Criminal markets
5.330.10
An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.
Human trafficking
5.500.00
Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.
Human smuggling
5.500.50
Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.
Extortion and protection racketeering
2.00-0.50
Crimes linked to exerting control over a territory/market including as a mediator and/or requesting a benefit in exchange for protection.
Arms trafficking
6.000.00
The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.
Trade in counterfeit goods
5.000.00
The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands.
Illicit trade in excisable goods
4.000.00
The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits.
Flora crimes
4.000.00
The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.
Fauna crimes
5.000.50
The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.
Non-renewable resource crimes
4.500.00
The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.
Heroin trade
4.000.00
The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.
Cocaine trade
8.000.50
The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cannabis trade
5.500.00
The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.
Synthetic drug trade
8.000.00
The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cyber-dependent crimes
7.00-0.50
Organized crimes that rely solely on using information communications technology with the aim of obtaining a monetary/material benefit.
Financial crimes
6.001.00
Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance.
Criminal actors
5.000.30
An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.
Mafia-style groups
4.00-0.50
Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.
Criminal networks
6.500.50
Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.
State-embedded actors
3.000.00
Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.
Foreign actors
7.001.00
State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.
Private sector actors
4.500.50
Profit-seeking individuals/entities who own/control a part of the legal economy free from the state, that collaborate with criminal actors.
Political leadership and governance
7.500.00
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
8.000.00
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
9.000.50
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
7.500.00
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
7.00-0.50
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
7.00-0.50
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
6.000.00
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
6.500.00
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
6.500.00
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
8.000.00
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
8.000.00
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
8.000.00
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
The Netherlands is mainly a destination country for human trafficking, though its role as a source country has grown in recent years. Victims are often subjected to sexual exploitation, forced labour, or other forms of trafficking. A significant number of identified victims experienced exploitation in legal sectors, including hospitality, inland shipping and agriculture. The country’s legal sex work industry creates opportunities for traffickers to operate within regulated spaces, further complicating law enforcement efforts. Vulnerable groups, including asylum seekers, unaccompanied minors and refugees – especially those fleeing the war in Ukraine – face increased risks of labour and sexual exploitation. Nigerian and Ugandan nationals represent a growing share of victims, while ethnic Albanian and Chinese criminal organizations are significant perpetrators of trafficking operations.
Human smuggling networks continue to exploit the high influx of asylum seekers into the Netherlands, facilitating the irregular entry of migrants, particularly through maritime routes and key transit points such as Ter Apel and Hoek van Holland. Smugglers operate near major refugee reception centres, helping new arrivals to reach other destinations within the European Union. The Netherlands also serves as a transit hub for migrants smuggled to the United Kingdom, with organized groups using Dutch ports to move them across the English Channel. Maritime smuggling operations have grown increasingly sophisticated, involving the illicit storage and transport of boats, life jackets and forged documents.
Extortion and protection racketeering are not well-documented within the Netherlands, though there have been isolated incidents involving organized crime groups. Reports of systematic racketeering remain limited, and it is unclear whether such activities constitute a consolidated criminal market.
The Netherlands is both a destination and transit country for arms trafficking, with illegal firearms entering through Belgium, Germany, Italy and the Czech Republic. Smuggling methods include concealed compartments in vehicles and the use of the darknet for purchasing firearms from the US. Criminal groups, particularly of Antillean, former Yugoslavian and outlaw motorcycle gang affiliations, are involved in firearms trafficking, with some members also acting as end-users. Deactivated firearms, prevalent in Slovakia due to a lack of standardized EU regulations for deactivation, can be easily re-activated by criminal elements in the Netherlands. Also, legally purchased non-lethal pistols from abroad, notably originating from Türkiye, are then converted into live-firing firearms in the Netherlands for use in illegal activities.
The trade in counterfeit goods is prevalent in the Netherlands, particularly in luxury items, designer clothing and counterfeited cigarettes. In particular, the Netherlands is used as a transit hub for counterfeit cigarettes destined for the UK and Ireland. Police operations have uncovered large-scale storage facilities for counterfeit goods, with criminal networks potentially using the illicit trade to launder money. The counterfeit market is closely linked to broader criminal activities, including drug and arms trafficking. The illicit trade in excise goods, particularly cigarettes, remains a significant issue. Recent seizures in neighbouring countries reveal millions of euros worth of illicit tobacco found to have transited through Dutch ports.
The Netherlands serves as a transit and destination hub for flora crimes, particularly the trafficking of endangered plant species. Schiphol Airport and the Port of Rotterdam play key roles in facilitating the movement of illicit flora, including orchids and cacti from Indonesia, Madagascar and Panama. Also, the country’s role in importing wood-based products from China, Romania and Ukraine has raised concerns about illegal logging in source countries.
