How to measure organized crime?
A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.
Read more on globalinitiative.netCriminal markets
4.73-0.02
An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.
Human trafficking
6.500.50
Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.
Human smuggling
6.500.50
Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.
Extortion and protection racketeering
2.00 n/a
Crimes linked to exerting control over a territory/market including as a mediator and/or requesting a benefit in exchange for protection.
Arms trafficking
4.501.00
The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.
Trade in counterfeit goods
4.00 n/a
The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands.
Illicit trade in excisable goods
4.00 n/a
The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits.
Flora crimes
4.000.50
The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.
Fauna crimes
4.00-0.50
The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.
Non-renewable resource crimes
3.500.00
The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.
Heroin trade
5.000.50
The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.
Cocaine trade
5.000.00
The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cannabis trade
5.500.00
The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.
Synthetic drug trade
6.000.50
The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cyber-dependent crimes
5.00 n/a
Organized crimes that rely solely on using information communications technology with the aim of obtaining a monetary/material benefit.
Financial crimes
5.50 n/a
Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance.
Criminal actors
4.500.25
An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.
Mafia-style groups
1.000.00
Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.
Criminal networks
4.000.00
Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.
State-embedded actors
7.000.00
Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.
Foreign actors
5.500.50
State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.
Private sector actors
5.00 n/a
Profit-seeking individuals/entities who own/control a part of the legal economy free from the state, that collaborate with criminal actors.
Political leadership and governance
4.500.00
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
3.500.00
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
4.50-0.50
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
5.00-0.50
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
5.000.00
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
5.00-1.00
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
6.50-0.50
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
5.500.00
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
4.500.00
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
4.500.00
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
6.000.00
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
4.000.00
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Hungary is a major source and transit country for human trafficking, which is among the country’s largest criminal markets. Victims of human trafficking are primarily subjected to sexual exploitation and forced labour. Foreign nationals who come to the country in pursuit of work are increasingly subjected to domestic labour trafficking in rural Hungary. Meanwhile, Hungarian nationals are trafficked for forced labour within the country and outside it in the UK, Belgium and the Netherlands. Hungarian women lured into sham marriages with third-country nationals in Europe are also reportedly subjected to forced prostitution, while men are subjected to labour trafficking in agriculture, construction and factories in Western Europe. Hungarian Roma women are often manipulated by perpetrators into sex trafficking, while child sex trafficking victims generally come from state-provided childcare institutions and correctional facilities. The criminal market is mainly run by transnational organized crime groups, criminals and repeating criminal offenders.
The human smuggling market in Hungary is growing and has been exacerbated by the effects of the war in Ukraine. Most human smuggling in Hungary takes place along the Hungarian–Serbian border, which has become a point of tension amid the European migrant crisis. Hungary is a transit and source country for human smuggling, especially by land, and irregular border crossings are reportedly increasing at the Hungarian–Slovakian border. Irregular migrants, often from Syria, Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan, are known to regularly enter Hungary by sea, usually in fishing boats, in the Danube Delta region, through Türkiye to Romania. Criminal gangs from Bulgaria are known to recruit Ukrainian and Georgian nationals to carry out such smuggling activities. In addition, Serbian, Turkish and Hungarian smugglers are also involved in this criminal market.
Extortion and racketeering are not common practices in Hungary. However, small-scale extortion occurs in the private sector, but is prevented in the public sector, which is heavily controlled by the state. Private-sector extortion and racketeering are connected to local gangs and criminal groups, who usually work on their own and extort from local businesses, such as restaurants and bars. Racketeering is conducted in specific markets, such as construction and small-scale sales.
Hungary has seen a decrease in the number of registered criminal offences involving firearms and ammunition. However, it remains a source country for illicit firearms destined for countries such as Romania. In addition, blank-firing weapons are acquired without a licence in Hungary to be trafficked to other European countries. Small weapons manufacturers have been accused of selling illegal firearms, mainly stockpiles of old military weapons after the fall of the Soviet Union. Criminals involved in other forms of trafficking and far-right groups are known to also be involved in arms trafficking in Hungary. The war in Ukraine is expected to have consequences on the arms trafficking market in Hungary in the coming years.
