People

Kazakhstan is a source and destination country for human trafficking. The human trafficking market is fuelled by local and external demand. Domestic victims are mostly subject to trafficking in Russia, but also in Middle Eastern countries like Bahrain and Türkiye. Foreign victims (specifically women and girls who come from East and Central Asia, the Middle East and Eastern Europe) are subject to sex trafficking, forced labour and domestic servitude in Kazakhstan after being lured to the country by false promises of employment. There are also reports of Kazakh men being exploited in forced labour while seeking employment by mercenary groups in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. Kazakh nationals from rural areas, along with members of the LGBTQ+ community (especially transgender individuals), are specifically vulnerable to human trafficking in the form of forced labour and sexual exploitation. Victims may also be coerced into criminal actions; children are often subjected to forced begging. Bride abductions in Kazakhstan have been linked to human trafficking. As many as a million Uzbek migrants were banned from re-entry into Russia and a significant percentage of them have tried settling in Kazakhstan, where they have become susceptible to trafficking. Trafficking rings reportedly collaborate with brothels locally and abroad, and traffickers allegedly use debt bondage and tough national law enforcement policies as a means of coercing victims into remaining in exploitative situations. State-embedded actors, specifically police officers who accept bribes, are reportedly complicit in the human trafficking market, together with organized criminal groups and recruiters.

With regards to human smuggling, Kazakhstan is a transit country for irregular migrants on their way to Russia, and a destination country for migrants who originate from Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, among others. Despite visa-free travel existing between these countries, human smuggling still occurs due to a lack of valid travel documents like passports. Kazakhstan also serves as a transit country for people from South Asia flying to Central Asia, from where they continue on land towards their final destinations in Europe. Kazakhstan is also a source country for human smuggling – some Kazakh nationals attempt to migrate illegally to the US and Europe. Although limited, extortion and protection racketeering are somewhat prevalent, with sporadic incidents reported in the country.

Trade

Kazakhstan primarily serves as a destination country for illegal arms, and to a lesser extent as a source or transit country for weapons smuggled to Russia. Due to the location of the country on the Northern Drug Route, drugs and arms trafficking are intertwined. Information points to several entry routes into Kazakhstan for illicit weapons; authorities maintain that Russia, Tajikistan and Afghanistan are the primary source countries. Other sources of illicit weapons include the diversion of stockpiled domestic arms, and local craft production. There has been an increase in the seizure of illegal weapons recently, which indicates an increase in this market.

Due to its geographic proximity and its porous borders with former Soviet republics, Kazakhstan is a destination and transit country for counterfeit goods produced in China, which are destined for Russia and Europe. Trade in counterfeit pharmaceutical products is a serious concern – this is exacerbated by drug shortages in the country. Due to western sanctions, Kazakhstan has also become a major transit and source country for the smuggling of goods into Russia, from automobile parts and construction materials to consumer goods. However, a lack of quantifiable data limits an assessment of the value of this market and its impact. Illicit trade in tobacco products, and to a lesser extent alcohol, is also prevalent, although the share of smuggled cigarettes has fallen due to a slowdown in the excise tax rate.

Environment

Flora crime is not common in Kazakhstan, or there is limited information available about this market. There has been a shift to positive net forest area growth in recent years due to forestation and other initiatives. Despite these initiatives and other improvements to legislation, along with a decrease in illegal logging cases, it seems that the volume of timber illegally harvested for fuel, and the illegal harvesting of unique flora, has continued.

Fauna crimes are more pronounced in the country: Kazakhstan is a major partner in the Belt and Road Initiative (a global infrastructure development strategy adopted by the Chinese government), which has presumably increased the frequency of irregular wildlife trade, along with legal trade. Wildlife trafficking also occurs on existing drug smuggling routes due to open border crossings in rural and remote areas. Animals are predominantly poached for subsistence, but rare and threatened species (like saiga antelope) have also been killed for their parts, which are smuggled into China and elsewhere in East and South East Asia. There is a notable trade in saiga horn in the country, with an established smuggling route and impunity for poachers. Traffickers use a system where illegally poached horns are merged with legal horns, making difficult for authorities to distinguish between them. Other poaching – of hawks, falcons and sturgeon – has also been recorded in Kazakhstan.

