Criminal markets
4.670.07
An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.
Human trafficking
5.000.00
Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.
Human smuggling
6.000.00
Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.
Extortion and protection racketeering
5.000.50
Crimes linked to exerting control over a territory/market including as a mediator and/or requesting a benefit in exchange for protection.
Arms trafficking
6.500.50
The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.
Trade in counterfeit goods
3.50-0.50
The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands.
Illicit trade in excisable goods
3.500.00
The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits.
Flora crimes
2.00-0.50
The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.
Fauna crimes
4.000.50
The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.
Non-renewable resource crimes
1.50-0.50
The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.
Heroin trade
3.000.00
The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.
Cocaine trade
6.000.50
The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cannabis trade
5.00-0.50
The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.
Synthetic drug trade
6.000.00
The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cyber-dependent crimes
6.500.50
Organized crimes that rely solely on using information communications technology with the aim of obtaining a monetary/material benefit.
Financial crimes
6.500.50
Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance.
Criminal actors
4.800.00
An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.
Mafia-style groups
5.500.50
Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.
Criminal networks
6.500.50
Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.
State-embedded actors
2.00-0.50
Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.
Foreign actors
6.500.00
State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.
Private sector actors
3.50-0.50
Profit-seeking individuals/entities who own/control a part of the legal economy free from the state, that collaborate with criminal actors.
Political leadership and governance
6.500.00
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
8.500.00
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
8.500.00
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
8.000.50
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
7.000.00
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
6.00-0.50
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
8.000.00
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
8.000.00
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
7.000.00
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
6.000.00
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
7.00-0.50
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
8.00-0.50
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Sweden is predominantly a destination country for human trafficking, with victims subjected to sexual and labour exploitation. Most victims come from West Africa, Eastern Europe and Asia, often misled by fraudulent recruitment schemes. Labour trafficking targets workers in sectors such as forestry, construction and automotive repair, where poor working conditions enable widespread abuse. Despite a strong state response, including victim identification efforts and legal enforcement, trafficking networks persist, exploiting gaps in asylum systems and demand for cheap labour. Human smuggling remains a notable and transnational market, with Sweden acting as both a destination and transit point for irregular migration. People from Afghanistan, Egypt, Morocco, West Africa and Eastern Europe make up a substantial share of the smuggled population. Sweden’s welfare system and legal protections make it an attractive destination, even as strict immigration controls limit legal entry. Smugglers use fraudulent documents, stolen identities and fake asylum claims to evade detection, and many migrants endure harsh conditions and exploitation in transit.
Extortion and protection racketeering have grown significantly in Sweden, making it one of the most affected countries in Northern Europe. Urban criminal networks target local businesses, migrant communities and rival groups through coercive schemes. Data from EncroChat – a Europe-based encrypted communication network widely used by criminals before being infiltrated and dismantled – has revealed evidence of extortion-related violence, including homicides and arson attacks. Some reports suggest that foreign criminal actors have used such tactics for political leverage, targeting both businesses and individuals. Protection racketeering typically involves gangs demanding payments under threat of property damage or physical harm.
Sweden is a key hub for arms trafficking in Northern Europe, with illicit firearms fuelling organized crime and gang violence. This illicit market includes automatic and semi-automatic weapons, grenades and explosives, many of which originate from the Balkans and Eastern Europe. Criminal groups exploit weaknesses in border controls to facilitate a steady inflow of firearms. Improvised explosive devices have also become a growing concern, frequently used in gang-related attacks. Despite strict gun laws, weapons are acquired through theft from legal stockpiles or via illicit online platforms.
The counterfeit goods market primarily involves fashion items, electronics and luxury goods, sourced from East Asia and Europe. Criminal networks operate through e-commerce platforms and social media, complicating enforcement. The trade is closely linked to fraud and money laundering, with profits often reinvested into other criminal ventures.
High excise taxes have contributed to a thriving market for illicit alcohol and tobacco. Smuggling routes from Eastern Europe and the Baltic states supply untaxed goods, undermining Sweden’s regulated market. Both organized criminal groups and small-scale smugglers exploit border control loopholes. Experts note that although Swedish customs reported a sharp increase in cigarette interceptions in 2023 compared to the previous year, the overall illegal cigarette market is still perceived to be in decline.
Flora crimes in Sweden are primarily linked to illegal logging and the unregistered timber trade. While some large corporations have been implicated in supply chain violations, organized crime involvement remains limited.