Fauna crimes are a growing problem, with the Netherlands ranking among the top European countries for wildlife seizures. The country is a significant entry point for illegal wildlife products, including reptiles and birds. Reports indicate an active underground market in exotic pets, with poison frogs from Brazil being trafficked through specialized pet stores and online platforms. The Netherlands also plays a role in the illicit trafficking of wildlife products through its shipping infrastructure, with seizures occurring at major ports and mail centres.
Illicit trade in non-renewable resources, particularly gold, poses a risk to the Netherlands. The country is implicated in the transnational trade of illegal gold, with criminal networks laundering money through gold transactions. Dutch overseas territories, including Aruba and Curaçao, act as key transit zones for Venezuelan gold, which is then refined and traded in mainland Netherlands. Fuel smuggling has also been reported, with Dutch gangs involved in tax fraud schemes related to fuel blending and resale.
The Netherlands remains a hub for the heroin trade, serving as a distribution point for heroin trafficked through the Balkan Peninsula. Turkish and Kurdish criminal groups dominate the heroin trade, with Dutch networks involved in storage and distribution across Europe. Nevertheless, recent seizures involving individuals linked to the ‘Mocro Mafia’ suggest their involvement as well. Seizures at the Port of Rotterdam have revealed the country’s role as a key entry point for heroin shipments destined for the EU and the UK. While heroin use in the Netherlands remains stable, the market continues to contribute to gang-related violence in cities such as Amsterdam and Rotterdam.
The Netherlands, with its substantial maritime infrastructure, serves as a major transit hub for cocaine, notably facilitating the trafficking of cocaine from South and Central America. The Port of Rotterdam remains a focal point for cocaine smuggling. Criminal groups operating in the Netherlands collaborate with counterparts in Morocco to facilitate the movement of cocaine into Europe. The Netherlands also serves as a distribution hub for cocaine trafficked through Belgian ports, and vice versa.
The cannabis market in the Netherlands continues to be shaped by its regulatory framework, which permits sales in ‘coffee shops’ while leaving production and supply in the hands of criminal networks. The ‘backdoor problem’– retail sales are legal, but supply remains illicit –has been a key driver of this illicit market. Domestically produced cannabis is not only distributed within the Netherlands but also trafficked to neighbouring European countries, while imports from Morocco supplement the domestic supply.
The synthetic drug trade is expanding, with the Netherlands serving as the major production hub for MDMA and amphetamines in Western Europe. Synthetic drug laboratories have increased in number, with Dutch criminal groups exploiting established trafficking routes to export products worldwide. China remains a key supplier of precursor chemicals, while Dutch-produced synthetic drugs are trafficked to several other regions – from Australia and New Zealand to West and Central Africa and, in recent years, to South America, Central America and the Caribbean. The proliferation of clandestine drug labs poses enforcement problems, even though authorities are dismantling record numbers of methamphetamine production sites.
Cybercrime remains a significant threat, with ransomware attacks affecting businesses and individuals. Following the conflict in Ukraine, there has been a revival in hacktivist organizations, exemplified by the Russian DDoS attacks on Dutch companies. Cryptocurrency-related fraud is also widespread, with illicit transactions detected across multiple platforms. Dutch authorities continue to enhance cybersecurity measures, though enforcement shortfalls persist due to the ever-evolving nature of cybercrime.
The Netherlands is considered one of the top global facilitators of corporate tax avoidance. Mafia networks have exploited Dutch financial structures for large-scale VAT fraud, with investigations revealing multimillion-euro schemes. Online scams, authorized push payment fraud and investment fraud have surged, with substantial fraud losses for public revenue. The Dutch Caribbean territories have seen a sharp rise in unusual financial transactions, highlighting the growing link between financial crime and organized criminal networks. Payment fraud, particularly authorized push payment scams, has also increased, with financial institutions struggling to mitigate risks associated with digital fraud.
Outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMGs) represent the closest equivalent to mafia-style groups in the Netherlands. Although media and political attention on OMGs has declined in recent years, their presence remains notable. Several prominent groups operate in the country, including Caloh Wagoh, Bandidos, Satudarah, Hells Angels and No Surrender, with the largest being Satudarah. These organizations maintain structured hierarchies, identifiable symbols and clear membership regulations. OMGs are associated with a range of criminal activities, including drug trafficking, gang violence and isolated incidents of extortion. Hardliners MC, for instance, has been linked to cases of drug-related debt enforcement, involving home visits, threats and violent reprisals against individuals failing to meet financial obligations. Despite indications of continued criminal involvement, official reporting on OMGs has been limited in recent years, raising questions about whether the perceived threat remains significant or whether this reduced visibility reflects a shift in the focus of law enforcement.
