The Organized Crime Index | ENACT
Year:
Indonesia
x
    United Kingdom

    Profile

    Indonesia

    Capital

    Jakarta

    Gross domestic product (GDP)

    USD 1,186,090.00 million

    Income group

    Lower middle income

    Population

    273,753,191

    Area

    1,916,907 km²

    Geography type

    Coastal

    6.850.48

    Criminality score

    20th of 193 countries 5

    8th of 46 countries in Asia1

    2nd of 11 countries in South-Eastern Asia1

    Criminal markets

    6.600.60

    An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.

    Human trafficking

    7.501.00

    Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.

    Human smuggling

    6.500.50

    Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.

    Extortion and protection racketeering

    6.00 n/a

    Crimes linked to exerting control over a territory/market including as a mediator and/or requesting a benefit in exchange for protection.

    Arms trafficking

    4.500.00

    The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.

    Trade in counterfeit goods

    7.50 n/a

    The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands.

    Illicit trade in excisable goods

    6.50 n/a

    The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits.

    Flora crimes

    8.000.50

    The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.

    Fauna crimes

    8.000.00

    The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.

    Non-renewable resource crimes

    8.000.50

    The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.

    Heroin trade

    3.500.00

    The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.

    Cocaine trade

    4.000.00

    The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.

    Cannabis trade

    6.500.00

    The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.

    Synthetic drug trade

    7.001.00

    The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.

    Cyber-dependent crimes

    7.50 n/a

    Organized crimes that rely solely on using information communications technology with the aim of obtaining a monetary/material benefit.

    Financial crimes

    8.00 n/a

    Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance.

    Criminal actors

    7.100.35

    An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.

    Mafia-style groups

    6.000.00

    Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.

    Criminal networks

    7.500.00

    Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.

    State-embedded actors

    8.000.50

    Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.

    Foreign actors

    6.000.00

    State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.

    Private sector actors

    8.00 n/a

    Profit-seeking individuals/entities who own/control a part of the legal economy free from the state, that collaborate with criminal actors.

    4.25-0.08

    Resilience score

    123rd of 193 countries -5

    23rd of 46 countries in Asia-1

    6th of 11 countries in South-Eastern Asia0

    Political leadership and governance

    4.000.00

    The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.

    Government transparency and accountability

    3.500.00

    The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.

    International cooperation

    6.000.50

    A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.

    National policies and laws

    5.000.00

    A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.

    Judicial system and detention

    3.500.00

    Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.

    Law enforcement

    3.50-0.50

    The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.

    Territorial integrity

    4.000.00

    The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.

    Anti-money laundering

    5.000.50

    A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.

    Economic regulatory capacity

    4.500.00

    The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.

    Victim and witness support

    4.50-0.50

    Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.

    Prevention

    4.00-0.50

    Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.

    Non-state actors

    3.50-0.50

    The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.

    4.25 7.10 6.60 4.25 7.10 6.60

    Analysis

    01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11

    People

    Human trafficking is a significant problem in Indonesia, which serves as a source, transit and destination country for trafficked people. Labour traffickers exploit Indonesians through coercion, including force and debt, in Asia and the Middle East. Fraudulent labour recruitment agents and subagents are responsible for more than half of the Indonesian female trafficking cases overseas. Women and children are particularly vulnerable to sexual exploitation, and tens of thousands of them become victims annually. Additionally, traffickers exploit women and girls in forced labour for domestic service, and children may be forced to participate in drug trafficking. The pandemic has made working-class Indonesians more vulnerable, especially women and children who have lost their savings and are more susceptible to exploitation. In fact, the scale of human trafficking in the country is estimated to have increased. Myanmar nationals are also reported to be increasingly vulnerable to human trafficking in Indonesia.

    Indonesia is also a significant source, transit and destination country for human smuggling, often linked to labour migration, which is facilitated by recruitment agents. Despite efforts to crack down on the fees charged by recruitment agencies, the practice continues, and corrupt officials reportedly facilitate the market. People transiting through Indonesia stay for an average of two to four weeks before switching smugglers, and border officials are believed to engage in bribery to provide falsified identity documents. Human smuggling serves as a means of economic survival for many Indonesians, especially in eastern regions such as Nusa Tenggara and Maluku. Migration flows along maritime routes from Indonesia to Malaysia continue to be dangerous and sometimes fatal, with smuggling mainly facilitated by Indonesian fishermen transporting asylum seekers. The reopening of the Malaysian economy is fuelling demand for foreign labour, and many Indonesians are seeking to return to Malaysia, where there are more than a million undocumented Indonesian workers. Rohingyas have also been smuggled from Indonesia to Malaysia.

    Extortion and protection racketeering are prevalent in Indonesia's informal economy, where syndicates control markets such as gambling and counterfeit goods. Financial crime syndicates have also taken advantage of the surge in online and delivery services, with illegal online lending syndicates, often collaborating with local authorities, becoming a growing problem. Historically, gangs of thugs and militias have controlled street markets and several types of economies, and new types of gangs and aggressive rent seekers continue to collect payments from local businesses.