Fuel smuggling, specifically across the Kazakh-Kyrgyz border, has been increasing in recent years due to the socio-economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the general slowdown of the Kazakh economy. Smuggling of liquified petroleum gas (LPG) has also been growing due to its rising price – the result of a government reform aimed at addressing the illegal export of the commodity to other countries like Russia and Kyrgyzstan.

Drugs

Kazakhstan is a key transit country on the Northern Route for heroin trafficking. The drugs originate in Afghanistan and are destined for Russia. Even though there have been no large-scale heroin seizures made by local Kazakh law enforcement agencies, a substantial increase in seizures in the likes of Russia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan indicates that seizures in Kazakhstan do not reflect the volume of heroin trafficking occurring in the country. Kazakhstan is also a destination country for heroin – it has the largest domestic heroin market in Central Asia, with a steady local demand. State-embedded actors, although low-level, are reported to be involved in this market. Conversely, the cocaine trade in the country is marginal – Russia is thought to be an important transit point for cocaine entering the country.

Kazakhstan is a producer of cannabis, which is mainly cultivated in the Chu Valley. It is also a destination country, since local consumption is widespread. Even though cannabis imports decreased due to stricter border controls during the COVID-19 pandemic, there has been a significant increase in hashish seizures following the lifting of restrictions.

Kazakhstan is a destination and increasingly a source country for synthetic drugs. There has been a rise in the seizure of synthetic drugs in recent years, and clandestine laboratories have been dismantled, both of which signal an exponentially increasing trend. In recent years, dependency on psychoactive substances has grown in urban areas: methamphetamines, synthetic cannabinoids and amphetamines are among the most-used synthetic drugs. Synthetic drugs arriving in the country mostly originate from China, Russia and Afghanistan, which has become a major exporter of synthetic drugs to Central Asia in recent years. The purchase of psychoactive substances has shifted from the street to online, using e-wallets and Telegram.

Cyber Crimes

Kazakhstan is vulnerable to cyber-dependent crimes due to its lack of cybersecurity capabilities. However, it is difficult to assess the value and impact of this criminal market given the lack of data and the issue of underreporting. In recent years, Kazakhstan has emerged as one of the leaders in total cryptocurrency operations per country, making it vulnerable to crypto-fraud and similar crimes related to cryptocurrencies.

Financial Crimes

When it comes to financial crimes, Kazakhstan is categorized as a country of primary concern. Incidents of tax evasion are increasing, as are Ponzi schemes and incidents of internet fraud. There are also concerns about opaque financial operations in the country, which might have been developed to help certain actors avoid economic sanctions imposed on Russia.

Criminal Actors

Although to a lesser degree in comparison to other countries in the region, state-embedded actors do still wield power in various criminal markets. There are reports indicating the involvement of low-level law enforcement agencies in drug and human trafficking, and the illicit trade of natural resources. The protests that took place in January 2022 have revealed links between organized criminal networks and the political elite. Some Kazakh elites receive benefits from corrupt customs practices, such as undeclared goods and illicit goods. Foreign actors (especially Afghan, Russian and Chinese nationals) are involved in criminal markets in the country, as some consider the country a convenient transit base for their operations. Even though the activities of some foreign actors have been disrupted by increased law enforcement control over cross-border movements in the aftermath of the recent protests, the long-term effects of these improvements are yet to be seen.