Organized crime in the Netherlands is dominated by loosely structured criminal networks rather than rigid hierarchical groups. These networks are active in street-level drug sales, prostitution and arms trafficking, often engaging in medium-level intergroup violence. The ‘Mocro Mafia’, a prominent criminal network originating in the Dutch-Moroccan community in the Netherlands, is a key player in the cocaine trade and has gained notoriety for its violent operations, including assassinations of high-profile figures such as journalists and defence lawyers. Criminal networks in the Netherlands also play a central role in the production and distribution of synthetic drugs, with Dutch groups collaborating with Turkish and Kurdish actors for heroin trafficking.
There is limited evidence of state-embedded actors facilitating criminal markets in the Netherlands. The main concerns are information leaks and police infiltration, particularly at lower levels of law enforcement and logistics hubs.
Foreign criminal organizations have a substantial presence in the Netherlands, contributing to the country’s role as a key hub for transnational organized crime. Italian groups such as the ‘Ndrangheta and, to a lesser extent, the Camorra operate in the Netherlands, particularly in financial crimes and drug trafficking. Albanian-speaking criminal groups have a strong foothold in the cocaine trade and are also involved in cannabis and synthetic drug production. Turkish and Kurdish groups dominate the heroin market, working closely with Dutch criminal networks for importation and distribution. Eastern and Central European groups, including Bulgarian, Romanian, Polish and Lithuanian criminal networks, known for ‘mobile banditry’, engage in organized robberies, vehicle theft and transnational criminal activities. The Netherlands is also home to organized groups from Suriname, Indonesia and the Dutch-Caribbean territories, with Aruba and Curaçao serving as important nodes in transnational illicit financial transactions. Also, triads such as the Snakehead Gang and German-Turkish OMGs like the Black Jackets maintain a presence in the country, further diversifying the range of foreign criminal actors.
The private sector in the Netherlands plays a noticeable role in facilitating organized crime, particularly in financial crimes and money laundering. Underground banking networks and corporate structures provide avenues for illicit financial flows, with concerns growing over the ease with which drug money is laundered through Dutch businesses. A large proportion of companies in the Netherlands are found to have either had staff convicted of crimes or had owners with criminal records, suggesting the likelihood of repeat offences. In Amsterdam in particular, retailers such as souvenir shops are used as fronts for money laundering.
The Netherlands remains a stable and well-governed country, with political leaders showing awareness of the risks posed by organized crime. Fears over the country’s vulnerability to becoming a so-called ‘narco-state’ have prompted politicians to seek expertise from international counterparts, particularly in Italy, to strengthen responses to organized crime. Organized crime prevention remains a priority within the national judicial policing strategy, with significant police resources allocated to tackling cross-border drug trafficking, human smuggling, arms trafficking, fraud and money laundering. While there is overall political consensus on tackling organized crime, skepticism prevails about the effectiveness of current measures. Government transparency and accountability mechanisms are robust, though areas of concern exist. The Netherlands ranked among the world’s least corrupt countries, but has faced criticism for weak enforcement in addressing corporate bribery abroad. Influence peddling is not classified as corruption under Dutch law, and this prevents many potential prosecutions. Also, oversight of lobbying activities is limited, as the country allows politicians to transition into lobbying roles with few restrictions. Reforms aimed at increasing transparency have been implemented, including the Open Government Act, which requires the proactive publication of government documents. However, delayed responses to information requests are common, and some government bodies have resisted full compliance with transparency rulings.
The Netherlands actively participates in international efforts against organized crime, hosting both Europol and Eurojust, and has extensive cooperation with law enforcement agencies worldwide. The country has ratified key international treaties, including the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Arms Trade Treaty. The Netherlands also has several bilateral extradition treaties signed with international counterparts, including but not limited to Morocco and the United Arab Emirates, to enhance cross-border cooperation against organized crime. Further collaborations with Latin America and Africa aim to strengthen security, trade and migration-related agreements. The country’s legal framework has undergone several amendments to address organized crime more effectively. The Dutch Opium Act provides the foundation for drug-related legislation, maintaining the country’s tolerance policy on cannabis while enforcing strict penalties for hard drugs. Experts have raised concerns that the country’s generally permissive cannabis policy may contribute to organized crime, prompting a controlled supply-chain experiment in ten municipalities, with positive early results in replacing the illegal market. The legal framework governing arms trafficking aligns with EU regulations, and the BIBOB Act remains a critical tool in preventing criminal infiltration of the legal economy. The effectiveness of regulations on illicit gold trade and wildlife crime remains unclear, but recent enforcement actions indicate a growing focus on environmental crimes.