The market for the trade of counterfeit goods in Hungary is not large. This is mostly due to the heavy regulation of the legal market. However, there is a considerable market for counterfeit products transited through the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe. The most common counterfeit goods in the country, which are also considered dangerous to public health, are perfumes, cosmetics, clothing, toys, car parts and pharmaceutical products.
Hungary is predominantly a source country for the alcoholic drinks illegally produced and smuggled inside the EU. Hungary is also a transit and destination country for the cheaper tobacco products smuggled from the Western Balkans and Belarus. Recent cases have shown that increasing quantities of tobacco from domestic production are also being illegally traded in the local market. This trend can be seen in the patterns of offences already detected and is also reflected in the declining volume of legal sales recorded by registered domestic tobacco producers.
There has been an increase in flora crimes in Hungary. The country is an important source of illegal logging in Europe, which has resulted in an 11% decrease in tree cover in Hungary. Illegal logging in the country has been linked to loose organized crime networks. Since the war in Ukraine, illegal logging committed by local communities for firewood has also increased, due to high energy prices. Protected plants such as snowdrops and Carpathian saffron enter or transit the country predominantly by road for subsequent sale on the black market.
Even though Hungary is considered a source, destination and transit country for fauna crime, the market is not extensive and poaching has shown a decreasing trend in recent years. However, smuggling of endangered species for medicinal and decorative use, bird and avian by-products, mammal and reptile by-products, and coral derivatives are still common forms of fauna crime in the country. Furthermore, Italian hunters, assisted by their Hungarian counterparts, are reported to shoot protected birds in great quantities, to smuggle them into Italy. The high level of corruption and the developed shadow economy facilitate the activities of crime groups involved in fauna crimes in Hungary. Some of them are also involved in illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing activities in the country.
Coal, oil, gas and manganese, in limited amounts, are some of Hungary’s key natural resources. The country has seen a recent spike in petrol prices due to raised fuel taxes, which resulted in an increase in petrol smuggling by illegal entrepreneurs. There are reports of a criminal group purchasing low-grade fuel oil in Poland and selling it at marked-up prices in Hungary, avoiding VAT, while using foreign companies as a front. Cases of gold laundering have also been reported.
Hungary has traditionally been a transit country for heroin, originating in Afghanistan and trafficked via the Balkan route to Western Europe. However, the heroin market in Hungary is not consolidated. Turkish organized crime groups continue to be the main importers and facilitators of heroin distribution in the country, often utilizing a northern branch of the Balkan route from Bulgaria and Romania to Hungary, Austria, the Czech Republic, Poland or Germany for transportation. Over the past decade, the number of cocaine seizures has risen continuously, particularly during the drug’s distribution at the retail level. Cocaine is mainly transported by road from Spain or the Netherlands or is directly imported by air from South America. However, in tandem with the increase in general online shopping that occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic, the illicit cocaine market is also flourishing online.
Cannabis is the most used illicit substance among young adults aged between 18 and 34 in Hungary. Cannabis is increasingly trafficked into Hungary by Vietnamese organized crime groups based in the Czech Republic, the Western Balkans and the Netherlands. Moreover, substantial amounts of cannabis have also been intercepted entering Hungary through its shared border with Serbia. Though Hungary is primarily a destination country for cannabis, reports indicate that cannabis is cultivated on a small scale. In recent years, new psychoactive substances compete with established drugs and continue to be a source of concern. While new psychoactive substances shipments are mainly imported from China, synthetic drugs, such as amphetamine and MDMA/Ecstasy, are primarily imported from Belgium and the Netherlands. Furthermore, the use of synthetic drugs has spread among the youth in the poorest parts of the country, particularly since designer drugs like synthetic cannabinoid and cathinone are reportedly cheaper than alcohol.
Cyber-dependent crime is a growing criminal market in Hungary. The frequency of data breaches has quadrupled in a few years, with malicious software infection and ransomware attacks being the most common forms of cybercrime. However, there is no indication that major criminal groups are involved in the market. Instead, it is mostly individual hackers or small hacker groups targeting private persons who are active in this criminal market.
