How to measure organized crime?
A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.
Read more on globalinitiative.netCriminal markets
4.100.10
An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.
Human trafficking
5.000.00
Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.
Human smuggling
3.500.00
Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.
Extortion and protection racketeering
3.00 n/a
Crimes linked to exerting control over a territory/market including as a mediator and/or requesting a benefit in exchange for protection.
Arms trafficking
4.000.50
The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.
Trade in counterfeit goods
2.50 n/a
The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands.
Illicit trade in excisable goods
5.00 n/a
The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits.
Flora crimes
2.00-0.50
The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.
Fauna crimes
4.000.00
The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.
Non-renewable resource crimes
3.00-0.50
The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.
Heroin trade
5.000.00
The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.
Cocaine trade
5.000.50
The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cannabis trade
4.500.50
The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.
Synthetic drug trade
4.500.00
The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cyber-dependent crimes
5.50 n/a
Organized crimes that rely solely on using information communications technology with the aim of obtaining a monetary/material benefit.
Financial crimes
5.00 n/a
Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance.
Criminal actors
3.40-0.23
An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.
Mafia-style groups
4.500.00
Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.
Criminal networks
4.500.50
Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.
State-embedded actors
1.50-0.50
Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.
Foreign actors
4.500.50
State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.
Private sector actors
2.00 n/a
Profit-seeking individuals/entities who own/control a part of the legal economy free from the state, that collaborate with criminal actors.
Political leadership and governance
8.000.00
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
8.500.00
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
9.000.00
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
8.500.00
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
8.000.00
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
8.00-0.50
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
8.000.00
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
7.000.00
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
8.000.50
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
7.00-0.50
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
7.000.00
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
8.000.50
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Political leadership and governance
8.000.00
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
8.500.00
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
9.000.00
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
8.500.00
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
8.000.00
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
8.00-0.50
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
8.000.00
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
7.000.00
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
8.000.50
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
7.00-0.50
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
7.000.00
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
8.000.50
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Norway is primarily a destination country in the human trafficking trade; victims mainly arrive via Denmark and Sweden. Most victims are adult women exploited for sex trafficking who come from Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine. The victim profile is expanding, however: victims from South America, Africa and Thailand have also been reported. Reports suggest that perpetrators are usually part of a loose organised crime structure – they are Norwegian or they share the ethnicity of the victims. Document forgery, social security legislation crimes, money laundering and the exploitation of victims of other crimes tend to occur in combination with human trafficking. Most revenue from human trafficking in Norway comes from sexual exploitation and forced labour in the construction and building sectors.
Norway is primarily a destination country for the human smuggling market, although with limited scope. Smuggled individuals are mostly employed for labour exploitation in the agriculture, fisheries, transport and construction sectors. They are generally smuggled in using false identity documents. Perpetrators of this crime are increasingly using technological tools to forge, sell and buy such documents online, enabling them to pass through legal channels. Organised crime groups are known to be involved in this market. The war in Ukraine has led to an increased risk in activities related to human smuggling; criminals have been found smuggling Ukrainian women through Poland and Sweden before facilitating their entry into Norway. The markets for extortion and protection racketeering are limited in Norway.
Norway is its own source and a destination country for arms trafficking, but this market is small and the level of trafficked and smuggled firearms and ammunition is low. Poor registration, decommissioning, destruction and tracking procedures are thought to make it easier for organised crime groups to acquire weapons. Illegal arms and ammunition are mainly handled by private collectors, followed by motorcycle gangs such as the Hells Angels and Bandidos. There has reportedly been an increase in gun violence among young gang members in recent years. The dark web is a source for instructions on how to assemble firearms, which seems to coincide with the recent increase in popularity of soft air guns converted to fire live ammunition.
The counterfeit market in Norway is thought to be small, although there is some activity related to articles of high value. In the luxury segment, the availability of cheaper alternatives for products like cosmetics has given way to a flourishing trade in fake products. This trend has been noticed by customs offices, but they are currently not actively working towards tackling the issue. There is a moderate market for illicit trade in excise goods in Norway, especially for contraband cigarettes. Illicit cigarettes are smuggled from Lithuania, through Poland and Sweden. Norway’s outsource is Denmark. Due to the relatively high tax on alcoholic beverages, there is also ongoing smuggling of beer, wine and spirits.
