How to measure organized crime?
A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.
Read more on globalinitiative.netCriminal markets
5.23-0.27
An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.
Human trafficking
7.001.00
Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.
Human smuggling
6.000.50
Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.
Extortion and protection racketeering
2.00 n/a
Crimes linked to exerting control over a territory/market including as a mediator and/or requesting a benefit in exchange for protection.
Arms trafficking
6.000.00
The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.
Trade in counterfeit goods
6.00 n/a
The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands.
Illicit trade in excisable goods
5.50 n/a
The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits.
Flora crimes
6.000.00
The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.
Fauna crimes
6.000.00
The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.
Non-renewable resource crimes
6.500.50
The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.
Heroin trade
2.500.00
The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.
Cocaine trade
8.000.50
The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cannabis trade
6.000.00
The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.
Synthetic drug trade
3.500.00
The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cyber-dependent crimes
3.50 n/a
Organized crimes that rely solely on using information communications technology with the aim of obtaining a monetary/material benefit.
Financial crimes
4.00 n/a
Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance.
Criminal actors
6.20-0.43
An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.
Mafia-style groups
5.000.00
Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.
Criminal networks
6.500.00
Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.
State-embedded actors
9.000.00
Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.
Foreign actors
6.500.50
State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.
Private sector actors
4.00 n/a
Profit-seeking individuals/entities who own/control a part of the legal economy free from the state, that collaborate with criminal actors.
Political leadership and governance
1.50-0.50
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
1.000.00
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
2.00-0.50
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
3.00-0.50
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
2.00-0.50
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
2.50-0.50
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
2.500.00
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
2.50-0.50
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
2.000.00
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
2.000.00
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
3.00-0.50
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
1.00-1.00
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Nicaragua hosts a notable human trafficking market that targets both Nicaraguan and foreign nationals residing in the country, including women and children who are particularly vulnerable to domestic and transnational sex trafficking. The lack of effective investigation, prosecution and prevention efforts, rampant poverty and large groups of people without birth certificates or any identification papers make the situation particularly acute. Labour trafficking is also prevalent in Nicaragua’s agricultural, construction, mining and domestic service industries, with social media platforms used to recruit victims through false job offers. Corrupt state-embedded actors are highly involved in Nicaragua’s human trafficking market, which also contributes to state revenue, but no state-driven investigations, prosecutions or convictions linked to their involvement have been reported.
Nicaragua is a source and transit country for human smuggling, with people from various nationalities travelling through it to reach the US. Despite the government’s efforts to deter irregular migration, the country’s porous borders have made it a key international route for those seeking settlement in the US. An increasing number of Nicaraguans have been fleeing the country due to various calamities, including the COVID-19 pandemic and natural disasters, and seeking refuge in neighbouring countries such as Costa Rica. In 2022, there was a rise in the number of Nicaraguans registered at the US-Mexico border. Nicaraguan army officials, tasked with preventing irregular migration and other forms of cross-border organized criminal activity, also facilitate the human smuggling market by accepting bribes. Episodes of extortion and protection racketeering committed by criminal organizations are scarce in the country.
Nicaragua serves as a hub for arms trafficking in Central America, supplying illegal weapons to countries such as Mexico, Honduras and Costa Rica. Both domestic and foreign actors contribute to the demand for arms, with unregistered weapons circulating within Nicaraguan borders. Many of the weapons being trafficked out of Nicaragua are civil war relics, previously in the possession of pro-government paramilitary groups. Corrupt Nicaraguan police and army officials are reportedly involved in facilitating the illicit cross-border transport of weapons, especially northbound towards Mexico or southbound across the Nicaraguan-Costa Rican border.
Despite a robust legal framework on intellectual property protection, Nicaragua fails to effectively prevent counterfeit crime, making it a target for counterfeit trade. Multi-media piracy, the use of unlicensed software and the sale of both counterfeit and pirated goods have reportedly been on the rise in recent years. Counterfeit cosmetics, perfumes, leather goods and handbags are also increasingly prevalent in the country. The Nicaraguan government’s lack of public reports on counterfeit goods seizures substantially limits understanding of the size and extent of this criminal market.
Nicaragua is a transit country for the smuggling of Chinese cigarettes and other excise merchandise to Central American countries such as Costa Rica. Excise goods, including tobacco and alcoholic beverages, are also smuggled into Nicaragua for domestic consumption, causing notable damage to the country’s legitimate tobacco industry.