Mafia-style groups have been losing their footprint in Kazakhstan over two last decades, but these groups are still present. Syndicates from across the former Soviet Union, led by so-called ‘thieves in law’ are involved in various activities including extortion and racketeering, fuel smuggling and drug trafficking, specifically in big cities. However, these groups do not usually control significant territories. Elements of former mafia structures that have survived are reportedly now part of cross-border criminal organizations spanning the Kazakh-Russian border. Criminal networks in Kazakhstan are relatively underdeveloped compared to other countries in Central Asia; only the smaller groups have remained in drug trafficking as it is considered to be too dangerous for larger organizations. Those organizations have moved on to more lucrative smuggling markets, such as oil, alcohol and consumer goods, mainly brought in from China. Most trafficking groups operate locally but there are some that have ties to foreign groups and operate transnationally. They engage in human and drug trafficking, and in the smuggling of arms and counterfeit goods. Although both mafia-style groups and criminal networks are invisible in daily life, recent civil unrest has revealed that they can be quickly mobilized, have access to weapons and are closely linked to some segments of the state apparatus. Even though private-sector actors carry out corrupt offences with impunity, there are no indications of large-scale involvement of private sector actors in criminal activities in the country.

Leadership and governance

Kazakhstan’s reputation as one of the most stable countries in Central Asia was undermined by anti-government protests in 2022. These were economically motivated and became more political, reflecting the population’s dissatisfaction with the government. The protests resulted in the end of duality of power and forced a shift within the government. Certain criminal groups fuelled the protests, which led the government to increase its commitment to fighting organized crime, as this was seen as a source of the instability. Even though Kazakhstan has high levels of corruption within the state apparatus, the political elite is not heavily linked to organized crime. The protests resulted in the removal of certain high-ranking members, but the perception is that one corrupt elite has just been replaced by another. Corruption remains pervasive in law enforcement, customs administration and within public procurement processes – irregular payments and embezzlement are widespread. Corruption charges against members of the political elite are rare and are only likely to be brought up in instances where those individuals have fallen out of favour. Access to information in Kazakhstan is poor, with scant transparency about governmental decision making and other operations.

Kazakhstan is party to all relevant treaties pertaining to organized crime and has bilateral extradition agreements with more than 60 nations. In spite of its international commitments, there is room for improvement in this field as trust in Kazakh authorities is limited at times. Nevertheless, the country’s legislative framework is well-equipped to tackle organized crime. Not only are the relevant laws in place, but amendments are drafted regularly (especially with regards to human trafficking, wildlife crime and drug trafficking) in an attempt to better facilitate the response to current and emerging threats. For instance, certain legislative acts adopted in the aftermath of the violent protests in 2021 have improved national policies aimed at fighting organized crime. Even though there have been positive developments, some legislative amendments have weakened certain basic rights. For example, in 2021, an amendment to the accreditation rules for journalists implemented stricter rules regarding reporting on government events, which may result in increased censorship.

Criminal justice and security

Corruption is pervasive in the judicial system, where the political elite holds significant sway. As a result, expectations around justice delivery are low, as is public trust in the legal system. Recent changes to the country’s legal framework may also threaten the independence of lawyers. Even though over-population in the penitentiary system is not a major concern, there are reports alleging the involvement of prison guards in the abuse and torture of inmates. In addition, the Kazakh penal system is struggling to meet international standards.

Similar to the judicial system, the 2022 protests have also revealed that the executive branch holds a notable influence over law enforcement. Despite the presence of several special law enforcement units targeting various criminal markets such as human trafficking and environmental offences, corruption within the police force – and arbitrary arrests – remains a serious problem. There are reports of excessive force and torture used by law enforcement members during the January 2022 protests, resulting in the death of some detainees. Despite recent government initiatives to prosecute corrupt law enforcement officials, a culture of impunity prevails in the police force. To counter this, following the 2022 protests, law enforcement agencies have been reorganized to improve efficiency.

Due to Kazakhstan’s border and customs units being systematically underfunded and ill-trained, the country struggles to secure its borders. Its geographic location at the heart of cross-border trafficking flows makes it vulnerable to organized crime. Kazakhstan has received training and support from its international partners, but further efforts to tackle drug trafficking, wildlife crime and human trafficking are necessary. Following Russia’s war in Ukraine, the government has increased its defence budget to safeguard its own territorial integrity.

