People

Nicaragua hosts a notable human trafficking market that targets both Nicaraguan and foreign nationals residing in the country, including women and children who are particularly vulnerable to domestic and transnational sex trafficking. The lack of effective investigation, prosecution and prevention efforts, rampant poverty and large groups of people without birth certificates or any identification papers make the situation particularly acute. Labour trafficking is also prevalent in Nicaragua’s agricultural, construction, mining and domestic service industries, with social media platforms used to recruit victims through false job offers. Corrupt state-embedded actors are highly involved in Nicaragua’s human trafficking market, which also contributes to state revenue, but no state-driven investigations, prosecutions or convictions linked to their involvement have been reported.

Nicaragua is a source and transit country for human smuggling, with people from various nationalities travelling through it to reach the US. Despite the government’s efforts to deter irregular migration, the country’s porous borders have made it a key international route for those seeking settlement in the US. An increasing number of Nicaraguans have been fleeing the country due to various calamities, including the COVID-19 pandemic and natural disasters, and seeking refuge in neighbouring countries such as Costa Rica. In 2022, there was a rise in the number of Nicaraguans registered at the US-Mexico border. Nicaraguan army officials, tasked with preventing irregular migration and other forms of cross-border organized criminal activity, also facilitate the human smuggling market by accepting bribes. Episodes of extortion and protection racketeering committed by criminal organizations are scarce in the country.

Trade

Nicaragua serves as a hub for arms trafficking in Central America, supplying illegal weapons to countries such as Mexico, Honduras and Costa Rica. Both domestic and foreign actors contribute to the demand for arms, with unregistered weapons circulating within Nicaraguan borders. Many of the weapons being trafficked out of Nicaragua are civil war relics, previously in the possession of pro-government paramilitary groups. Corrupt Nicaraguan police and army officials are reportedly involved in facilitating the illicit cross-border transport of weapons, especially northbound towards Mexico or southbound across the Nicaraguan-Costa Rican border.

Despite a robust legal framework on intellectual property protection, Nicaragua fails to effectively prevent counterfeit crime, making it a target for counterfeit trade. Multi-media piracy, the use of unlicensed software and the sale of both counterfeit and pirated goods have reportedly been on the rise in recent years. Counterfeit cosmetics, perfumes, leather goods and handbags are also increasingly prevalent in the country. The Nicaraguan government’s lack of public reports on counterfeit goods seizures substantially limits understanding of the size and extent of this criminal market.

Nicaragua is a transit country for the smuggling of Chinese cigarettes and other excise merchandise to Central American countries such as Costa Rica. Excise goods, including tobacco and alcoholic beverages, are also smuggled into Nicaragua for domestic consumption, causing notable damage to the country’s legitimate tobacco industry.

Environment

Nicaragua’s timber trafficking market thrives due to informal arrangements between community leaders, local governments, forestry agents and other groups. While domestic actors typically profit from the market, international demand from Chinese consumers drives its highly consolidated nature. State-embedded actors issue harvesting permits for more timber than exists, particularly in protected forest regions, resulting in deforestation mainly in indigenous land or the country’s northern or southern regions. In recent years, Nicaraguan criminal groups have increasingly participated in eco-trafficking crimes, leading to broader societal challenges such as heightened violence against indigenous communities. Despite the severity of these issues, Nicaraguan officials have failed to prioritize and allocate resources towards combatting land grabbing, deforestation and timber trafficking, and even low-level police and military officials often accept bribes to avoid intervention.

Wildlife trafficking is another prevalent issue in Nicaragua, with felines, parrots and turtles being the most threatened species. Criminal networks are heavily involved in the exotic pet trade, selling parrots to Honduran customers at lucrative prices. Although illegal to consume, turtles are still exploited for their meat, eggs and shells, and turtle egg theft is a persistent problem. The sale of protected species in public markets and roadsides underscores the prevalence of wildlife trafficking in the country, which is facilitated by corrupt police and army officials.