Nicaragua’s timber trafficking market thrives due to informal arrangements between community leaders, local governments, forestry agents and other groups. While domestic actors typically profit from the market, international demand from Chinese consumers drives its highly consolidated nature. State-embedded actors issue harvesting permits for more timber than exists, particularly in protected forest regions, resulting in deforestation mainly in indigenous land or the country’s northern or southern regions. In recent years, Nicaraguan criminal groups have increasingly participated in eco-trafficking crimes, leading to broader societal challenges such as heightened violence against indigenous communities. Despite the severity of these issues, Nicaraguan officials have failed to prioritize and allocate resources towards combatting land grabbing, deforestation and timber trafficking, and even low-level police and military officials often accept bribes to avoid intervention.
Wildlife trafficking is another prevalent issue in Nicaragua, with felines, parrots and turtles being the most threatened species. Criminal networks are heavily involved in the exotic pet trade, selling parrots to Honduran customers at lucrative prices. Although illegal to consume, turtles are still exploited for their meat, eggs and shells, and turtle egg theft is a persistent problem. The sale of protected species in public markets and roadsides underscores the prevalence of wildlife trafficking in the country, which is facilitated by corrupt police and army officials.
Illicit gold mining occurs along the Nicaraguan-Costa Rican border, posing a threat to protected ecosystems. There are also suspicions of illicit gold transport between Nicaragua and Venezuela, with Venezuelan-sourced gold being refined and exported from Nicaragua as Nicaraguan-sourced gold, potentially serving as a key source of revenue for corrupt officials. Moreover, Nicaragua’s North Caribbean Coast Autonomous Region is a hub for illicit mineral extraction, leading to violent land grabbing and attacks against environmental defenders.
There is no evidence of a notable heroin trade in Nicaragua. Due to widespread poverty and the drug’s relatively high price, domestic heroin consumption remains low. However, Nicaragua is an important transit country for cocaine trafficking between South and North America. Colombian, Peruvian and Bolivian-sourced cocaine is transported through Nicaragua, which serves as a key point for the arrival, storage and trans-shipment of drugs. Mexican drug cartels also have a strong presence in the country. Nicaraguan criminal networks collaborate with counterparts from Costa Rica and Honduras to transport cocaine, generating substantial revenue. Corruption within the state apparatus facilitates the cocaine trafficking market, with allegations pertaining to elite officials accepting bribes and negotiating with drug traffickers. Nicaraguan authorities do not communicate or cooperate with Costa Rican counterparts in the fight against drug trafficking, making it easier for drug trafficking operations between the two countries to occur.
Nicaragua has a consolidated cannabis market catering mainly to local demand. Due to its affordability, marijuana is the most-consumed drug among teenagers. Nicaraguan criminal networks facilitate the production, transportation and distribution of marijuana and use micro-commercialization strategies to sell small quantities of the drug in Nicaraguan cities. Locally produced marijuana, as well as from Costa Rica and Honduras, is primarily distributed and commercialized in cities such as Managua, Chinandega, Estelí, Rivas, Puerto Cabezas and Bluefields, where most consumers reside.
While the market for synthetic drugs lacks consolidation, it is driven by Nicaraguan drug mules who traffic legally purchased ketamine, primarily in liquid form, across the country’s porous southern border into the hands of Costa Rican drug traffickers. Although domestic ketamine consumption remains negligible, its legality in Nicaragua facilitates the drug’s illicit transport into neighbouring Costa Rica. Nicaragua-based criminal networks are also known to distribute meth, and various amphetamines among local drug markets, especially in Estelí.
Nicaragua is poorly equipped to deal with cyber threats. Nevertheless, the illicit market does not seem to be particularly developed in the country so far. Nevertheless, there have been cyber-attacks targeting governmental institutions, media outlets and individuals in Nicaragua, which include the hacking of social media accounts belonging to independent online outlets, distributed denial-of-service attacks targeting newspapers, hacking of SMS platform accounts, and cyber-attacks on the databases and websites of various public institutions.