Economic and financial environment

Kazakhstan does not face any major vulnerabilities with regard to money laundering and terrorist financing, nor are there any strategic anti-money laundering (AML) and counter financing of terrorism (CFT) deficiencies. Legislation for AML and CFT are both weakly enforced, however. As a transit country for a number of trafficking flows, former oligarchs and businesses are able to carry out money laundering activities in Kazakhstan. Despite government attempts to bring Kazakh legislation in line with international standards by adopting new regulations around AML/CTF, law enforcement agencies lack the capacity to investigate sophisticated financial crimes. Additionally, parallel financial investigations are not carried out routinely alongside investigations of money laundering, and inter-agency information sharing is poor.

The economic regulatory environment in Kazakhstan is conducive to doing business (to some extent). The adoption of unparalleled system-wide reforms is expected to improve the business environment in the country and lessen bureaucratic barriers and burdens. Nevertheless, corruption is reportedly the primary constraint to doing business in Kazakhstan. Patronage networks negatively affect the country’s business environment, while bureaucracy and vague legislation restrict foreign investment. In addition, public procurement carries a high risk of corruption for businesses investing in Kazakhstan, with public funds often diverted to individuals or companies with ties to the elite. Despite the socio-economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Kazakh economy has made a tentative recovery and the government continues to finance major infrastructure projects and other targeted economic support measures, such as assistance for small and medium-sized enterprises. International financial institutions also continue to support the growth of private enterprises, which are still outweighed by the public sector in Kazakhstan.

Civil society and social protection

The Kazakh government has taken steps to protect victims of human trafficking through increased funding allocated to a number of state-funded, NGO-operated shelters for victims that provide legal, medical and psychological assistance. A new anti-trafficking national action plan has also been adopted, and a victim compensation fund has been established. Despite these efforts, identification and provision of support to victims of forced labour, and victims who are foreign nationals, remains inadequate. Related to that, a large percentage of foreign victims are unwilling to identify themselves, mainly because they do not trust the authorities. Many foreign victims are also not eligible to receive services at the above-mentioned shelters unless they cooperate with law enforcement. There is government assistance available to victims in the form of pro bono attorneys, but they often lack experience. As for support provided for drug users, patient care in addiction treatment centres has been hindered due to an increased need for social services by drug users, and a lack of funds.

The government has maintained prevention efforts towards human trafficking by funding information and education campaigns; awareness campaigns (radio and television programmes); newspaper articles; and enhanced cooperation with NGOs. Additionally, the government continues to promote an anti-trafficking hotline operated by an NGO. However, the government has not taken any action to reduce the demand for sex work or forced labour. The latest data available on the prevention of drug use suggests that there are various government resolutions in place, in addition to regional programmes, which also set out preventative measures. These include awareness campaigns and health initiatives. The government has also taken steps to identify and prevent the poaching of critically endangered saiga antelope through the use of satellite collars. A new anti-corruption strategy for 2022–’26 was adopted to prevent corruption in judiciary and law enforcement agencies, among other goals. Lastly, following an increase of counterfeit pharmaceutical products, the government has initiated mandatory product serialization to combat this illicit trade.

Despite constitutional provisions, press freedom is a concern in Kazakhstan: prominent media outlets are either controlled by businessmen loyal to the government or by the government itself. The situation has worsened since the 2022 protests: most opposition media outlets have been banned and the few that remain are restricted by judicial proceedings. Journalists are subject to targeted attacks, while mass surveillance and restriction of access characterize internet usage in Kazakhstan. Civil society organizations are underdeveloped and severely limited. Routine harassment and persecution of activists is the norm, while legislative amendments to tighten control over society – often on the grounds of counteracting radicalization and extremism – have either already been adopted or are in the process of being drafted. Government control over the civil sector and political opponents is ubiquitous: foreign-funded NGOs are not allowed to pursue political goals and there are restrictions on free speech, freedom of assembly and freedom of association.