Illicit gold mining occurs along the Nicaraguan-Costa Rican border, posing a threat to protected ecosystems. There are also suspicions of illicit gold transport between Nicaragua and Venezuela, with Venezuelan-sourced gold being refined and exported from Nicaragua as Nicaraguan-sourced gold, potentially serving as a key source of revenue for corrupt officials. Moreover, Nicaragua’s North Caribbean Coast Autonomous Region is a hub for illicit mineral extraction, leading to violent land grabbing and attacks against environmental defenders.

Drugs

There is no evidence of a notable heroin trade in Nicaragua. Due to widespread poverty and the drug’s relatively high price, domestic heroin consumption remains low. However, Nicaragua is an important transit country for cocaine trafficking between South and North America. Colombian, Peruvian and Bolivian-sourced cocaine is transported through Nicaragua, which serves as a key point for the arrival, storage and trans-shipment of drugs. Mexican drug cartels also have a strong presence in the country. Nicaraguan criminal networks collaborate with counterparts from Costa Rica and Honduras to transport cocaine, generating substantial revenue. Corruption within the state apparatus facilitates the cocaine trafficking market, with allegations pertaining to elite officials accepting bribes and negotiating with drug traffickers. Nicaraguan authorities do not communicate or cooperate with Costa Rican counterparts in the fight against drug trafficking, making it easier for drug trafficking operations between the two countries to occur.

Nicaragua has a consolidated cannabis market catering mainly to local demand. Due to its affordability, marijuana is the most-consumed drug among teenagers. Nicaraguan criminal networks facilitate the production, transportation and distribution of marijuana and use micro-commercialization strategies to sell small quantities of the drug in Nicaraguan cities. Locally produced marijuana, as well as from Costa Rica and Honduras, is primarily distributed and commercialized in cities such as Managua, Chinandega, Estelí, Rivas, Puerto Cabezas and Bluefields, where most consumers reside.

While the market for synthetic drugs lacks consolidation, it is driven by Nicaraguan drug mules who traffic legally purchased ketamine, primarily in liquid form, across the country’s porous southern border into the hands of Costa Rican drug traffickers. Although domestic ketamine consumption remains negligible, its legality in Nicaragua facilitates the drug’s illicit transport into neighbouring Costa Rica. Nicaragua-based criminal networks are also known to distribute meth, and various amphetamines among local drug markets, especially in Estelí.

Cyber Crimes

Nicaragua is poorly equipped to deal with cyber threats. Nevertheless, the illicit market does not seem to be particularly developed in the country so far. Nevertheless, there have been cyber-attacks targeting governmental institutions, media outlets and individuals in Nicaragua, which include the hacking of social media accounts belonging to independent online outlets, distributed denial-of-service attacks targeting newspapers, hacking of SMS platform accounts, and cyber-attacks on the databases and websites of various public institutions.

Financial Crimes

According to Nicaraguan authorities, cyber-enabled financial crimes, such as electronic fraud and social media-based commerce fraud, are a problem in the country. Scammers are known to steal corporate client data and pose as corporate officials demanding false debt payments. They contact their victims via international phone calls, posing as banking employees and collecting their personal banking information. There is evidence of transnational involvement in these financial crimes. Nicaragua also suffers losses in annual tax revenues, amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars, due to corporate tax abuse.

Criminal Actors

The country has been adversely affected by high-level corruption and alleged links between state-embedded actors and organized criminal groups that operate with impunity. There are allegations that drug trafficking networks operate with the complicity of security forces, and other criminals even steal illicit drug shipments with the aid of corrupt state officials. The accusations have fueled long-standing suspicions of elite links to drug cartels, with high-profile arrests of parliamentarians and drug traffickers who have been seen with government officials. Collaboration with foreign criminal networks is also common, with reports of territorial expansion of Mexican cartels into Nicaragua. Mid- and low-level officials have been implicated in timber and wildlife trafficking, and prominent business and institutional representatives have also been known to work with criminal actors. Pro-government paramilitary groups have been accused of collaborating with state security forces to intimidate and commit violence against perceived enemies of the regime.