    Trade

    Arms trafficking is a moderate problem in Indonesia, with the country serving as a destination for trafficked arms from neighbouring countries such as Cambodia, Myanmar and the Philippines. The demand for arms is generated by local actors such as rebel groups, separatist movements and terrorists, who use both online and offline networks to conduct transactions. This market has been fueled by internal conflicts, and the challenge of detecting and monitoring arms circulation has further exacerbated the situation. The proliferation of arms has resulted in rising rates of violence and communal conflict in regions such as Ambon, Maluku and Poso in Central Sulawesi. However, the arms market is smaller than other criminal markets in Indonesia, and the country has low distribution of small arms compared to other countries in the region.

    Counterfeit goods are a significant problem in Indonesia, as the country serves as a transit point for fake goods due to its proximity to China and its own local market for counterfeit goods. The trade has increased significantly, with e-commerce playing a major role in distribution. Despite complaints, e-commerce platforms in Indonesia have been slow to take down counterfeit materials, leading to calls for increased enforcement and specialized police forces to tackle the issue. Indonesia has been flagged as a country of concern internationally due to insufficient intellectual property protection and enforcement actions.

    The COVID-19 pandemic has caused a surge in illegal tobacco sales in Asian countries, with cigarettes being one of the most commonly smuggled goods in the region. Organized crime groups and syndicates are behind networks that smuggle these goods through countries in the region, with Malaysia’s and Indonesia’s lax laws making it harder to prosecute illegal trading syndicates. The complex excise tax system in Indonesia has incentivized domestic manufacturers to under-declare their liabilities, leading to a high demand for illegally produced cigarettes domestically.

    Environment

    Indonesia is a major hub for illegal logging, driven primarily by wood harvesting and the conversion of land for palm oil plantations. The industry involves powerful brokers, private sector entrepreneurs and local political leaders, with most profits staying within the country. The trade has major negative impacts on the environment, social relations and the Indonesian economy, with losses of billions of dollars per year in uncollected non-tax revenues. Despite attempts to curb the trade, including the introduction of a timber legality verification system, implementation remains weak, and the legal system has failed to punish those responsible for the crime. In fact, locals who engage in illegal logging are often punished while those who fund and profit from it avoid prosecution. During the COVID-19 pandemic, illegal logging of rainforests on the Indonesian island of Sulawesi is reported to have increased by almost three-quarters due to reduced monitoring activities.

    Indonesia also faces massive illegal wildlife trade, with poachers targeting endangered species such as tigers, pangolins, cockatoos and orangutans. The market is one of the largest criminal markets in the country, with significant overlap with the legal wildlife trade market. There is no accreditation mechanism to differentiate between animals that are commercially bred and those captured in the wild. The illegal wildlife trade is expanding due to hobby communities and social media networks, with almost all traded animals believed to be poached. In addition, Indonesia has a significant illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing industry, with foreign actors from neighbouring countries such as the Philippines, Vietnam and China involved in the crime.

    Illegal mining and drilling of non-renewable resources is a major issue in Indonesia, with millions of people participating across the country. The COVID-19 pandemic has led to an increase in artisanal mining, associated with safety concerns and environmental damage. Illegal mining for gold and other metals has resulted in fatalities, and illegal tin mining has raised tensions between miners and fishermen. The illegal mining market generates billions of dollars annually, making it one of the most significant criminal markets in Indonesia and South East Asia. Corruption is prevalent in the market, with low-level officials and the military allegedly receiving bribes to turn a blind eye to illegal activities. South Sumatra, home to Indonesia's largest coal reserves, has hundreds of thousands of hectares of land occupied by illegal mining operations. Illegal oil drilling also takes place in various provinces.

    Drugs

    Indonesia is a transit and destination country for heroin that is smuggled from Thailand, Laos and Myanmar. Although drug trafficking is a significant criminal market in Indonesia, the heroin trade is relatively small compared to other countries in the region. Corruption is rampant in the market, with reports of state-embedded actors accepting payments to facilitate illegal drug trades. The heroin trade in Indonesia is profitable for both domestic and foreign actors, and demand primarily comes from within the country.

    Bali is one of the most popular places for cocaine consumption and other drug use. While cocaine use in Indonesia is moderate, the drug is increasingly sold through social media platforms and transported via post. In 2022, the country's biggest cocaine seizure to date was made. Cannabis is mainly used in the northern part of Sumatra for cooking and producing cigarettes and herbal medicine, and it is mostly grown for domestic consumption. Although both locals and foreign nationals participate in the cannabis trade, locals play a more significant role in the market.

    The synthetic drug trade in Indonesia is thriving, with methamphetamine being the most widely used and seized drug. Methamphetamine in the country is produced by Middle Eastern and Chinese criminal organizations, and Indonesia serves as a transit country for methamphetamine being transported to Australia and New Zealand. The synthetic drug market is highly sophisticated, with major established domestic producers enjoying state backing. The synthetic drug trade continues to become more prevalent, and drug consumption in general has risen significantly in the country.

    Cyber Crimes

    Indonesia boasts one of the world's largest digital economies, but its vulnerability to cyber-attacks is a growing concern. This is due in part to a shortage of skilled professionals and inadequate digital infrastructure. During the COVID-19 pandemic, cyber-attacks increased fivefold, making it even more challenging to regulate and enforce data protection, especially when the government is accused of using cyber-malware and surveillance software against its critics. Data breaches are prevalent in Indonesia, but there has been little effort to address security vulnerabilities or provide recourse for victims. Cybercriminals have capitalized on the pandemic by creating fake apps to monitor COVID-19, which has resulted in unsuspecting victims inadvertently installing malware on their devices. The most common cybercrime methods in Indonesia include malware and distributed denial-of-service, with no specific targets. The origin of these attacks is challenging to identify, but there may be transnational criminal networks profiting from these operations.