People

Human trafficking remains a considerable issue in Kyrgyzstan, which is a source, transit and destination country for this criminal market. High levels of poverty, alongside other gender practices, continue to exacerbate the local population’s vulnerability to exploitation, both locally and abroad. Women, men and children are forced into labour domestically or in neighbouring countries – or elsewhere in Central Asia, the Middle East and Europe – in sectors like agriculture, construction, textile, domestic service and childcare. Male labour migrants are the most vulnerable to trafficking. Russian policies towards migrant workers and the threat of deportation have also made Kyrgyz migrants vulnerable to exploitation in forced labour and sex trafficking. In addition, children in Kyrgyzstan continued to be forced to participate in the drug trade, both locally and in neighbouring countries, as well as to engage in domestic servitude and begging. Kyrgyz women and girls are victims of sexual exploitation domestically and throughout the Middle East and Asia. There has been an increase in human trafficking incidents that target migrants from across Central Asia who transit through Kyrgyzstan towards other countries in the region, the Middle East and Europe. Growing numbers of bride kidnappings have also raised concerns in recent years – such practices may subsequently lead to sex trafficking and forced labour. Given that Kyrgyzstan is a transit, source and destination country for human trafficking, criminal actors involved in the domestic illicit market are linked to transnational criminal networks. Corrupt government officials facilitate Kyrgyzstan’s human trafficking market, enabling traffickers to operate with relative impunity.

Human smuggling is a consolidated criminal market with domestic and foreign actors operating together. In this respect, Kyrgyzstan is considered a source, transit and (to a limited extent) destination country for human smuggling. In a bid to improve their living conditions, Kyrgyz nationals irregularly travel to other Central Asian, European and Middle Eastern countries such as Russia, Kazakhstan and Türkiye. Despite the visa-free regime with Kazakhstan and Russia, migrants seek out human smugglers to protect themselves from exploitation. Also, irregular migrants originating from South and South East Asia use the country as a transit point with an aim to reach Russia and Western Europe, although the scale of this flow is negligible. Despite limited official data pertaining to extortion and protection racketeering in Kyrgyzstan, there has been a reported increase in the volume of incidents involving racketeering of small businesses and street shops. There are also reports suggesting that criminal networks have assumed the role of mediator in disputes between business owners in areas controlled by the networks.

Trade

Even though the arms trafficking market in Kyrgyzstan remains negligible, there has been a surge in the illegal circulation of firearms within the country, evidenced by the increased number of confiscations carried out by law enforcement. Rising rates of possession of illegal firearms within the population is linked to the illegal trade through the country and within its borders, and the regulatory loopholes pertaining to the registration of firearms. There are reports suggesting that Kyrgyzstan is a transit country for arms trafficked from Iran towards Afghanistan, demonstrating the transnational nature of this market. A further expansion in the arms trafficking market is expected following the takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban, as Kyrgyzstan is on one of the major arms trafficking routes from Afghanistan into Russia.

Even though Kyrgyzstan is not considered to be a major producer of counterfeit goods, illegal trade in such goods has increased over recent years and the country seems to have become an intermediary between China and Russia. The Dordoi Bazaar, located in Bishkek, is the largest counterfeit market in Central Asia and a hub for the re-exportation of Chinese counterfeit goods to Europe and Russia. The country is also considered to be a transit point for the smuggling of tobacco products and alcohol within the Eurasian Economic Union; most of the products enter from Middle Eastern and European countries, and other Central Asian countries like Tajikistan.

Environment

The country’s rare and protected trees and flowers are threatened by livestock grazing, traditional harvesting, firewood collection, construction and tree felling. Even though poor flora management enables criminal activity to occur, the market remains limited and there is scant evidence that organized criminal groups are involved. However, there is evidence of illegal poaching and wildlife trafficking. There is a steady flow of wildlife products through Kyrgyzstan, especially from China, Afghanistan and Pakistan; Kyrgyzstan also serves as a source country for illicitly traded animals including Marco Polo sheep (a subspecies of the argali sheep) and saker falcons. Trophy hunting is prevalent in Kyrgyzstan: hunted species include CITES-listed argali, brown bear and wolf. This market is assumed to be driven by external demand since wildlife trafficking is mainly transboundary, involving foreign criminal groups collaborating with local actors.