Foreign criminal entities, including several Colombian, Venezuelan and Costa Rican criminal organizations, operate across Nicaragua, relying on local criminal actors to provide key services such as transport and contacts to facilitate organized criminal markets. These foreign criminal entities reportedly exert near-total control over the country’s cocaine trafficking market. Although Nicaragua has a limited presence of mafia-style groups, the strongest provide specialized services to transnational criminal entities involved in drug trafficking, timber trafficking, wildlife trafficking or other forms of organized crime.

Smaller criminal networks in Nicaragua also work with foreign counterparts in various illicit activities such as human trafficking, drug trafficking, timber trafficking, wildlife trafficking and micro-commercialization. Some networks specialize in specific aspects of Nicaragua’s drug trafficking market, such as the transport of drugs across Central America, while others steal drug shipments with the help of corrupt state officials.

The largest private companies in the country are managed and/or owned by political elites, which raises concerns over the existence of a business network known to use state funds through contracts with public institutions. The advantages obtained in exchange for these concessions showcase rampant corruption in the private sector. Some of these companies are also found to be involved in money laundering schemes.

Leadership and governance

Nicaragua is currently in a state of political and economic crisis, with only a small percentage of the population expressing support for the regime. The ruling political party has been accused of having links to the transnational drug trade, and state-driven anti-organized crime initiatives are regarded as being only symbolic. Human rights violations have been increasing, with political prisoners remaining unfairly imprisoned and opposition candidates facing arbitrary arrests. The Nicaraguan government’s credibility has also been tarnished by money laundering, embezzlement and the exploitation of cybercrime legislation to accuse political opposition leaders of financial-related crimes. High-level corruption linked to political elite has been alleged to permeate the entire Nicaraguan state apparatus, leading to concerns about political attacks on individuals and larger regulatory entities. The executive’s overtaking of state powers has led to the dismantling of institutions and represents a significant setback in transparency and accountability.

Nicaragua is a party to international treaties and conventions related to organized crime and has extradition agreements with several countries. However, the government has faced criticism for granting Nicaraguan nationality to foreign individuals who are facing charges of corruption and other crimes in the courts of their countries to evade legal extradition requirements. Nicaragua has collaborated with various international entities to combat organized crime, but it has been widely condemned on the international stage. The US and EU have imposed sanctions on high-level Nicaraguan officials. Nicaragua has a relatively strong legislative framework against most forms of organized crime but lacks adequate legislation against environmental crimes such as illicit gold mining, timber trafficking and wildlife trafficking. Moreover, the country does not have effective regulations or infrastructure in place to combat cybercrimes. High-level corruption and violence linked to the regime have rendered anti-organized crime legislation largely symbolic. Nicaragua’s adoption of life imprisonment as a penalty for hate crimes has been widely regarded as an attempt to silence the regime’s political opposition, along with the adoption of legislation limiting local human rights and political organizations.

Criminal justice and security

Nicaragua’s judicial system is weak, heavily influenced by politics and corrupt. Most judges are affiliated with the ruling party and are known to accept bribes from drug traffickers in exchange for judicial favours. The government’s increasing weaponization of the judicial system against political opponents has resulted in the revocation of the legality of political opposition parties and unfair imprisonment of their members, leading to a widespread criticism of the presidential re-election in 2021. The willingness of Nicaraguan judiciary officials to undermine democracy and commit severe human rights violations has led to foreign governments imposing sanctions on them. More than half of the total prison population in Nicaragua is imprisoned for drug-related offenses, and the prison system is severely overcrowded, with extremely poor living conditions. Criminal groups often bribe corrupt prison officials and operate from within the prison system.

Nicaragua’s law enforcement agencies are widely considered tools of political repression, often collaborating with pro-government paramilitary groups to target human rights defenders, independent journalists and dissident activists. The Nicaraguan military, which was previously praised for its effectiveness in drug seizures and community programmes, has been accused of corruption, arbitrary arrest, torture and collaboration with paramilitary groups. The police force’s annual budget has increased, leading some to view it as a reward for loyalty to the ruling elite.