The Dutch judiciary is generally well-resourced and independent, with dedicated units addressing transnational organized crime. The National Prosecution Office specializes in crimes such as drug trafficking, human trafficking, money laundering and cybercrime. While prison conditions in the Netherlands meet international standards, concerns have been raised over conditions in Dutch Caribbean territories, where reports of substandard facilities persist. Staffing shortages in the Netherlands’ prisons have also been noted, alongside increasing incidents of violence and intimidation. High-ranking members of criminal organizations have been reported to continue illegal activities from within prisons, prompting the addition of security measures in some facilities. Dutch law enforcement is highly organized, with specialized units focusing on counterterrorism, organized crime and intelligence gathering. But observers say the police force is underfunded relative to the scale of organized crime threats. In 2024, police representatives requested increased funding to address staff shortages and modernize digital crime-fighting capabilities. While Dutch law enforcement collaborates effectively with EU and international agencies, public trust in the police has declined, and there has been a notable increase in reports of excessive use of force. Criticism has also been directed at the tax authorities for failing to act on large volumes of financial crime reports.
The Netherlands’ geographic location and extensive transport infrastructure make it a key hub for illicit trade. Rotterdam, Europe’s largest port, remains a focal point for drug and arms smuggling, while Amsterdam’s Schiphol Airport is a major transit hub for organized criminal activity. As a Schengen member, the Netherlands faces challenges in controlling illicit flows across its borders. While enforcement efforts at ports and airports have increased, vulnerabilities persist, particularly in Aruba and other Dutch Caribbean territories, where cybercrime risks and financial crimes remain notable concerns.
Money laundering remains a significant challenge for the Netherlands, with the country serving as a major hub for illicit financial flows. While anti-money laundering regulations have been strengthened, the ease of establishing shell companies and the nature of the country’s corporate tax regime create opportunities for criminal exploitation. Hawala banking networks, particularly within South Asian communities, are an alternative financial system that has proved difficult to regulate. The Netherlands actively co-operates with the Financial Action Task Force and has made progress in seizing criminal assets. But concerns remain over regulatory loopholes related to virtual asset service providers and beneficial ownership transparency. The Dutch economy benefits from strong legal protections and a transparent business environment, but some vulnerabilities exist, allowing criminal groups to exploit legitimate businesses for money laundering. Regulatory measures aimed at preventing criminal infiltration are in place, but their enforcement is inconsistent across different industries.
The Netherlands places considerable emphasis on victim and witness support, with extensive resources dedicated to trafficking victims and individuals affected by organized crime. Witness protection programmes are considered effective, and civil society organizations play a key role in victim assistance. However, foreign victims without legal residency face difficulties in accessing support services, and restrictions on non-cooperating trafficking victims obstruct their access to long-term assistance. Moreover, the Netherlands is entering a new era of harm reduction, with renewed calls to shift from punitive drug policies toward health- and rights-based approaches that prioritize regulation, reinvestment in services, and stronger support to victims. In Dutch Caribbean territories, funding for anti-trafficking initiatives has been criticized as inadequate, raising concerns about the protection of vulnerable populations.
Crime prevention efforts in the Netherlands focus on strengthening security at key transport hubs, disrupting criminal financial networks, and providing social alternatives for at-risk youth. In 2024, the government introduced stricter sentencing for serious drug-related offences to deter organized crime involvement. At the same time, it began phasing out funding for Mainline, a key harm reduction organization, signaling a move away from a public health-centered drug policy. Corporate self-reporting mechanisms were also introduced, offering fine reductions for companies that disclose financial misconduct. Human trafficking prevention efforts have also been expanded, with more funding allocated to support services for trafficking victims.
Non-state actors play a critical role in combating organized crime in the Netherlands. NGOs actively contribute to research, policy advocacy and victim support. The Netherlands maintains strong protections for media freedom, although journalists face increasing threats, particularly those reporting on organized crime. Concerns have also been raised about government pressure on NGOs, particularly in relation to counterterrorism financing regulations, which have led to increased scrutiny of Islamic organizations. Despite these challenges, civil society organizations continue to operate freely, with limited government interference. Media outlets are instrumental in uncovering organized crime networks and holding authorities accountable, though risks to press freedom exist.
Criminal markets
5.530.36
An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.
Human trafficking
5.500.50
Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.
Human smuggling
6.500.50
Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.
Extortion and protection racketeering
3.000.50
Crimes linked to exerting control over a territory/market including as a mediator and/or requesting a benefit in exchange for protection.
Arms trafficking
6.500.50
The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.
Trade in counterfeit goods
6.001.00
The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands.
Illicit trade in excisable goods
5.001.00
The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits.
