The Organized Crime Index | ENACT
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Latvia
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    Profile

    Latvia

    Capital

    Riga

    Gross domestic product (GDP)

    USD 39,853.50 million

    Income group

    High income

    Population

    1,884,490

    Area

    64,590 km²

    Geography type

    Coastal

    GINI Index

    35.7

    3.900.39

    Criminality score

    156th of 193 countries 8

    35th of 44 countries in Europe1

    4th of 8 countries in Northern Europe1

    Criminal markets

    4.500.85

    An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.

    Human trafficking

    5.000.50

    Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.

    Human smuggling

    4.501.00

    Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.

    Extortion and protection racketeering

    3.50 n/a

    Crimes linked to exerting control over a territory/market including as a mediator and/or requesting a benefit in exchange for protection.

    Arms trafficking

    3.500.00

    The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.

    Trade in counterfeit goods

    6.00 n/a

    The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands.

    Illicit trade in excisable goods

    6.00 n/a

    The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits.

    Flora crimes

    1.500.50

    The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.

    Fauna crimes

    2.000.00

    The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.

    Non-renewable resource crimes

    2.000.00

    The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.

    Heroin trade

    4.500.00

    The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.

    Cocaine trade

    5.500.50

    The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.

    Cannabis trade

    5.500.00

    The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.

    Synthetic drug trade

    5.500.50

    The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.

    Cyber-dependent crimes

    6.00 n/a

    Organized crimes that rely solely on using information communications technology with the aim of obtaining a monetary/material benefit.

    Financial crimes

    6.50 n/a

    Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance.

    Criminal actors

    3.30-0.08

    An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.

    Mafia-style groups

    4.000.50

    Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.

    Criminal networks

    3.500.00

    Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.

    State-embedded actors

    2.000.00

    Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.

    Foreign actors

    4.500.00

    State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.

    Private sector actors

    2.50 n/a

    Profit-seeking individuals/entities who own/control a part of the legal economy free from the state, that collaborate with criminal actors.

    7.580.17

    Resilience score

    11th of 193 countries 7

    8th of 44 countries in Europe4

    6th of 8 countries in Northern Europe1

    Political leadership and governance

    7.00-0.50

    The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.

    Government transparency and accountability

    6.500.50

    The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.

    International cooperation

    8.500.00

    A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.

    National policies and laws

    8.500.50

    A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.

    Judicial system and detention

    8.000.50

    Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.

    Law enforcement

    8.000.50

    The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.

    Territorial integrity

    8.500.00

    The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.

    Anti-money laundering

    6.000.50

    A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.

    Economic regulatory capacity

    8.000.00

    The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.

    Victim and witness support

    7.500.00

    Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.

    Prevention

    7.500.00

    Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.

    Non-state actors

    7.000.00

    The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.

    7.58 3.30 4.50 7.58 3.30 4.50

    7.580.17

    Resilience score

    11th of 193 countries 7

    8th of 44 countries in Europe4

    6th of 8 countries in Northern Europe1

    Political leadership and governance

    7.00-0.50

    The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.

    Government transparency and accountability

    6.500.50

    The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.

    International cooperation

    8.500.00

    A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.

    National policies and laws

    8.500.50

    A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.

    Judicial system and detention

    8.000.50

    Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.

    Law enforcement

    8.000.50

    The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.

    Territorial integrity

    8.500.00

    The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.

    Anti-money laundering

    6.000.50

    A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.

    Economic regulatory capacity

    8.000.00

    The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.

    Victim and witness support

    7.500.00

    Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.

    Prevention

    7.500.00

    Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.

    Non-state actors

    7.000.00

    The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.

    Analysis

    01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11

    People

    Latvia's recent economic progress has made it an enticing destination for human traffickers, especially in cases of labour exploitation. Ukrainians who have been affected by the war are also at risk of falling victim to trafficking in Latvia. The absence of risk-prevention measures, and unregistered refugee centres, contribute to the vulnerability of potential victims. Authorities have observed a rising number of Ukrainian workers being classified as ‘posted workers’ during inspections targeting illegal employment and violations at construction sites. At the same time, Latvian nationals are subjected to forced labour in other parts of Europe – a practice often facilitated by organized crime groups. Women are trafficked domestically and elsewhere in Europe, where they are often recruited for brokered marriages. The use of modern technology in fraudulent marriages complicates the detection and prosecution of these crimes, leading to substantial financial gains for organized criminal groups.

