How to measure organized crime?
A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.
Read more on globalinitiative.netCriminal markets
5.470.67
An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.
Human trafficking
6.000.50
Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.
Human smuggling
7.000.00
Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.
Extortion and protection racketeering
5.50 n/a
Crimes linked to exerting control over a territory/market including as a mediator and/or requesting a benefit in exchange for protection.
Arms trafficking
6.000.00
The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.
Trade in counterfeit goods
5.50 n/a
The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands.
Illicit trade in excisable goods
4.50 n/a
The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits.
Flora crimes
2.501.00
The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.
Fauna crimes
4.000.50
The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.
Non-renewable resource crimes
3.000.50
The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.
Heroin trade
4.500.00
The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.
Cocaine trade
7.000.50
The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cannabis trade
6.001.00
The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.
Synthetic drug trade
6.500.50
The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cyber-dependent crimes
6.50 n/a
Organized crimes that rely solely on using information communications technology with the aim of obtaining a monetary/material benefit.
Financial crimes
7.50 n/a
Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance.
Criminal actors
5.200.20
An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.
Mafia-style groups
5.000.00
Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.
Criminal networks
6.500.00
Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.
State-embedded actors
2.000.00
Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.
Foreign actors
7.000.50
State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.
Private sector actors
5.50 n/a
Profit-seeking individuals/entities who own/control a part of the legal economy free from the state, that collaborate with criminal actors.
Political leadership and governance
6.50-0.50
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
7.00-0.50
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
8.000.00
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
8.000.00
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
8.000.50
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
7.500.00
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
8.50-0.50
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
6.00-0.50
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
7.000.00
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
8.000.00
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
8.000.00
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
7.50-0.50
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Germany continues to be primarily a destination country for human trafficking, especially sex trafficking, which constitutes the majority share of the human trafficking market in the country. Both German nationals and foreigners are being exploited in sex trafficking. Organized criminal networks are often behind forced sex work, with families and groups also involved. In Germany, labour exploitation is also a significant problem in the construction, care, catering, and cleaning sectors. The country’s human trafficking market is characterized by a high degree of diversity, including various criminal structures and suspects from different countries of origin, including Germany. Victims and perpetrators of trafficking for organized forced begging, shoplifting and pickpocketing are reported to be mostly foreign nationals. Reports have emerged of Ukrainian women being targeted by human traffickers upon arrival in Germany. The impact of legalizing sex work on the state's ability to combat illegal sexual exploitation and human trafficking is hotly debated.
Germany is a major destination for human smuggling, particularly along the central and eastern Mediterranean routes. The market is highly fragmented but transnationally organized. Smuggling for the purpose of unlawful employment, mainly in the low-wage sector, has increased in recent years, and victims are targeted by professional smugglers in their home countries. Smuggled individuals are typically hidden in cars, vans, or trucks, although air travel is also used by human smugglers. The effectiveness of state responses is constrained by the dispersed occurrence of the crime in Germany. In general, human smuggling is a highly politicized topic in Germany and often overlaps with discussions about immigration, xenophobia, right-wing political extremism and violent extremism.
Cases of extortion and protection racketeering have been reported in Germany, although they are not prevalent crimes. Firearms are often used in these activities, and a significant proportion of suspects are non-German. The extent of protection racketeering in the country is difficult to estimate, but transnational organized crime groups have been found to be extorting German businesses, particularly in the food service industry.
Germany serves both as a destination and transit country for smuggled weapons. Handguns and converted firearms are the most frequently used types of weapons in violent crimes. Gas guns are the most commonly seized firearms at customs points. The Western Balkans are the primary source of arms, ammunition, and explosives trafficked into Germany. Customs have recorded an increase in the number of weapons, ammunition, and explosives seized. The illicit trade in firearms in Germany involves a diverse range of actors, including some criminal gangs and organized smuggling networks. Firearms and explosives are mainly brought into Germany by land in small shipments to avoid detection by law enforcement. Additionally, firearms are frequently stolen from private firearm owners, retailers, law enforcement, and armed services. The dark web has also become a significant means of arms trafficking.
Counterfeit goods continue to be a significant issue in Germany, with German customs seizing thousands of counterfeit items at borders. Apparel, accessories, and jewellery are the most commonly counterfeited items. However, counterfeit pharmaceutical products and food have also been seized. The country serves not only as a destination but also as a transit point for counterfeit goods, with shipments arriving from China and Türkiye and then being distributed through various channels.