By contrast, fauna crime has seen an expansion in recent years, driven by illegal poaching and trophy hunting. Wolves, bears and lynx are frequent targets, with poaching operations largely overlooked by authorities. Environmental agencies have been criticized for pro-hunting policies, which have weakened the state’s ability to curb wildlife crime. Illegal fishing and overfishing also pose increasing threats to marine biodiversity.
Non-renewable resource crimes are rarely reported in Sweden, but the discovery of rare earth elements, as well as graphite and iron deposits, has sparked concerns about illegal mining and resource exploitation. Although there is no evidence of organized crime involvement in these activities, advocacy groups have protested resource extraction projects, citing environmental damage and violations of indigenous rights.
Sweden remains a destination market for heroin, with supply chains linked to Afghanistan via the Balkans. The market is relatively small, with consumption concentrated among long-term opioid users.
The cocaine market, on the other hand, is expanding, driven by organized crime groups and transnational cartels. Trafficked from South America via European transit hubs, cocaine is primarily distributed through nightlife venues and private networks. The trade begins at ports south of Sweden and extends across the country, with Stockholm serving as the key hub. Profits are accrued by both local gangs and foreign actors, most notably Latin American cartels and ethnic Albanian criminal networks. Over the last decade, Sweden has seen a sharp rise in gang violence, with killings and bombings becoming more frequent, and a growing number of young people involved as both victims and perpetrators. The surge in gang activity is closely linked to Sweden's to the cocaine trade, fuelling inter-gang rivalries.
The illegal cannabis market is commonplace, with Sweden acting as both a source and destination. Supply comes from domestic cultivation as well as imports, including hashish from Morocco and West Africa via Spain’s Canary Islands. Groups involved in cannabis trafficking are often also active in the cocaine, heroin and synthetic drug trades.
Synthetic drugs, including methamphetamine, amphetamines and 3-CMC, are widely available. While large quantities are produced in the eastern Balkans and marketed across Europe, a significant share is also manufactured in Swedish laboratories. Distribution relies on darknet markets and encrypted online platforms, complicating enforcement efforts. Furthermore, authorities have reported an increase in overdoses involving synthetic opioids, highlighting the growing availability of these substances and the serious public health concerns associated with them.
Sweden has experienced a sharp rise in cybercrime, including ransomware attacks and data breaches. These offences are often transnational, with the country targeted by foreign hacker groups. Recent reports highlight the involvement of Russian actors in several cyber-attacks. Since joining NATO in March 2024, Sweden has also faced numerous influence operations and cyber disruptions.
Financial crime continues to increase in Sweden, with fraud the most common offence. Criminal networks have exploited welfare systems, particularly by establishing private clinics to embezzle public health funds. Reports from 2024 identify fraud as the fastest-growing crime type, marked by a surge in social engineering scams and card fraud. Identity theft has also become widespread, affecting a significant portion of the population in recent years.
Mafia-style actors in Sweden are largely limited to outlaw motorcycle gangs, which play a prominent role in drug trafficking and other illicit markets. Unlike loosely structured street gangs, these groups operate at a more sophisticated level, engaging in arms trafficking, the drug trade and more recently, financial crime, including welfare fraud. Reports show that members of these groups established private healthcare clinics as fronts to divert public funds. Illicit profits from these operations are estimated to be twice the value of the drug trade. Biker gangs maintain global affiliations, with ties to counterparts in Denmark and the US, while preserving an independent internal structure. Members display distinctive tattoos and clothing and operate under a strict hierarchy. While there is limited evidence of direct corruption within public institutions, these groups have infiltrated financial systems anonymously by setting up front companies to commit fraud.
Swedish criminal networks are primarily composed of loosely organized street gangs, involved in drug trafficking, arms smuggling, human smuggling and extortion. These groups lack fixed hierarchies, often forming fluid alliances and engaging in internal conflict. They thrive in socially marginalized areas marked by unemployment, poverty and widespread school dropouts, conditions that drive youth recruitment into gangs. Gangs reportedly recruit over a thousand people annually, targeting minors and vulnerable youth. In November 2024, authorities reported a rise in gang violence, driven in part by the use of social media to recruit children as young as 11 for contract killings and drug distribution. This trend has fuelled an increase in gang-related homicides and violent crime. The proliferation of firearms and drive-by shootings has made Sweden one of the most gun-violent countries in Europe.
By contrast, state-embedded actors play a limited role in Sweden’s organized crime landscape. While isolated cases of bribery and corruption involving public officials have been reported, there is no evidence of systemic corruption at the institutional level.