    Financial Crimes

    Illegal online trading platforms have proliferated in Indonesia, with influencers promoting fraudulent apps that attract investors to trade stocks, resulting in millions of dollars in losses. Financial crime syndicates are constantly coming up with new ways to infiltrate financial systems for a profit, and many banks in the Asia-Pacific region report that new digital services have led to increased losses to online financial fraud. Every hour, tens of thousands of reports of financial fraud flood into Indonesia, with senior management of companies found to be responsible for most cases, often by recording fictitious sales.

    Criminal Actors

    Over the past two decades, mafia-style groups in Indonesia have evolved into looser and more mobile networks. Although the government does not officially recognize their existence, some of these groups have existed since the 1980s and have been supported by wealthy and/or military families. These groups are involved in a range of sectors, including property, gambling, drugs, car dealerships, forestry, mining and manufacturing. They typically have low membership and secretive internal structures. Other mafia-style groups in Indonesia include paramilitary-style militias, which have a long history in the country and are linked to police and military elites, or to competition between regional and national political parties. These groups often make money through debt collection, informal security provision and other coercive tactics.

    State-embedded actors have significant control over criminal markets in Indonesia, and corruption is rampant at both national and regional levels. This includes the procurement of goods and services, licensing, bribery, budget misuse, illegal taxation, money laundering and obstruction of corruption investigations. Prison officers and border control officers are believed to facilitate drug trafficking operations. State-embedded actors also appear to influence the democratic process by buying votes to acquire strategic political positions.

    Criminal networks are significant in Indonesia and are believed to be involved in various forms of organized crime, including drug trafficking, human trafficking and terrorism. Many criminal networks include state actors, making it difficult to distinguish between criminal and corrupt state networks. The networks often influence the democratic process by participating in political campaigns and buying votes. Larger criminal networks adhering to religious interests have also carried out terror-like operations. Criminal human trafficking networks are believed to exist primarily in rural areas, especially in eastern Indonesia.

    Foreign criminal actors are heavily involved in Indonesia's human trafficking and drug trafficking markets. Chinese and Myanmar organizations reportedly fund the production of methamphetamine in Myanmar and transport the drugs through Malaysia into Indonesia. Meanwhile, Middle Eastern organizations produce methamphetamine in the Pakistan–Afghanistan border region and transport it using vessels with Iranian crews. Motorcycle gangs have also expanded internationally, with ad hoc and disorganized connections to amphetamine and weapons trafficking. Foreign and local criminal actors in Indonesia reportedly have a high level of interaction.

    Private sector corruption is a serious concern in Indonesia. Private companies control most of the country's land mass, often paying the police and military to guard their concessions in mining and logging industries, which results in the persecution of local communities. The powerful elites controlling landed interests are linked to issues like deforestation, illegal logging and illegal palm oil development, with one in five hectares of palm oil being illegal. Private sector actors are also involved in illegal plastic supply chains, with many legal businesses mislabelling waste and plastic shipments to raise profits and engaging in money laundering and other illegal activities.

    Leadership and governance

    In recent years, Indonesia's political leadership and governance have faced criticism for a decline in state legitimacy, human rights, economic equality and security. The current administration has been accused of attempting to maintain its power and potentially avoid elections, with calls from ministers to defer elections and amend the constitution to allow the president to stay in office for three consecutive administrations instead of two. Polling shows that Indonesians are not interested in postponing elections, and the current president's approval has fallen steeply, largely due to a rise in cooking oil prices and allegations of government corruption and the existence of palm oil cartels. It is reported that organized crime is not seriously dealt with, and several internal conflicts between the government and separatist movements threaten government resilience to organized crime.

    The hobbling of the anti-corruption commission has made it difficult to root out illegality and criminality in Indonesia. The current president has been accused of using the threat of crime, particularly illegal drugs, to secure favourable election results. This has also further politicized the police, who are known to be politically loyal to the president. Currently, the anti-corruption agency's role has shifted away from prosecution to prevention. Despite attempts to weaken the institution, they continue to investigate high-profile politicians and government officials for their involvement in corruption.

    Indonesia has ratified all international treaties related to organized crime and established extradition agreements with several countries. It prioritizes international cooperation to combat organized crime and contributes to the efforts of regional organizations, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, to address transnational organized crimes such as people smuggling, human trafficking, drug trafficking and cybercrime. Indonesia has been strengthening its collaboration efforts to tackle cybercrime with other allies in the region, such as Australia. However, several countries believe that Indonesia is not doing enough against Chinese cyber and physical capabilities.

    Indonesia has a legal framework in place to combat organized criminal activities, with most anti-crime legislation focusing on drug, flora and fauna crimes and forestry and illegal fishing crimes. However, concerns have been raised about the revision of the Corruption Act, which may weaken state capacities to tackle corruption. Despite the government's aim to improve the country's fight against crime, critics worry that projected changes in the penal code will allow authoritarian action against certain minorities.