According to Nicaraguan authorities, cyber-enabled financial crimes, such as electronic fraud and social media-based commerce fraud, are a problem in the country. Scammers are known to steal corporate client data and pose as corporate officials demanding false debt payments. They contact their victims via international phone calls, posing as banking employees and collecting their personal banking information. There is evidence of transnational involvement in these financial crimes. Nicaragua also suffers losses in annual tax revenues, amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars, due to corporate tax abuse.
The country has been adversely affected by high-level corruption and alleged links between state-embedded actors and organized criminal groups that operate with impunity. There are allegations that drug trafficking networks operate with the complicity of security forces, and other criminals even steal illicit drug shipments with the aid of corrupt state officials. The accusations have fueled long-standing suspicions of elite links to drug cartels, with high-profile arrests of parliamentarians and drug traffickers who have been seen with government officials. Collaboration with foreign criminal networks is also common, with reports of territorial expansion of Mexican cartels into Nicaragua. Mid- and low-level officials have been implicated in timber and wildlife trafficking, and prominent business and institutional representatives have also been known to work with criminal actors. Pro-government paramilitary groups have been accused of collaborating with state security forces to intimidate and commit violence against perceived enemies of the regime.
Foreign criminal entities, including several Colombian, Venezuelan and Costa Rican criminal organizations, operate across Nicaragua, relying on local criminal actors to provide key services such as transport and contacts to facilitate organized criminal markets. These foreign criminal entities reportedly exert near-total control over the country’s cocaine trafficking market. Although Nicaragua has a limited presence of mafia-style groups, the strongest provide specialized services to transnational criminal entities involved in drug trafficking, timber trafficking, wildlife trafficking or other forms of organized crime.
Smaller criminal networks in Nicaragua also work with foreign counterparts in various illicit activities such as human trafficking, drug trafficking, timber trafficking, wildlife trafficking and micro-commercialization. Some networks specialize in specific aspects of Nicaragua’s drug trafficking market, such as the transport of drugs across Central America, while others steal drug shipments with the help of corrupt state officials.
The largest private companies in the country are managed and/or owned by political elites, which raises concerns over the existence of a business network known to use state funds through contracts with public institutions. The advantages obtained in exchange for these concessions showcase rampant corruption in the private sector. Some of these companies are also found to be involved in money laundering schemes.
Nicaragua is currently in a state of political and economic crisis, with only a small percentage of the population expressing support for the regime. The ruling political party has been accused of having links to the transnational drug trade, and state-driven anti-organized crime initiatives are regarded as being only symbolic. Human rights violations have been increasing, with political prisoners remaining unfairly imprisoned and opposition candidates facing arbitrary arrests. The Nicaraguan government’s credibility has also been tarnished by money laundering, embezzlement and the exploitation of cybercrime legislation to accuse political opposition leaders of financial-related crimes. High-level corruption linked to political elite has been alleged to permeate the entire Nicaraguan state apparatus, leading to concerns about political attacks on individuals and larger regulatory entities. The executive’s overtaking of state powers has led to the dismantling of institutions and represents a significant setback in transparency and accountability.
Nicaragua is a party to international treaties and conventions related to organized crime and has extradition agreements with several countries. However, the government has faced criticism for granting Nicaraguan nationality to foreign individuals who are facing charges of corruption and other crimes in the courts of their countries to evade legal extradition requirements. Nicaragua has collaborated with various international entities to combat organized crime, but it has been widely condemned on the international stage. The US and EU have imposed sanctions on high-level Nicaraguan officials. Nicaragua has a relatively strong legislative framework against most forms of organized crime but lacks adequate legislation against environmental crimes such as illicit gold mining, timber trafficking and wildlife trafficking. Moreover, the country does not have effective regulations or infrastructure in place to combat cybercrimes. High-level corruption and violence linked to the regime have rendered anti-organized crime legislation largely symbolic. Nicaragua’s adoption of life imprisonment as a penalty for hate crimes has been widely regarded as an attempt to silence the regime’s political opposition, along with the adoption of legislation limiting local human rights and political organizations.
Nicaragua’s judicial system is weak, heavily influenced by politics and corrupt. Most judges are affiliated with the ruling party and are known to accept bribes from drug traffickers in exchange for judicial favours. The government’s increasing weaponization of the judicial system against political opponents has resulted in the revocation of the legality of political opposition parties and unfair imprisonment of their members, leading to a widespread criticism of the presidential re-election in 2021. The willingness of Nicaraguan judiciary officials to undermine democracy and commit severe human rights violations has led to foreign governments imposing sanctions on them. More than half of the total prison population in Nicaragua is imprisoned for drug-related offenses, and the prison system is severely overcrowded, with extremely poor living conditions. Criminal groups often bribe corrupt prison officials and operate from within the prison system.