Foreign actors are a significant presence in Sweden’s organized crime landscape, particularly in drug trafficking and firearms smuggling. There is considerable overlap between foreign criminal groups and local gangs, often based on first- or second-generation migrant backgrounds. Most foreign groups originate from the Western Asia or the Balkans, adding a transnational dimension to Sweden’s criminal networks. Ethnic Albanian organizations also play a central role in controlling smuggling routes through Swedish ports, facilitating drug trafficking from Latin America into Europe. These networks are concentrated in urban centres such as Stockholm, Malmö and Gothenburg, but also operate in smaller cities such as Sundsvall, Uppsala and Helsingborg.
Private-sector involvement in organized crime remains limited, though concerns persist regarding biker gangs using private companies to commit welfare fraud and exploit Sweden’s tax system. Reports suggest some career criminals manage multiple businesses, using them as financial vehicles for illicit activities. While there is no direct evidence that these enterprises are used to launder drug profits, they appear to operate as independent financial crime ventures.
Sweden maintains a strong governance framework, consistently demonstrating respect for the rule of law and other fundamental principles, reflecting the country's commitment to political rights and civil liberties. However, rising gang-related violence has prompted discussions about expanding the role of security forces. The growing presence of organized criminal groups in urban areas has drawn attention ongoing challenges in law enforcement. Measures to track and counter criminal activity have included cooperation with the EU on facial recognition initiatives. Despite these efforts, persistent gang-related activity has raised concerns about the formation of parallel societies in some urban areas. Reports also indicate that biker gangs are engaged in activities affecting state resources, including fraud involving fictitious private healthcare companies. In July 2024, the government introduced stricter penalties for gun crimes and established security zones to address rising violence. Broader discussions around a more comprehensive approach have since emerged in response to ongoing security challenges.
Sweden remains one of the least corrupt countries globally. It upholds transparency in public expenditure, audits and private-sector contracting, with constitutional protections ensuring access to official documents. Despite this, experts have identified areas where public access to information could be improved, particularly in conflict-of-interest disclosures and oversight mechanisms.
The country is also highly engaged in international cooperation to combat organized crime, participating actively in Europol and INTERPOL, and maintaining established extradition agreements and intelligence-sharing mechanisms. Sweden has ratified key international treaties, including the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, the Arms Trade Treaty and the CITES convention on wildlife trafficking. In November 2024, it moved to join the Macolin Convention, aimed at combating match-fixing and corruption in sport. This aligns with broader efforts to strengthen anti-corruption measures, particularly in the financial crimes sector.
Sweden has a comprehensive legal framework addressing drug trafficking, arms smuggling, human trafficking and terrorism. However, certain legal provisions present challenges, including relatively lenient sentences for organized crime offences. These factors have contributed to Sweden's appeal for some criminal groups. In February 2024, the country introduced its first national strategy explicitly targeting organized crime, alongside efforts to strengthen its cybersecurity framework. Investments in new cybersecurity agencies aim to counter rising cyber threats. Financial crime also remains a priority, particularly fraud within the healthcare system, where persistent vulnerabilities continue to be exploited.
Sweden’s judicial system remains robust, but concerns have emerged regarding judicial independence and prison capacity. Reports highlight overcrowding, particularly among youth offenders involved in organized crime. Rehabilitation opportunities remain limited, though plans to expand prison infrastructure have been announced.
In response to escalating gang violence, the government has intensified law enforcement efforts in recent years, including the deployment of military personnel to support police operations. The Swedish police authority leads national law enforcement, with specialized units for financial crime and cybercrime. However, staffing shortages persist, and instances of officers leaking information to criminal networks have been documented. A 2024 investigation identified security risks involving at least 30 officers, resulting in dismissals.
Sweden's geographic position and open Schengen borders make it a key transit point for organized criminal groups trafficking illicit goods across Scandinavia and into Europe. Its proximity to major ports, including Rotterdam, heightens its exposure to drug trafficking risks. In response to rising insecurity from gang violence and terrorism concerns, Sweden has reintroduced border controls and tightened security at key entry points. The country is also strengthening its defence and emergency preparedness, emphasizing regional cooperation through NATO. In the cyber domain, Sweden has a solid legal and institutional framework, though challenges remain in fully protecting its digital infrastructure despite significant investment.
Sweden maintains a highly developed anti-money laundering framework, with strict financial reporting requirements and stepped-up enforcement measures introduced in 2024. However, recent violations identified by regulatory authorities have exposed weaknesses in risk assessments and monitoring of money laundering threats. While the country has strong market oversight, concerns about criminal infiltration of the private sector have grown, particularly in the healthcare industry.