    Criminal justice and security

    Indonesia's judicial system lacks specific units to deal with organized crime, and corruption and fraud persist in all state spheres, giving criminals a means to interfere with prosecutions. Judicial authorities have a low awareness of trafficking crimes and relevant legislation, and illegal logging cases are not frequently pursued, with only a handful of companies facing legal action. Prisons are overcrowded and conditions are harsh, with some drug networks operating inside them. Although the police have a mandate to combat organized crime, Indonesia's law enforcement agencies lack specific units dedicated to tackling it. Many believe that current capacities remain insufficient, particularly due to a lack of training in controlling Indonesia's maritime boundary. Corruption at all levels of government impedes law enforcement's efforts to address criminal markets, with the police having a reputation for corruption. The police have also been accused of being politicized, with weak horizontal accountability.

    Indonesia's vast number of remote areas and weak border infrastructure make it particularly vulnerable to transnational organized crime. Efforts to combat drug trafficking have been hampered by poor border management and lack of necessary infrastructure. However, the government has been working on developing border infrastructure for almost a decade and has collaborated with neighbouring countries to improve border control. During the pandemic, Indonesia limited crossings at several check-points, but experts expected a rebound in illegal border crossings as the country reopened. Insufficient information and communications infrastructure make it challenging to connect Indonesia's geographically dispersed population digitally. The government's plan to create three new provinces in Papua has been met with opposition from native Papuans, who see it as an attempt to break up the separatist movement rather than an effort to address border issues.

    Economic and financial environment

    Indonesia has made significant efforts to combat money laundering by implementing legislation and adopting standard international recommendations. The country's financial intelligence agency is responsible for preventing money laundering, managing data and information, supervising compliance and investigating financial transactions. Although disclosing beneficial ownership is mandated, no tangible outcomes have been seen yet. In June 2021, the Constitutional Court expanded the interpretation of the money laundering law, allowing all civil servants authorized to investigate crimes to conduct parallel money laundering investigations. This move is expected to increase investigations related to environmental crimes such as illegal logging. In recent years, the majority of cases reported on this crime have been related to terrorist financing, followed by corruption and tax evasion.

    The Indonesian government is working to improve the country's economic competitiveness and accelerate post-pandemic economic recovery. New legislation includes provisions to lower corporate taxes, simplify business licences, reform labour laws and reduce bureaucratic and regulatory investment barriers. However, some experts question the ability of the new laws to guarantee economic regulatory capacity or sustainable growth. The government is also considering introducing new taxes, including a value added tax increase and a wealth tax on the rich, to rebalance the country's finances after borrowing and spending during the COVID-19 crisis. The pandemic has forced the government to borrow heavily and invest large sums of money, leading to a crackdown on tax evasion with the aid of training, financial data and international agreements to follow the money trail more efficiently. Preventative laws are in place to combat tax crimes, and those found guilty may face fines of two to four times the failed payment value and prison sentences ranging from six months to two, or even six, years. E-commerce is rapidly growing as a market platform for advertising in Indonesia, but criminal actors have taken advantage of these platforms to sell illicit items such as drugs, fauna and flora. While there is no evidence of criminal groups being involved in the regulation of economic markets, it is possible that corrupt officials have aided criminal actors in influencing economic decisions.

    Civil society and social protection

    Indonesia has implemented measures to support victims of and witnesses to crimes, including human trafficking and drug-related crimes. However, there have been allegations that the witness and victim protection agency has had slow response times and been oppositional to witnesses. Limited support is available for whistle-blowers, and victims of sexual assault often hesitate to report incidents due to cultural norms and conservative Muslim beliefs. Civil society organizations supplement government services for male victims, and funds have been allocated to support Indonesian victims of human trafficking abroad. NGOs have established rehabilitation centres for drug users and victims of drug-related crimes.

    To combat organized crime, including human trafficking, forced labour and drug abuse, the Indonesian government has established prevention strategies. The government has created various task forces and distributed awareness materials to address these issues. However, NGOs have raised concerns about the effectiveness of the government's ban on Indonesian fishermen working aboard Chinese-flagged vessels to prevent trafficking for forced labour. The government also lacks standard operating procedures for proactive victim identification and referral to rehabilitation services. Nevertheless, mechanisms are available for local communities to report organized crime through call centres, texts or online platforms. Efforts to increase financial inclusion and literacy among the population, particularly the 97% of the workforce that lacks access to formal banking, are being made. However, the country faces challenges in preventing financial crimes such as online trading and gambling, which pose a threat to the economy.

    Indonesia's government has been accused of failing to grant press freedom, with a rise in attacks on journalists, particularly those covering the environment and natural resources. While an independent media is protected by the Constitution, the government sometimes restricts the media using regulations relating to blasphemy, hate speech, defamation and false information. In addition, concerns have been raised over the operation of cyber police units, which experts believe to be detrimental to free speech, and a new agency regulating academic research has raised questions about the independence of scholarship. Civil society is under constant threat, and its space is shrinking. NGOs and other non-governmental groups are obliged by law to register in a government database, and they suffer harassment from government and religious groups. Attacks against human rights defenders have increased in recent years.

    Profile

    United Kingdom

    Capital

    London

    Gross domestic product (GDP)

    USD 3,131,380.00 million

    Income group

    High income

    Population

    67,326,569

    Area

    243,610 km²

    Geography type

    Coastal

    5.750.86

    Criminality score

    61st of 193 countries 38

    10th of 44 countries in Europe7

    2nd of 11 countries in Western Europe2

    Criminal markets

    5.501.10

    An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.