In Hungary, the financial crimes market is frequently connected to the embezzlement and misuse of funds, including both public and corporate funds. These acts primarily involve individuals and small groups, who are not part of the larger organized crime groups. Corruption based on personal connections between business owners and high-ranking public officials and politicians appears to facilitate the illegal financial crimes market. In recent years, allegations have been made of corrupt activities in governmental procurement contracts and tender processes.
As Hungary is a transit country for various criminal markets, foreign criminal organizations operate in the country to varying degrees. For instance, Italian, Albanian and Georgian mafia-style groups are presently active in Hungary and engage in money laundering and cannabis trafficking. Criminal actors from the Turkish diaspora influence the heroin market, while both Slovakian and Bulgarian actors influence the human smuggling market. Domestic loose criminal networks are pervasive in almost all criminal markets present in Hungary, primarily in human trafficking and human smuggling, but also drug trafficking and petty theft. These networks are known to be involved in flora and fauna crimes as well, alongside opportunistic perpetrators.
Through informal patron–client networks, members of the Hungarian economic elite influences not only major political institutions, but also controls lower-level institutions, such as local government and civil society groups. Corruption is an ongoing problem and new legislation limiting the definition of public funds could result in further challenges, as many of the companies in Hungary with close government links are supported by public funds. Furthermore, high-level politicians are connected to the oligarchs and use this connection to obtain control over certain markets, like the media. Connections between the government and private-sector actors are traditionally strong, and the government has a stronghold over private businesses. This is reflected in the preferential treatment some businesses receive from the government and the flouting of taxation and customs duty regulations. There is no evidence to suggest domestic mafia-style groups exist in Hungary.
The state of governance and political leadership in Hungary is generally associated with the growth of illiberal populism. Political leaders use migration as a key campaign issue, drawing parallels between migration, crime and human smuggling in ways that critics claim stoke xenophobia and racism. The government’s control over supposedly independent institutions such as the judiciary, along with the adoption of anti-migrant and anti-LGBT+ policies, and laws that hamper the work of opposition groups, journalists, universities and NGOs critical of the government, have resulted in a lack of progress in the country. In addition, independent journalists, lawyers, politicians and businesspeople in Hungary have allegedly been targeted by secret surveillance in recent years using spyware. Corruption in the political system is rampant, with several political leaders being accused of corrupt practices. The recently re-elected Prime Minister and his political party have been considered responsible of putting in place various measures that have decreased transparency and accountability. The public procurement sector is also prone to a high risk of corruption and manipulation, with companies indicating that irregular payments and bribes were commonplace in the awarding of government contracts and licences. In addition, government prosecution services have ignored or refused to investigate cases of state corruption.
Hungary has ratified all relevant international treaties and conventions on organized crime and cooperates in joint investigations with Dutch, Belgian, Swiss and British authorities, and has worked with non-EU countries in training and capacity building. Moreover, Hungary actively cooperates with Europol and other countries’ law enforcement to prevent the smuggling of migrants, arms and drugs. In 2021, Hungary took part in the largest international law enforcement operation to date working to prevent the use of encrypted information in organized crime networks, which resulted in the confiscation of drugs, cash and cryptocurrency in Hungary. The country has various laws and policies in place to address organized crime, including drug trafficking and flora and fauna crimes, among others. Sex and labour trafficking is criminalized under law, but its legal definition is inconsistent with international law. Recent reforms have been made in the criminal code to combat human trafficking and money laundering more effectively. However, the implementation of both national and international legislation on organized crime matters is still lacking.
The Hungarian judicial system is at a moderate risk for corruption, as bribes and irregular payments in return for favourable judgments sometimes occur. The current government has significantly weakened the judiciary and the Constitutional Court, and the politically influenced appointment of new Constitutional Court judges has raised concerns. Trust among the commercial sector in the independence of the judiciary has sharply declined. Furthermore, rulings not in line with party interests are harshly criticized by pro-government media and government officials. As for the penitentiary system, there are no reports suggesting overcrowding, subpar conditions and ill-treatment.