Sweden’s victim and witness support framework operates through the Swedish crime victim authority, in coordination with courts and NGOs. However, witness intimidation by organized crime groups remains a challenge, with victims often hesitant to testify due to fear of retaliation. To address this issue, in October 2024, the Swedish government proposed new measures allowing anonymous testimonies in gang-related trials. Child recruitment by gangs continues to be an issue, with limited intervention mechanisms in vulnerable communities. Support for human trafficking victims has been strengthened, including funding for NGO-led shelter programmes. However, legal identification of trafficking victims remains restricted to law enforcement agencies, making asylum-seekers reluctant to report crimes due to deportation fears. Sweden enforces strict drug laws, which have contributed to high drug-related mortality rates. Harm reduction efforts remain limited, and hospitalization rates for heroin and cocaine cases remain high, reflecting ongoing demand for medical intervention.
Sweden’s crime prevention strategies are built on multi-agency cooperation involving municipalities, schools and police, with tailored approaches depending on the crime type. Efforts to combat sex and labour trafficking include 24-hour hotlines, dedicated funding and partnerships with labour unions and international civil society. A national task force brings together law enforcement, civil society and government agencies to enhance prevention. Technologies such as facial recognition and drones are employed to address gang violence, yet preventative measures against gang recruitment remain limited. Frustration with centralized, top-down strategies has led local communities – especially in suburban areas – to take a more active role through awareness campaigns and youth engagement initiatives. Nonetheless, challenges persist, particularly due to the concentration of welfare and policing services.
The country upholds strong political and civil liberties, maintaining a free press and multi-party democracy. However, anti-immigrant sentiment and far-right extremism have increased in recent years, contributing to a rise in hate crimes. Despite its global reputation for media freedom, journalists covering gang violence and migration issues face threats and intimidation. Media ownership is highly concentrated, with five companies controlling most national news outlets, raising concerns about press diversity. Civil society remains active in crime prevention, with NGOs playing a key role in victim assistance programmes. The 2024 National Strategy against Organized Crime includes provisions to enhance civil society involvement, reinforcing multi-stakeholder engagement in Sweden’s crime prevention initiatives.
Criminal markets
5.130.16
An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.
Human trafficking
5.500.00
Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.
Human smuggling
6.000.00
Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.
Extortion and protection racketeering
3.000.50
Crimes linked to exerting control over a territory/market including as a mediator and/or requesting a benefit in exchange for protection.
Arms trafficking
4.500.00
The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.
Trade in counterfeit goods
5.000.50
The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands.
Illicit trade in excisable goods
6.000.50
The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits.
Flora crimes
2.500.00
The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.
Fauna crimes
4.50-0.50
The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.
Non-renewable resource crimes
5.500.00
The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.
Heroin trade
4.000.00
The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.
Cocaine trade
5.500.50
The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cannabis trade
5.500.00
The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.
Synthetic drug trade
7.500.50
The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cyber-dependent crimes
6.000.50
Organized crimes that rely solely on using information communications technology with the aim of obtaining a monetary/material benefit.
Financial crimes
6.000.00
Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance.
Criminal actors
4.200.20
An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.
Mafia-style groups
2.000.00
Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.
Criminal networks
6.000.00
Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.
State-embedded actors
4.500.00
Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.
Foreign actors
4.000.50
State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.
Private sector actors
4.500.50
Profit-seeking individuals/entities who own/control a part of the legal economy free from the state, that collaborate with criminal actors.
Political leadership and governance
5.500.00
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
5.001.00
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
7.500.00
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
7.000.00
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
5.000.00
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
6.500.00
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
7.500.00
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
6.500.00
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
6.500.00
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
5.500.50
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
6.000.50
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
4.500.50
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Poland serves as a source, transit and destination country for human trafficking, with forced labour being the most prevalent form of exploitation. Victims primarily include foreign nationals, particularly from Africa, Asia and other Eastern European countries, with notable increases in trafficking involving individuals from Belarus, Ukraine, Vietnam and North Korea. Women and children from Eastern and south-eastern Europe remain especially vulnerable to sexual exploitation and forced prostitution. Domestic victims, often from marginalized communities, are trafficked abroad to Western and Northern Europe for labour exploitation, forced begging and benefit fraud. Criminal groups frequently use online advertisements to recruit individuals, subsequently coercing them into exploitative conditions, such as the confiscation of identity documents, poor living and working environments, unpaid labour and cycles of debt. The influx of Ukrainian refugees has increased vulnerabilities, with millions crossing into Poland and becoming potential targets for traffickers. Reports indicate an increase in exploitation through deceptive employment offers, transportation scams and coerced sex work. Corruption among state officials, including labour inspectors and border guards, has contributed to the persistence of forced labour cases.