Nicaragua’s Pacific and Caribbean borders, with difficult terrain and blind spots, provide significant topographical advantages for the execution of transnational organized crime. Drug traffickers, often with the aid of corrupt state officials, take extensive advantage of remote Nicaraguan coastlines and islands to transport drugs through the country. Regional cocaine trafficking and money laundering operations frequently pass through Nicaraguan territory. High-level corruption not only facilitates cross-border organized crime, but also makes it difficult to measure the extent of Nicaragua’s organized criminal markets. Following years of cyber-attacks against state institutions, Nicaraguan and Russian authorities agreed to collaborate on the development of virtual infrastructures to protect national security.

Economic and financial environment

Nicaragua is considered to be one of the world’s highest-risk countries for money laundering and terrorist financing. Despite some improvements, the country’s anti-money laundering initiatives are reportedly targeted against the political opposition of the ruling party. The Financial Analysis Unit (UAF) has been criticized for its vague language, which could be exploited to characterize public demonstrations as terrorism, and for allowing the Nicaraguan Army to monitor national banking institutions. Although the law outlines confiscation procedures following seizures of criminally sourced funds and assets, these procedures are rarely implemented. Consequently, Nicaragua has been grey-listed internationally due to its unreliability and high potential for money laundering.

Rampant corruption, favouritism and impunity among Nicaraguan officials, exacerbated by weak law enforcement capacity, constitute considerable deterrents to foreign investors. Moreover, Nicaragua has fallen into a deep state of political and economic crisis since the outbreak and brutal suppression of social security reform protests. This crisis, compounded in recent years by COVID-19 pandemic-linked increases in poverty and unemployment, has caused many foreign businesses to leave the country. Extortion, facilitation payments and kickbacks also plague Nicaragua's economic regulatory system. Tax and customs officials not only enforce national regulations arbitrarily, but also engage in bribery and corruption, creating a challenging business environment for foreign companies. More recently, the regime’s heightened isolation on the international stage has exacerbated the above-mentioned issues and triggered a significant increase in criminal financing accessibility.

Civil society and social protection

Although Nicaragua’s policies outline procedures for victim identification and assistance, authorities rarely implement them. The government has not established shelters or allocated funding for specialized victim services, with minimal support efforts in place. Despite enabling the provision of humanitarian visas to foreign human trafficking victims, the government has not identified any foreign victims since 2018.

Nicaragua’s anti-organized crime legislative framework includes preventative measures, such as public awareness and education programmes, but they are not well-implemented. Public outreach strategies, such as targeted brochures and radio segments, have limited efficacy, and there is a lack of reliable data on drug consumption, making analysis of drug prevention programmes difficult. Drug prevention and treatment services are reportedly rarely utilized, possibly due to a lack of awareness or limited operational capacity.

The regime in Nicaragua has been criticized for its restrictions on press freedom and its repressive approach towards independent media outlets, with journalists and media employees facing physical and judicial harassment, arbitrary detention and false allegations of libel and defamation. Many media broadcasters in the country are owned or controlled by political allies of the regime. Civil society organizations also report being subjected to harassment, violence and legislative action aimed at limiting their activities. NGOs and independent media outlets documenting and reporting human rights violations in Nicaragua have been stripped of their legality, with over a thousand organizations believed to have been shut down or sent into exile. The disappearance of humanitarian, development and pro-democracy groups has had a severe impact on local populations, with indigenous communities facing high vulnerability to land theft and settler violence. Nicaragua was identified as the country with the highest per-capita rate of land and environmental defender assassinations worldwide in 2022.

People

Venezuela remains a significant hub for human trafficking, where both domestic and foreign victims are exploited. Women are particularly vulnerable, often sexually exploited in Latin American countries that have received Venezuelan refugees. Criminal activities are facilitated by the lack of control of the police, and the complicity of migration authorities, boat captains and mafia groups operating at the borders. Venezuelans have been reported to take part in forced labour and sexual exploitation in the production of cocaine in the Catatumbo region of Colombia.