    When it comes to human smuggling, Latvia is a transit area for individuals attempting to reach Scandinavian countries. Organized crime groups take advantage of Latvia's strategic location to facilitate smuggling between Asia and Europe. Source countries include Vietnam, Russia, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Iraq and India. The influx of refugees from both sides of the Russia/Ukraine conflict might have stabilized, but there has been a recent surge in irregular state border crossings, particularly by Iraqi citizens of Kurdish origin. The smuggling of people primarily occurs from east to west; Riga has been identified as a central hub for this illicit activity. Local actors in border communities play a role in facilitating human smuggling, while online platforms are used for recruitment, logistics, exploitation and the advertisement of prostitution.

    Extortion and protection racketeering are not common in Latvia. Most occurrences are digital in nature, but more traditional forms of extortion are still perpetrated by some organized crime groups, mainly performed in the context of the privatization of state-owned companies. Criminal organizations engaged in extortion also tend to operate in related fields of car theft, fraud and counterfeiting.

    Trade

    The arms trafficking market in Latvia is relatively small but it does pose a moderate threat. While organized criminal groups have limited involvement, individuals play a key role in the illegal movement of firearms. Due to its location, Latvia has the potential to be an attractive transit hub for transporting stolen weapons. There has been an increasing trend in trafficking reactivated firearms and modified gas pistols; many criminal offenses are associated with the illegal excavation and modification of these weapons. The country also faces challenges concerning legacy firearms, including the illicit retrieval of World War II-era weapons and the unlawful possession of historical arms from other wars and the Soviet occupation. Latvian authorities have discovered firearms of German or Soviet manufacture, which can be restored and adapted for firing. Residents, particularly in rural areas, store unregistered weapons and ammunition and sometimes engage in illegal hunting. There are also reports of trafficked firearms between Latvia and Lithuania, with an intra-regional route passing through the Netherlands. Smuggling between Latvia and Russia has also been reported.

    The sale of counterfeit goods causes millions of euros in losses in Latvia every year. In recent years, there has been an increasing trend in the online purchase of counterfeit goods, including counterfeit medicine, cosmetics, perfumes, toys and more. The consumption of counterfeit cigarettes is rapidly increasing as illegal manufacturers use more sophisticated methods. Organized criminal groups are increasingly involved in the illicit trade of excise goods: these activities, which encompass the illegal movement, sale and purchase of excisable goods such as cigarettes and tobacco products, are detected on a daily basis. The trade in illegal excise goods is driven by significant price disparities between neighbouring countries like Belarus, Ukraine and Russia, where prices are much lower than in Latvia and other EU countries. The smuggling of excise goods not only involves the influx of these products into the country, but also a number of illegal cigarette and alcohol production facilities. Illicit excise goods are mainly sold through illegal outlets known as ‘tochkas’, which are located in rural areas and cities and cater to low-income individuals who either consume alcohol regularly or cannot afford legally available products. Goods are stored in various locations and distribution involves small quantities to minimize legal consequences. The COVID-19 pandemic has contributed to an increase in tolerance toward purchasing smuggled goods.

    Environment

    There is no established or well-developed market for flora crimes in Latvia. However, the country's economy relies heavily on timber, which is its primary natural resource and main export product. Even so, the risks associated with illegal logging are currently considered to be low. Fauna-related crimes are also not widespread, but they do exist; Latvia is a source and destination country in this regard. Incidents have been recorded involving the escape of exotic animals from private owners. There have also been individual incidents involving various fauna by-products, like a polar bear skin, different bird species, wolves, lynxes, a black panther and a monkey. Coral and crocodile products, along with other smuggled souvenirs and gift items, are commonly found in Latvia. The border with Russia facilitates the entry of illegal wildlife into the country for further distribution in the European market.

    The illicit market for non-renewable resources in Latvia is primarily focused on fuel smuggling and the illegal trade of amber. Like other Baltic countries, Latvia's fuel market attracts criminal groups due to disparities in fuel tax. Fuel smuggling from Russia into Latvia has become more challenging since the war in Ukraine. Even though there are active groups involved in non-renewable resource crimes in Latvia, the size of this shadow economy is smaller compared to other Baltic states. The illicit market for non-renewable resources consequently has limited influence on society and generates relatively low value.