Nicaragua’s law enforcement agencies are widely considered tools of political repression, often collaborating with pro-government paramilitary groups to target human rights defenders, independent journalists and dissident activists. The Nicaraguan military, which was previously praised for its effectiveness in drug seizures and community programmes, has been accused of corruption, arbitrary arrest, torture and collaboration with paramilitary groups. The police force’s annual budget has increased, leading some to view it as a reward for loyalty to the ruling elite.
Nicaragua’s Pacific and Caribbean borders, with difficult terrain and blind spots, provide significant topographical advantages for the execution of transnational organized crime. Drug traffickers, often with the aid of corrupt state officials, take extensive advantage of remote Nicaraguan coastlines and islands to transport drugs through the country. Regional cocaine trafficking and money laundering operations frequently pass through Nicaraguan territory. High-level corruption not only facilitates cross-border organized crime, but also makes it difficult to measure the extent of Nicaragua’s organized criminal markets. Following years of cyber-attacks against state institutions, Nicaraguan and Russian authorities agreed to collaborate on the development of virtual infrastructures to protect national security.
Nicaragua is considered to be one of the world’s highest-risk countries for money laundering and terrorist financing. Despite some improvements, the country’s anti-money laundering initiatives are reportedly targeted against the political opposition of the ruling party. The Financial Analysis Unit (UAF) has been criticized for its vague language, which could be exploited to characterize public demonstrations as terrorism, and for allowing the Nicaraguan Army to monitor national banking institutions. Although the law outlines confiscation procedures following seizures of criminally sourced funds and assets, these procedures are rarely implemented. Consequently, Nicaragua has been grey-listed internationally due to its unreliability and high potential for money laundering.
Rampant corruption, favouritism and impunity among Nicaraguan officials, exacerbated by weak law enforcement capacity, constitute considerable deterrents to foreign investors. Moreover, Nicaragua has fallen into a deep state of political and economic crisis since the outbreak and brutal suppression of social security reform protests. This crisis, compounded in recent years by COVID-19 pandemic-linked increases in poverty and unemployment, has caused many foreign businesses to leave the country. Extortion, facilitation payments and kickbacks also plague Nicaragua's economic regulatory system. Tax and customs officials not only enforce national regulations arbitrarily, but also engage in bribery and corruption, creating a challenging business environment for foreign companies. More recently, the regime’s heightened isolation on the international stage has exacerbated the above-mentioned issues and triggered a significant increase in criminal financing accessibility.
Although Nicaragua’s policies outline procedures for victim identification and assistance, authorities rarely implement them. The government has not established shelters or allocated funding for specialized victim services, with minimal support efforts in place. Despite enabling the provision of humanitarian visas to foreign human trafficking victims, the government has not identified any foreign victims since 2018.
Nicaragua’s anti-organized crime legislative framework includes preventative measures, such as public awareness and education programmes, but they are not well-implemented. Public outreach strategies, such as targeted brochures and radio segments, have limited efficacy, and there is a lack of reliable data on drug consumption, making analysis of drug prevention programmes difficult. Drug prevention and treatment services are reportedly rarely utilized, possibly due to a lack of awareness or limited operational capacity.
The regime in Nicaragua has been criticized for its restrictions on press freedom and its repressive approach towards independent media outlets, with journalists and media employees facing physical and judicial harassment, arbitrary detention and false allegations of libel and defamation. Many media broadcasters in the country are owned or controlled by political allies of the regime. Civil society organizations also report being subjected to harassment, violence and legislative action aimed at limiting their activities. NGOs and independent media outlets documenting and reporting human rights violations in Nicaragua have been stripped of their legality, with over a thousand organizations believed to have been shut down or sent into exile. The disappearance of humanitarian, development and pro-democracy groups has had a severe impact on local populations, with indigenous communities facing high vulnerability to land theft and settler violence. Nicaragua was identified as the country with the highest per-capita rate of land and environmental defender assassinations worldwide in 2022.
Criminal markets
6.930.43
An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.
Human trafficking
6.001.00
Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.