Since Kyrgyzstan has substantial deposits of gold, coal and rare-earth metals, among others, illegal mining is widespread. Coal is illegally mined in the south of the country, from where it is shipped to Uzbekistan. Illegal gold mining has been increasing due to high rates of unemployment in the country, specifically in the Naryn region. Due to the country’s geographical location, it is also a transit point for illegal minerals trafficked from Afghanistan and Tajikistan, as well as oil smuggled from Kazakhstan en route to Tajikistan.

Drugs

Kyrgyzstan plays a notable role as a transit country on the Northern Route for heroin trafficking – the drugs originate in Afghanistan and are destined for Russia and European countries. Heroin trafficking is facilitated by weak border controls and rampant corruption involving bureaucrats and law enforcement officials. Due to the transnational nature of the market, heroin trafficking is mainly controlled by foreign actors from transnational organized crime groups. The growth of the market in Kyrgyzstan has been attributed to the takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban, a group which is known to be heavily involved in the market. An uptick in heroin seizures during the same period confirms the existence of a steady drug trafficking network in the country. Despite this, however, official statistics show that domestic consumption continues to decrease, although the accuracy of these statistics is questionable. The cocaine trade remains insignificant in the country, mainly as a result of low income levels and an abundance of other types of drugs that are substantially less expensive.

Regarding the cannabis trade, Kyrgyzstan is a source and transit country. There has been a significant surge in the illegal cultivation and trafficking of cannabis out of financial need, especially in the districts of Talas Oblast and other rural areas. Cannabis trade in the country is controlled by foreign actors who are members of transnational criminal groups, while local actors are involved in small-scale production. As a transit country for cannabis, the southern borders are prone to the trafficking of hashish from Afghanistan and Pakistan, which travels through Tajikistan.

Kyrgyzstan is mainly a transit country for the trade of synthetic drugs that originate in countries like the Netherlands, Iran, Türkiye, Russia, Kazakhstan and China. However, recent dismantling of clandestine laboratories producing synthetic drugs suggests a rising local production of such substances too, using precursors imported from China. Kyrgyzstan has not been immune to the rapid spread of synthetic drugs in the world, evidenced by increased seizures of synthetic drugs by Kyrgyz law enforcement during the last few years. Despite the growing production and transit of synthetic drugs, local demand for these substances remains low: amphetamine use in Kyrgyzstan is lower than use of opioids, cannabis and hallucinogens, among others.

Cyber Crimes

Cyber-dependent crimes are relatively common in Kyrgyzstan. Attacks range from ransomware to cyber-espionage, targeting individuals, corporations and even the country’s national security. Kyrgyzstan, among other Central Asian countries, has also become an attractive location for crypto-hackers who use software to take control of vulnerable computers and use their resources to mine cryptocurrency without permission. Despite all this, the effect of cybercrimes is modest, mostly due to a relatively low level of internet coverage in the country.

Financial Crimes

Financial crimes – in the form of phone call frauds, phishing and charity scams – are widespread in the country and cause substantial losses to citizens. Criminal networks are using more and more cyber-enabled methods, the most common of which is phishing. Official statistics also indicate an increase in the number of Ponzi schemes targeting financially illiterate citizens in need of quick money. Tax evasion – with the collaboration of corrupt state officials – is also commonplace in Kyrgyzstan.

Criminal Actors

State-embedded actors are heavily involved in organized crime and criminal organizations, and the apparatus of the state is intricately intertwined with both. State officials not only facilitate but also engage in criminal markets, especially in the drug trade. There have been major arrests of high-level politicians in recent years, with the aim of eradicating corruption within the state, though the underlying goal of these arrests has been questioned by observers.

Organized crime in Kyrgyzstan is at a stage of fluid development. It mainly consists of networks of small groups engaged in localized criminal activities, servicing specific markets. There are also large organized criminal groups operating in the country. Mafia-style groups continue to exert influence on local populations and prisons, and operate in multiple criminal markets. Members of these groups have also infiltrated the Kyrgyz parliament and important public authorities. There are reports suggesting an increase in the activities of some mafia-style groups, specifically those involved in heroin trafficking.

