People

Georgia is a source and transit country for human trafficking, especially sexual exploitation and forced labour. For instance, women from former Soviet republics are trafficked through Georgia on their way to Türkiye. Forced labour is also observed in the country: Georgian men and women are trafficked domestically and abroad. The primary trafficking destinations for forced labour are Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt and Cyprus. There are also reports of increased vulnerability to sex trafficking and forced labour among South East Asian women working in massage parlours.

Despite the country’s role as a transit point for human smuggling from Asia and Africa to Türkiye and the rest of Europe, and the increased targeting of the country by organized criminals for these activities, the human smuggling market remains minimal compared to other criminal markets in the country.

When it comes to extortion and racketeering, there has been a notable increase that seems to be related to the increasing activities of so-called ‘thieves in law’, specifically in Tbilisi and border towns. Extortion and racketeering have traditionally been the most common activities among thieves in law, who provide alternative protection to businesses. It has been reported that organized criminal groups have taken advantage of overstretched security forces (due to COVID-19 pandemic restrictions) to carry out extortion activities targeting business owners and high net worth individuals.

Trade

Tensions in the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and in Nagorno-Karabakh and other conflict regions in the Caucasus, together with the invasion of Ukraine by Russian forces, have left Georgia vulnerable to arms trafficking. The illegal and unaccounted movement of arms and ammunition within the region has increased concerns over the proliferation of such weapons.

Georgia is a transit country for counterfeit goods like garments, toys and footwear originating from Türkiye and China. There are also concerns over a potential increase of counterfeit pharmaceutical products in the country following the decision to allow imports of all pharmaceutical products approved by Türkiye. Even though illicit trade of excise goods (mainly tobacco products) is prevalent in the country, the market remains limited and stable. There are reports suggesting smuggling of tobacco products around the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but further information about this matter is limited. Recent reports also indicate that Georgia is becoming a source country for illicit tobacco products destined for neighbouring countries, specifically Azerbaijan.

Environment

Flora crimes are moderately problematic for Georgian authorities. The most significant threats are illegal logging, wood harvesting for fuel and overgrazing. The traditional harvesting and sale of wild plants is also a commonplace practice, which is placing many species under threat. While corruption is deemed to be one of the main facilitating factors, the market does not appear to be associated with any violence.

Increased rural dependence on natural resources has led to unsustainable hunting of endangered wildlife. Poaching incidents are also recorded in limited numbers, but there is no indication that organized criminal groups are involved. The hunting of falcons in Georgia has increased – the captured birds are exported to Gulf countries. Since it borders Türkiye, Russia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, Georgia is one of the most prominent countries for smuggling through the Caucasus. Overfishing in the Black Sea is also considerable: fishermen exceed their legal quotas tenfold. Smuggling of non-renewable resources remains limited, with sporadic incidents of oil theft documented in the country.

Drugs

Georgia functions as a transit country for opiates produced in the so-called ‘Golden Crescent’: Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The country has also emerged as an additional supply route for the European and (to a lesser extent) Russian markets. The Georgian opiate trade route has become more popular due to effective control measures imposed on heroin trafficking in neighbouring Türkiye. Georgia is also a destination country for heroin – it has been identified as one the most prevalent drugs used. Even though this market is mainly controlled by foreign actors, there is anecdotal evidence suggesting that local criminal organizations are also involved. Conversely, the cocaine market in the country seems to be small, evidenced by limited and occasional seizures of the drug.

Georgia is not a major cannabis-producing country. Local indoor and outdoor cultivation has been recorded but it takes place on a small scale and mostly for personal use. The country is a transit point for synthetic drugs, but judging by seized quantities, Georgia is not a major corridor for smuggling operations in these drugs.

Cyber Crimes

Cyber-dependent crimes are still an emerging criminal market in Georgia. This is mainly due to a lack of understanding of the economic and other damages that these crimes can cause, plus a degree of under-reporting. Cyber-dependent crimes are expected to increase in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and due to poor bilateral relations with Russia and continuing tensions between the central government and Georgia’s two breakaway regions.

Financial Crimes

Financial crimes, specifically tax-related crimes and embezzlement are prevalent in Georgia. Additionally, there are reports of fraudulent investment schemes carried out by criminal groups through the use of call centres, which target citizens in various European countries.