Human smuggling
5.501.50
Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.
Extortion and protection racketeering
7.00 n/a
Crimes linked to exerting control over a territory/market including as a mediator and/or requesting a benefit in exchange for protection.
Arms trafficking
8.500.50
The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.
Trade in counterfeit goods
7.00 n/a
The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands.
Illicit trade in excisable goods
5.00 n/a
The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits.
Flora crimes
8.500.00
The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.
Fauna crimes
8.500.00
The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.
Non-renewable resource crimes
8.500.50
The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.
Heroin trade
2.500.50
The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.
Cocaine trade
9.000.00
The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cannabis trade
8.500.50
The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.
Synthetic drug trade
4.500.50
The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cyber-dependent crimes
8.00 n/a
Organized crimes that rely solely on using information communications technology with the aim of obtaining a monetary/material benefit.
Financial crimes
7.00 n/a
Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance.
Criminal actors
6.600.10
An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.
Mafia-style groups
8.000.50
Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.
Criminal networks
7.000.50
Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.
State-embedded actors
8.500.00
Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.
Foreign actors
3.500.00
State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.
Private sector actors
6.00 n/a
Profit-seeking individuals/entities who own/control a part of the legal economy free from the state, that collaborate with criminal actors.
Political leadership and governance
3.000.00
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
4.500.00
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
7.500.00
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
4.500.00
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
3.000.00
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
4.50-0.50
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
5.500.00
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
6.000.00
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
5.50-0.50
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
5.000.00
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
4.000.00
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
6.00-0.50
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Brazil is a country that is both a source of and destination for human trafficking, with victims from Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa and China being identified. The COVID-19 pandemic has made people, especially children, more vulnerable to human trafficking, and criminals are exploiting social networks, marketplaces and other platforms to reach more victims. The main actors involved in human trafficking are relatives or friends of victims who are paid by big entrepreneurs to recruit people. In some cases, female, poor or foreign victims could become recruiters themselves. Officials and the population in general often overlook and even normalize this crime.
Furthermore, Brazil has become a hub for human smuggling, with people travelling to and from the country for various reasons. In recent years, a record number of Brazilians have been detained for illegally crossing the southern border into the US, due to the economic crisis and expectations of lenient migration policies. Some Brazilian cities, such as Governador Valadares in Minas Gerais, have become hubs for illegal immigration, with smuggling ‘packages’ being sold. Brokers help people from Africa and Asia to travel to Brazil, sometimes through corruption, by providing visas. Once in Brazil, they can be transported to various locations across the Americas, including Argentina, Chile, the US and Canada. The federal police has investigated cases of transnational collaboration in smuggling, which may involve potential ties to terrorism.
Extortion in Brazil is difficult to quantify as there are no nationwide estimates, but mafia-style organizations frequently engage in extortion during their activities. Extortion has become more widespread in recent years due to the expansion of militias, which charge local businesses and the population protection fees for the use of various services.
The illegal trafficking of arms in Brazil is a significant problem as the country is a major producer and exporter of small weapons. Firearms are smuggled back into the country from Paraguay, the US, Bolivia and Uruguay. Young criminals have easy access to illegal firearms, and local and transnational networks manage most of the trafficking. This illegal market fuels conflicts between criminal groups and security forces, making Brazil one of the countries with the highest homicide rates in the region. Corruption and inefficiency in the arms control sector of the federal police also contribute to the problem, as a substantial percentage of seized weapons were legally acquired. Despite this, the government has in recent years facilitated the purchase and ownership of guns with the implementation of at least eight decrees.
Counterfeit goods are a growing problem for intellectual property rights holders, particularly for products like clothing, perfumes, medicine, luxury cars, electronic devices, computers and mobile phones. The majority of counterfeit products are produced in China and sent to other Latin American countries before being exported to Brazil in order to mislead Brazilian authorities about their origin. Counterfeit goods are a source of income and a means of survival for many impoverished Brazilians, and the market is dominated by violent criminal organizations that use profits to finance other illegal activities, mainly drug trafficking.
The illicit trade in excise goods, such as tobacco products and alcoholic beverages is also an expanding criminal market in the country. Cigarette smuggling to Brazil is driven by the large tax difference between Brazil and Paraguay, as Paraguay has one of the world’s lowest taxes for these products. Nevertheless, the government has determined that reducing taxes on tobacco is not the solution to reducing illicit trade. Instead, it plans to increase control and has implemented track-and-trace systems for these products.