    Human trafficking

    7.001.00

    Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.

    Human smuggling

    6.001.00

    Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.

    Extortion and protection racketeering

    6.00 n/a

    Crimes linked to exerting control over a territory/market including as a mediator and/or requesting a benefit in exchange for protection.

    Arms trafficking

    4.501.00

    The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.

    Trade in counterfeit goods

    6.50 n/a

    The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands.

    Illicit trade in excisable goods

    6.00 n/a

    The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits.

    Flora crimes

    3.000.50

    The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.

    Fauna crimes

    4.000.00

    The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.

    Non-renewable resource crimes

    2.500.50

    The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.

    Heroin trade

    4.500.00

    The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.

    Cocaine trade

    7.000.50

    The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.

    Cannabis trade

    5.501.00

    The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.

    Synthetic drug trade

    6.000.50

    The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.

    Cyber-dependent crimes

    6.50 n/a

    Organized crimes that rely solely on using information communications technology with the aim of obtaining a monetary/material benefit.

    Financial crimes

    7.50 n/a

    Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance.

    Criminal actors

    6.000.63

    An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.

    Mafia-style groups

    4.500.50

    Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.

    Criminal networks

    7.000.50

    Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.

    State-embedded actors

    3.500.50

    Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.

    Foreign actors

    7.50-0.50

    State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.

    Private sector actors

    7.50 n/a

    Profit-seeking individuals/entities who own/control a part of the legal economy free from the state, that collaborate with criminal actors.

    7.54-0.33

    Resilience score

    12th of 193 countries -4

    9th of 44 countries in Europe-3

    3rd of 11 countries in Western Europe-1

    Political leadership and governance

    7.50-0.50

    The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.

    Government transparency and accountability

    6.50-1.00

    The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.

    International cooperation

    7.50-0.50

    A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.

    National policies and laws

    8.00-0.50

    A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.

    Judicial system and detention

    8.00-0.50

    Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.

    Law enforcement

    7.500.00

    The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.

    Territorial integrity

    8.500.00

    The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.

    Anti-money laundering

    6.500.00

    A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.

    Economic regulatory capacity

    7.500.00

    The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.

    Victim and witness support

    7.00-0.50

    Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.

    Prevention

    7.500.00

    Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.

    Non-state actors

    8.50-0.50

    The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.

    7.54 6.00 5.50 7.54 6.00 5.50

    Analysis

    01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11

    People

    The UK is a major destination for human trafficking victims, mostly from Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe. Exploitation in the form of forced labour and sexual trafficking is common for both domestic and foreign victims. Victims who are subject to forced labour are mostly exploited in sectors such as agriculture, construction and domestic service. Trafficking victims are also forced to take part in criminal activities such as cannabis cultivation and the drug trade. Children and vulnerable adults are also trafficked, primarily for sexual exploitation, with children comprising one-fourth to one-third of reported victims. Irregular migrants, specifically unaccompanied children, are particularly vulnerable to trafficking in the country. Traffickers use various methods to exploit their victims, including debt bondage, confiscation of documents and threats of violence. Online platforms are also increasingly used for human trafficking.

    The UK is also facing a significant challenge due to irregular migration and human smuggling, primarily caused by visa overstaying and document fraud. Thousands of undocumented individuals are camping in the UK border region, vulnerable to exploitation by organized crime groups. These groups, especially those active in France, are heavily involved in smuggling and charge large sums of money for their illegal services. The most common way for smuggled individuals to enter the UK is in lorries or other commercial vehicles transported by rail or ferry, subjecting them to significant personal risk. Recently, there has been a surge in the use of small boats for irregular crossings of the English Channel, which has gained popularity as a more affordable and swifter smuggling method compared to the aforementioned means of transportation. Although some limited law enforcement operations have been carried out, the response has not been systematically focused on interdiction and action against the organizers. UK-based networks have links with countries such as Albania, Ukraine and Romania, and are highly adaptable.

    Extortion and protection racketeering are persistent issues in the UK, with foreign groups, particularly from Asia, often engaging in protection rackets within their ethnic communities. National organized criminal groups also engage in extortion practices, victimizing individuals and businesses. Northern Ireland has a long history of extortion to maintain paramilitary control, generating millions of pounds per year for paramilitary organizations. However, due to underreporting, the full scope of the issue is challenging to assess. In recent years, cyber-affiliated extortion and blackmail have been increasing. While less than a tenth of extortion attempts are likely to be reported to the police due to victims' fears of reputational damage or retaliation, extortion are still prevalent crimes and more likely to be linked to organized crime.

    Trade

    The UK's strict policy and law enforcement measures have helped maintain a low rate of gun crime. However, the smuggling of military-grade firearms into the country by organized crime groups and urban gangs is a priority threat. The increasing use of firearms in connection with organized crime has resulted in high-profile incidents where innocent members of the public have been killed. Firearms are often trafficked into the UK from Central and Eastern Europe, concealed in vehicles on channel ferry and tunnel routes. The online trade, particularly on the dark web, is also a distribution route for illegal firearms. The rise of 3D printing has altered the market and supply for firearms people sought to purchase or produce firearms domestically as an alternative to weapons smuggled from abroad.