The illicit trade of excise goods, including alcohol and cigarettes, is another problem in the country. Smugglers evade excise duties, causing significant tax losses. Cigarettes are the most prominent type of excise good that is smuggled or confiscated. South East Asian street vendors are particularly active in Berlin, selling untaxed cigarettes and operating without using violence to avoid attracting attention.
The illegal timber trade is becoming a concern in Germany, with major ports and airports facilitating the importation of timber from around the world. Although Germany appears to enforce the EU timber regulations reasonably well, detecting the origin of illegal timber can be challenging, as organized crime groups in source countries collaborate with corrupt officials and traders. Other forms of flora crimes are also on the rise in Germany, with transnational criminal networks increasingly smuggling large quantities of protected plant species, rare plants and supplements made from rare plants from Southeast Asia and Latin America.
More importantly, Germany is a transit and destination country for trafficked wildlife fauna, with international criminal networks being the primary organizers of this crime. Although Germany is not the primary destination country for high-value protected fauna products, it appears to be an essential transit hub for illegally traded goods from Western and Central African countries to East and Southeast Asia. The illegal trade often includes ivory, pangolin scales, and live animals, with Frankfurt and Leipzig airports the primary airfreight hubs between Africa and Asia. Germany also has a persistent illicit market for reptiles and birds, with German individuals involved in smuggling and online sales of these animals. Raptor persecution is a severe issue in the country, and various international trade fairs for fauna provide a meeting point for reptile traffickers from all over Europe. Germany is also known for illegal trade in amphibians, mammals, and fish products, with major airports and harbours being used for smuggling. The legal wildlife trade market in Germany has expanded to include not only birds and mammals but increasingly fish and invertebrates.
Germany, with its abundant natural resources, has a role in non-renewable resource crimes, particularly in gold-related crimes and tax fraud concerning diesel fuel. German companies are also involved in mining-related crimes abroad. The illegal market of non-renewable resources in Germany may have some influence on some parts of society and may accrue some value. However, Germany has a very low level of perceived corruption and a limited shadow economy, and thus the impact of such illegal activities may be limited. German authorities have carried out multiple seizures of illegal gold and silver, highlighting the country's role in gold trafficking in the region. Recently, there have been cases of gold trafficking between France, Germany, and Türkiye.
The heroin trade in Germany is heavily linked to other criminal markets, and organized criminal groups are involved in every stage of the trade. Motorcycle clubs, Italian mafias, Russian-Eurasian groups, and ethnic clans primarily from the Lebanese, Turkish, and Albanian diaspora all contribute to the heroin market in the country to some extent. The heroin trade has been known to fuel violent conflict between organized crime groups, and there have been reports of mafia-style groups bribing low-level officials. Germany is both a transit and destination country for heroin, with its eastern borders serving as a gateway for heroin shipped from Afghanistan through Central Asia to Western Europe. Local data suggests that injecting heroin is becoming less prevalent, with more people smoking or snorting it. Moreover, the trade in heroin has become much less prevalent in the country than the trade in other drugs, especially amphetamines and cocaine. Cocaine trafficking continues to thrive in Germany, with mafia-style groups connected to transnational networks dominating the market. Albanian groups appear to be the primary players in the trade. Seizures of cocaine have increased more than threefold compared to previous years. Although cocaine is smuggled through various routes, the container ports in Hamburg and Bremerhaven are the primary gateways. The increased cocaine production in South America and rising import volumes in Germany could lead to a rise in conflicts between competing organized criminal groups, similar to what has been seen in the Netherlands. Additionally, the greater availability of cocaine on the European drug markets has led to increased usage, as indicated by the rise in the levels of cocaine in wastewater in almost all German cities.
Cannabis is the most widely consumed illegal drug in Germany, and the country is both a source and destination for the cannabis trade. Mafia-style groups with transnational connections appear to be the main players in the market. Germany is also a significant transit country for the distribution of cannabis in Western Europe. Most of the traded hashish comes from Morocco and is trafficked with the help of criminal groups from Albania, the Western Balkans, and the Netherlands. The German government is in the process of legalizing the acquisition of cannabis under certain circumstances. Health-related emergencies associated with cannabinoids are rare, but cannabis-related hospitalizations have increased in recent years.