    Drugs

    Latvia is primarily a transit country for the heroin trade, which is largely controlled by Russian organized crime groups. While overall heroin usage has been declining in the country, it remains one of the most popular drugs. Heroin enters the country through land routes from Russia and Belarus, with the highest risk of narcotics trafficking occurring at the Latvian-Russian border, and on ferry lines from Western Europe. Organized crime groups do not earn their main income from heroin sales within Latvia, but rather from smuggling heroin through the country. The heroin market has witnessed a shift towards carfentanil, a synthetic opioid that is cheaper and more potent.

    Cocaine has gained in popularity among local consumers. Latvia primarily serves as a transit point for trafficking: the drug is further transported to Russia and Scandinavian countries. Latvian and other eastern Baltic nationals have been involved as couriers in these operations. Former communist countries around the Baltic Sea have become important hubs for cocaine smuggling, with notable seizures in ports such as Riga in Latvia, Klaipeda in Lithuania, and Tallinn Airport in Estonia. Organized crime groups act as consignors and consignees in the cocaine trafficking trade, while transportation within Latvia is often carried out by legal logistics companies. The use of the internet, cryptocurrencies, postal services and courier services all facilitate the transfer and sale of cocaine: smuggling techniques including concealing drugs among legal goods in trucks displaying popular freight company logos.

    The cannabis trade in Latvia involves cultivation, distribution and transit. The country is a known hub for production: cannabis is grown both indoors and outside in uninhabited spaces. In recent years, the number of confiscated plants has decreased. The distribution of marijuana is concentrated in the Riga region; several marijuana farms have been discovered in the area. Cannabis use is prevalent among young adults, particularly males, and recent trends indicate an increase in marijuana use among youth. Despite the impact of COVID-19, general cultivation and self-cultivation for personal use have both increased. Herbal cannabis is imported from countries such as the Netherlands, the UK and Germany, while cannabis resin primarily originates from Morocco and enters Latvia through other EU states, often en route to Russia.

    The synthetic drug trade has become prevalent in Latvia, where synthetic opioids are busy replacing heroin in the illicit market. These synthetic drugs, some of which are extremely potent, present challenges for doctors treating overdoses. Drug distribution occurs through various means, including air and road transportation, as well as postal and courier services. The COVID-19 pandemic led to an increase in drug distribution on the dark web. Synthetic substances are mainly imported from European countries, but there is also domestic production within Latvia, carried out by organized criminal groups operating professional laboratories, or by chemistry enthusiasts setting up homemade labs. Domestic production of synthetic drugs has been on the rise, with instances of raw materials being transported to Russia and Belarus. Carfentanil, a synthetic alternative to heroin, is sold by drug dealers at the same price as heroin, making it more profitable.

    Cyber Crimes

    Cybercrimes have increased in Latvia due to technological advancements and the growing popularity of cryptocurrencies. Criminals are using increasingly sophisticated methods and creating complex schemes that make the detection and investigation of these crimes more challenging. The availability of viruses, malware and ransomware on online marketplaces and forums are key factors that facilitate cybercrimes.

    Since the onset of the war in Ukraine, there has been a rise in cyberattacks in Latvia. However, the actual impact of these attacks is often unclear, as cyberattacks by pro-Kremlin ‘hacktivist’ groups typically achieve nothing more than publicity. Nevertheless, these incidents remain a cause for concern.

    Financial Crimes

    Financial crimes have undergone a digital transformation, making it more challenging to identify perpetrators and prove their guilt. The COVID-19 pandemic saw a noteworthy surge in fraud cases, particularly on websites and in the media. Latvian nationals have increasingly fallen victim to telephone fraud and online scams, where fraudsters use deceptive tactics like courier company logos to mislead individuals into purchasing unseen goods. Various forms of financial fraud have been observed, including phishing, telephone fraud and attempts to acquire customer payment card data. Fraudsters often impersonate well-known companies and employ tactics such as creating fake internet banking websites. Additionally, victims are enticed into investing in dubious websites with promises of high returns.

