriving in the country originates from Afghanistan and is transited through the Balkans to Germany or the United Kingdom. The heroin market is dominated by organized mafia-style groups dispersed across Europe who are often involved in numerous criminal markets. However, there is a decline in heroin consumption in Poland, which may be related to the significant increase in the popularity of drugs derived from cannabis.

    Poland is primarily a transit and destination country for smuggling of cocaine from South America to Western European countries. The illicit cocaine trade in Poland is a dynamic and international market, where distribution is flexible in a loose, horizontally structured network, allowing more small distributors who employ a variety of marketing strategies to enter the market. However, cocaine is considered a luxury drug in Poland due to its high price and it is mostly consumed by affluent individuals. Cocaine is commonly smuggled in containers containing legal products, such as food, wood, industrial machinery and citrus fruit, which are received by legally operating Polish or international companies. Polish citizens are also used as couriers for cocaine smuggling using the mail or the ‘ingestion’ method.

    Poland is a source and transit country for cannabis products including hashish, resin and dried leaves. Medical use of marijuana is legal in Poland and it can be obtained at pharmacies with a prescription. The illegal cultivation and production of cannabis products is predominantly run by organized criminal groups including groups composed of citizens from various Asian countries. However, members of Polish criminal groups are also organizers of cannabis cultivation outside Poland’s borders, especially in Spain. In recent years, the smuggling of cannabis-related drugs from cannabis from Spain, Belgium and the Netherlands has become a regular part of the earnings of Polish citizens who, when leaving the country, transport precursors for the production of synthetic drugs and when returning to Poland transport marijuana and hashish.

    The illicit synthetic drugs market is the largest drug market in Poland. The most common synthetic drugs are amphetamine, methamphetamine, MDMA, Ecstasy, GBL, BMK and other designer drugs. The illegal synthetic drug market (primarily focused on amphetamine, methamphetamine and MDMA) is controlled by organized criminal groups or mafia-style groups with international ties. Additionally, amphetamine is produced in Poland for European markets, while amphetamine in liquid form is smuggled into the country. Polish criminal groups import it because it is easy to process into an inhalable form. Another drug frequently imported into Poland is Ecstasy pills. It comes overland from the Netherlands and Belgium transported by couriers who use their own vehicles.

    Cyber Crimes

    Cyber-dependent crimes in Poland mostly consist of ransomware. Due to the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine, the number of cyber-attacks has drastically increased. Perpetrators use the cyber vulnerabilities created by the Russia–Ukraine war to commit both financially motivated and politically motivated crimes. Perpetrators target individuals with assets, such as crypto wallets. They also attack government agencies’ websites and online resources, satellite operations and critical infrastructure, such as state institutions and banks.

    Financial Crimes

    Financial crimes in Poland are on the rise. The country has had numerous cases involving VAT fraud carried out by organized crime groups. Schemes include mis-invoicing, trade in fictitious goods, forging VAT documents and similar activities, which have earned vast amounts of money for the perpetrators. Goods involved in illegal or fictitious trade include the purchase and sale of services, including transport, construction, IT and commercial goods, fuel, food and beverages, event services and the trade in steel products. In terms of property crime, many crimes are committed in cyberspace or using electronic communications. Furthermore, organized criminal groups conduct scams on the internet, such as ‘remote desktop’ scams that are built around investments. The pandemic period also had a tremendous impact on the increase in cybercriminals’ activity, who improved known and implemented new online fraud mechanisms.

    Criminal Actors

    Organized crime networks are fairly widespread in Poland, but groups in bigger cities dominate the main illicit economies. Criminal networks are most prevalent in drug-related crimes and economic offences. Depending on the illicit market, often in the drug trade, these groups have moved onto the darknet and other forms of social media platforms, to maintain anonymity. Furthermore, football hooligans occupy a stable space in the criminal networks landscape in Poland. Members of a local Silesian football club were charged with participation in organized criminal groups along with other charges including drugs and firearms trafficking, robbery and money laundering.