Germany plays a significant role in the synthetic drug trade, serving as both a transit and destination country. The country serves as a transit point for substances which often originate from Poland and are destined for producers in the Netherlands. Germany is also a main production centre for amphetamines and methamphetamines in the EU. The smuggling of base substances and the production of synthetic drugs for the German consumer market are closely linked to groups operating in the Netherlands, where illegal labs are becoming more common. Germany, particularly Eastern Germany, is also an important destination market for synthetic drugs produced in the Netherlands and crystal meth produced in the Czech Republic. Precursors for new psychoactive substances often come from China, are transported to various European countries for further processing, and sold mainly via online shops. Based on the levels of illicit drugs and their metabolites found in wastewater, Germany, alongside the Netherlands and Belgium, has some of the highest mass loads of MDMA (Ecstasy).
In recent years, cybercrime incidents in Germany have increased. ’Crime-as-a-service’, where loose and organic criminal networks offer criminal activities as a service to others, remains a central aspect of criminal markets in the cyber-realm, with Germany being a popular target for ransomware attacks. In the past years, Germany registered a state of emergency after a cyber-attack and additional cases of public administration targeted by ransom or malware. Cyber-attacks by criminal networks or state-controlled groups affect German society in many areas and their material impact could be high, especially if losses related to these attacks, such as loss of sales at companies, are included. In the area of critical infrastructure, the risk of damage and the possibility of cyber-warfare are significant.
Financial crimes have been prevalent in Germany in recent years, with tax fraud investigations leading to millions of euros in fines. The Pandora Papers scandal increased scrutiny of tax fraud and prompted calls for the prohibition of offshore companies by federal law. Other corporate fraud scandals saw high-ranking officials charged with fraud, embezzlement and market manipulation. Instances of financial crimes include the illegal obtaining of energy efficiency certifications and subsidies, as well as fraudulently applying for COVID-19 state subsidies. The impact of financial crimes is significant, with the financial damage often leading to decreased trust in institutions and politics. The difficulties in tracing investments made by oligarchs after the start of Russia’s war against Ukraine highlighted gaps in the state’s capacity to control this sector.
Organized crime in Germany continues to have strong ties with foreign actors. Arab and Turkish clans, Italian groups, and West African groups are heavily involved in the drug trade, particularly in cocaine and marijuana, and in human trafficking. The German government has reported an increase in the number of alleged members of Italian mafia organizations, while Russian-Eurasian organized crime groups are active in property crime, drug trafficking, violent crime, and cybercrime. Although COVID-19 may have temporarily disrupted cross-border criminal activities, there is no indication of a structural decline in international activities due to the pandemic. In fact, the increased prevalence of cybercrime may even facilitate the internationalization of organized crime.
The traditional view of crime as being dominated by informal networks of loosely connected criminals has evolved into a scenario where multiple mafia-style groups cooperate and divide tasks in different stages of the supply chain for various criminal activities. The EU has experienced an increase in ‘crime-as-a-service’. Mafia-style groups in Germany, such as outlaw motorcycle criminal groups, are involved in multiple criminal markets, including the drug trade, forced sex work, offences related to gun control, extortion, and property crime. These groups maintain a moderate level of territorial control and engage in physical violence against competing groups and other victims. Drug offences connected to such groups are the most common attracting criminal investigations, although economic crimes are also among their most important sources of income.
The German ministry of finance has identified the real estate market and transactions involving large amounts of cash as the biggest risk areas for money-laundering in Germany, with the private sector being the primary location for the crime. Banks report tens of thousands of suspicious money laundering cases each year, but other relevant actors, such as notaries, lawyers, real estate agents, and car dealers, report almost nothing. Luxury items, real estate, and cars are major areas for laundering illicit proceeds, and the food service sector is expected to suffer increased exploitation by illegal activities from organized crime groups, such as Arabic clans, in the post-COVID-19 pandemic era.
There is no evidence of state-embedded criminal groups or actors, with the only exception being recent reports of right-wing extremism within the police force and the military, and alleged connections of right-wing violent extremists to intelligence and law enforcement.
Germany's new government has made combating organized crime a priority for its security services, focusing on clan criminality and human trafficking. However, the lack of control by public authorities over certain parts of German cities, the apparent rise of right-wing extremism linked to security forces, and Germany's role as a money-laundering hot spot have raised concerns. Criminal networks and money launderers have taken advantage of the lack of state controls during the COVID-19 pandemic, leading to criticisms of political leadership and governance. Despite these problems, Germany remains one of the world's most stable countries and performs well in terms of transparency. However, there have been criticisms of regulations on financial contributions to political parties, politicians’ conflicts of interest, and transparency regarding lobbying group activities.