    Counterfeiting and piracy are costly problems for the British economy. While luxury goods and apparel remain prime targets for counterfeiters, criminals are increasingly turning to more dangerous items, such as medicines, medical equipment, car parts, toys, food, cosmetics and household electrical goods. Brexit changes have made the UK more vulnerable to the trade of counterfeit goods, as the UK no longer has direct access to the EU-wide intelligence database used to alert authorities to intercept shipments and routes used by counterfeiters. The revenue and customs authority has implemented an equivalent UK system known as the Intellectual Property Office intelligence hub since Britain left the EU, but its efficacy remains to be seen. Counterfeiting is also linked to other criminal activities such as the narcotics trade, money laundering and terrorism, which raises concerns.

    The illicit trade of excise goods, such as tobacco products and alcoholic beverages, is a significant issue, with criminal networks using a range of tactics to smuggle and trade these products. The UK's exit from the EU has presented challenges for authorities seeking to combat the illicit trade of excisable goods due to limited intelligence-sharing and cooperation with EU countries. However, the UK government has responded by revising laws and implementing measures to increase enforcement, such as deploying overseas intelligence officers, adding customs officers and increasing the use of x-ray scanners.

    Environment

    Illegal flora trafficking is an issue in the UK, with Heathrow airport being the primary point of seizure. The illegal harvest of protected plants, including rare orchid species, is also a concern, and enforcement is challenging due to difficulties in identifying protected species. Although there is limited data available on wild plant-related crimes domestically, reports of illegal uprooting of bluebell bulbs have emerged. Additionally, the UK serves as a crucial transit route for illegal flora trafficking in Europe. Wildlife trafficking is also a severe problem, with the UK serving as a transit and destination point for illegally-traded species such as live birds, reptile parts and products made from tigers, rhinos and elephants. In fact, the UK ranks among the top global wildlife importers. Fauna crimes in the UK include hare coursing, fish and deer poaching, and the persecution of badgers, birds of prey and bats.

    Non-renewable resource crimes in the UK are generally limited in influence and value, with only a few isolated cases of gold theft and illicit export of precious metals. Criminal activity related to the oil trade, primarily in Northern Ireland, is mainly in the form of excise fraud. Fuel theft has increased following rising fuel prices due to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Although non-renewable resource crimes have a limited impact on society, excise fraud related to oil remains a concern. The illicit outbound movement of precious metals appears to have increased, with gold being used to launder criminal funds.

    Drugs

    The UK's heroin trade is controlled by organized crime groups which primarily import it from Afghanistan via Pakistan. The majority of these groups are poly-drug distributors, making it difficult to separate their activities into individual commodities. Heroin is imported by various methods, but public transport is frequently used in heroin imports from Dublin. The decrease in interdiction at the UK border as a result of the border force focusing more on human smuggling, has led to increased heroin on British streets. Heroin and opiates account for almost half of all drug-related deaths.

    The UK is a large and profitable market for cocaine. The drug is typically smuggled via maritime container ships arriving at European hub ports such as Antwerp and Rotterdam, and subsequently transported to the UK. Albanian criminal organizations are major players in the cocaine market, and UK-based groups involved in the trade are also increasing. Evidence suggests that crack cocaine use is rising in England and Wales. The county lines drug distribution model is characterized by the exploitation of children and young individuals, the creation and takeover of rural drug markets, and violence and intimidation tactics used to enforce discipline.

    Cannabis is the most commonly seized and used drug in the UK. While recreational use of cannabis is illegal, there has been growing interest in its use for medicinal purposes. Law enforcement is increasingly tolerating personal use of cannabis, but organized crime groups still supply a large chunk of the cannabis market. COVID-19 has led to an increase in domestic cannabis cultivation, but most cannabis is still imported by land, sea and air transport from countries like Afghanistan, Morocco and the Netherlands. Albanian gangs have overtaken Vietnamese gangs in dominating the cannabis farm market in the country. Albanian gangs are known to recruit migrant workers for these illicit cannabis farms, and are reportedly exploiting loopholes in the Modern Slavery Act to avoid prosecution.

    The synthetic drug trade in the UK is controlled by organized criminal gangs, and consumption of synthetic drugs has led to an increase in the number of deaths related to drug abuse in the country. The UK drug market has diversified with the emergence of a variety of new psychoactive substances, commonly referred to as legal highs. The drugs most commonly trafficked to the UK are stimulants such as amphetamine, methylamphetamine and ecstasy (MDMA). The chemicals necessary for amphetamine production continue to enter the country; street prices of amphetamine have dropped, indicating rising availability of the drug.

    Cyber Crimes

    In the field of cybercrime, the distinction between nation-states and criminal groups is increasingly blurred, making it difficult for UK enforcement agencies to attribute responsibility. Home-grown cybercriminals are becoming more sophisticated and pose a rising threat. As the country moves towards becoming a cashless society and the public's knowledge of technology increases, the threat of cybercrime continues to grow. The most frequent cyber-threat is that of low-sophistication malware attacks targeting businesses and the public. Social media and email hacking have also increased significantly, with ransomware and distributed denial-of-service attacks posing a significant threat to UK businesses and organizations. The majority of ransomware criminal groups that target the UK are based in and around Russia. While it is unclear to what extent these groups are directed by the Kremlin, they are known to benefit from the tacit consent of the Russian state. The evolving technical capabilities of malware have also facilitated new crimes such as crypto-mining malware that targets digital currencies like Bitcoin. These digital currencies also pose a significant risk of facilitating illegal activity on the dark web, including the illegal drug market, weapons trading and child exploitation.