Illegal logging and deforestation have become serious issues in the Amazon rainforest in Brazil, with record levels of deforestation reported each year. Studies show that nearly all timber leaving the Amazon is illegally or irregularly sourced, and organized-crime groups involved in illegal mining, land grabbing and farming with environmental liabilities are often the driving force behind these activities. The government’s public support for loggers and agribusiness farmers, as well as the dismantling of essential federal agencies, have contributed to the highest levels of deforestation in years. Criminal gangs use environmental crimes as an opportunity to accumulate capital, and their involvement often results in violence against indigenous communities, activists and authorities. Additionally, legal companies, aided by corruption and limited monitoring capacity, also contribute to irregular practices, making it difficult to distinguish between legal and illegal trade in the Amazon.
Wildlife trafficking is another major problem in Brazil, which remains one of the top countries for illegally traded wildlife due to weak legislation and insufficient public response. Brazil’s environmental crime legislation considers the trafficking of animals a minor offence, resulting in lax penalties. Wildlife traffickers operate both domestic and international markets, with domestic trade run by low-income individuals who capture animals and sell them for extra income at highways, fairs and bus stops. International trade is characterized by a more organized market, with networks using corruption and bribery to forge documents and bypass inspections.
Illegal mining, particularly in the state of Pará, has also become a growing concern in Brazil. Criminal organizations invade protected territories, causing social tensions and human-rights abuses. Despite the government’s support programme for the development of artisanal and small-scale mining, unregulated mining is larger than industrial mining in the country. Criminal groups and powerful economic entities dominate the national mining landscape, leading to violence, sexual exploitation, hunger and environmental destruction and contamination. Indigenous people are especially vulnerable to attacks from miners. Although Brazil is not among the world’s largest global markets for illegal mining products, there are hundreds of illegal mining areas in the Brazilian Amazon.
Although the heroin market in Brazil is limited due to irregular shipments from Asia and poorly developed routes, the non-medical use of prescribed opioids has increased. There is a concern that without stricter controls, Brazil could see an increase in the consumption of illegal opioids like heroin, as is the case in other countries.
In contrast, Brazil’s cocaine market is worth billions of dollars, making it one of the top ten markets in the world. Criminal organizations, including local elites, control the main wholesale cocaine entry routes into Brazil, leading to violent conflicts over distribution in urban centres. The retail sale of cocaine is an important source of income for the poor population on the outskirts of large cities, and it has contributed to their involvement in crime. Although the pandemic impacted cocaine trafficking in Brazil, traffickers adapted by diversifying their national routes and international destinations.
Brazil also has a large cannabis market. While possession of small amounts of cannabis for personal use is depenalized, selling remains illegal, leading to an increase in contact with the criminal justice system and prisons. Domestic organized-crime groups control local cultivation, but Paraguay is the main supplier for the country. Colombian marijuana, known as creepy, is becoming more popular due to its stronger effects. Trafficking routes for Colombian marijuana often involve passing through Venezuela before entering Brazil through the border with Roraima, or through Peru and Bolivia and entering Brazilian territory through the states of Acre, Mato Grosso and Mato Grosso do Sul. Gangs associated with various criminal factions distribute the drug nationally.
The synthetic drug trade in Brazil is relatively small and limited to the upper class, with domestic networks involved in the production of ecstasy and methamphetamine in small makeshift factories. However, there has been an increase in the international trafficking of these drugs from neighbouring countries, as well as distribution by mail from domestic production centres in the south and centre-west of the country. Brazil has also experienced an increase in the use and seizures of ketamine.
Brazil boasts well-developed technological infrastructure. However, the pandemic has led to a surge in cybercrime, which has more than doubled. Malware attacks are common, and Brazil is considered among the top countries in the world for cyber-attacks. The primary targets of these attacks are political groups, journalists, government institutions and businesses. The manufacturing sector is especially vulnerable to ransomware attacks. Major attacks have been perpetrated by the Brazilian malware Bizarro, which targeted 70 different banks from South America. Additionally, infostealers have been utilized to transfer user information to hackers.