Germany is a signatory party to all relevant multilateral treaties concerning organized crime and actively participates in various international organizations and initiatives aimed at combating this threat. The country has domestic legislation in place to address various forms of organized crime, including human trafficking, drug and arms trafficking, and environmental crimes. However, there is only a general ’working definition’ of organized crime which is not reflected in the criminal code and is narrowly interpreted by the judiciary. The new German government aims to combat high-level corruption by making the penal code addressing bribery of federal parliament members more effective.
Germany's criminal justice system is widely regarded as highly effective, with no reports of corruption or political influence by external parties. The correctional system is also held in high regard. The new government has pledged to strengthen international judicial cooperation and make criminal trial processes more effective, faster, more modern, and practical.
The federal criminal police, in conjunction with their state-level counterparts and state police, has the jurisdiction to conduct investigations relating to various criminal markets, including the trafficking of human beings, drugs and arms. Moreover, Germany has established a national law enforcement information and analysis cooperation grouping to facilitate data-sharing and the detection of criminal structures, including organized crime with an aim to more effectively combat terrorism and other criminal activities. Overall, law enforcement and intelligence agencies are regarded as trustworthy and effective. However, systemic challenges such as regional police understaffing, increasing drop-out rates from police academy programmes, and issues with cooperation between federal and state authorities still exist.
Germany's porous borders are difficult to monitor and vulnerable to organized crime activities. While there is little evidence of corruption within customs or border police, the heavy flow of organized crime activities in and out of Germany through its international airports, seaports, and intra-EU/intra-Schengen borders remains a challenge to the country's territorial integrity. Moreover, increasing digitalization, Germany’s influential position in the EU and NATO, and the fragility of other risks increasingly enable cyber-attacks and pose a significant risk to Germany's security.
The financial intelligence unit (FIU) in Germany has been criticized for its ineffectiveness in combating money laundering, primarily due to underfinancing and understaffing. It has been argued that Germany's wide acceptance of cash payments enables large-scale money laundering, with the EU suggesting a 'cash cap' limiting cash transactions. The new German government plans to introduce anti-money laundering reforms, which include strengthening the FIU and German customs authority and improving the transparency register. However, recent incidents involving money laundering schemes and the FIU's alleged obstruction of justice have highlighted the limitations of the current system.
In general, legitimate private businesses are able to operate without criminal activities in all sectors of the economy. However, underestimating espionage remains an issue in Germany, as it can be challenging to detect. Alongside espionage, cyber-attacks are also a significant problem in the legal market. The only area in which illicit activities are assumed to be a major part of the market is sex work, despite voluntary sex work being legal in Germany.
The German government has implemented several support programmes for victims of modern slavery and other crimes, but funding and human resources remain among the challenges in terms of victim protection. Among the programmes in place are witness protection, support for sex workers and victims of forced sex work, and an ombudsperson against corruption. The new government has decided that victims of human trafficking will receive a right of residence independent of their willingness to make a declaration with the police. Public awareness campaigns cover some organized crime areas, including the trafficking of goods, human trafficking, and the protection of flora and fauna. The national weapons register is expected to be extended and expanded to prevent weapons from getting lost in illegality.
The involvement of civil society in fighting organized crime is limited. Conversely, independent and investigative journalism plays a significant role in exposing criminal activities, such as human trafficking, the drug trade, corruption, and white-collar crime. Despite financial pressures, the German media landscape continues to be relatively healthy and serves as an effective Fourth Estate. However, concerns remain about weak laws on access to information, declining media pluralism, and attacks on journalists by far-right extremists and populist parties.
Criminal markets
4.970.57
An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.
Human trafficking
5.500.00
Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.
Human smuggling
6.001.50
Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.
Extortion and protection racketeering
2.50 n/a
Crimes linked to exerting control over a territory/market including as a mediator and/or requesting a benefit in exchange for protection.
Arms trafficking
4.501.00
The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.
Trade in counterfeit goods
4.50 n/a
The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands.
Illicit trade in excisable goods
5.50 n/a
The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits.
Flora crimes
2.500.50
The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.