Human smuggling networks exploit Poland’s position as a major transit country, particularly along the Belarusian border. Routes originating from the West Asia and Africa and pass through Belarus, Türkiye or Russia before reaching Poland and continuing toward Western Europe. Most irregular crossings involve third-country nationals, primarily entering through land borders, with a growing trend in attempts through air travel. In 2023, the primary nationalities of migrants included Syrians, Ukrainians, Turks, Georgians and Afghans. The involvement of foreign state actors has further exacerbated migration flows, with smugglers utilizing fraudulent documentation, cash-for-visa schemes and covert transport networks. While Poland has intensified border controls in 2024, it remains a key transit hub for organized smuggling operations, although the volume of crossings has slightly declined.
Extortion and protection racketeering continue to exist in Poland, although they are largely opportunistic rather than systematically controlled by criminal organizations. There has been a rise in cyber-related extortion, particularly involving fraudulent loan schemes and digital threats. Organized groups have started to shift their extortion activities to online platforms, leveraging the dark web for illicit financial operations.
Poland functions as both a transit and, to a lesser extent, a destination country for arms trafficking. Criminal groups exploit Poland’s geographical position and the open borders of the EU to smuggle firearms, ammunition and deactivated weapons. Recent trends indicate an increase in illegal arms exports to Sweden, Ukraine and Libya. While there is some evidence suggesting that the demand for firearms is rising within the country, the local market primarily operates online and on a smaller scale through individually concealed weapons caches located throughout Poland. While law enforcement has dismantled several trafficking networks, the country continues to face emerging risks associated with illicit 3D-printed firearms and increased arms flows due to regional conflicts.
The counterfeit goods market in Poland remains extensive, driven by high public demand and the prevalence of e-commerce platforms. Poland ranks among the top destinations in the EU for counterfeit imports, with significant volumes of counterfeit toys, clothing and cosmetics circulating within the country. Organized networks utilize Poland as both a production and transit hub, employing carousel fraud schemes that connect Polish companies to broader European counterfeit distribution networks. Notably, counterfeit tobacco production is particularly prominent, with Polish factories manufacturing illicit cigarettes for export to Western European markets.
Illicit trade in excise consumer goods, including cigarettes and alcohol, continues to be an issue. Poland functions as a source, transit and destination country for untaxed tobacco and alcohol products, with smuggling routes linking Belarus, Ukraine and Russia. Criminal networks exploit tax discrepancies between Poland and its neighbouring states, and despite government crackdowns, the illicit cigarette trade continues to thrive. While Poland's internal market for illegal goods is relatively small, the country remains a significant hub for transit and sourcing of various illicit products, particularly cigarettes destined for Western and Northern Europe.
Illegal flora trade in Poland remains relatively limited, but concerns persist regarding timber smuggling. Criminal groups have engaged in fraudulent documentation schemes to bypass EU sanctions, allowing timber of Russian origin to enter Polish markets under false claims of originating from Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan. Reports indicate that organized actors launder illicit timber through legitimate sawmills before exporting it to EU destinations.
Poland is both a transit and, to a lesser extent, a destination country for wildlife trafficking. Smuggling networks import protected species, including live birds, reptiles and caviar, before distributing them to Western Europe. Loopholes in Poland’s permit system have enabled traffickers to exploit legal breeding permits for illicit wildlife shipments. The Polish–Ukrainian border remains a hotspot for illegal wildlife trade, with a growing number of seizures of protected specimens, including corals, snake-derived products and medicinal items containing animal derivatives.
Non-renewable resource crimes in Poland encompass the illegal mining of coal, amber and minerals. While Poland’s coal industry remains heavily regulated, the emergence of unauthorized mining pits has heightened concerns regarding the involvement of organized crime. The illicit amber trade, which involves smuggling raw materials primarily from Ukraine, is then processed in Polish workshops and sold in international markets, yielding significant profits for criminal networks. Additionally, Poland serves as a key transit country for fuel smuggling, with organized groups laundering diesel and gasoline imports to evade excise taxes.
Poland primarily functions as a transit country for heroin trafficking, with supply routes originating in Afghanistan and passing through the Balkans and Türkiye before reaching Western Europe. While domestic consumption remains relatively low and further decreasing, organized crime groups continue to facilitate heroin smuggling to Germany and the UK. The decline in local heroin use is largely attributed to reduced availability caused by disruptions in trafficking routes, particularly due to the war in Ukraine, as well as a growing preference for cannabis and synthetic drugs among users.