    Criminal Actors

    Foreign criminal activity in Latvia is noticeable but not pervasive. Lithuanian organized crime groups have a significant influence, particularly in vehicle-related offenses and property crimes such as theft. As COVID-19 restrictions eased, the presence of foreign criminal groups became more apparent, especially in the cyber realm. Russian organized crime groups dominate the landscape when it comes to foreign mafia-style groups operating in Latvia. These groups engage in activities such as human trafficking, illicit tobacco trading, drug trafficking, theft and money laundering. Language and cultural barriers often limit their interaction with locals. Certain Russian groups have alleged connections to the Russian government, raising concerns about their potential influence over governments in Eastern and central Europe. Other foreign criminal groups, like the Azerbaijani mafia, are involved in activities such as human smuggling.

    Mafia-style groups are involved in various illicit activities in Latvia, including drug trafficking, theft, fraud, armed robbery and money laundering. The leaders of some of these groups are believed to have connections with Russian criminal groups and similar organizations in Europe. While there are numerous organized crime groups in Latvia, only a few operate internationally. Outlaw motorcycle gangs are active and engage in illegal activities at national, regional and transnational levels. However, the number of criminal networks has been decreasing in recent years, partly due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the implementation of more effective regulations by the police. Drug trafficking remains a prominent source of income for Latvian organized crime groups. Leveraging its strategic geographical location next to Russia, Latvia serves as a significant transit point for the illicit transportation of narcotics from western countries to Russia.

    Private sector actors are mainly involved in financial crimes, particularly money laundering cases. The market often relies on individuals known as ‘money mules’, who agree to allow criminals to use their bank accounts for a fee, or assist in transferring small amounts of cash. These money mules are often students or individuals facing financial difficulties. Professional money launderers, well-versed in the financial system, devise more sophisticated schemes and seek ways to circumvent national laws. Crimes involving public officials are rare in Latvia. Evidence implicating public figures (often customs officials) in bribery or other forms of corruption is limited.

    Leadership and governance

    Despite a low level of public trust in the government and parliament, some efforts have been made at the ministerial and political levels to combat organized crime. Although Latvia is relatively stable compared to other countries, the perception remains that internal security, including the fight against organized crime, is insufficient; and the allocation of financial resources to the internal affairs system, including the state police, is limited. Corruption is recognized as a notable problem affecting politics, the judiciary and the overall criminal justice system in Latvia. While the government has taken steps to combat corruption and money laundering, investigative and auditing bodies have faced challenges due to a lack of consolidated power within their areas of competence. Although Latvia has an extensive legislative framework for transparency and accountability, there is a lack of transparency in state-owned companies and public procurement processes. Access to information is considered poor, and there is no external administrative level of appeal for information requests. According to public opinion, the perception of corruption is highest among parliament members, government officials, municipality employees, banking sector employees and leaders of private companies.

    Latvia cooperates at an international level to combat organized crime, collaborating with various international organizations and participating in extradition, mutual legal assistance and other forms of legal cooperation. The effectiveness of Latvia's international cooperation is evident in successful operations such as the arrest of an international criminal group involved in the distribution of narcotics and psychotropic substances across multiple countries. To combat transnational organized crime, Latvia has implemented various national policies and laws. Offenses such as human trafficking, human smuggling, money laundering, arms crime, drug crimes, flora crimes, fauna crimes and illegal organ harvesting have been criminalized. Latvia has also adopted national strategies for the prevention of human smuggling and has established penalties for these crimes. While the country's national policies and laws are generally implemented well, there are still shortcomings in the implementation of the anti-corruption framework.

    Criminal justice and security

    The judicial system in Latvia has shown gradual improvement. While the system is generally considered efficient, challenges persist regarding judicial independence and public expectation. According to research, about half of the general public (and companies) in Latvia perceive the courts to be independent. Issues remain regarding the prosecution and adjudication of corruption cases, which are often lengthy and drawn-out. Efforts are underway to enhance lobbying transparency and strengthen conflict-of-interest regulations. There are some concerns about inconsistencies regarding the provision of legal aid, and incidents of interrogation without a lawyer present. Lengthy pre-trial detention periods and a backlog of criminal cases also hamper the justice system, particularly in human trafficking cases where lenient sentences are common.