Criminal Actors

Most criminal networks in Georgia consist of poorly organized young people trying to gain control over a specific territory in competition with similar groups. Such groups are usually involved in petty crime – mainly robbing cars and small shops. Reports of bank robberies by better-organized and more violent groups have also emerged. In addition, criminal networks (in cooperation with foreign actors) are likely involved in heroin trafficking. Turkish groups mostly control this criminal market and information suggests that these groups have established their presence in the legal economies of key countries along the trafficking route. It is therefore possible that such groups control legal businesses in Georgia. Foreign actors might also collaborate with individual facilitators in the country, or have Georgian nationals in their ranks. There is a growing concern over the increased influence of foreign actors in the country since the Taliban took over Afghanistan, and since Russia invaded Ukraine.

Despite the diminished prominence of state-embedded actors in criminal markets, nepotism and corruption persist in Georgia. State-embedded actors are often involved in the embezzlement of public funds through public procurement contracts and tenders. Mafia-style groups known as ‘thieves in law’ or kanonieri qurdebi locally were prominent in Georgia in the 1990s. The groups were highly hierarchical and leaders of different clans were equal in status. However, they were largely dismantled following the adoption of an anti-mafia strategy by authorities, which implemented laws targeting these groups. Authorities believe that mafia-style groups are no longer an issue in Georgia, but certain elements that survived the crackdown continue to operate abroad – in Russia and Western Europe. Additionally, information suggests that a criminal subculture may have taken hold again in remote regions, and in certain prisons in the country. Groups are believed to be involved in multiple criminal markets including drug trafficking and extortion, as well as politics and business. In the Georgian political and business context, it is often difficult to disentangle private-sector actors and state-embedded actors due to the concentration of power in these sectors. The state apparatus is reported to be compromised by these actors with heavy influences over key institutions. It is also difficult to assess the involvement of private-sector actors in organized crime due to a lack of data.

Leadership and governance

Oligarchs continue to hold influence over policy, political interests hinder rule of law, and tenders remain a challenge for policymakers. While the government continues to make efforts to fight corruption and organized crime, public trust remains low due to persisting corruption and nepotism. Despite a legal framework that allows scrutiny of government operations by auditing bodies, as well as access to public information aimed at fighting corruption in the country, corruption in Georgia remains rampant. Agencies responsible for corruption prevention and investigation are reportedly unresponsive to corruption cases involving high-ranking public officials or people with close ties to the ruling party. In addition, even though elections are deemed to be fair, issues have been observed by third parties suggesting undue influence over the process by the ruling party.

Georgia is party to all treaties and conventions pertaining to organized crime, except the UN Firearms Protocol, which is supplemental to the Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC). International cooperation on matters of justice and law enforcement is well established in both law and practice. Moreover, the government has taken steps to improve international cooperation to curb certain organized criminal markets, including illegal logging, wildlife trade, flora and fauna crimes, arms trafficking and cybercrime. However, cooperation between Georgia and European countries and the US has been in decline in recent years. On a national level, the Georgian legislative framework covers all criminal markets including arms trafficking, human trafficking and human smuggling, among others.

Criminal justice and security

Executive and legislative interference in the courts remains a substantial challenge, despite ongoing efforts towards judicial reform. The independence of the judicial system is further affected by secrecy and by informal negotiations that take place behind closed doors, which altogether create a lack of transparency. Cronyism and the suppression of dissent by dominant judicial groups (evident in political cases) are additional challenges. The judiciary is also understaffed, with a backlog of cases. Despite decriminalizing cannabis and making efforts to regulate consumption, drug laws are aggressively enforced, which reportedly causes severe and unjustifiable harm. There are also concerns over arbitrary arrests without the right to an effective defence.

There are special units within the Georgian central criminal police department to tackle organized crime, especially human trafficking and drug-related offences. Georgia’s state security service is tasked with fighting terrorism and organized crime. The prosecutor’s office conducts its operative, administrative and investigative responsibilities in an effective and independent manner. Even though local policing agencies lack the necessary investigative and digital forensic skills and capacities, especially outside the main cities, police corruption lower down the hierarchy is not a major issue due to anti-corruption reforms. Civilian authorities have effective control over the security forces and over internal mechanisms to investigate corruption. However, as with the judicial system, law enforcement bodies suffer from political interference and therefore lack independence. Furthermore, law enforcement agencies (including special units) are often understaffed and lack the ability and experience to effectively respond to organized crime threats. Georgia’s vulnerability to trafficking and illicit flows is further exacerbated by territorial disputes, poor bilateral relations with Russia, and lax border governance with Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Economic and financial environment