Flora crimes
3.500.50
The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.
Fauna crimes
4.000.50
The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.
Non-renewable resource crimes
4.000.00
The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.
Heroin trade
4.000.00
The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.
Cocaine trade
8.000.00
The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cannabis trade
6.500.00
The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.
Synthetic drug trade
7.500.00
The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cyber-dependent crimes
6.500.50
Organized crimes that rely solely on using information communications technology with the aim of obtaining a monetary/material benefit.
Financial crimes
6.500.00
Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance.
Criminal actors
4.100.40
An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.
Mafia-style groups
3.000.00
Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.
Criminal networks
5.500.50
Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.
State-embedded actors
2.500.50
Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.
Foreign actors
6.001.00
State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.
Private sector actors
3.500.00
Profit-seeking individuals/entities who own/control a part of the legal economy free from the state, that collaborate with criminal actors.
Political leadership and governance
7.500.50
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
6.50-0.50
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
8.500.50
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
7.500.00
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
6.500.50
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
6.50-0.50
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
6.000.00
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
7.000.00
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
7.000.00
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
8.000.50
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
7.500.50
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
7.500.00
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Belgium remains a central hub for human trafficking, with labour and sexual exploitation cases prevalent across several sectors. Economic exploitation has risen, particularly among vulnerable populations. Victims are trafficked from Asia, Eastern Europe and Africa, with Chinese and Vietnamese nationals notably exploited in nail salons. West African networks dominate Belgium’s illegal sex industry, while Thai organizations control Thai massage parlours. Belgian and Dutch children have also been subjected to sexual exploitation. Many victims are lured via social media, subjected to forced confinement, and experience physical and/or sexual violence. The country’s geographic proximity to France and the UK makes it a major conduit for Vietnamese trafficking networks. Debt bondage is common, particularly among Asian victims, and trafficking schemes frequently involve false self-employment or ‘mailbox’ companies.
Belgium is both a transit and destination country for human smuggling, particularly for migrants aiming to reach the UK. Smuggling networks include ethnic Albanians and actors from Asia and West Africa. The ‘impostor’ system, which involves smuggling migrants using authentic documents with similar photos, remains common. Criminal networks exploit legitimate businesses such as retail stores and transport companies to facilitate smuggling operations. Smugglers charge high fees, with some migrants paying extra for specialized ‘VIP’ smuggling services. Reports of physical and sexual violence against smuggled migrants continue, and debt repayment through forced labour is an emerging trend. Belgian law enforcement has prioritized the dismantling of smuggling networks, with national and international cooperation leading to significant arrests.
Extortion and protection racketeering are not widely reported in Belgium, though isolated cases have emerged. Cyber-enabled extortion schemes have been documented. Maritime workers, police and judiciary members have been implicated in criminal networks, sometimes having participated under coercion. Despite occasional reports, extortion is not considered a ‘stand-alone’ market but rather a supplementary tool used by organized crime groups to exert control.
Belgium is a significant player in arms trafficking as both a source and transit country. The port of Antwerp serves as a key entry point for illicit firearms, which are often smuggled alongside narcotics. The market has expanded in recent years, with Western Balkan and Italian criminal groups facilitating the trade. Firearms are commonly used in violent incidents linked to drug trafficking. Turkish non-lethal pistols, easily converted into lethal weapons, are widely available, and online sales of gun parts have increased. Despite regional efforts to curb arms trafficking, Belgium’s strategic location continues to make it a crucial hub for the illicit firearms trade.
The trade in counterfeit goods has grown substantially, with Belgium serving as a transit and distribution centre. Key counterfeit items include medicines, cosmetics, cigarettes and electronic parts. Foreign actors, mainly from China, Singapore, the UAE and Türkiye, dominate supply chains. The port of Antwerp is a major entry point for counterfeit products, while the city of Liège has become a hub for illicit e-commerce. Local production of counterfeit cigarettes has been uncovered, with factories linked to organized crime groups. Customs authorities remain overwhelmed by the influx of counterfeit shipments, and enforcement efforts have failed to match the scale of the problem.
Belgium has also seen an increase in illicit trade in excise goods, particularly tobacco products. The country is among the top EU nations for illicit tobacco consumption. Smuggling of these goods occurs daily, with the country serving as a gateway to both the local market and other European countries, and Chinese online sales platforms have compounded the issue. Despite sustained enforcement efforts, customs authorities remain understaffed, making it difficult to reduce the scale of illicit trade.
Belgium plays a transit role in flora crimes, acting as a major hub for timber trafficking. The port of Antwerp facilitates the import and export of illegal timber, particularly from Africa. Legal timber imports have increased, but illegal timber imports continue, often disguised as legitimate shipments. Organized crime groups and private-sector actors collaborate to launder illicit timber through legal supply chains.