    There is little information in governmental and media sources on the potential involvement of private-sector and state-embedded actors in criminal activities. However, an increasing number of reports on high-level corruption provide a troublesome picture of state actors engaging in, if not criminal, at least questionable ventures. Some state-owned companies in the country, in particular those involved in the oil industry, are suspected of distorting market rules and engaging in corrupt practices to generate more profits. Also criminal activities conducted by private sector actors in Poland include various financial crimes, such as tax evasion.

    Many foreign national actors participate in the trade of narcotics and human trafficking using their international links in Poland. Most criminal diasporas in the country run locally organized criminal activities but are equally involved in international criminal activities. Illegal trade in narcotics is still believed to be the focus of foreign national groups, along with high levels of cigarette smuggling. Additionally, Georgian and Ukrainian organized crime groups, participate in the illegal smuggling of migrants across Poland’s eastern border. Furthermore, Poland continues to be free from domestic mafia-style groups, as two of the most famous ones, Pruszkow and Wolomin, were dissolved early in the first decade of the 2000s. However, older members of these groups sometimes attempt to get back into their business after being released from prison. In 2021, the Polish Police Central Bureau of Investigation arrested in Warsaw a man associated with the 'Old Pruszkow' mafia.

    Leadership and governance

    The Polish government and political parties continue to express the desire to fight organized crime. However, in practice, organized crime is not a priority, nor is it an issue raised in political debates. The impetus to fight organized crime is to halt financial crime and close the VAT tax gap, which the Polish government hopes will make additional funds available for social welfare programmes. However, recent reports suggest that the available VAT tools have not had the desired effect in eliminating organized tax fraud. Furthermore, political parties and the government are the least-trusted institutions in the country. The Central Anti-Corruption Office in Poland has been working to combat public and economic corruption at various levels, though they are perceived as ‘political police’. Other institutions, including the border guard, the military gendarmerie, the military counter-intelligence service and the national revenue administration, are also responsible for combatting corruption in the country. Documentation relating to national budgets, legislative changes, public procurement and legislative processes are publicly available through information bulletins and government websites. However, even though international reports indicate improvement in corruption management in the country, public perception continues to believe in a worsening situation. There are also reports showcasing an increase in the number of corruption scandals linked to the current government and gradually normalized corrupt practices among those in power.

    Poland has ratified and adopted various international statutes pertaining to various forms of organized crime. As a member of the EU, Poland participates in the implementation of EU policies relating to counteracting and combating crime, including economic crime. The country’s internal security agency cooperates internationally within the Anti-Terrorist Centre and is also a part of the EU’s counter-terrorism strategy. Furthermore, the Polish police participates in the work of the Task Force for Combating Organized Crime in the Baltic Sea Region, in which Polish Central Police Investigation Bureau officers actively participate. Poland also has extradition agreements with several countries and various bilateral cooperation agreements in the fight against organized crime. Poland’s regulatory framework criminalizes acts of organized crime, including drug offences; obstruction of justice; participation in organized criminal groups; smuggling of migrants; illegal trade in cultural property; and people trafficking. Poland also has an anti-corruption strategy, a programme combating economic crime, an anti-drug strategy, a strategy to develop state security, and a national plan to combat human trafficking.

    Criminal justice and security

    Poland’s justice system consists of a supreme court, common courts, administrative courts and military courts, all of which are allowed to pass judgment against organized crime. Penalties and prison sentences are imposed effectively. There have been reports of visible levels of destabilization in the judiciary in Poland. Notably, judicial proceedings are typically lengthy, and, as organized crime cases are often more complex, these can take a toll on the judicial system. The judiciary reforms implemented by the current government are not compatible with EU law and planned changes to the legal system may further undermine democracy in Poland. The treatment of prisoners in Poland is not in line with EU standards, nor with international human rights standards.

    The police in Poland cooperate with the military police and the military information services in the fight against organized crime, and the national prosecutor’s office has a department for organized crime and corruption. The activities undertaken by the Polish police’s central bureau of investigation are aimed at combating organized crime of a cross-border nature that are related to terrorist acts. The internal security agency was established to protect the internal security of the state and its citizens, and deals with recognizing structures, undertakings and methods of operation of organized crime. Nevertheless, law enforcement is not effective enough in countering organized crime and face challenges with political interference. Furthermore, Poland’s ruling party recently introduced new legislation that effectively allows mass surveillance, which is against EU law. In December 2021, reports emerged about the government’s use of the Israeli spyware Pegasus to keep many Polish opposition figures under surveillance.