The country is a source country for human smuggling with Venezuelans using illegal crossings controlled by criminal groups to leave their country. As a result, these criminal networks have seen substantial financial gains from their involvement in this crime. Venezuelans with some means choose to leave the country through travel agencies run by smugglers that reach almost every country in Latin America. Transportation by land to Chile involves sophisticated transnational criminal structures, and victims have reported being abandoned on their way through inhospitable desert areas. Human smuggling activities also take place on the Venezuelan coast, particularly to transport people to Trinidad and Tobago, Aruba, Curaçao and Bonaire, with many of these boats sinking during the crossing. The humanitarian crisis in Venezuela continues to force people to flee.

Extortion and protection racketeering are widespread in Venezuela, carried out by criminal networks. These activities are prevalent in areas under the control or influence of criminal groups, such as the borders of the provinces of Arauca and Apure, commercial areas in Caracas and Zulia, and mining areas where small miners are forced to pay a percentage of the gold they extract to armed groups. Extortion is also carried out through fake kidnappings made from prisons through phone calls. Smuggled Venezuelans are extorted multiple times during their journey to a destination country, including paying with money, goods or sexual favours. Indigenous people in Bolívar experience extortion by paramilitary groups. Despite efforts to combat extortion, victims are often left with no choice but to comply with the demands of criminal actors.

Trade

Illegal weapons are extensively available in Venezuela, with government corruption playing a major role in their circulation. Most gang bullets come from the state-owned firearms manufacturer, with some security forces’ members selling their arms on the black market. The government’s lack of accountability, and incentives for officials to seize and destroy arms, have created a vicious cycle, where police officers sell seized weapons to criminals. In this market, bullets have become the most profitable item, and gangs use them indiscriminately as a sign of status. Illicit weapons are also prevalent within the correctional system and are used by various unregulated groups, generating insecurity and crime. Notably, routes originating from Venezuela, particularly through Norte de Santander and Arauca, have emerged as significant conduits for the influx of Russian and European weaponry into Colombia.

Trade in counterfeit goods is prevalent in Venezuela, with the economic crisis driving the production and sale of fake products. At least a quarter of the country’s market comprises counterfeit products, ranging from clothing and electronics to pharmaceuticals and foodstuffs. Fake famous brand franchises have also been detected, with commercial establishments infringing intellectual property rights offering services openly. The country has seen an increase in counterfeit medicines coming from China, Cuba and Russia, with these smuggled through the borders of Brazil and Colombia.

The illicit trade in excise goods is also commonplace in Venezuela, particularly due to the inflation of prices and the economic crisis. The illegal trade mainly comes from the border between Venezuela and Colombia, where prices are considerably cheaper. During the period that the borders between Colombia and Venezuela were closed, the illegal trade of products increased almost threefold, benefitting the criminal markets. This border is full of illegal crossings/trochas, controlled by mafias. These crossings are used to enter Venezuela with excise goods, including alcoholic beverages and tobacco products. Tobacco smuggling increased exponentially, accounting for approximately a quarter of the Venezuelan market.

Environment

An increase was registered in flora crimes in Venezuela, largely due to the country’s economic crisis and lack of government control. The energy crisis has, as well, led to a rise in illegal tree cutting for firewood, which has resulted in a local market where people cut trees from protected areas to supply themselves or sell the wood on the streets. Additionally, there is a demand for timber from external countries such as the US and China, as well as European countries. Environmental organizations in Colombia have reported illegal timber exports to Venezuela due to the high prices in neighbouring countries.

Wildlife trafficking and bushmeat consumption have also surged in Venezuela, particularly in the Orinoco Delta, due to smugglers coming from neighbouring countries. This has critically threatened deer, manatee and baquiro because of their consumption by foreign nationals. Locals, struggling to survive in the economic and humanitarian crisis, are also hunting animals in danger of extinction, such as yellow-headed parrots, cardenalitos, and red and blue macaws. Hunger in the country has also increased the poaching of dolphins, pink flamingos and sea turtles for local consumption. The market for animal products is predominantly ruled by domestic actors, but smugglers have also entered the market, responding to local and international demand.