Hungarian law enforcement has a special unit dedicated to combatting organized crime and an asset recovery office that is tasked to detect and freeze assets originating from criminal acts or assets in the possession of organized crime groups, as well as supporting investigations of financial crime-related cases. However, efforts need to be intensified in order for law enforcement officials to more effectively confront with the challenges posed by organized crime. Hungarian territorial integrity also continues to be challenged by criminal activities due to the country’s role as a transit hub. The country’s southern and western borders, including its border with Serbia, remain hotspots for overland migrant smuggling. Hungary is moderately equipped to withstand cyber-attacks. The Special Service for National Security manages cyber-security incidents and is the home of the computer security incident response team. In case of a cyber-security incident, this service has broad controlling rights, while other parties must cooperate with them.
Hungary is a member of the Financial Action Task Force and has implemented various international standards and legislation to keep money-laundering and terrorist financing under control. The assistance provided by the Hungarian Financial Intelligence Unit significantly bolsters efforts to detect and disrupt money laundering threats and deprive criminals of these proceeds. Despite these efforts, Hungary is at medium risk of money laundering and terrorist financing, as law enforcement and other authorities have failed to use financial intelligence appropriately to investigate cases of money laundering.
Hungary has a sizable informal economy and lacks transparency and predictability to encourage financial investments. Multinational corporations have complained of excessive red tape as well as preferential treatment and favouritism for Hungarian and government-linked firms. The government has tried to keep secret the contracts and finances of some state-owned companies, stating that the release of information would constitute a competitive disadvantage in the marketplace. In addition, reports suggest that the government’s strong anti-migrant rhetoric and actions have made it difficult for international companies to obtain approval for new investments. Corruption in Hungary presents a significant risk to businesses, particularly in the tax administration and public procurement sectors. Companies report that unofficial payments are sometimes necessary to resolve certain administrative tasks, and public procurement is vulnerable to irregularities at the local level, because of strong informal relationships between businesses and political actors.
Victim assistance services in Hungary, especially for trafficking victims remain scarce, uncoordinated and inadequate, exposing victims to the risk of re-victimization. A national crisis telephone service (OKIT) – a 24-hour hotline for assisting victims of domestic violence, prostitution, child abuse and human trafficking – is operational, although the telephone line only offers services in Hungarian and English. The government has various acts and regulations in place that provide shelters as a victim support service. The government is committed to open three new shelters each year to build a nationwide network that includes trained staff, victim registration, a victim support hotline, as well as witness counselling, monetary aid and certificates indicating victim status. Furthermore, new provisions on the protection of witnesses and victims were introduced that lay out the criteria for special treatment and the protection of witnesses and victims. However, the lack of a transparent framework and resources devoted to regulating foreign-national labour recruitment have a negative influence on the effectiveness of the assistance provided for male victims of labour trafficking. A recovery-oriented approach is adopted when providing assistance to drug users, with an emphasis on enhancing the availability and quality of treatment services, with a particular focus on young people. Treatment is carried out by the healthcare system and social services with the participation of non-governmental institutions.
Hungary’s measures to prevent organized crime, especially in the protection of human rights, have stagnated in the past few years. However, multiple awareness and preventive measures are in place, along with thorough customs inspections to address organized crime relating to flora and fauna. Although government-sponsored efforts exist, including law enforcement-implemented awareness campaigns geared towards children, funding of the related national action plan has been reduced.
The Hungarian government adopted a series of laws that hamper the operations of opposition groups, journalists, universities and NGOs critical of the government. Nonetheless, NGOs supported by the state assist human trafficking victims, running a 24-hour hotline in English and Hungarian. As for the media landscape in the country, a significant cause for concern is that the media is increasingly concentrated in the hands of oligarchs allied with the government. The ruling party has seized de facto control of 80% of the country’s media through political-economic manoeuvers and the purchase of news organizations by oligarchs close to the government. Recently, a law was introduced that conflates homosexuality and gender-identity expression with paedophilia, while also banning discussion of sexual diversity in schools, the media and elsewhere. This came in the wake of a new anti-LGBT+ law that prevents transgender or intersex people from legally changing their gender – putting them at risk of harassment, discrimination and even violence in daily situations when they need to use identity documents.
Criminal markets
5.470.67
An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.
Human trafficking
6.000.50
Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.
Human smuggling
7.000.00
Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.
Extortion and protection racketeering
5.50 n/a
Crimes linked to exerting control over a territory/market including as a mediator and/or requesting a benefit in exchange for protection.