    Poland’s position on the eastern border of the European Union makes it attractive for the smuggling many products, such as tobacco and cigarettes. Despite this position, Poland is an independent country with no challenges to its territorial integrity. The scale and dynamics of crime on Poland’s eastern border are determined by political decisions on the rules relating to border crossings and are also determined by economic factors, such as differences in the price of excise goods. The Polish border guard is a well-organized and functioning institution that cooperates with many counterparts in neighbouring countries, as well as with Frontex, Europol and Eurojust. However, Poland’s cyberspace is threatened by the increase in cyber-dependent crimes, which was exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia–Ukraine war. To ensure the integrity of its national cyberspace, Poland makes efforts to systematically strengthen and develop its national cyber-security system. These efforts include the establishment of a new cyberspace defence force that is being developed by the National Cyberspace Security Centre, as a specialized component of the Polish armed forces.

    Economic and financial environment

    The Polish system of counteracting money laundering and the financing of terrorism is shaped by both national and EU regulations. The General Inspector of Financial Information is the mandated authority to verify suspicions of money laundering or terrorist financing contained in reports issued by various local and foreign institutions and finance investigating units. The national tax administration, the internal security agency, the central anti-corruption bureau and the central investigation bureau are also tasked with investigating irregularities and enforcing the relevant regulations. However, the authorities have limited understanding of money laundering and terrorism financing, and this renders the regulatory framework ineffective. Recent changes were introduced in the Law on Counteracting Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism and certain other laws to improve the functioning of the laws on anti-money laundering and anti-financing of terrorism. Nevertheless, the effects of these amendments are yet to be observed. Legitimate businesses are reported to be influenced by criminal groups carrying out activities in Poland. The government fails to protect legitimate businesses due to a lack of effective regulations. Furthermore, the grey economy has continued to grow in recent years, fuelled by the COVID-19 pandemic.

    Civil society and social protection

    Poland has victim assistance measures in place. The Minister of Justice recently approved a programme to assist victims of crime in response to a diagnosed need to introduce uniform standards of assistance to crime victims and witnesses. Poland has also adopted a national action plan against trafficking in human beings. However, the Fund for Victims’ Aid and Post-Penitentiary Assistance’s financial management was conducted in violation of the principles governing public finance, as some of the funds were spent to achieve other goals rather than to help victims of crime. Currently, there are 16 main assistance centers that provide support in the form of free legal, psychological, social and other services to people who have been victimized by crime. Various NGOs and other organizations provide witness protection and support victims of organized crime.

    Poland has several strategies in place that relate to the prevention of drugs crimes, economic crimes, corruption and human trafficking. Many programmes and strategies directly or indirectly aim to fight organized crime. For instance, the Polish police has initiated a training cycle to raise awareness about human trafficking victims among crime prevention services. There are also various local programmes and workshops raising awareness about human trafficking and drug use. However, not enough evaluation of the effectiveness of these efforts has been done.

    Civil society organizations are an important component of maintaining the balance of power, exposing irregularities and working to moderate against government actions in political and social life. Researchers and scientists in criminology or law prepare many studies on organized crime. Meanwhile, media independence from the government plays a significant role in the disclosure of organized crime. However, the media have experienced unprecedented harassment and government intimidation in various forms, including requests to remove news articles uncovering corruption, suing newspapers and taking control of national TV, spreading disinformation and promoting the ruling party.

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    The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to 10. The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel.

    How to measure organized crime?

    A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.

    Read more on globalinitiative.net
    How to measure organized crime?

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    This report was funded in part by a grant from the United States Department of State.

    ENACT is funded by the European Union and implemented by the Institute for Security Studies and INTERPOL, in affiliation with the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.

    The opinions, findings and conclusions stated herein are those of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State.