Gold and oil smuggling are pervasive issues in Venezuela, driven by years of corruption and mismanagement in the state-owned oil company, as well as US sanctions. Corruption is widespread within the country’s oil industry with state officials reported to be involved in fraud, bribery and currency scams that have resulted in billions of dollars in losses. Resulting shortages of gas and oil in the country have turned Venezuela into a destination country for smuggled oil. Decreased oil production has also forced the regime to compensate for losses with mineral resources located in the Orinoco Mining Arc (OMA). Currently, from all countries sharing the Amazon rainforest, Venezuela has the most illegal mining spots identified, with clandestine airstrips used to ship minerals, especially gold, out of the country. The proliferation of small illegal mines in the OMA has created a complex network of criminality. Non-state armed groups and Brazilian gangs operate directly in the mines or extort small miners to let them work, which has led to disputes between these groups resulting in increased violence and many deaths in recent years.

Drugs

Although the Venezuelan government has reported a decrease in heroin seizures, it is uncertain whether this reduction is due to less drug trafficking, decreased consumption or a lack of government control. However, Venezuela remains a major country for the production and trafficking of cocaine, with high-ranking officials facilitating the drug trade. The Amazon River is a key drug trafficking route that includes Colombia, Venezuela and Brazil, with Brazil being the primary country for drug shipments to Europe. Criminal organizations use fast boats to transport cocaine to the Caribbean islands, and Venezuelans provide cheap labour to harvest, process and move the shipments.

The marijuana available on the local market has high levels of THC and, during the COVID-19 lockdown, the price of cannabis increased dramatically, surpassing the average income of the population, leading to a constrained market. Marijuana plantations have been reported in various parts of the country for local consumption and small-scale export to the English-speaking Caribbean islands. It is possible that marijuana follows the same routes as cocaine from Colombia. Venezuela is not significantly involved in the transnational synthetic drug trade. However, the sale of various synthetic drugs, including methamphetamine and keratin, is surging in local markets. There are currently no indications of synthetic opioids being sold.

Cyber Crimes

Cybercrime in Venezuela has been increasing over the years, with a surge in remote desktop protocol attacks and malware attacks. Notable cases include the hacking of Venezuelan military intelligence, which leaked information about Hezbollah agents in the country, as well as individuals involved in drug and arms trafficking, and money laundering. Digital media outlets and human rights organizations have been increasingly targeted by these crimes in recent years. Distributed denial-of-service attacks are often attributed to the media’s coverage of corruption scandals, leading to suspicions of these being state-sponsored.

Financial Crimes

Financial crimes market has been expanding in Venezuela in recent years, with a particular rise in fraudulent online activities through social media. Victims have been targeted with fake emails from the migration and administrative system, as well as other government platforms. The release of the Pandora Papers shed light on the involvement of high-ranking Venezuelan officials in offshore accounts and illegal activities, such as corruption in the national oil company. Many people in the country have also fallen victim to Ponzi schemes.

The prevalence of informal financial activities in Venezuela, such as currency sales and purchases, and foreign and local currency transfers, has created an environment that is conducive to fraudulent schemes of varying sizes. Moreover, the country’s isolation from the global financial system has led to opaque international transactions that involve large cash transfers, providing opportunities for misappropriation and large-scale fraud.

Criminal Actors

The Venezuelan state is plagued with criminal activities, and high-ranking officials are reportedly collaborating with criminal organizations to carry out various illegal operations, including drug trafficking and money laundering. Political elites in Venezuela are also accused of using the state-owned oil company to launder billions of dollars for their own benefit, as well as that of others in the government.

In terms of mafia-style groups, ‘megabandas’ control territory, possess heavy weaponry and have a clear hierarchy. The southern part of the country is the most affected as guerrillas and gangs fight for control of the territory, drug trafficking and gold extraction. These actors are also involved in extortion and have significant access to weapons. They control the penitentiary system and coordinate criminal operations within prisons. While the Venezuelan security forces launched various operations that resulted in the deaths of important leaders, these attacks have only been aimed at gangs that have attracted national attention for their violence, rather than being part of an overall strategy.