    Law enforcement in Latvia is resilient at combating organized crime. Although a new plan for the prevention and combating of organized crime was approved, that plan has not yet been adopted. Insufficient financial resources hinder the safe implementation of laws. While the risk of corruption in Latvian law enforcement is low, there are concerns about how reliable law enforcement is at protecting citizens from crime and upholding the rule of law.

    Latvia is part of the Schengen Area and benefits from open borders with neighbouring countries such as Lithuania, Estonia and a maritime border with Sweden. However, the country faces challenges on its borders with Belarus and Russia. To address security concerns, Latvia has constructed a barbed-wire fence along its Russian border and plans to build a similar fence along the Belarusian border. The state of emergency has been extended in border areas due to an increase in illegal border crossings, particularly from Belarus. The eastern regions of Latvia, such as Latgale, have territorial integrity issues due to the influence of Russian and Belarusian media and socioeconomic disparities. Riga, the capital city, has been identified as a hub for smuggling and money laundering: efforts are being made to combat these activities.

    Economic and financial environment

    Money laundering remains a significant concern; Latvian banks are being exploited to legitimize illicit funds from abroad. In response to international pressure, Latvia has taken steps to improve its money laundering laws and enhance cooperation among local and international authorities. The establishment of a financial intelligence unit has been crucial in recovering assets and combating money laundering in general. Money laundering activities often involve funds connected to offshore accounts: popular locations include the Seychelles, the British Virgin Islands, Belize, Panama and Hong Kong. Despite some improvements, Riga is still seen as a hub for money laundering, and money laundering schemes continue to operate there. The country has made progress in areas such as financial sanctions, client assessment, regulation of financial institutions and international cooperation. Additionally, action plans have been approved for anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism.

    Latvia's economic regulatory environment faces challenges, particularly concerning organized crime and the shadow economy. The prevalence of the shadow economy seems to have increased during the pandemic. Concerns exist that certain groups and criminal interests may exploit EU funds. Entering the Latvian market can be expensive for businesses due to the country's small population, leading many companies to consider Latvia as part of the broader Baltic region or the EU market. Additional challenges include local labelling requirements, the potential for market saturation, and the difficulty of protecting business secrets in a small market. Despite these challenges, Latvia demonstrates the capacity to uphold land and property rights, as reflected in its economic regulatory framework.

    Civil society and social protection

    Latvia has both a legislative framework and concrete mechanisms to combat human trafficking and provide support to victims and witnesses of crime. The state-funded victim assistance programme offers comprehensive services, including medical, psychological and legal support, as well as housing and reintegration assistance. However, there are shortcomings, such as the lack of specialized legal aid and long-term psychological support and the lengthy duration and monitoring of assistance need to be addressed. The identification of victims remains a concern, particularly child victims and those involved in sexual exploitation within the legal prostitution industry. Despite the country’s generally supportive framework, not all victims seek assistance from relevant authorities.

    The Latvian government has implemented various methods to monitor and assess the effectiveness of their efforts in combating organized crime. Some methods include the monitoring of reports regarding illicit activities such as the movement of tobacco and petroleum products, and surveys to gauge public experience with combating crime. At municipal level, task forces and training programmes have been established to address human trafficking. The government has also undertaken awareness-raising initiatives, such as publishing books by trafficking survivors for use in schools. Specific measures to reduce demand within the commercial sex industry have not yet been reported.

    Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play a major role in running government-funded victim assistance programmes in Latvia, providing various forms of support to victims of human trafficking. While the government has made efforts to improve civil society protection measures, the civic space in Latvia is still considered limited and advocacy by NGOs is sometimes seen as partisan. In terms of media freedom and pluralism, Latvia has passed legislation to enhance the independence of the media regulator and safeguard journalists' rights and access to information. However, journalists continue to face personal attacks online, often from politicians, indicating ongoing challenges in this area. Concerns have also been raised regarding restricted access to Russian media outlets due to propaganda concerns. Lagging media literacy, the spread of hate speech and increasing online attacks against journalists are growing concerns that need to be addressed.

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    The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to 10. The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel.

    How to measure organized crime?

    A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.

    Read more on globalinitiative.net
    How to measure organized crime?

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    This report was funded in part by a grant from the United States Department of State.

    ENACT is funded by the European Union and implemented by the Institute for Security Studies and INTERPOL, in affiliation with the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.

    The opinions, findings and conclusions stated herein are those of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State.