Belgium also functions as an entry and transit point for wildlife trafficking, due to links to its former colonial territories. Illegal wildlife trade through Belgium includes exotic birds, reptiles and ivory. The port of Antwerp and Brussels Zaventem Airport serve as major entry points for illicit wildlife products, which are often destined for Asian markets. Local demand for exotic pets and bushmeat contributes to the market’s persistence. The online wildlife trade remains insufficiently regulated, and this limits the capacity of enforcement agencies to combat such trafficking.
The country is also a major hub for diamond and gold trafficking, particularly in Antwerp due to its historic role in the diamond trade. Illicit diamonds from conflict zones enter Belgium by obscuring their origins. The diamond industry’s economic significance complicates enforcement efforts, and there are concerns about its involvement in money laundering and its ties to cocaine trafficking. Efforts to regulate the trade remain politically sensitive, particularly in connection to Russian diamond imports. Non-renewable resource crimes in Belgium are also associated with economic crimes and tax evasion, as illustrated by a recent case in which authorities arrested individuals over a multimillion-euro biodiesel fraud. The suspects were part of a criminal network that misdeclared the origin and type of biodiesel to evade EU duties and gain environmental benefits.
Belgium is primarily a destination for heroin. Although heroin trafficking remains secondary to other drugs, including cocaine, recent trends show an increase in opioid imports from Iran. The port of Antwerp continues to be a key entry point, with mafia-style actors and criminal networks overseeing distribution. The drug is also transported via cargo and trucks through the Caucasus and the Balkan Peninsula, often hidden in legitimate shipments. Heroin consumption is lower than that of other illicit substances, and its related violence is less prevalent than cocaine-related violence. But local consumption has increased, and its use appears prevalent among young males in precarious communities.
Cocaine trafficking is the largest drug market in Belgium, with Antwerp serving as the main European entry point for South American shipments. Corruption among customs and law enforcement officials has facilitated the trade. Western Balkan groups and the ‘Mocro Mafia’ play a significant role in distribution, often collaborating with Italian and French networks. Cocaine-related violence has increased in recent years, particularly in Antwerp and Brussels, as groups compete for control. Despite frequent seizures, authorities have struggled to curb the flow of cocaine into the country.
Belgium is both a transit and destination country for cannabis. The market is dominated by the ‘Mocro Mafia’ and Western Balkan groups, with local cultivation on the rise. While cannabis remains the most widely used drug, its impact is less severe than that of cocaine. Social acceptance of cannabis use is high, and law enforcement prioritizes more destructive drug markets. Despite large seizures, authorities have not been able to disrupt trafficking networks significantly.
The country also plays a major role in the synthetic drug trade, with production centred along the Belgian-Dutch border zone. Criminal networks, including Dutch and Western Balkan groups, oversee production and export operations. Synthetic drugs, particularly amphetamines and Ecstasy, are frequently trafficked alongside other narcotics. Online sales and parcel-based distribution methods have expanded, making enforcement more challenging.
Cybercrime is a serious concern in Belgium, with transnational criminal networks increasingly targeting local businesses. Ransomware attacks are widespread and small businesses in the country are particularly vulnerable. Although law enforcement cooperation with international partners has led to successful dismantling of cybercriminal networks, local police remain under-equipped to handle the scale of cyber threats, and this allows the market to continue expanding.
Financial crimes in Belgium encompass various forms including phishing, investment fraud (boiler room scams), spoofing, and online credit-card fraud. Phishing stands out as the most prevalent cyber-enabled scam, while newer forms of computer fraud like investment fraud, invoice fraud, help-wanted fraud and high-security account fraud are also on the rise. These illicit activities are known to be perpetrated by loosely organized criminal networks who exploit the country’s role as an EU financial centre.
Mafia-style groups operating in Belgium include several largely domestic outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMGs), who are involved in illicit activities, particularly drug and firearms trafficking. Notable OMGs in Belgium include the Outlaws, Hells Angels, No Surrender, El Diablo and the Bandidos. These groups operate with a hierarchical structure, engage in criminal initiation rituals, and use distinctive biker clothing to assert their presence. Their activities also extend to cannabis production, synthetic drug manufacturing and sexual exploitation. While crackdowns in Germany and the Netherlands in the previous decade have made Belgian chapters less visible, recent seizures and arrests indicate that these groups remain active in transnational organized crime. Despite the significant setback for mafia-style groups following the 2021 dismantling of Sky ECC, competition for trafficking territories persists, and their access to firearms continues. While territorial control is generally loose and limited to specific trafficking areas, conflicts between rival groups occasionally escalate into violence. Attempts to corrupt officials have been reported, though they remain infrequent.