Cocaine trafficking has surged, with Poland emerging as both a transit and destination country. Latin American suppliers transport cocaine through Polish ports, concealing shipments within legitimate cargo. Nigerian and European criminal networks oversee distribution, and domestic consumption is rising despite the drug's high cost. Major seizures in 2024 indicate Poland’s expanding role in the European cocaine market.
The cannabis market in Poland is notable, encompassing both domestic cultivation and imports from Western Europe. Criminal networks operate sophisticated indoor plantations, often concealing operations within legitimate agricultural enterprises. Polish traffickers also collaborate with Czech and Spanish groups to smuggle cannabis into Poland. Despite the legalization of cannabis for medical use, the illicit market remains robust, with smuggling routes linked to broader drug distribution networks and illegal cultivation.
Poland is a key producer and transit country for synthetic drugs, particularly amphetamines. Polish laboratories manufacture synthetic stimulants for export, primarily to Scandinavian countries, as well as Germany, the UK and Ireland, leveraging Poland’s well-established supply chains. In 2024, law enforcement dismantled a record number of synthetic drug laboratories, revealing the scale of domestic production. While amphetamine use remains relatively low in Poland, the emergence of synthetic opioids and new psychoactive substances presents growing challenges. The discovery of a large-scale methadone production facility highlights Poland’s evolving role in synthetic drug manufacturing.
Cybercrime in Poland has increased, driven by ransomware attacks and malware. Cybercriminals are targeting financial institutions, e-commerce platforms and individuals, employing sophisticated hacking techniques. The landscape of cybercrime in Poland has been shaped by geopolitical factors, with state-sponsored actors and hacktivist groups. The proliferation of underground hacking forums and illicit digital marketplaces continues to pose challenges for law enforcement.
Financial crimes in Poland continue to pose a significant challenge, with VAT fraud and tax evasion schemes inflicting considerable economic damage. Organized criminal networks exploit loopholes to engage in invoice fraud, carousel schemes and investment scams, draining state resources. Notably, investment fraud has surged, with criminals impersonating prominent individuals and institutions to lure victims into fraudulent schemes that promise high returns. The growing use of advanced technologies, including deepfake videos and AI-generated content, has enhanced the credibility of these scams, making them more difficult to detect. Additionally, other cyber-enabled financial crimes, such as fictitious online stores and remote desktop scams, have become increasingly sophisticated, further complicating law enforcement efforts. Corruption remains a persistent issue, with investigations uncovering links between high-profile political figures and fraudulent financial activities.
Poland remains largely free from traditional mafia-style groups, as the once-prominent Pruszków and Wołomin mafias have lost much of their influence due to effective law enforcement operations. However, remnants of these groups persist, with older members attempting to regain influence after their release from prison. Their reintegration efforts have been met with varying degrees of success, as newer, more decentralized criminal networks have taken control of many illicit markets. These successor groups often consist of smaller gangs linked to sports clubs and football hooligan communities, focusing on drug trafficking and money laundering. While their structure is less hierarchical than that of traditional mafia groups, their adaptability presents new challenges for law enforcement. Despite high levels of police infiltration, public fears of mafia-style groups persist and are sometimes exploited for political narratives. Reports from the Central Investigation Bureau of Police confirm that the terminology in official discourse has shifted toward organized criminal groups rather than mafia-style organizations.
Poland’s criminal networks operate in a highly flexible and opportunistic manner, engaging in a wide range of illicit activities, including human trafficking, drug smuggling and arms trafficking. These groups exploit Poland’s strategic position as a European transit hub, facilitating the movement of illicit goods and people across borders. These networks encompass local, regional and transnational actors and have demonstrated remarkable adaptability to geopolitical and socio-economic changes, such as the war in Ukraine and the Belarusian–EU border crisis. They frequently integrate legitimate business structures into their operations, leveraging legal loopholes and corrupt connections to facilitate illicit trade and financial crimes. Criminal networks are deeply embedded throughout Poland, with major urban centres such as Warsaw, Kraków, Wrocław and Poznań serving as key hubs for organized criminal activities. While some groups employ violent enforcement tactics, the majority prefer to operate discreetly, laundering illicit proceeds through front businesses and legitimate enterprises to evade detection.