Fauna crimes
5.002.50
The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.
Non-renewable resource crimes
5.500.00
The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.
Heroin trade
4.000.00
The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.
Cocaine trade
5.000.50
The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cannabis trade
5.500.00
The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.
Synthetic drug trade
7.000.50
The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cyber-dependent crimes
5.50 n/a
Organized crimes that rely solely on using information communications technology with the aim of obtaining a monetary/material benefit.
Financial crimes
6.00 n/a
Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance.
Criminal actors
4.000.38
An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.
Mafia-style groups
2.000.00
Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.
Criminal networks
6.000.50
Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.
State-embedded actors
4.501.00
Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.
Foreign actors
3.500.00
State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.
Private sector actors
4.00 n/a
Profit-seeking individuals/entities who own/control a part of the legal economy free from the state, that collaborate with criminal actors.
Political leadership and governance
5.500.00
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
4.000.00
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
7.500.50
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
7.000.00
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
5.00-0.50
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
6.500.00
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
7.500.00
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
6.50-0.50
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
6.50-1.00
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
5.000.00
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
5.50-0.50
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
4.00-1.00
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Poland is a source, transit and destination country for human trafficking. Forced labour is the main form of trafficking and male foreigner nationals are usually targeted. Women and children, especially from Eastern and south-eastern Europe as well as South America, are mainly trafficked for sexual exploitation in the country. Criminal groups often recruit Polish, Ukrainian and Russian women through advertisements on the internet and then force them into prostitution. Polish victims are also forced into begging, stealing, or extorting credit and social benefits.
Human smuggling in Poland has become a significant source of income for organized crime groups and funds received from such activities are often used for other criminal practices. Smuggling routes usually cross the Belarussian and Ukrainian borders to Poland, to continue further west. On the Belarusian border, massive pushbacks of migrants coming from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan and lack of cooperation between the two countries, combined with the involvement of state actors in these practices, have increased opportunities for human smugglers. In addition, the war in Ukraine brought millions of Ukrainians to Poland and the sudden influx and chaotic humanitarian operations in the first months of the crisis made the refugees vulnerable to smugglers and traffickers. Extortion and protection racketeering are recorded in the country, although such criminal activities are limited to rare incidents and are carried out in an opportunistic and unorganized manner.
Although still relatively modest in scale, arms trafficking is increasing in and through Poland, despite the strict regulations and the military’s control of the arms market. The southern border, with its well-established trafficking routes, is a particular source of concern for Poland. There is a small but steadily developing illegal arms market in the country, with guns being trafficked from Slovakia and Czechia. There is also an emerging trend of the illegal transport of firearms out of Poland, mainly to Ukraine and Libya. Furthermore, arms trafficking is linked to other forms of trafficking, mainly drugs and excise goods. Illegal weapons are smuggled from the US to Poland and other European countries though the darknet. There is also an emerging market in 3-D-printed weapons, with illegal workshops set up across the EU.
Counterfeit goods in Poland are a growing challenge and are either produced locally or, more often, imported from China. A good percentage of Polish consumers accept that they buy counterfeit goods, predominantly clothes, leather goods and cosmetics as well as toys, games, sport equipment, food, medicine and electronics. The COVID-19 pandemic increased trade in counterfeit products, as many consumers started to use e-commerce websites, while highly specialized criminal networks adjusted their marketing and production strategies.
Trade in excise goods in Poland is carried out along with trade in counterfeits. However, it is seen as an opportunistic activity in the country, while international trade is more organized. Poland is a popular destination for illegal trade in cigarettes and alcohol without excise. The market for cigarettes is, for the most part, fed by products produced in illegal factories. Nevertheless, occasional attempts to smuggle large quantities of cigarettes occur both by road transport, mainly from Belarus, and by sea. This illicit market is mostly operated by Polish citizens and those from neighbouring countries.
The market for illicit trade in flora is not well developed in Poland. There is, however, a growing concern about the illegal flora trade on the internet. In the last two years, an increase in illegal logging across the entire country has been noted. There have been cases in which crime groups are reported to supply illegally logged timber to sawmills where timber is converted into planks. Furthermore, since the war in Ukraine, Polish companies are reported to circumvented EU sanctions by paying Belarusian companies to import timber with false documents, which claim that the wood comes from Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan instead of Russia.