Criminal networks in Belgium are mainly composed of small, loosely structured groups, particularly in the drug-trafficking arena. Belgian nationals in these groups play a major role in cannabis cultivation and synthetic drug production, while their involvement in the cocaine trade is secondary to that of foreign actors. These networks often resort to extreme violence, including shootings, surpassing the levels of violence seen among more structured organized crime groups. Informal criminal networks frequently involve foreign contacts and are heavily engaged in drug trafficking between Belgium and the Netherlands. They operate mainly in urban centres, with significant concentrations in Antwerp and Brussels, and along the Dutch border. These networks maintain strong ties to organized crime groups based in the Netherlands, facilitating the movement of illicit goods across national borders. Despite law enforcement efforts, the impact of these groups persists, and their activities continue to shape Belgium’s organized crime landscape.
State-embedded actors have limited involvement in Belgium’s organized crime landscape, with minimal evidence suggesting significant collusion between government officials and criminal organizations. However, recent cases indicate that attempts to bribe public officials, while not widespread, are becoming more apparent. Police officers, customs agents and even members of the public prosecutor’s office have been implicated in trafficking-related offences. While such incidents remain isolated, they do point to vulnerabilities within Belgium’s security infrastructure.
Foreign actors play a dominant role in Belgium’s organized crime markets, accounting for the majority of criminal actors in the country. The most significant foreign influence comes from Dutch nationals, who control the majority of the cocaine trade destined for Belgium. Deep ties exist between Dutch and Belgian drug trafficking networks, particularly in Antwerp and Brussels. Albanian-speaking criminal groups are key players in cocaine procurement at the port of Antwerp, facing increasing competition from Italian groups and the ‘Mocro Mafia’, a generic and controversial term for local Dutch and Belgian criminal networks with ethnic Moroccan members. Major Italian mafias active in Belgium include the Camorra, Cosa Nostra and the ‘Ndrangheta. These groups operate across different Belgian cities, engaging in drug trafficking and money laundering. The Italian ‘Ndrangheta, in particular, is mainly involved in drug trafficking, arms smuggling and human trafficking. Foreign criminal networks connected to the ‘Mocro Mafia’ wield substantial influence in cannabis and cocaine trafficking. Similarly, mafia-style groups originating from the Western Balkans and Nigerian criminal organizations play a critical role in drug distribution, arms trafficking and human smuggling.
Organized crime groups in Belgium frequently exploit legitimate businesses to launder illicit funds. Companies in sectors such as car washes and the luxury goods trade serve as key channels for money laundering. Criminal organizations involved in drug trafficking often launder proceeds through businesses in Belgium and offshore locations such as Dubai. Professional facilitators, including accountants, notaries and lawyers, occasionally appear in organized crime cases, though reporting of suspicious transactions remains low. The Belgian Financial Intelligence Processing Unit (CTIF) has expressed concerns about the under-reporting of money-laundering activities by these professionals. In markets such as diamond and timber trafficking, registered private companies have also been implicated. Hence there are notable intersections between legitimate business activities and organized crime in Belgium.
Belgium upholds strong governance principles, aligning with broader European values that emphasize human rights protection. The country hosts key EU institutions in Brussels, reinforcing its role as the ‘heart’ of Europe. However, rising public distrust in political institutions has been observed due to factors such as corruption scandals, increasing xenophobia and perceptions of government inertia. While political rights and civil liberties are largely respected, problems such as terrorism threats and economic instability have contributed to growing public dissatisfaction. Belgium has taken a proactive stance in combating organized crime, particularly through its National Security Strategy, which complements the existing National Security Plan. The Belgian government has identified drug trafficking as a national priority, leading to increased police deployment, stronger customs operations and enhanced screening measures for individuals in sensitive positions. Legislation has also focused on empowering local authorities to shut down illicit businesses linked to criminal activities. Despite all these efforts, there remains a perception that criminal organizations are infiltrating state institutions, although Belgium is not classified as a narco-state.
Government transparency in Belgium remains relatively strong, with the country maintaining stable rankings in corruption perception and press-freedom indices. Belgium’s Central Office for the Repression of Corruption (OCRC) and the CTIF oversee corruption investigations and suspicious capital flows. However, high-profile corruption cases surrounding misappropriation of public funds by parliamentarians and bribery allegations against European Parliament members, are concerning. Regulatory weaknesses persist, particularly on lobbying practices and conflicts of interest, and integrity checks within the Federal Police remain outdated. The legal framework governing foreign donations and gifts also remains underdeveloped.