Georgia continues to improve its anti-money laundering (AML) framework, through the implementation of an anti-money laundering action plan and anti-money laundering training. In addition to traditional money laundering techniques, such as using gambling businesses, cryptocurrency has become widespread in this market. No investigations into crypto-based money laundering cases have been initiated, however, and despite training efforts, the effectiveness of the financial intelligence unit continues to be undermined by technical deficiencies, poor implementation and limited resources. Reform measures have taken aim at organised crime and corruption, but despite efforts to curb illicit financial flows, concerns have been raised over the provision of services by Georgian banks and other businesses to Russian civilians and entities to avoid sanctions.

The legal framework and government policies are generally supportive of private business. Nevertheless, the protection of property rights remains a weak point, and deficiencies in judicial independence and government transparency hinder economic freedom. Loan sharks have proliferated in the country due to the socio-economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Civil society and social protection

The Georgian government continues to maintain its victim and witness support mechanisms through government-run anti-trafficking shelters that offer medical, psychological and legal assistance. There are also government-backed NGOs that offer support to human trafficking victims during the investigation process by providing initial psychological care, medical assistance, legal support and temporary shelter. There is a state fund dedicated to trafficking victims, which provides protection, assistance and rehabilitation support. However, there have been concerns in recent years over the circumvention of witnesses’ rights by law enforcement.

The government has maintained prevention efforts pertaining to certain criminal markets, including drug and human trafficking. For example, Georgia has been coordinating with the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) to launch a drug-use survey specifically for the country, which will highlight trends and help inform prevention attempts, as well as improve treatment and guide future drug policies. Overall, Georgia’s drug policies create a favourable legal environment for treatment, rehabilitation and drug reduction, but there still seems to be a lack of coherent drug-use prevention mechanisms. With regards to human trafficking, the government has taken preventative measures by disseminating leaflets and other information to raise awareness, and by funding anti-trafficking hotlines. Issues still remain due to a lack of transparency and insufficient resources and training.

Civil society organizations have been involved in several issues in Georgie, including human trafficking. While some of these organizations operate freely and are part of policy discussion, others report external pressures and defamation campaigns against them. Concerns over press freedom have been raised after recent imprisonments and physical attacks against journalists who were critical of the ruling party.

People

Poland is a source, transit and destination country for human trafficking. Forced labour is the main form of trafficking and male foreigner nationals are usually targeted. Women and children, especially from Eastern and south-eastern Europe as well as South America, are mainly trafficked for sexual exploitation in the country. Criminal groups often recruit Polish, Ukrainian and Russian women through advertisements on the internet and then force them into prostitution. Polish victims are also forced into begging, stealing, or extorting credit and social benefits.

Human smuggling in Poland has become a significant source of income for organized crime groups and funds received from such activities are often used for other criminal practices. Smuggling routes usually cross the Belarussian and Ukrainian borders to Poland, to continue further west. On the Belarusian border, massive pushbacks of migrants coming from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan and lack of cooperation between the two countries, combined with the involvement of state actors in these practices, have increased opportunities for human smugglers. In addition, the war in Ukraine brought millions of Ukrainians to Poland and the sudden influx and chaotic humanitarian operations in the first months of the crisis made the refugees vulnerable to smugglers and traffickers. Extortion and protection racketeering are recorded in the country, although such criminal activities are limited to rare incidents and are carried out in an opportunistic and unorganized manner.

Trade

Although still relatively modest in scale, arms trafficking is increasing in and through Poland, despite the strict regulations and the military’s control of the arms market. The southern border, with its well-established trafficking routes, is a particular source of concern for Poland. There is a small but steadily developing illegal arms market in the country, with guns being trafficked from Slovakia and Czechia. There is also an emerging trend of the illegal transport of firearms out of Poland, mainly to Ukraine and Libya. Furthermore, arms trafficking is linked to other forms of trafficking, mainly drugs and excise goods. Illegal weapons are smuggled from the US to Poland and other European countries though the darknet. There is also an emerging market in 3-D-printed weapons, with illegal workshops set up across the EU.