Arms trafficking
6.000.00
The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.
Trade in counterfeit goods
5.50 n/a
The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands.
Illicit trade in excisable goods
4.50 n/a
The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits.
Flora crimes
2.501.00
The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.
Fauna crimes
4.000.50
The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.
Non-renewable resource crimes
3.000.50
The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.
Heroin trade
4.500.00
The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.
Cocaine trade
7.000.50
The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cannabis trade
6.001.00
The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.
Synthetic drug trade
6.500.50
The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cyber-dependent crimes
6.50 n/a
Organized crimes that rely solely on using information communications technology with the aim of obtaining a monetary/material benefit.
Financial crimes
7.50 n/a
Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance.
Criminal actors
5.200.20
An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.
Mafia-style groups
5.000.00
Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.
Criminal networks
6.500.00
Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.
State-embedded actors
2.000.00
Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.
Foreign actors
7.000.50
State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.
Private sector actors
5.50 n/a
Profit-seeking individuals/entities who own/control a part of the legal economy free from the state, that collaborate with criminal actors.
Political leadership and governance
6.50-0.50
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
7.00-0.50
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
8.000.00
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
8.000.00
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
8.000.50
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
7.500.00
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
8.50-0.50
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
6.00-0.50
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
7.000.00
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
8.000.00
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
8.000.00
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
7.50-0.50
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Germany continues to be primarily a destination country for human trafficking, especially sex trafficking, which constitutes the majority share of the human trafficking market in the country. Both German nationals and foreigners are being exploited in sex trafficking. Organized criminal networks are often behind forced sex work, with families and groups also involved. In Germany, labour exploitation is also a significant problem in the construction, care, catering, and cleaning sectors. The country’s human trafficking market is characterized by a high degree of diversity, including various criminal structures and suspects from different countries of origin, including Germany. Victims and perpetrators of trafficking for organized forced begging, shoplifting and pickpocketing are reported to be mostly foreign nationals. Reports have emerged of Ukrainian women being targeted by human traffickers upon arrival in Germany. The impact of legalizing sex work on the state's ability to combat illegal sexual exploitation and human trafficking is hotly debated.
Germany is a major destination for human smuggling, particularly along the central and eastern Mediterranean routes. The market is highly fragmented but transnationally organized. Smuggling for the purpose of unlawful employment, mainly in the low-wage sector, has increased in recent years, and victims are targeted by professional smugglers in their home countries. Smuggled individuals are typically hidden in cars, vans, or trucks, although air travel is also used by human smugglers. The effectiveness of state responses is constrained by the dispersed occurrence of the crime in Germany. In general, human smuggling is a highly politicized topic in Germany and often overlaps with discussions about immigration, xenophobia, right-wing political extremism and violent extremism.
Cases of extortion and protection racketeering have been reported in Germany, although they are not prevalent crimes. Firearms are often used in these activities, and a significant proportion of suspects are non-German. The extent of protection racketeering in the country is difficult to estimate, but transnational organized crime groups have been found to be extorting German businesses, particularly in the food service industry.
Germany serves both as a destination and transit country for smuggled weapons. Handguns and converted firearms are the most frequently used types of weapons in violent crimes. Gas guns are the most commonly seized firearms at customs points. The Western Balkans are the primary source of arms, ammunition, and explosives trafficked into Germany. Customs have recorded an increase in the number of weapons, ammunition, and explosives seized. The illicit trade in firearms in Germany involves a diverse range of actors, including some criminal gangs and organized smuggling networks. Firearms and explosives are mainly brought into Germany by land in small shipments to avoid detection by law enforcement. Additionally, firearms are frequently stolen from private firearm owners, retailers, law enforcement, and armed services. The dark web has also become a significant means of arms trafficking.
Counterfeit goods continue to be a significant issue in Germany, with German customs seizing thousands of counterfeit items at borders. Apparel, accessories, and jewellery are the most commonly counterfeited items. However, counterfeit pharmaceutical products and food have also been seized. The country serves not only as a destination but also as a transit point for counterfeit goods, with shipments arriving from China and Türkiye and then being distributed through various channels.