Financial crimes are prevalent in Brazil, with tax fraud being the most common. This type of fraud often involves the sale of products without invoices, the use of duplicate or cancelled invoices, and fictitious interstate sales. In addition, bank-client fraud saw a significant rise in 2021. Many criminal networks specialize in tax evasion and loan-sharking. Embezzlement of public funds is also a common occurrence in some states where government officials make deals with illegal miners. There have been cases where military officers have formed militias to assist these criminals. As a result, accomplices of these crimes often seem to live luxurious lives.
The Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) is Brazil’s largest criminal organization, with tens of thousands of members involved in drug trafficking domestically and internationally, primarily through cargo ships. The Comando Vermelho (CV) is the second largest group and competes with the PCC for control of drug trafficking in certain areas. Both groups are involved in various other illegal activities, including illegal mining, arms trafficking, bank robberies, kidnappings and money laundering. Other criminal groups that operate like mafias, including white-collar-crime groups and independent militias composed of current and former police officers, are also found in urban areas in Brazil. These paramilitary groups are known for extorting neighbourhoods, perpetrating extrajudicial killings and controlling various industries, including the gas supply and public transportation.
Criminal networks in Brazil typically ally with either the PCC or the CV and have expanded in recent years, with notable access to weapons contributing to high levels of violence across the country. Violence has particularly increased in the northern and north-eastern states, while in the south networks allied with the main mafia groups are profiting from a newly instituted route for cocaine trafficking.
Furthermore, the PCC and CV have connections with transnational mafias in Bolivia, Paraguay, Peru and Colombia to ensure the shipment and transportation of drugs to Europe. The Italian mafia also operates in Brazil, along with other Latin American countries, to transport cocaine. The tri-border area and the Amazon region are hotspots for criminal activities involving both domestic and foreign networks.
In relation to state-embedded actors, militias and paramilitary groups composed of former and current law enforcement officials are of particular concern, as they have the ability to infiltrate the three powers of the state and have been linked to politically motivated murders. They control certain territories in Rio de Janeiro and engage in criminal activities, such as the collection of security and housing fees and the installation of clandestine cable TV and internet centres. In recent years, the link between militias and politics has become increasingly evident, with politicians using ties with such groups to assert their interests and silence opponents. Paramilitary violence, especially in Rio, remains a major problem.
Tax fraud and money laundering are prevalent in Brazil, with tax evasion and operational fraud being common practices among business owners. Illegal mining is another substantial issue, often facilitated by legal brokers and enterprises, with miners collaborating with local governments to receive weapons and abuse indigenous peoples fighting for their land. Loggers are also accused of involvement in illegal timber-trafficking activities, with evidence suggesting a link between drug trafficking and groups connected to environmental crimes. Additionally, private-sector actors are frequently used as facilitators by foreign actors, particularly in drug trafficking and money laundering, with cryptocurrency scams frequently masquerading as opportunities offered by prestigious private enterprises.
Brazilian politics have a long-standing history of corruption, where leadership is based on patronage systems and deals in congress. Governance and law enforcement are lacking in low-income areas where organized crime thrives, and public-security policies vary widely between states. Punitive strategies, which are the main focus of initiatives, have only increased violence in the country. The justice system is notorious for wrongfully arresting the poor and marginalized population while dangerous criminals often go free, which fuels organized crime that originates in prisons. Organized crime has been a persistent issue in all political campaigns and governments, with various solutions proposed. Furthermore, criminal organizations are involved in democratic processes at regional and local levels, with militias attacking candidates and threatening civilians in certain areas. Brazil has been struggling with corruption and poor transparency in recent years. Despite the existence of independent investigation and prosecution bodies, the government is heavily influenced by private and criminal interests. Although Brazil has a strong legal framework for access to information, corruption remains a significant problem in Brazilian politics, and transparency mechanisms have not been effective in deterring it or organized crime.
Brazil has been actively participating in international cooperation efforts to tackle organized crime, including signing and ratifying treaties and conventions on drugs, arms and human trafficking, and having extradition treaties with many countries. It is also a member of MERCOSUR (Common Market of the South) trade bloc and has several cooperation agreements with international agencies and governments to exchange experiences on public-security policies and strategies to fight crime. Brazil has a robust legal framework to fight crime, but the government lacks the efficiency and capacity to enforce the law due to corruption and patronage. The penal code and other laws classify a wide range of crimes, but the police mostly react when violence rises or tackle small-scale operators, rather than acting preventively.