Counterfeit goods in Poland are a growing challenge and are either produced locally or, more often, imported from China. A good percentage of Polish consumers accept that they buy counterfeit goods, predominantly clothes, leather goods and cosmetics as well as toys, games, sport equipment, food, medicine and electronics. The COVID-19 pandemic increased trade in counterfeit products, as many consumers started to use e-commerce websites, while highly specialized criminal networks adjusted their marketing and production strategies.

Trade in excise goods in Poland is carried out along with trade in counterfeits. However, it is seen as an opportunistic activity in the country, while international trade is more organized. Poland is a popular destination for illegal trade in cigarettes and alcohol without excise. The market for cigarettes is, for the most part, fed by products produced in illegal factories. Nevertheless, occasional attempts to smuggle large quantities of cigarettes occur both by road transport, mainly from Belarus, and by sea. This illicit market is mostly operated by Polish citizens and those from neighbouring countries.

Environment

The market for illicit trade in flora is not well developed in Poland. There is, however, a growing concern about the illegal flora trade on the internet. In the last two years, an increase in illegal logging across the entire country has been noted. There have been cases in which crime groups are reported to supply illegally logged timber to sawmills where timber is converted into planks. Furthermore, since the war in Ukraine, Polish companies are reported to circumvented EU sanctions by paying Belarusian companies to import timber with false documents, which claim that the wood comes from Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan instead of Russia.

Poland is both a destination and transit point for wildlife trafficking, which is increasingly expanding in the country. Live birds, reptiles and caviar are some of the most illegally traded wildlife and wildlife-derived products. Crime groups involved in this market distribute produce though courier networks to Western European countries. This indicates the presence of structured criminal supply chains involved in the illegal wildlife trade in Poland. The country’s border with Ukraine has been identified as a critical wildlife trafficking hotspot. In addition, some organized crime groups are involved in illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing in Poland. This is a lucrative business and the crime groups involved sometimes use violence against law enforcement officials.

Poland has a pervasive market for the illegal extraction and smuggling of natural resources. The country’s key non-renewable resources include coal, silver, natural gas, amber, copper and salt. Organized criminal networks, mafia-style networks and private sector actors participate in illegal trade of non-renewable resources in Poland, predominately fuel. Polish criminal groups are also involved in the illegal trade of coal and amber. Due to the coal crisis and high heating fees in Poland, there is a resurgence in the phenomenon of illegal mining. In addition, diesel, mainly imported from the east, is laundered and sold as a biofuel in Poland. The perpetrators of the crimes take advantage of the differentiation of excise tax rates for diesel and heating oil, as well as the tax exemptions for other fuels. Smugglers use land and maritime routes; source countries are based in Western, southern and Eastern Europe, as well as the Black Sea region.

Drugs

Poland is a source, destination and transit country for heroin. However, while domestic heroin is mostly produced for the Polish market, heroin arriving in the country originates from Afghanistan and is transited through the Balkans to Germany or the United Kingdom. The heroin market is dominated by organized mafia-style groups dispersed across Europe who are often involved in numerous criminal markets. However, there is a decline in heroin consumption in Poland, which may be related to the significant increase in the popularity of drugs derived from cannabis.

Poland is primarily a transit and destination country for smuggling of cocaine from South America to Western European countries. The illicit cocaine trade in Poland is a dynamic and international market, where distribution is flexible in a loose, horizontally structured network, allowing more small distributors who employ a variety of marketing strategies to enter the market. However, cocaine is considered a luxury drug in Poland due to its high price and it is mostly consumed by affluent individuals. Cocaine is commonly smuggled in containers containing legal products, such as food, wood, industrial machinery and citrus fruit, which are received by legally operating Polish or international companies. Polish citizens are also used as couriers for cocaine smuggling using the mail or the ‘ingestion’ method.

Poland is a source and transit country for cannabis products including hashish, resin and dried leaves. Medical use of marijuana is legal in Poland and it can be obtained at pharmacies with a prescription. The illegal cultivation and production of cannabis products is predominantly run by organized criminal groups including groups composed of citizens from various Asian countries. However, members of Polish criminal groups are also organizers of cannabis cultivation outside Poland’s borders, especially in Spain. In recent years, the smuggling of cannabis-related drugs from cannabis from Spain, Belgium and the Netherlands has become a regular part of the earnings of Polish citizens who, when leaving the country, transport precursors for the production of synthetic drugs and when returning to Poland transport marijuana and hashish.