Numerous loose criminal networks and dozens of criminal gangs also operate in Kyrgyzstan – they primarily engage in the smuggling of illicit goods. While gangs in the southern region are mainly involved in drug trafficking, criminal networks in the north concentrate on racketeering and embezzlement of state assets, as well as the illicit smuggling of Chinese goods. Similar to mafia-style groups, criminal networks in Kyrgyzstan also have influence over the democratic process, although to a lesser extent.

There is a strong collaboration between local criminal networks and foreign actors, especially in human trafficking, drug trafficking and non-renewable resource crimes, due to the transnational nature of these markets. Some local criminal groups also organize on the basis of foreign ethnicity: Uzbek, Tajik, Azeri, Chechen and Russian, for example. The drug trade is mostly controlled by foreign criminal actors. An increase in the influence of Chinese criminal actors in Kyrgyzstan has been noted. Private-sector actors are mainly involved in financial crimes like embezzlement, tax evasion and corruption.

Leadership and governance

Kyrgyzstan’s governmental system changed in the aftermath of presidential elections that were held with a referendum. Major amendments to the Kyrgyz constitution followed. Through these constitutional amendments, the president and high-ranking officials were granted extensive executive authority, which has given them immense political power. Fighting organized crime was one of the main promises made by the political leadership, and even though the promise has been kept to a certain extent following arrests of various members of organized criminal groups, most perpetrators were released or fined, placing the legitimacy of the government’s actions under question. Since the elections (and following the concentration of power within the executive branch), reports indicate that the efficiency of the state has decreased in general – including the fight against corruption and organized crime. The Kyrgyz government’s anti-drug trafficking policies have also been hampered by ongoing political changes and continued competition among political groups and law enforcement agencies. Overall, the Kyrgyz government remains vulnerable to criminal influence; the political system has been penetrated by organized crime; and corruption is pervasive in the executive branch. And even though the scope of anti-corruption actions continues to grow, such actions remain ineffective. Likewise, the work of organizations tasked with combating corruption is limited due to political influence.

Kyrgyzstan has ratified most relevant conventions and treaties related to organized crime and has several extradition treaties in place. The Kyrgyz government participates in international and regional cooperation efforts against various forms of organized crime, which are also reflected under Kyrgyzstan’s legislative framework. However, laws are ineffective and their implementation is lacking. Due to frequent political turmoil, Kyrgyzstan policy development has stalled and remains a major weakness.

Criminal justice and security

The Kyrgyz judicial system lacks a specialized unit focusing on issues related to organized crime. Additionally, the country's judicial system is deemed to be one of the most corrupt state bodies in the country, with widespread corruption and bribery among judges. The right to fair trial remains severely compromised, and coerced confessions through torture are commonplace, as are other practices like arbitrary convictions and withholding the right to an attorney. There are reports showing evidence of intimidation, threats and violence against defendants, attorneys and judges. The Kyrgyz judiciary is heavily influenced by organized crime. Many leaders of organized criminal groups have been released in recent years and politicians have prevented convictions against others. Concerns surrounding the independence of the judiciary have grown following the constitutional amendments made after the elections, which granting extensive executive authority to the presidential office, including the power to appoint almost all judges. Judgements made in recent political cases have largely involved fines instead of incarceration, which is thought to be a result of the subservience of the judiciary to the executive branch. Nevertheless, some efforts have been made to make the justice system more responsive, accountable and transparent. The most important needs have been identified and systems have been digitized. Conditions in prisons and detention centres in Kyrgyzstan are harsh, with overcrowding, limited access to food and medicine, and serious allegations of mistreatment. Organized criminal groups wield significant control in these spaces.

Despite the presence of law enforcement units dedicated to fighting various forms of organized crime, performance has been poor due to high levels of corruption and political influence, a constant lack of resources and professionalism, and nepotism. Police officers reportedly engage in arbitrary arrests, politically motivated arrests, and they extort people by threatening prosecution. There are similar reports suggesting serious human rights issues including the use of torture by law enforcement officers and security services. As a result, there is limited public trust in law enforcement bodies. However, public trust has been bolstered somewhat by community-based policing systems, which enhance cooperation between police, local government, civil society and the media.