Corruption within Poland’s state institutions has enabled various forms of organized crime, including human trafficking, arms smuggling and financial fraud. Some state-embedded actors have contributed to these crimes by issuing fraudulent work permits, assisting in smuggling operations or misusing public funds. A high-profile scandal in 2023 exposed large-scale visa fraud involving Polish consulates in Africa and Asia, with state officials implicated in the improper issuance of over 200 000 work visas. This scheme raised concerns about the extent to which state actors may be complicit in human smuggling and trafficking operations. Additionally, reports indicate that some border enforcement officials have enabled the smuggling of illicit goods, including weapons and drugs. Financial crimes linked to state-embedded actors include VAT fraud and the misallocation of public funds. Investigations have uncovered instances where officials manipulated tax regulations and engaged in fraudulent financial schemes, thereby exacerbating Poland’s challenges in combating organized crime.
Foreign criminal actors play a moderate role in Poland’s organized crime landscape, particularly in human trafficking, drug smuggling, arms trafficking and the distribution of counterfeit goods. Due to Poland’s strategic location within Europe, these groups exploit the open borders of the EU to facilitate illicit trade. Many foreign networks collaborate with domestic criminal organizations to enhance their operations. Vietnamese and Filipino nationals have been involved in forced labour schemes, while individuals from Syria, Iraq and Georgia are linked to human smuggling networks operating through Poland. Russian-speaking organized crime groups, including those from Georgia and Ukraine, have also participated in smuggling migrants across Poland’s eastern border. The influx of refugees from Ukraine has provided new opportunities for criminal networks engaged in human trafficking. Foreign actors are also active in Poland’s narcotics trade, with Dutch criminal organizations exerting significant influence over the country’s drug markets. Additionally, the Italian mafia, particularly the ‘Ndrangheta, has been linked to occasional arrests in Poland, indicating limited but noteworthy connections to Polish criminal networks.
Private-sector actors in Poland play a role in facilitating organized crime, particularly in financial crimes such as VAT fraud, money laundering and counterfeit goods trafficking. Criminal networks frequently use legitimate businesses as fronts for illicit activities, exploiting regulatory gaps to evade law enforcement. One of the most prevalent financial crimes in Poland is VAT fraud, with organized groups engaging in carousel fraud schemes and employing shell companies to circumvent tax regulations. Offshore accounts, intermediary banking services and cryptocurrency exchanges are commonly used to launder illicit proceeds. The production and distribution of counterfeit goods, including clothing, electronics and pharmaceuticals, continue to pose significant challenges. Many counterfeit products are either produced locally or imported before being sold through e-commerce platforms and physical markets.
Additionally, businesses involved in transportation and logistics have been implicated in facilitating the smuggling of excise goods such as alcohol and tobacco. Human trafficking and labour exploitation also intersect with private-sector activities, particularly in industries that rely on undocumented workers. Some businesses have been found to engage in exploitative labour practices, taking advantage of gaps in labour protections for migrant workers. On a broader scale, the infiltration of private-sector entities by criminal networks remains a critical issue, with businesses being used as vehicles for money laundering and fraud.
Poland’s political leadership has demonstrated a commitment to combating organized crime, although its prioritization remains inconsistent. While all major political parties recognize the necessity of addressing organized crime, concrete policy actions often focus on economic crime, particularly efforts to close the VAT tax gap. This approach reflects a broader effort to recover lost revenues rather than a strategic crackdown on organized criminal networks. Additionally, public trust in political institutions is low, driven by ongoing corruption scandals, judicial controversies and the ruling party’s influence over state institutions. The October 2023 parliamentary elections, which resulted in a victory for a centrist coalition, marked a shift in governance. However, the new administration’s primary focus remains on economic and political restructuring rather than directly addressing organized crime.
Transparency and accountability in governance have raised concerns, particularly regarding judicial reforms initiated by the former ruling party. While the new government has dissolved the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (CBA), citing its politicization, broader systemic challenges persist. The state’s anti-corruption efforts have faced criticism for their perceived lack of impartiality, with ongoing investigations primarily targeting former officials. Although Poland has introduced technical measures to improve transparency, such as the national e-invoicing system and public access to parliamentary proceedings, systemic issues regarding accountability remain unaddressed.
Poland actively participates in international efforts to combat organized crime by collaborating with organizations such as Europol, INTERPOL and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office. The country has ratified key international treaties, including the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Arms Trade Treaty. Poland’s recent decision to strengthen cooperation with NATO in response to regional security threats highlights its evolving approach to international security cooperation.