The illicit synthetic drugs market is the largest drug market in Poland. The most common synthetic drugs are amphetamine, methamphetamine, MDMA, Ecstasy, GBL, BMK and other designer drugs. The illegal synthetic drug market (primarily focused on amphetamine, methamphetamine and MDMA) is controlled by organized criminal groups or mafia-style groups with international ties. Additionally, amphetamine is produced in Poland for European markets, while amphetamine in liquid form is smuggled into the country. Polish criminal groups import it because it is easy to process into an inhalable form. Another drug frequently imported into Poland is Ecstasy pills. It comes overland from the Netherlands and Belgium transported by couriers who use their own vehicles.

Cyber Crimes

Cyber-dependent crimes in Poland mostly consist of ransomware. Due to the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine, the number of cyber-attacks has drastically increased. Perpetrators use the cyber vulnerabilities created by the Russia–Ukraine war to commit both financially motivated and politically motivated crimes. Perpetrators target individuals with assets, such as crypto wallets. They also attack government agencies’ websites and online resources, satellite operations and critical infrastructure, such as state institutions and banks.

Financial Crimes

Financial crimes in Poland are on the rise. The country has had numerous cases involving VAT fraud carried out by organized crime groups. Schemes include mis-invoicing, trade in fictitious goods, forging VAT documents and similar activities, which have earned vast amounts of money for the perpetrators. Goods involved in illegal or fictitious trade include the purchase and sale of services, including transport, construction, IT and commercial goods, fuel, food and beverages, event services and the trade in steel products. In terms of property crime, many crimes are committed in cyberspace or using electronic communications. Furthermore, organized criminal groups conduct scams on the internet, such as ‘remote desktop’ scams that are built around investments. The pandemic period also had a tremendous impact on the increase in cybercriminals’ activity, who improved known and implemented new online fraud mechanisms.

Criminal Actors

Organized crime networks are fairly widespread in Poland, but groups in bigger cities dominate the main illicit economies. Criminal networks are most prevalent in drug-related crimes and economic offences. Depending on the illicit market, often in the drug trade, these groups have moved onto the darknet and other forms of social media platforms, to maintain anonymity. Furthermore, football hooligans occupy a stable space in the criminal networks landscape in Poland. Members of a local Silesian football club were charged with participation in organized criminal groups along with other charges including drugs and firearms trafficking, robbery and money laundering.

There is little information in governmental and media sources on the potential involvement of private-sector and state-embedded actors in criminal activities. However, an increasing number of reports on high-level corruption provide a troublesome picture of state actors engaging in, if not criminal, at least questionable ventures. Some state-owned companies in the country, in particular those involved in the oil industry, are suspected of distorting market rules and engaging in corrupt practices to generate more profits. Also criminal activities conducted by private sector actors in Poland include various financial crimes, such as tax evasion.

Many foreign national actors participate in the trade of narcotics and human trafficking using their international links in Poland. Most criminal diasporas in the country run locally organized criminal activities but are equally involved in international criminal activities. Illegal trade in narcotics is still believed to be the focus of foreign national groups, along with high levels of cigarette smuggling. Additionally, Georgian and Ukrainian organized crime groups, participate in the illegal smuggling of migrants across Poland’s eastern border. Furthermore, Poland continues to be free from domestic mafia-style groups, as two of the most famous ones, Pruszkow and Wolomin, were dissolved early in the first decade of the 2000s. However, older members of these groups sometimes attempt to get back into their business after being released from prison. In 2021, the Polish Police Central Bureau of Investigation arrested in Warsaw a man associated with the 'Old Pruszkow' mafia.

Leadership and governance

The Polish government and political parties continue to express the desire to fight organized crime. However, in practice, organized crime is not a priority, nor is it an issue raised in political debates. The impetus to fight organized crime is to halt financial crime and close the VAT tax gap, which the Polish government hopes will make additional funds available for social welfare programmes. However, recent reports suggest that the available VAT tools have not had the desired effect in eliminating organized tax fraud. Furthermore, political parties and the government are the least-trusted institutions in the country. The Central Anti-Corruption Office in Poland has been working to combat public and economic corruption at various levels, though they are perceived as ‘political police’. Other institutions, including the border guard, the military gendarmerie, the military counter-intelligence service and the national revenue administration, are also responsible for combatting corruption in the country. Documentation relating to national budgets, legislative changes, public procurement and legislative processes are publicly available through information bulletins and government websites. However, even though international reports indicate improvement in corruption management in the country, public perception continues to believe in a worsening situation. There are also reports showcasing an increase in the number of corruption scandals linked to the current government and gradually normalized corrupt practices among those in power.