Due to its mountainous topography and rough landscape, Kyrgyzstan’s borders are challenging to monitor, rendering the country vulnerable to organized crime. A lack of infrastructure also prevents the use of vehicles in border regions, making the borders highly porous, especially in southern Kyrgyzstan where high rates of organized crime occur. The Kyrgyz–Uzbek and Kyrgyz–Tajik borders, in particular, are difficult to monitor due to widespread criminality and long-standing ethnic tensions in those areas. Border-control personnel are poorly paid and under-resourced, making them vulnerable to corruption. Kyrgyzstan’s territorial integrity has been weakened by a flare up of the border conflict with Tajikistan – many clashes have occurred in recent years. In addition, cyber-espionage attacks threaten Kyrgyzstan’s national security.

Economic and financial environment

Kyrgyzstan has an extremely high risk of money laundering and terrorist financing, exacerbated by its proximity to terrorist groups in neighbouring countries and its position along major drug-trafficking routes. The country’s shadow economy is largely cash-based, making it more difficult for authorities to identify instances of money laundering and tax evasion. The existence of anti-money laundering legislation (AML) and a dedicated financial intelligence unit resulted in Kyrgyzstan being identified as not having any strategic AML deficiencies, but there are still major shortcomings in identifying risks and coordinating intelligence-sharing among law enforcement units.

Investment legislation is liberal, without significant limits and prohibitions for national and foreign investors willing to do business, even though competition in the market has been weak due to the instability of institutions, inadequate rules and omnipresent corruption. This liberal approach has been changing following the 2021 presidential elections: regulatory legislation has been introduced banning foreign companies from future large mining projects in the country. Another major legislative reform is the implementation of a tax code aimed at bolstering the stability of the tax system, creating equal conditions for doing business, and reducing the shadow economy.

Civil society and social protection

Despite measures taken by the government to support victims of organized crime, Kyrgyzstan continues to lack sufficient victim protection and treatment services. The limited services available were decreased even further in recent years due to a lack of funding exacerbated by the post-COVID-19 financial crisis. Gaps in identification procedures and the lack of a national referral mechanism impede the identification and assistance of victims. Despite cooperation between the country’s competent authorities with international organizations and NGOs to identify and assist trafficking victims, major shortcomings persist. For example, protective orders requested by victims of bride kidnappings are not enforced. Reports also suggest threats, extortion and even rape of child sex-trafficking victims by law enforcement officials. There is a legal framework pertaining to proper treatment of witnesses, but the implementation of this framework is rare. Government action related to victims of drug trafficking is better: the government continues to promote programmes aimed at reducing the harm caused by drugs, as well as victim-support measures and drug-awareness campaigns aimed at the youth. These programmes are supported by international funding and partnerships.

The government carries out prevention efforts related to organized crime, mostly through collaboration with civil society organizations. Overall, Kyrgyzstan’s approach to crime prevention revolves around awareness campaigns and training about the legal consequences of crime, especially in at-risk communities. Most of these prevention programmes have been significantly reduced due to a lack of funding.

Civil society organizations are active and effective, although they tend to focus on issues related to human and civil rights rather than organized crime. Although numerous NGOs work to combat high-level corruption and engage in legislative reform campaigns, civil society is hindered by inter-ethnic conflict and legal restrictions on the freedom of assembly and association – all of which have been exacerbated under the current regime. Although freedom of speech and freedom of the press are both provided for in law, these rights are severely restricted in practice. Self-censorship due to political pressure is common. Some journalists have been intimidated and harassed by political figures and subjected to arbitrary raids, arrests and cyber-attacks. Moreover, there are growing concerns about an attack on freedom of expression and association resulting from regulatory changes in recent years. These changes include the introduction of a false information law and a financial reporting scheme that has potential to be used as a tool for censorship and interference. Kyrgyzstan’s media landscape also lacks diversity: Uzbek- and Russian-language media outlets are limited.