The country’s legislative framework criminalizes various forms of organized crime, including human trafficking, drug trafficking and cybercrime. However, enforcement gaps remain, particularly in areas such as wildlife trafficking, where poaching and illegal trade are not formally recognized as criminal offenses. Recent amendments to the Penal Code have increased penalties for corruption and financial crimes; however, stakeholders have raised concerns about the proportionality of these measures. Additionally, Poland has introduced new cybersecurity regulations to address the growing threat of cyber-enabled crimes.
Poland’s judicial system plays a crucial role in combating organized crime, but it faces significant structural challenges. Judicial independence has long been a concern, as previous government reforms have undermined the separation of powers. Recent efforts to restructure the judiciary aim to restore independence and transparency, although their effectiveness remains uncertain. The backlog of organized crime cases and protracted judicial proceedings continue to strain the system, raising questions about efficiency and the guarantees of a fair trial.
Law enforcement agencies, including the Central Bureau of Investigation and the Internal Security Agency, are actively involved in combating organized crime. However, inter-agency coordination remains weak, with fragmented data-sharing mechanisms impeding efficiency. The planned redistribution of the CBA’s responsibilities to other agencies aims to depoliticize anti-corruption efforts but presents challenges in maintaining operational continuity, especially in complex, cross-border investigations. Poland participates in international law enforcement cooperation, leveraging resources from Europol and INTERPOL to target transnational criminal networks.
Poland’s location along the eastern border of the EU makes it a key entry point for the smuggling of various goods, particularly tobacco and cigarettes. Its border security has come under further strain due to regional crises, including the Belarus-EU border tensions and the Russian invasion of Ukraine – both of which have been exploited by criminal groups to facilitate human smuggling and trafficking. Despite these pressures, the Polish Border Guard remains a well-organized and operationally capable institution, having increased patrols and enhanced cooperation with partners such as neighbouring countries, Frontex, Europol and Eurojust. The Polish government has also intensified border control efforts, particularly along the border with Belarus, to manage migration flows – though these measures have raised concerns over potential human rights violations. Nevertheless, Poland continues to face persistent challenges in fully detecting and intercepting illicit cross-border activities.
Poland’s anti-money laundering framework has undergone improvements, although enforcement remains inconsistent. The General Inspector of Financial Information is tasked with monitoring suspicious financial transactions and coordinating with law enforcement agencies. However, international assessments have identified weaknesses in Poland’s ability to disrupt illicit financial flows. A limited understanding of money laundering risks, combined with the lack of a comprehensive national coordination platform, continues to pose challenges. Moreover, the country is also struggling to align its national policies with EU anti-money laundering regulations.
The economic regulatory environment in Poland has been influenced by recent global and regional economic challenges, including the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine. The country’s grey economy has expanded, particularly in sectors such as construction, transportation and hospitality. This expansion has created vulnerabilities that organized criminal groups exploit, including unregistered employment and tax evasion.
During the reporting period, the Polish government enhanced victim protection efforts, offering shelter, medical and psychological care, legal aid and reintegration support. Victim identification tools were improved with updated, trauma-informed procedures, and a national referral mechanism was finalized, pending approval. Authorities screened vulnerable groups, including migrants, though controversial pushbacks at the Belarus border raised concerns about unidentified trafficking victims being returned. Funding for victim services increased for the first time since 2015, with additional resources allocated to train social workers. However, gaps remained in support for unaccompanied children and in shelter capacity for male victims. Efforts to prevent organized crime in Poland primarily focus on public awareness campaigns, as well as drug prevention and harm reduction initiatives. The government has also collaborated with NGOs to develop intervention strategies aimed at preventing exploitation. However, these prevention efforts are often fragmented, characterized by inconsistencies in regional implementation and a lack of sustained funding, which limits their long-term effectiveness. Drug prevention strategies have also been expanded, with campaigns highlighting the dangers of narcotics and synthetic drugs being rolled out. However, access to rehabilitation programs remains uneven, particularly in rural areas where the availability of substance abuse treatment is limited.
Non-state actors, including civil society organizations and media outlets, play a crucial role in exposing organized crime and holding authorities accountable. However, press freedom has faced notable restrictions, particularly under the previous administration, which exerted substantial pressure that further limited independent journalism. Nevertheless, the newly elected Parliament passed a resolution calling for the restoration of impartiality in public media, which has taken important steps in this regard. However, the media's ability to report on organized crime in Poland has been significantly undermined by the systematic marginalization of journalistic investigations into misconduct within key state institutions, including those overseeing internal security, the judiciary and law enforcement. Despite these challenges, civil society organizations remain vocal in advocating for anti-corruption measures and stronger protections for victims of organized crime, often filling the gaps left by state institutions.
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The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to 10. The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel.
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