The illicit trade of excise goods, including alcohol and cigarettes, is another problem in the country. Smugglers evade excise duties, causing significant tax losses. Cigarettes are the most prominent type of excise good that is smuggled or confiscated. South East Asian street vendors are particularly active in Berlin, selling untaxed cigarettes and operating without using violence to avoid attracting attention.
The illegal timber trade is becoming a concern in Germany, with major ports and airports facilitating the importation of timber from around the world. Although Germany appears to enforce the EU timber regulations reasonably well, detecting the origin of illegal timber can be challenging, as organized crime groups in source countries collaborate with corrupt officials and traders. Other forms of flora crimes are also on the rise in Germany, with transnational criminal networks increasingly smuggling large quantities of protected plant species, rare plants and supplements made from rare plants from Southeast Asia and Latin America.
More importantly, Germany is a transit and destination country for trafficked wildlife fauna, with international criminal networks being the primary organizers of this crime. Although Germany is not the primary destination country for high-value protected fauna products, it appears to be an essential transit hub for illegally traded goods from Western and Central African countries to East and Southeast Asia. The illegal trade often includes ivory, pangolin scales, and live animals, with Frankfurt and Leipzig airports the primary airfreight hubs between Africa and Asia. Germany also has a persistent illicit market for reptiles and birds, with German individuals involved in smuggling and online sales of these animals. Raptor persecution is a severe issue in the country, and various international trade fairs for fauna provide a meeting point for reptile traffickers from all over Europe. Germany is also known for illegal trade in amphibians, mammals, and fish products, with major airports and harbours being used for smuggling. The legal wildlife trade market in Germany has expanded to include not only birds and mammals but increasingly fish and invertebrates.
Germany, with its abundant natural resources, has a role in non-renewable resource crimes, particularly in gold-related crimes and tax fraud concerning diesel fuel. German companies are also involved in mining-related crimes abroad. The illegal market of non-renewable resources in Germany may have some influence on some parts of society and may accrue some value. However, Germany has a very low level of perceived corruption and a limited shadow economy, and thus the impact of such illegal activities may be limited. German authorities have carried out multiple seizures of illegal gold and silver, highlighting the country's role in gold trafficking in the region. Recently, there have been cases of gold trafficking between France, Germany, and Türkiye.
The heroin trade in Germany is heavily linked to other criminal markets, and organized criminal groups are involved in every stage of the trade. Motorcycle clubs, Italian mafias, Russian-Eurasian groups, and ethnic clans primarily from the Lebanese, Turkish, and Albanian diaspora all contribute to the heroin market in the country to some extent. The heroin trade has been known to fuel violent conflict between organized crime groups, and there have been reports of mafia-style groups bribing low-level officials. Germany is both a transit and destination country for heroin, with its eastern borders serving as a gateway for heroin shipped from Afghanistan through Central Asia to Western Europe. Local data suggests that injecting heroin is becoming less prevalent, with more people smoking or snorting it. Moreover, the trade in heroin has become much less prevalent in the country than the trade in other drugs, especially amphetamines and cocaine. Cocaine trafficking continues to thrive in Germany, with mafia-style groups connected to transnational networks dominating the market. Albanian groups appear to be the primary players in the trade. Seizures of cocaine have increased more than threefold compared to previous years. Although cocaine is smuggled through various routes, the container ports in Hamburg and Bremerhaven are the primary gateways. The increased cocaine production in South America and rising import volumes in Germany could lead to a rise in conflicts between competing organized criminal groups, similar to what has been seen in the Netherlands. Additionally, the greater availability of cocaine on the European drug markets has led to increased usage, as indicated by the rise in the levels of cocaine in wastewater in almost all German cities.
Cannabis is the most widely consumed illegal drug in Germany, and the country is both a source and destination for the cannabis trade. Mafia-style groups with transnational connections appear to be the main players in the market. Germany is also a significant transit country for the distribution of cannabis in Western Europe. Most of the traded hashish comes from Morocco and is trafficked with the help of criminal groups from Albania, the Western Balkans, and the Netherlands. The German government is in the process of legalizing the acquisition of cannabis under certain circumstances. Health-related emergencies associated with cannabinoids are rare, but cannabis-related hospitalizations have increased in recent years.