    Financial Crimes

    Financial crimes, including fraud, constitute the largest stand-alone crime type in England and Wales, where the majority of reported cases of fraud is cyber-enabled. Digital fraud has risen substantially in the UK, with account takeovers and payment transfer frauds increasing exponentially. Organized UK cybercrime groups are motivated by profit, and new and innovative fraud types continue to emerge. The British economy's openness to foreign capital and investment, its integration into the global financial system and business-friendly regulatory frameworks make it vulnerable to criminal exploitation. Limited liability partnerships (LLPs) in the UK are linked to a range of corruption cases, including embezzlement, misuse of public resources and tax and sanctions evasion, as well as weapons and goods smuggling. The scale of corruption schemes in the UK is enormous, worth billions of pounds over the past decade. The abuse of UK companies in these schemes can be attributed, in large part, to the permissive environment that enables the formation of secretive UK legal entities en masse. Weak checks on information, quick and easy formation, transparency loopholes and ineffective supervision and enforcement contribute to these deficiencies. Financial crime is a significant threat to the security and prosperity of the UK, impacting citizens, private sector businesses and the government. The lack of law enforcement response and separation of fraud and identity theft, even when stolen identities are used to commit fraud, has increased public anxiety.

    Criminal Actors

    Foreign criminal groups, including Asian, Russian and Balkan organized crime syndicates, continue to operate in the UK. Albanian gangs are believed to be consolidating power in the UK criminal underworld, particularly in the cocaine market. Russian organized crime groups are also increasing their hold and influence in the UK, involved in money laundering, cyber-attacks and targeted assassinations. There is growing evidence of significant relationships between oligarchs connected to Russia and businesses connected to members of parliament and the political establishment. Chinese state-owned enterprises also pose a significant challenge to the UK’s national security due to their penetration of critical national infrastructure, particularly communication networks. They also control much of the precursor chemical market, necessary for drug production, and the market in production and distribution of counterfeit goods. However, the extent of foreign actors’ participation in some of the criminal activities carried out in the country is sometimes inflated by the media and the government’s rhetoric.

    Domestic criminal organizations, including mafia-style groups, have been expanding their influence in certain areas of the UK, especially in London, Liverpool, Birmingham and Glasgow. These organizations are primarily involved in drug cartels and money laundering. Some of them maintain a family-based structure and have small-level units disbursed across the country. However, this actor-type has expanded only moderately in recent years, allowing more organized crime groups that operate as loose networks to proliferate. These groups work with different nationalities, blend legal and illegal activities, and collaborate with major money launderers. In the UK, criminal networks have a significant presence, with thousands of groups operating and a considerable portion of the country's GDP consisting of laundered criminal money. Modern criminal networks are defined as self-formed associations that engage in serious and continuous crime for mutual profit and power, primarily focusing on the illegal drug market, firearms, modern slavery and immigration crimes.

    The British government has updated its plans to tackle economic crime and fraud in the private sector, which has been linked to money laundering and tax evasion. However, the existence of a network of enablers based in the UK, who facilitate large-scale money laundering, poses a significant reputational risk to the country's integrity. These enablers include accountants, lawyers, investment managers, notaries and company formation agents who assist in moving, cleaning, spending and defending ill-gotten gains within the legitimate economy. In fact, a significant number of all LLPs ever incorporated in the UK show major red flags for their use in high-end financial crimes.

    The state, for its part, denies any active involvement in organized crime, though isolated cases of state-embedded criminal actors have been reported. Concerns have been raised about corruption in the judicial system and connections between members of the UK establishment and Russian oligarchs.

    Leadership and governance

    The UK is considered to be a stable country. The government's commitment to tackling organized crime is evident in its transparent approach to crime levels. This includes sharing accurate data on firearm use, drug seizures and imports, and deaths caused by illegal substances. However, years of cuts to the police service have resulted in the lowest number of officers for decades, and the country's reliance on the private sector to raise funds and tackle crime as ‘first line defenders’ has increased. Leadership in the UK has been problematic, with scandals leading to frequent changes in prime ministers. As a result, the public has lost faith in the current government, particularly with the increase in inflation and interest rates. There are also concerns about corruption, nepotism and an overall lack of transparency which particularly attracted attention in recent years following the awarding of public contracts. Such deals between the government and private companies have been deemed unlawful, sparking public concern and a renewed debate on banning second jobs for members of parliament to protect democracy. Even though the government claims that transparency and accountability are at the forefront of its policies, there has been an increasing lack of trust among the citizens towards the government due to the recent scandals and corruption cases.

    The UK has ratified all relevant international treaties against organized crime, except the UN Firearms Protocol. The country actively engages in mutual legal assistance in criminal matters and asset recovery, but cooperation with neighbouring countries is complicated due to the uncertain nature of the future relationship with the EU. Brexit negotiations and the influx of foreign nationals have placed pressure on UK relations with France, and there is a question of whether UK-EU foreign policy cooperation will become much more reactive rather than strategic and long-term. The UK has yet to conclude cooperation treaties or bilateral agreements with EU member states in the areas of judicial and law enforcement cooperation. As of today, Brexit appears to have had a tangible negative effect on the UK's ability to tackle the trade in counterfeit goods. The UK has implemented a range of policies and laws to combat organized crime, including human, arms and drug trafficking, as well as environmental crime. Nonetheless, concerns have been raised over the Nationality and Borders Bill, which undermines the 1951 Refugee Convention, and plans to send smuggled individuals and asylum seekers to Rwanda while their claims are considered.