The Brazilian criminal justice system is widely criticized for being inefficient, corrupt and biased against black people and the poor, owing to class and racial prejudices among legal practitioners. The executive has been attempting to interfere with the autonomy of the judiciary, leading to political polarization and challenges to executive decisions by the Supreme Court. While institutions such as the attorney general’s office and the federal police are effective in investigating crime, impunity remains a common issue. Prisons suffer from structural problems such as overcrowding and poor conditions, which have contributed to the development of criminal networks.
Law enforcement in Brazil has a militarized approach to public security, and has resulted in police violence and low levels of public trust. The expansion and militarization of police strategies have led to increased violence and incarceration, making Brazil one of the most violent countries in the world, with a substantial prison population. State police forces have been accused of extrajudicial executions against young and black men in marginalized areas, and police corruption is rampant. However, the federal police remains the best-equipped police force in the country, and the National Force reinforces the work of the armed forces and the civil police in some states of the country. Some police forces, such as the Federal Highway Police, are suspected of having supported the electoral tension that swept through the country during the presidential election of 2022. While the country frequently employs the armed forces in operations against organized crime, the lack of coordination between the different security forces remains a challenge.
Brazil’s vast and complex borders are vulnerable to transnational organized crime. The Tri-Border Area, where Brazil borders Argentina and Paraguay, is a major hub for drug trafficking, arms trafficking and other crimes. Additionally, illegal-mining and drug-trafficking routes are prevalent in the northern and north-eastern border regions with Venezuela. Within the country, criminal organizations and militias have a significant influence on inner-city areas and the political process, presenting further challenges for law enforcement.
Brazil has effective measures in place to prosecute money laundering, and is an active member of both the Financial Action Task Force of Latin America and the Financial Action Task Force. However, concerns have been raised in the past about a lack of accountability in addressing some key deficiencies. Currently, the country is considered to have moderate risks of money laundering and terrorism financing.
The regulatory environment in Brazil is considered to be unfriendly to businesses. The country’s tax environment is one of the primary factors contributing to economic complexity, with various taxes imposed at each level of government, making it difficult for multinationals seeking to operate in the country. Although the government has taken steps to simplify the bureaucracy and reform systems such as pensions, the structure remains challenging to navigate.
Brazil has a victim and witness protection programme that offers support, health care and psychological assistance to hundreds of people annually. However, the programme has been criticized for not providing adequate guidance and support regarding anonymity. Furthermore, modern slavery, human trafficking and smuggling continue to be notable issues in the poorest areas, with police tactics in cities being heavy-handed, resulting in organized-crime victims being treated as criminals or extrajudicially killed by the police. Investigations into police killings are rare, and relatives of victims and witnesses often report a lack of support.
The Brazilian government has several campaigns aimed at preventing drug use, human trafficking and fauna trafficking. Non-state institutions are also involved in implementing prevention strategies. One of the primary programmes for the prevention of drug use by young people is conducted in schools by the military police of all Brazilian states. However, it has been criticized for not having an assessment of its effectiveness and not involving drug issue specialists. The country also carries out highly visible actions throughout the country to warn against trafficking in people, and non-state actors work with members of congress and the senate to raise awareness and support legislative changes to improve the fight against such crimes. Nonetheless, complex mechanisms for the prevention of organized crime remain challenging to implement, and socio-economic development policies aimed at low-income urban areas are rare. Another challenge for preventive strategies is that crime bosses are able to operate and maintain their influence from within prisons or wealthy gated communities. Despite attempts at apprehension, they still retain power and continue to coordinate criminal activities.
Under the previous government, the state increased its attacks on journalists and NGOs, resulting in a deterioration of civil liberties. Violence against journalists more than doubled between 2019 and 2021. Although the media environment in Brazil remains vibrant and the media has consistently denounced corruption, coverage of organized crime is weak, with media organizations refusing to mention the names of crime groups. The situation is particularly perilous for environmental activists and indigenous leaders, who face harassment and threats due to the government’s policy towards the Amazon and indigenous lands. Civil-society organizations have proliferated in low-income urban areas, providing assistance to communities through legal advice and awareness campaigns, and education, health services and small business support. Nevertheless, the Brazilian state’s capacity and willingness to protect non-governmental actors have continued to deteriorate.
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The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to 10. The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel.
A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.
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