Poland is both a destination and transit point for wildlife trafficking, which is increasingly expanding in the country. Live birds, reptiles and caviar are some of the most illegally traded wildlife and wildlife-derived products. Crime groups involved in this market distribute produce though courier networks to Western European countries. This indicates the presence of structured criminal supply chains involved in the illegal wildlife trade in Poland. The country’s border with Ukraine has been identified as a critical wildlife trafficking hotspot. In addition, some organized crime groups are involved in illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing in Poland. This is a lucrative business and the crime groups involved sometimes use violence against law enforcement officials.
Poland has a pervasive market for the illegal extraction and smuggling of natural resources. The country’s key non-renewable resources include coal, silver, natural gas, amber, copper and salt. Organized criminal networks, mafia-style networks and private sector actors participate in illegal trade of non-renewable resources in Poland, predominately fuel. Polish criminal groups are also involved in the illegal trade of coal and amber. Due to the coal crisis and high heating fees in Poland, there is a resurgence in the phenomenon of illegal mining. In addition, diesel, mainly imported from the east, is laundered and sold as a biofuel in Poland. The perpetrators of the crimes take advantage of the differentiation of excise tax rates for diesel and heating oil, as well as the tax exemptions for other fuels. Smugglers use land and maritime routes; source countries are based in Western, southern and Eastern Europe, as well as the Black Sea region.
Poland is a source, destination and transit country for heroin. However, while domestic heroin is mostly produced for the Polish market, heroin arriving in the country originates from Afghanistan and is transited through the Balkans to Germany or the United Kingdom. The heroin market is dominated by organized mafia-style groups dispersed across Europe who are often involved in numerous criminal markets. However, there is a decline in heroin consumption in Poland, which may be related to the significant increase in the popularity of drugs derived from cannabis.
Poland is primarily a transit and destination country for smuggling of cocaine from South America to Western European countries. The illicit cocaine trade in Poland is a dynamic and international market, where distribution is flexible in a loose, horizontally structured network, allowing more small distributors who employ a variety of marketing strategies to enter the market. However, cocaine is considered a luxury drug in Poland due to its high price and it is mostly consumed by affluent individuals. Cocaine is commonly smuggled in containers containing legal products, such as food, wood, industrial machinery and citrus fruit, which are received by legally operating Polish or international companies. Polish citizens are also used as couriers for cocaine smuggling using the mail or the ‘ingestion’ method.
Poland is a source and transit country for cannabis products including hashish, resin and dried leaves. Medical use of marijuana is legal in Poland and it can be obtained at pharmacies with a prescription. The illegal cultivation and production of cannabis products is predominantly run by organized criminal groups including groups composed of citizens from various Asian countries. However, members of Polish criminal groups are also organizers of cannabis cultivation outside Poland’s borders, especially in Spain. In recent years, the smuggling of cannabis-related drugs from cannabis from Spain, Belgium and the Netherlands has become a regular part of the earnings of Polish citizens who, when leaving the country, transport precursors for the production of synthetic drugs and when returning to Poland transport marijuana and hashish.
The illicit synthetic drugs market is the largest drug market in Poland. The most common synthetic drugs are amphetamine, methamphetamine, MDMA, Ecstasy, GBL, BMK and other designer drugs. The illegal synthetic drug market (primarily focused on amphetamine, methamphetamine and MDMA) is controlled by organized criminal groups or mafia-style groups with international ties. Additionally, amphetamine is produced in Poland for European markets, while amphetamine in liquid form is smuggled into the country. Polish criminal groups import it because it is easy to process into an inhalable form. Another drug frequently imported into Poland is Ecstasy pills. It comes overland from the Netherlands and Belgium transported by couriers who use their own vehicles.
Cyber-dependent crimes in Poland mostly consist of ransomware. Due to the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine, the number of cyber-attacks has drastically increased. Perpetrators use the cyber vulnerabilities created by the Russia–Ukraine war to commit both financially motivated and politically motivated crimes. Perpetrators target individuals with assets, such as crypto wallets. They also attack government agencies’ websites and online resources, satellite operations and critical infrastructure, such as state institutions and banks.