Foreign actors, particularly Colombian dissidents from the FARC and other guerrilla groups, have long used Venezuela as a base for their operations. The criminal situation in Venezuela is complex and involves a mix of internal and foreign actors with different interests that only align partially and temporarily. Colombian criminal groups are one of the dominant actors in Venezuela’s major criminal markets, including cocaine, petrol and gold trafficking, and human smuggling. Brazilian crime syndicates are also increasing their stakes in southern Venezuela, and groups of Brazilian armed miners invade border areas rich in gold in the states of Bolívar and Amazonas.

Regarding criminal networks, experienced militia men from Iran and Lebanon are said to have been entering the country to train Colectivos (government-backed armed groups that claim to protect the Bolivarian revolution) in counterintelligence and the repression of social protests, in exchange for passports and legal documentation that allow them to expand their operations throughout Latin America. The Colectivos control the black market for government-regulated food in some neighbourhoods, enjoying impunity for their actions, with high-level authorities placing direct orders for their activities. These groups have been accused of using violence against regime opponents during anti-crime operations, as well as being involved in local drug trafficking.

Private sector actors in the gold mining industry in Venezuela actively collaborate with criminal networks. These actors, including gold processing companies, work in conjunction with criminal groups to force miners to sell the gold they extract directly to them for further refining or processing. Furthermore, labour unions in the construction, oil and mining sectors are involved in criminal activities. Rather than representing the workers’ interests, these pseudo-unions have been extorting workers in their sectors to secure them jobs. On the employer’s side, they extort managers and bosses of different projects or construction sites, threatening them into hiring only the people that they indicate, or buying materials from certain companies. Disputes between the pseudo-unions result in several murders per year, many of them in the form of hired killings.

Leadership and governance

Venezuela is widely considered to be a fragile state, currently facing severe economic and political crises that have led to extremely low governability and legitimacy, and have had an impact on the basic human needs of Venezuelans. The country's income has substantially decreased due to US sanctions, economic collapse and an unprecedented decline in oil and gas production, forcing the state to rely on alternative sources of income. The regime has deinstitutionalized its military forces, transforming them into a decentralized resistance force, which has led to the proliferation of other armed entities allied with the regime. The state has not prioritized the dismantling of organized crime groups that engage in criminal activities, and there is no political will to do so. Since 2014, the Venezuelan regime has not published its macroeconomic data, forcing NGOs and foreign governments to record any data related to the country’s situation. The lack of transparency and accountability is evident in the absence of fair and free elections, openness, and fair electoral laws and frameworks. The re-election of president Nicolás Maduro was widely regarded as fraudulent, leading to the non-recognition of his government by many countries, and the creation of a parallel opposition government led by Juan Guaidó. However, the credibility of the latter has also been marred by corruption cases, as it was not prepared to manage public funds with accountability. The high levels of corruption, crime and impunity in the country have led to their normalization.

Venezuela is party to international agreements on organized crime and has extradition treaties with several countries. Nevertheless, Venezuela fails to adhere to its international obligations and the country consistently refuses to receive international fact-finding missions to investigate human rights abuses. Additionally, Venezuela has become a safe haven for criminals wanted by INTERPOL, with fugitives hiding in the country. The criminal legal framework in Venezuela has not undergone significant changes, and the lack of judicial independence in the country has fostered criminality and human rights violations. National legislation against organized crime has not been effectively implemented.

Criminal justice and security

The justice system in Venezuela lacks independence, which contributes to the government’s repression of opponents and serious human rights violations. Political actors are reported to give orders to judges, and those who refuse are often intimidated and vilified. The chief prosecutor eliminated the competitive selection process for prosecutors, resulting in judges and prosecutors being placed by high-ranking officials. The penitentiary system faces notable challenges such as corruption, weak security, poor infrastructure, overcrowding, insufficient staffing and poorly trained guards. Criminals within the system coordinate illegal activities outside prison walls, such as kidnappings, extortion and drug trafficking.