Germany plays a significant role in the synthetic drug trade, serving as both a transit and destination country. The country serves as a transit point for substances which often originate from Poland and are destined for producers in the Netherlands. Germany is also a main production centre for amphetamines and methamphetamines in the EU. The smuggling of base substances and the production of synthetic drugs for the German consumer market are closely linked to groups operating in the Netherlands, where illegal labs are becoming more common. Germany, particularly Eastern Germany, is also an important destination market for synthetic drugs produced in the Netherlands and crystal meth produced in the Czech Republic. Precursors for new psychoactive substances often come from China, are transported to various European countries for further processing, and sold mainly via online shops. Based on the levels of illicit drugs and their metabolites found in wastewater, Germany, alongside the Netherlands and Belgium, has some of the highest mass loads of MDMA (Ecstasy).
In recent years, cybercrime incidents in Germany have increased. ’Crime-as-a-service’, where loose and organic criminal networks offer criminal activities as a service to others, remains a central aspect of criminal markets in the cyber-realm, with Germany being a popular target for ransomware attacks. In the past years, Germany registered a state of emergency after a cyber-attack and additional cases of public administration targeted by ransom or malware. Cyber-attacks by criminal networks or state-controlled groups affect German society in many areas and their material impact could be high, especially if losses related to these attacks, such as loss of sales at companies, are included. In the area of critical infrastructure, the risk of damage and the possibility of cyber-warfare are significant.
Financial crimes have been prevalent in Germany in recent years, with tax fraud investigations leading to millions of euros in fines. The Pandora Papers scandal increased scrutiny of tax fraud and prompted calls for the prohibition of offshore companies by federal law. Other corporate fraud scandals saw high-ranking officials charged with fraud, embezzlement and market manipulation. Instances of financial crimes include the illegal obtaining of energy efficiency certifications and subsidies, as well as fraudulently applying for COVID-19 state subsidies. The impact of financial crimes is significant, with the financial damage often leading to decreased trust in institutions and politics. The difficulties in tracing investments made by oligarchs after the start of Russia’s war against Ukraine highlighted gaps in the state’s capacity to control this sector.
Organized crime in Germany continues to have strong ties with foreign actors. Arab and Turkish clans, Italian groups, and West African groups are heavily involved in the drug trade, particularly in cocaine and marijuana, and in human trafficking. The German government has reported an increase in the number of alleged members of Italian mafia organizations, while Russian-Eurasian organized crime groups are active in property crime, drug trafficking, violent crime, and cybercrime. Although COVID-19 may have temporarily disrupted cross-border criminal activities, there is no indication of a structural decline in international activities due to the pandemic. In fact, the increased prevalence of cybercrime may even facilitate the internationalization of organized crime.
The traditional view of crime as being dominated by informal networks of loosely connected criminals has evolved into a scenario where multiple mafia-style groups cooperate and divide tasks in different stages of the supply chain for various criminal activities. The EU has experienced an increase in ‘crime-as-a-service’. Mafia-style groups in Germany, such as outlaw motorcycle criminal groups, are involved in multiple criminal markets, including the drug trade, forced sex work, offences related to gun control, extortion, and property crime. These groups maintain a moderate level of territorial control and engage in physical violence against competing groups and other victims. Drug offences connected to such groups are the most common attracting criminal investigations, although economic crimes are also among their most important sources of income.
The German ministry of finance has identified the real estate market and transactions involving large amounts of cash as the biggest risk areas for money-laundering in Germany, with the private sector being the primary location for the crime. Banks report tens of thousands of suspicious money laundering cases each year, but other relevant actors, such as notaries, lawyers, real estate agents, and car dealers, report almost nothing. Luxury items, real estate, and cars are major areas for laundering illicit proceeds, and the food service sector is expected to suffer increased exploitation by illegal activities from organized crime groups, such as Arabic clans, in the post-COVID-19 pandemic era.
There is no evidence of state-embedded criminal groups or actors, with the only exception being recent reports of right-wing extremism within the police force and the military, and alleged connections of right-wing violent extremists to intelligence and law enforcement.