Crimes related to flora seem to be limited in Norway: there is no suggestion of organised crime involvement in this market. Few illegal plants are brought into Norway. Conversely, fauna crimes is a relatively prevalent criminal market, with the country serving as a destination and source for fauna-related crime. Animals are mainly trafficked by plane, ferry, car and in travel luggage, or using freight companies. Predator birds and bird eggs are predominantly smuggled out of the country. Smuggling of wildlife into Norway is aided by the country’s extensive land borders. Reptiles are smuggled in from countries like Germany, Sweden and Denmark. Norway suffers from illegal fishing, with under-reporting and misreporting of catches. This is particularly prevalent in the king crab fishing industry, and perpetrated by both Norwegian and foreign fishing businesses. The illegal hunting of wolves also occurs to a limited degree.
Illegal trade in non-renewable resources is small in Norway, despite the country being rich in natural resources. Given its major iron-ore mining and oil and gas industries, it is estimated that there may be occasional incidents of non-renewable resource smuggling. For example, there have been some recent instances of crime groups smuggling oil, due to substantial price discrepancies between countries.
Heroin is reportedly responsible for most overdose deaths in Norway. The drug is smuggled in from West Africa, Morocco, Poland, Lithuania and the Balkans. Heroin coming via the Balkan route passes through Germany and the Netherlands before it enters Norway. Heroin trafficking in Norway is carried out by smaller organised crime groups and individuals. Foreign mafia-style groups retain a significant share of the market. Heroin is not the most lucrative drug in Norway, however: the market has seen a substantial change with a large number of users joining rehabilitation programmes.
Cocaine consumption has been increasing in the country over the years due to a reduction in the social stigma associated with the drug. However, viewed in the general European context, cocaine use and trade in Norway are comparatively low. The drug is smuggled in from South American countries such as Bolivia, via Belgium and the Netherlands. Foreign actors, specifically Serbian criminals, seem to be involved in this criminal market, along with bigger local gangs, small entrepreneurs and dealers.
Cannabis is the most commonly used and seized drug in Norway: organized criminal groups are engaged in its production and distribution. Norway acts as a destination country for cannabis smuggled via the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Poland. Spain is a major supplier of hash, which originates in Morocco. Mafia-style groups and ethnic gangs control smuggling into Norway and the distribution of the drugs within the country. Cannabis is also cultivated by certain foreign groups in the country, reducing the cost and risk of cross-border smuggling.
Norway is a source and destination country for synthetic drugs. Amphetamines arrive via Germany, Poland and Sweden, with the majority of MDMA coming from the Netherlands. The import of chemicals used to make synthetics has increased, partly due to the ease with which these chemicals can be obtained online. Online sale and smuggling via mail make it difficult to regulate the drugs. Organised crime groups and single actors are involved in this market. Tranquilizers and sedatives are some of the most-used synthetic drugs in the country, along with MDMA.
Norway is one of the safest countries in the world when it comes to cybercrime – it only accounted for a minimal percentage of cyber-attacks in Western Europe. However, the COVID-19 pandemic and the continuously growing use of technology have increased the vulnerability of users and cybercrime is now a considerable threat. Such crimes are mostly carried out by foreign actors against Norwegian companies – in search of trade secrets and proprietary technology. Organised criminals are known to use the digital space for financial gain through ransomware viruses and data theft.
Financial crimes are prevalent in Norway. Since most of these crimes are carried out using digital channels, it is not uncommon for fraudsters to operate from a different country via the internet. It is also a known practice for the fraudster to use so-called ‘straw men’ and professional helpers. Recently, there have been cases of fraud carried out by private actors in the banking sector in Norway. There is reason to believe that the extent of fraud in Norway is far greater than what is recorded. Local police districts handle most minor fraud cases; specialized financial crime units tend to target larger, more complex fraud cases with international connections.
Most organized crime in Norway is carried out by loose criminal networks, many of which are homegrown, long-standing and generational. Far right and neo-Nazi groups are growing in the country with a subsequent increase in extremist violence. The influence of foreign actors on Norwegian society is limited. That said, groups from the Baltics – especially Lithuanians – often work within the drug trade, connecting local and transnational networks. West Africans, particularly Nigerians, are thought to be involved with importing drugs, and also with prostitution and illegal money transactions.
There are no outright mafia-style groups in Norway – the closest in nature are the motorcycle gangs. The Bandidos and Hells Angels are the main biker groups and they have been actively recruiting young people for gang crime. The most notorious criminal groups in Norway are said to be based in Oslo, with affiliates across the country consisting of criminals who engage mostly in drug-related crimes, violence and threats, including protection schemes. There is limited involvement of private sector and state actors in illicit activities in Norway.