Financial crimes in Poland are on the rise. The country has had numerous cases involving VAT fraud carried out by organized crime groups. Schemes include mis-invoicing, trade in fictitious goods, forging VAT documents and similar activities, which have earned vast amounts of money for the perpetrators. Goods involved in illegal or fictitious trade include the purchase and sale of services, including transport, construction, IT and commercial goods, fuel, food and beverages, event services and the trade in steel products. In terms of property crime, many crimes are committed in cyberspace or using electronic communications. Furthermore, organized criminal groups conduct scams on the internet, such as ‘remote desktop’ scams that are built around investments. The pandemic period also had a tremendous impact on the increase in cybercriminals’ activity, who improved known and implemented new online fraud mechanisms.
Organized crime networks are fairly widespread in Poland, but groups in bigger cities dominate the main illicit economies. Criminal networks are most prevalent in drug-related crimes and economic offences. Depending on the illicit market, often in the drug trade, these groups have moved onto the darknet and other forms of social media platforms, to maintain anonymity. Furthermore, football hooligans occupy a stable space in the criminal networks landscape in Poland. Members of a local Silesian football club were charged with participation in organized criminal groups along with other charges including drugs and firearms trafficking, robbery and money laundering.
There is little information in governmental and media sources on the potential involvement of private-sector and state-embedded actors in criminal activities. However, an increasing number of reports on high-level corruption provide a troublesome picture of state actors engaging in, if not criminal, at least questionable ventures. Some state-owned companies in the country, in particular those involved in the oil industry, are suspected of distorting market rules and engaging in corrupt practices to generate more profits. Also criminal activities conducted by private sector actors in Poland include various financial crimes, such as tax evasion.
Many foreign national actors participate in the trade of narcotics and human trafficking using their international links in Poland. Most criminal diasporas in the country run locally organized criminal activities but are equally involved in international criminal activities. Illegal trade in narcotics is still believed to be the focus of foreign national groups, along with high levels of cigarette smuggling. Additionally, Georgian and Ukrainian organized crime groups, participate in the illegal smuggling of migrants across Poland’s eastern border. Furthermore, Poland continues to be free from domestic mafia-style groups, as two of the most famous ones, Pruszkow and Wolomin, were dissolved early in the first decade of the 2000s. However, older members of these groups sometimes attempt to get back into their business after being released from prison. In 2021, the Polish Police Central Bureau of Investigation arrested in Warsaw a man associated with the 'Old Pruszkow' mafia.
The Polish government and political parties continue to express the desire to fight organized crime. However, in practice, organized crime is not a priority, nor is it an issue raised in political debates. The impetus to fight organized crime is to halt financial crime and close the VAT tax gap, which the Polish government hopes will make additional funds available for social welfare programmes. However, recent reports suggest that the available VAT tools have not had the desired effect in eliminating organized tax fraud. Furthermore, political parties and the government are the least-trusted institutions in the country. The Central Anti-Corruption Office in Poland has been working to combat public and economic corruption at various levels, though they are perceived as ‘political police’. Other institutions, including the border guard, the military gendarmerie, the military counter-intelligence service and the national revenue administration, are also responsible for combatting corruption in the country. Documentation relating to national budgets, legislative changes, public procurement and legislative processes are publicly available through information bulletins and government websites. However, even though international reports indicate improvement in corruption management in the country, public perception continues to believe in a worsening situation. There are also reports showcasing an increase in the number of corruption scandals linked to the current government and gradually normalized corrupt practices among those in power.
Poland has ratified and adopted various international statutes pertaining to various forms of organized crime. As a member of the EU, Poland participates in the implementation of EU policies relating to counteracting and combating crime, including economic crime. The country’s internal security agency cooperates internationally within the Anti-Terrorist Centre and is also a part of the EU’s counter-terrorism strategy. Furthermore, the Polish police participates in the work of the Task Force for Combating Organized Crime in the Baltic Sea Region, in which Polish Central Police Investigation Bureau officers actively participate. Poland also has extradition agreements with several countries and various bilateral cooperation agreements in the fight against organized crime. Poland’s regulatory framework criminalizes acts of organized crime, including drug offences; obstruction of justice; participation in organized criminal groups; smuggling of migrants; illegal trade in cultural property; and people trafficking. Poland also has an anti-corruption strategy, a programme combating economic crime, an anti-drug strategy, a strategy to develop state security, and a national plan to combat human trafficking.