    Criminal justice and security

    The legal system in the UK is not unified, with separate systems in England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. While the judiciary is independent, the prosecution services have been criticized for being weak, as the number of cases prosecuted has declined despite an increase in fraud. The prison system has faced challenges, including a growing backlog of court cases that was exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, concerns about corruption and drug availability, and reports of increased use of force against prisoners. The use of mobile phones remains a problem across prisons, as it enables contact between inmates and outside gangs.

    The UK has an independent and well-resourced law enforcement system, with the National Crime Agency leading the fight against serious and organized crime, economic crime, fraud, corruption, cybercrime and child exploitation. However, individual cases of fraud and economic crime are considered low priority, and UK law enforcement still lacks the capability to deal with the full range of threats from organized crime, such as wildlife trafficking, money laundering and foreign-based human trafficking gangs. The Metropolitan Police is the largest police force in the UK, but recent failures have led to public distrust and concerns over recruitment standards. The UK government has also been criticized for measures that broaden police powers and restrict protest and assembly rights in England and Wales, which led to mass protests. Additionally, UK police have been accused of using stop-and-search powers disproportionately, with black people being seven times more likely to be searched than white people.

    Since leaving the EU, the UK has maintained strict border controls, with increased restrictions on EU nationals and visitors requiring visas for extended travel to EU member states. One area of contention remains the future border arrangements between Ireland and Northern Ireland, with concerns over regulatory divergence and the potential for increased smuggling. The UK faces a small but complex and unpredictable terrorist threat, with the threat level having been raised to 'severe' in previous years.

    Economic and financial environment

    The UK is estimated to be one of the world's most prominent hubs for money laundering, with criminals laundering billions of pounds every year. Although it is not identified as having any significant strategic anti-money laundering shortcomings, the UK is categorized as a major concern for financial crime. Despite this, the country has a strong and effective system to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, as well as to recover illicit funds. The ease of money laundering, particularly in London, has been widely criticized, as well as the fact that the UK has several tax haven jurisdictions. Several large-scale money-laundering operations have been discovered that run through banks in the Baltic and Nordic regions to the UK. The main source of these funds appears to be countries within the former Soviet Union, particularly Russia and Azerbaijan, with many linked to significant corruption cases. A frequent characteristic of these ‘laundromats’ is the widespread use of legal entities established in the UK as channels for funds with questionable origins. LLPs and Scottish limited partnerships were commonly employed in these schemes. Known criminal activities facilitated by British LLPs include Russian tax fraud; large-scale bank thefts in Moldova, Kazakhstan and Ukraine; bribery and money laundering by Mexican drug cartels; and corruption in the Nigerian defence sector.

    The UK has one of the freest economies globally, with a highly effective and transparent regulatory environment that places a strong emphasis on independent economic regulation. The private sector is dominated by small- and medium-sized enterprises, which account for the majority of businesses. However, the impact of Brexit may threaten investment and limit trade flows with the EU, the UK's largest economic partner. As part of its post-Brexit commercial strategy, the UK has secured trade deals with Australia, Japan and other countries.

    Civil society and social protection

    The UK has a witness protection scheme in place to safeguard those who have provided evidence against a crime and are at risk. In addition, support teams are available across England and Wales to help victims and witnesses recover after a crime. Local support is free even if the crime has not been reported to the police. The government has invested heavily in research and has introduced minimum standards of care in all future contracts for support services to adult trafficking victims. However, the government’s efforts to combat human trafficking have been mixed. Concerns have been raised over the treatment of foreign victims and the vulnerability of workers from the European Economic Area. Furthermore, plans to send migrants and asylum seekers to Rwanda while their claims are considered have raised fears over the human rights record in the receiving country, and the potential for exploitation by organized crime groups.

    The UK government is committed to preventing various forms of organized crime, such as drug trafficking, human smuggling and fraud, and has implemented numerous campaigns and prevention programmes to achieve this goal. The government has published a 10-year plan to reduce the supply and demand for drugs and deliver a high-quality treatment and recovery system. Strategies for achieving these goals include restricting upstream flow, securing the border and targeting the middle market.

    The UK is considered a stable democracy with a strong record of protecting political rights and civil liberties. However, recent years have seen concerns over increased government surveillance, rising Islamophobia and anti-immigrant sentiment. While the country has an independent media, concerns have been raised about impartiality and freedom of information restrictions. The government's commitment to defending global media freedom has been called into question due to domestic restrictions, such as blacklisting critical media outlets and threats of libel action. The concentration of power and influence in the hands of a few media companies has also threatened pluralism in the British media landscape. Despite these issues, the UK has an active civil society and academic sector, as well as a large number of NGOs and charities. It also has a high level of social cohesion and many community-run initiatives, suggesting a strong sense of social support and generosity within society.

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    The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to 10. The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel.

    How to measure organized crime?

    A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.

    Read more on globalinitiative.net
    How to measure organized crime?

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    This report was funded in part by a grant from the United States Department of State.

    ENACT is funded by the European Union and implemented by the Institute for Security Studies and INTERPOL, in affiliation with the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.

    The opinions, findings and conclusions stated herein are those of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State.