Norway is considered one of the most robust democracies in the world and it has a strong public stance against organised crime. However, different parties approach organized crime from different perspectives: some take the economic angle; others focus on immigration. While the government has received criticism for its ‘slow’ response to fighting organized crime, the overall apparatus appears to be effective. Government authorities respect and protect civil rights. They take their human rights obligations seriously, cooperating openly with international monitoring mechanisms. The level of corruption in Norway is perceived to be fairly low, and the government has mechanisms in place to identify and punish officials who may commit human rights abuses or acts of corruption. The government is considered to be highly transparent – any citizen has the right to access public documents. Access to other information in Norway is average, however: businesses, trade unions and civil society organisations (CSOs) are known to wield influence through the equivalents of parliamentary interest groups.
Norway cooperates strongly in the international fight against organised crime. It is a major global financial contributor and supports various initiatives, especially in the field of justice against human trafficking, corruption, terror and piracy. The Norwegian government also actively proposes new conventions and recommendations within the scope of criminal justice cooperation. In the greater region, there is a high level of cooperation between the Norwegian police and other Nordic police forces. Politicians in the country proactively give attention to meeting the new demands of law enforcement in Norway. The country’s criminal law stipulates two penal provisions that directly target participation in various forms of criminal organizations. Norway has a strict enforcement policy regarding drug laws, but the bill aimed at decriminalising possession and use of small amounts of narcotics remains unapproved. New strategies to address intellectual property rights have been launched by the police force, and Norway is busy incorporating directives relating to the cross-border sale of tobacco and nicotine.
As is the case with other state institutions in Norway, the judicial system and law enforcement agencies are trusted by the public and are not seen to be corrupt. Overall, the Norwegian judiciary is well resourced by the state and able to make effective decisions. Norway does not have a constitutional or special court. Investigations related to economic crime are increasingly being privatised, but the state still has firm control over the prison system. Prisons are seemingly in line with international standards with no reports of overcrowding.
The Norwegian government’s strategy follows a number of priorities that guide police to fight organised crime. These include regularly assessing criminal law so that it remains appropriate and effective; developing and strengthening interaction across police district boundaries; and strengthening the role of the national coordination body. However, some fields of policing are understaffed and call for improvement, especially in areas of strategic analysis and the use of intelligence. A multi-agency approach is used in policing crimes like human trafficking and drugs, tracking cash flows generated by organised crime, and prosecution of economic and environmental crime. Since Norway is part of the Schengen Area, with open borders to Sweden, Finland and Denmark, its borders are difficult to control. However, permanent customs offices and checkpoints at major crossing points, coupled with effective collaboration between the neighbouring countries, enables effective border control.
Norway has high resilience to money laundering and terrorist financing. This is due to different government institutions’ shared strategic focus and their combined mandate to promote financial stability and well-functioning markets. Norway’s law against money laundering effectively keeps such activities in check. Norway’s economy is one of the freest in the world, especially among European countries. Stable and well-functioning non-market institutions are present, and there is a large state sector with accessible funding to ensure economic protection from criminal elements. Corruption is not a barrier to commerce or investment in the country. Norway’s economy has remained stable through the pandemic.
Victim and witness support are significant aspects of the government’s strategy against organised crime. However, there are obstacles concerning the accessibility of these support systems, especially for victims of sex trafficking who may have entered the country irregularly. Despite this, the government is working on investigating more trafficking cases, allocating more funding to NGOs for victim assistance, and providing substantial financial support to campaigns and projects aimed at combating sex and labour trafficking. The Norwegian government is also working towards creating systems to help victims of drug addiction. Additionally, the government runs witness protection programmes that offer physical protection and a change of identity for victims.
Prevention of organised crime in Norway starts at the local level and follows a similar pattern to more general law enforcement strategies. Youth engagement, cooperation across professional fields and sectors, capacity building, education programmes, and locally tailored strategies make-up the government’s preventive efforts. Furthermore, when it comes to cybercrime, various government agencies work with the business community to exchange information, share experiences and create a holistic plan to tackle the problem.
Norway is considered a free country where civil liberties are respected; independent media and civil society actors hold the government accountable. Norway’s legal framework safeguards freedom of the press and media, which ensures editorial independence and freedom from any government interference. Journalists are not subject to censorship and violence, but the government’s new code of criminal procedure has been subject to criticism as it reportedly fails to protect the confidentiality of journalistic sources. There are several activities carried out by non-state actors in the fight against organised crime. Such actors include NGOs, as well as private organisations who help sex workers and other victims of trafficking.
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The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to 10. The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel.
A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.
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