Poland’s justice system consists of a supreme court, common courts, administrative courts and military courts, all of which are allowed to pass judgment against organized crime. Penalties and prison sentences are imposed effectively. There have been reports of visible levels of destabilization in the judiciary in Poland. Notably, judicial proceedings are typically lengthy, and, as organized crime cases are often more complex, these can take a toll on the judicial system. The judiciary reforms implemented by the current government are not compatible with EU law and planned changes to the legal system may further undermine democracy in Poland. The treatment of prisoners in Poland is not in line with EU standards, nor with international human rights standards.
The police in Poland cooperate with the military police and the military information services in the fight against organized crime, and the national prosecutor’s office has a department for organized crime and corruption. The activities undertaken by the Polish police’s central bureau of investigation are aimed at combating organized crime of a cross-border nature that are related to terrorist acts. The internal security agency was established to protect the internal security of the state and its citizens, and deals with recognizing structures, undertakings and methods of operation of organized crime. Nevertheless, law enforcement is not effective enough in countering organized crime and face challenges with political interference. Furthermore, Poland’s ruling party recently introduced new legislation that effectively allows mass surveillance, which is against EU law. In December 2021, reports emerged about the government’s use of the Israeli spyware Pegasus to keep many Polish opposition figures under surveillance.
Poland’s position on the eastern border of the European Union makes it attractive for the smuggling many products, such as tobacco and cigarettes. Despite this position, Poland is an independent country with no challenges to its territorial integrity. The scale and dynamics of crime on Poland’s eastern border are determined by political decisions on the rules relating to border crossings and are also determined by economic factors, such as differences in the price of excise goods. The Polish border guard is a well-organized and functioning institution that cooperates with many counterparts in neighbouring countries, as well as with Frontex, Europol and Eurojust. However, Poland’s cyberspace is threatened by the increase in cyber-dependent crimes, which was exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia–Ukraine war. To ensure the integrity of its national cyberspace, Poland makes efforts to systematically strengthen and develop its national cyber-security system. These efforts include the establishment of a new cyberspace defence force that is being developed by the National Cyberspace Security Centre, as a specialized component of the Polish armed forces.
The Polish system of counteracting money laundering and the financing of terrorism is shaped by both national and EU regulations. The General Inspector of Financial Information is the mandated authority to verify suspicions of money laundering or terrorist financing contained in reports issued by various local and foreign institutions and finance investigating units. The national tax administration, the internal security agency, the central anti-corruption bureau and the central investigation bureau are also tasked with investigating irregularities and enforcing the relevant regulations. However, the authorities have limited understanding of money laundering and terrorism financing, and this renders the regulatory framework ineffective. Recent changes were introduced in the Law on Counteracting Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism and certain other laws to improve the functioning of the laws on anti-money laundering and anti-financing of terrorism. Nevertheless, the effects of these amendments are yet to be observed. Legitimate businesses are reported to be influenced by criminal groups carrying out activities in Poland. The government fails to protect legitimate businesses due to a lack of effective regulations. Furthermore, the grey economy has continued to grow in recent years, fuelled by the COVID-19 pandemic.
Poland has victim assistance measures in place. The Minister of Justice recently approved a programme to assist victims of crime in response to a diagnosed need to introduce uniform standards of assistance to crime victims and witnesses. Poland has also adopted a national action plan against trafficking in human beings. However, the Fund for Victims’ Aid and Post-Penitentiary Assistance’s financial management was conducted in violation of the principles governing public finance, as some of the funds were spent to achieve other goals rather than to help victims of crime. Currently, there are 16 main assistance centers that provide support in the form of free legal, psychological, social and other services to people who have been victimized by crime. Various NGOs and other organizations provide witness protection and support victims of organized crime.
Poland has several strategies in place that relate to the prevention of drugs crimes, economic crimes, corruption and human trafficking. Many programmes and strategies directly or indirectly aim to fight organized crime. For instance, the Polish police has initiated a training cycle to raise awareness about human trafficking victims among crime prevention services. There are also various local programmes and workshops raising awareness about human trafficking and drug use. However, not enough evaluation of the effectiveness of these efforts has been done.
Civil society organizations are an important component of maintaining the balance of power, exposing irregularities and working to moderate against government actions in political and social life. Researchers and scientists in criminology or law prepare many studies on organized crime. Meanwhile, media independence from the government plays a significant role in the disclosure of organized crime. However, the media have experienced unprecedented harassment and government intimidation in various forms, including requests to remove news articles uncovering corruption, suing newspapers and taking control of national TV, spreading disinformation and promoting the ruling party.
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The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to 10. The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel.
A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.
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