Belgium is a committed participant in international legal frameworks against organized crime. It has ratified major treaties, including the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), the UN Convention against Corruption and the Arms Trade Treaty. Belgium actively engages in Europol and Interpol operations and has established bilateral extradition agreements. However, there has been controversy about Belgium’s decisions to extradite certain individuals, particularly in cases that may violate human rights. In 2024, the Belgian EU Council Presidency launched the European Port Alliance, a regional initiative aimed at addressing drug trafficking. Belgium has also engaged in diplomatic efforts with Latin American countries to counter cocaine trade networks.
The Belgian Criminal Code criminalizes participation in organized crime, with specific laws addressing drug trafficking, human smuggling and financial crimes. However, there are shortcomings in legislation related to non-renewable resource crimes. In 2024, Belgium adopted a law allowing municipalities to screen applicants for business licences in high-risk economic sectors. While this measure strengthens oversight, bureaucratic obstacles are reportedly hindering effective enforcement.
Belgium’s judicial system plays a crucial role in prosecuting organized crime, with the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office (OC Section) handling high-profile cases. The office has been instrumental in investigating transnational crime, including operations against encrypted communication networks used by criminal groups. However, Belgium’s prison system faces significant challenges, including overcrowding and understaffing. The inmate population exceeds the system’s capacity, and government plans to construct four new prisons by 2030 to alleviate pressure on existing facilities.
Belgium’s law enforcement structure consists of federal and local police forces, with police zones across the country operating autonomously. The Central Directorate for the Fight Against Serious and Organized Crime is tasked with disrupting criminal groups and prioritizing offences such as human trafficking, drug smuggling and cybercrime. In 2024, Belgium expanded its Expertise and Information Centres to every judicial district, aiming to enhance administrative approaches to combating organized crime. But resource shortages and fragmented policing structures remain problematic, particularly as drug trafficking and organized crime-related violence escalate.
Belgium’s strategic location and porous borders make it an attractive transit point for smuggling operations. The Port of Antwerp and Brussels Zaventem Airport serve as major hubs for illicit goods. Schengen Area membership, while facilitating legitimate trade, also poses security risks by reducing border controls. Cyber threats have also become an increasing concern, prompting Belgium to strengthen national cybersecurity measures through updated protection systems and law enforcement coordination.
Belgium has a robust anti-money laundering framework, with the CTIF leading investigations. It processes approximately 30 000 suspicious transactions annually, and recent measures have improved information-sharing between law enforcement and financial institutions. However, Belgium remains listed as a high-risk jurisdiction for money laundering, particularly due to its focus on predicate offences rather than direct money-laundering prosecutions.
The country has a strong economic regulatory environment, ranking highly in global competitiveness. But rising public debt and fiscal instability are risk factors. Belgium has a well-developed transportation and trade infrastructure, but criminal groups exploit these advantages to facilitate illicit financial transactions. The Belgian government has faced European Commission scrutiny for budgetary deficits, with proceedings initiated in 2024 to address fiscal concerns. Still, no specific information on the links between the Belgian economy and organized crime has been found for the reporting period.
Belgium has a comprehensive victim and witness support system, particularly for human trafficking cases. Specialized shelters provide psychosocial, medical and legal assistance, with the Federal Centre for Migration overseeing victim protection programmes. Victims identified through law enforcement or NGOs can access temporary residence permits and long-term legal protections if they cooperate in criminal investigations. However, the high costs of legal representation have deterred many victims from seeking compensation. Shelters for trafficking victims, while government-funded, face capacity constraints. Lastly, Belgium's national anti-drug strategy emphasizes supporting victims, with the organization ‘Infor-Drogues’ providing anonymous information, assistance and advice regarding drug use. Protective measures are in place to safeguard witnesses who fear reprisals, including options for partial or complete anonymity.
Belgium has prioritized crime-prevention strategies at the national and municipal levels. Programmes focusing on awareness campaigns, early intervention and cross-sector collaboration are available. The Flemish Centre of Expertise for Alcohol and Drugs has developed training initiatives to prevent cocaine use. Belgium’s National Action Plan on Organized Crime outlines four strategic objectives, including improving research methodologies, expanding investigative capabilities and enhancing inter-agency cooperation. While they are promising, the effectiveness of these strategies remains to be fully evaluated.
Belgium has a very active civil society sector, with NGOs playing a central role in combating organized crime. Organizations have been instrumental in shaping national and EU-level policies. Civil society initiatives have also targeted wildlife trafficking, financial crime and drug prevention. Following a decline in public trust in Belgian media, a media literacy programme was introduced to address concerns over bias and misinformation. Despite this, Belgium continues to have an independent and trustworthy media. Nevertheless, journalists continue to face online threats and violence at protests.
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The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to 10. The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel.
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