Germany's new government has made combating organized crime a priority for its security services, focusing on clan criminality and human trafficking. However, the lack of control by public authorities over certain parts of German cities, the apparent rise of right-wing extremism linked to security forces, and Germany's role as a money-laundering hot spot have raised concerns. Criminal networks and money launderers have taken advantage of the lack of state controls during the COVID-19 pandemic, leading to criticisms of political leadership and governance. Despite these problems, Germany remains one of the world's most stable countries and performs well in terms of transparency. However, there have been criticisms of regulations on financial contributions to political parties, politicians’ conflicts of interest, and transparency regarding lobbying group activities.
Germany is a signatory party to all relevant multilateral treaties concerning organized crime and actively participates in various international organizations and initiatives aimed at combating this threat. The country has domestic legislation in place to address various forms of organized crime, including human trafficking, drug and arms trafficking, and environmental crimes. However, there is only a general ’working definition’ of organized crime which is not reflected in the criminal code and is narrowly interpreted by the judiciary. The new German government aims to combat high-level corruption by making the penal code addressing bribery of federal parliament members more effective.
Germany's criminal justice system is widely regarded as highly effective, with no reports of corruption or political influence by external parties. The correctional system is also held in high regard. The new government has pledged to strengthen international judicial cooperation and make criminal trial processes more effective, faster, more modern, and practical.
The federal criminal police, in conjunction with their state-level counterparts and state police, has the jurisdiction to conduct investigations relating to various criminal markets, including the trafficking of human beings, drugs and arms. Moreover, Germany has established a national law enforcement information and analysis cooperation grouping to facilitate data-sharing and the detection of criminal structures, including organized crime with an aim to more effectively combat terrorism and other criminal activities. Overall, law enforcement and intelligence agencies are regarded as trustworthy and effective. However, systemic challenges such as regional police understaffing, increasing drop-out rates from police academy programmes, and issues with cooperation between federal and state authorities still exist.
Germany's porous borders are difficult to monitor and vulnerable to organized crime activities. While there is little evidence of corruption within customs or border police, the heavy flow of organized crime activities in and out of Germany through its international airports, seaports, and intra-EU/intra-Schengen borders remains a challenge to the country's territorial integrity. Moreover, increasing digitalization, Germany’s influential position in the EU and NATO, and the fragility of other risks increasingly enable cyber-attacks and pose a significant risk to Germany's security.
The financial intelligence unit (FIU) in Germany has been criticized for its ineffectiveness in combating money laundering, primarily due to underfinancing and understaffing. It has been argued that Germany's wide acceptance of cash payments enables large-scale money laundering, with the EU suggesting a 'cash cap' limiting cash transactions. The new German government plans to introduce anti-money laundering reforms, which include strengthening the FIU and German customs authority and improving the transparency register. However, recent incidents involving money laundering schemes and the FIU's alleged obstruction of justice have highlighted the limitations of the current system.
In general, legitimate private businesses are able to operate without criminal activities in all sectors of the economy. However, underestimating espionage remains an issue in Germany, as it can be challenging to detect. Alongside espionage, cyber-attacks are also a significant problem in the legal market. The only area in which illicit activities are assumed to be a major part of the market is sex work, despite voluntary sex work being legal in Germany.
The German government has implemented several support programmes for victims of modern slavery and other crimes, but funding and human resources remain among the challenges in terms of victim protection. Among the programmes in place are witness protection, support for sex workers and victims of forced sex work, and an ombudsperson against corruption. The new government has decided that victims of human trafficking will receive a right of residence independent of their willingness to make a declaration with the police. Public awareness campaigns cover some organized crime areas, including the trafficking of goods, human trafficking, and the protection of flora and fauna. The national weapons register is expected to be extended and expanded to prevent weapons from getting lost in illegality.
The involvement of civil society in fighting organized crime is limited. Conversely, independent and investigative journalism plays a significant role in exposing criminal activities, such as human trafficking, the drug trade, corruption, and white-collar crime. Despite financial pressures, the German media landscape continues to be relatively healthy and serves as an effective Fourth Estate. However, concerns remain about weak laws on access to information, declining media pluralism, and attacks on journalists by far-right extremists and populist parties.
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The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to 10. The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel.
A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.
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