Venezuela’s lack of control over its territories has forced the government to rely on non-state armed groups and corrupt military officials to maintain control and authority in those areas. While the government has repressed some illegal groups and regained control of disputed territories, law enforcement has been accused of torture and extrajudicial killings, exacerbating the problem of violence and compounding distrust within communities towards the police. The situation within security forces is dire, with widespread corruption, weak security and poor infrastructure contributing to the problems.

Venezuela’s porous borders have also led to the proliferation of illegal activities by criminal groups. From the beginning of the Chavez regime, the Venezuelan state has welcomed Colombian guerrillas as ideological allies and as a military force that could help the government control the country’s borders and deter an invasion from the US or Colombia. However, the state has lost control of its expansion, and illegal mining and drug trafficking have flourished in many territories. Some provinces have been de facto controlled by criminal groups fighting for transnational criminal markets. The lack of state presence, as well as the willingness of local authorities to accept bribes, further complicates the situation. Despite the Venezuelan government’s efforts to regain control, the outcome remains uncertain.

Economic and financial environment

Money laundering remains a substantial problem in Venezuela. Despite some slight improvements, the vulnerabilities of the financial system, the extensive foreign exchange market, unregulated circulation of dollars and lack of transparency continue to hinder any state initiative. Drug trafficking, corruption and smuggling of goods are recognized as sources of illicit funds, with international sanctions reinforcing the extent of money laundering in the country. Venezuela’s geographical location, weak supervision and enforcement, and limited bilateral cooperation also contribute to widespread financial abuses. International sanctions have led Venezuela to increasingly seek to sell its oil through grey markets abroad.

Several factors have weakened Venezuela’s economic regulatory capacity, including financial sanctions, the decline of wages and the formal economy, corruption and lack of rule of law. Financial sanctions have led to the economy relying on grey transactions, cash and barter to bypass them and avoid international financial systems. The destruction of wages and the formal economy has pushed a significant portion of the population to engage in informal and illegal activities, further discouraging entrepreneurs from starting businesses. Further, the government’s slow payment process is a considerable obstacle to investment. Although the country is expected to grow in the coming years, it is far from reaching the economic levels experienced decades ago, as the private sector has been almost dismantled by the state. Venezuela still has the highest inflation rate in the world, and the new economic measures aimed at promoting the use of the Bolivar show that economic decisions are still political rather than technical. The economic crisis has affected the living conditions of Venezuelans to a dire extent, with almost the entire population living below the poverty line and facing shortages of food, medicines and basic goods.

Civil society and social protection

The Venezuelan justice system remains flawed and lacks independence, violating victims’ rights, despite recent reforms to a law on the protection of victims by the National Assembly. In some cases, judges have failed to protect victims of torture by ordering their return to detention centres where they were allegedly tortured. The Venezuelan government has not provided support for trafficking victims, as there are no specialized shelters available for them. Nevertheless, some civil society and religious organizations offer assistance to these victims. The high level of distrust of citizens towards authorities and security forces renders any kind of victim and witness support ineffective, or even non-existent.

The relationship between the Venezuelan regime’s and independent media outlets as well as NGOs has been weak, as there is a limited tolerance towards criticism. The regime has implemented a decree forcing NGOs to register and provide detailed information about their financing, which is seen as an attempt to silence independent organizations that have been documenting and denouncing the human rights crisis in the country. Local NGOs are under scrutiny, and some have been accused of being terrorist groups and infiltrators for foreign intelligence agencies, resulting in personnel being detained, tortured and disappeared. The government has also been stripping critical radio and TV stations of their broadcast frequencies, blocking their social media, and carrying out arbitrary arrests and violence against reporters and civil society organizations. It has implemented repressive laws and regulations that restrict the exercise of their right to freedom of peaceful assembly, association and expression. Journalists are frequently threatened or beaten-up during elections, with no safety guarantee for them.