Poland has ratified and adopted various international statutes pertaining to various forms of organized crime. As a member of the EU, Poland participates in the implementation of EU policies relating to counteracting and combating crime, including economic crime. The country’s internal security agency cooperates internationally within the Anti-Terrorist Centre and is also a part of the EU’s counter-terrorism strategy. Furthermore, the Polish police participates in the work of the Task Force for Combating Organized Crime in the Baltic Sea Region, in which Polish Central Police Investigation Bureau officers actively participate. Poland also has extradition agreements with several countries and various bilateral cooperation agreements in the fight against organized crime. Poland’s regulatory framework criminalizes acts of organized crime, including drug offences; obstruction of justice; participation in organized criminal groups; smuggling of migrants; illegal trade in cultural property; and people trafficking. Poland also has an anti-corruption strategy, a programme combating economic crime, an anti-drug strategy, a strategy to develop state security, and a national plan to combat human trafficking.

Criminal justice and security

Poland’s justice system consists of a supreme court, common courts, administrative courts and military courts, all of which are allowed to pass judgment against organized crime. Penalties and prison sentences are imposed effectively. There have been reports of visible levels of destabilization in the judiciary in Poland. Notably, judicial proceedings are typically lengthy, and, as organized crime cases are often more complex, these can take a toll on the judicial system. The judiciary reforms implemented by the current government are not compatible with EU law and planned changes to the legal system may further undermine democracy in Poland. The treatment of prisoners in Poland is not in line with EU standards, nor with international human rights standards.

The police in Poland cooperate with the military police and the military information services in the fight against organized crime, and the national prosecutor’s office has a department for organized crime and corruption. The activities undertaken by the Polish police’s central bureau of investigation are aimed at combating organized crime of a cross-border nature that are related to terrorist acts. The internal security agency was established to protect the internal security of the state and its citizens, and deals with recognizing structures, undertakings and methods of operation of organized crime. Nevertheless, law enforcement is not effective enough in countering organized crime and face challenges with political interference. Furthermore, Poland’s ruling party recently introduced new legislation that effectively allows mass surveillance, which is against EU law. In December 2021, reports emerged about the government’s use of the Israeli spyware Pegasus to keep many Polish opposition figures under surveillance.

Poland’s position on the eastern border of the European Union makes it attractive for the smuggling many products, such as tobacco and cigarettes. Despite this position, Poland is an independent country with no challenges to its territorial integrity. The scale and dynamics of crime on Poland’s eastern border are determined by political decisions on the rules relating to border crossings and are also determined by economic factors, such as differences in the price of excise goods. The Polish border guard is a well-organized and functioning institution that cooperates with many counterparts in neighbouring countries, as well as with Frontex, Europol and Eurojust. However, Poland’s cyberspace is threatened by the increase in cyber-dependent crimes, which was exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia–Ukraine war. To ensure the integrity of its national cyberspace, Poland makes efforts to systematically strengthen and develop its national cyber-security system. These efforts include the establishment of a new cyberspace defence force that is being developed by the National Cyberspace Security Centre, as a specialized component of the Polish armed forces.

Economic and financial environment

The Polish system of counteracting money laundering and the financing of terrorism is shaped by both national and EU regulations. The General Inspector of Financial Information is the mandated authority to verify suspicions of money laundering or terrorist financing contained in reports issued by various local and foreign institutions and finance investigating units. The national tax administration, the internal security agency, the central anti-corruption bureau and the central investigation bureau are also tasked with investigating irregularities and enforcing the relevant regulations. However, the authorities have limited understanding of money laundering and terrorism financing, and this renders the regulatory framework ineffective. Recent changes were introduced in the Law on Counteracting Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism and certain other laws to improve the functioning of the laws on anti-money laundering and anti-financing of terrorism. Nevertheless, the effects of these amendments are yet to be observed. Legitimate businesses are reported to be influenced by criminal groups carrying out activities in Poland. The government fails to protect legitimate businesses due to a lack of effective regulations. Furthermore, the grey economy has continued to grow in recent years, fuelled by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Civil society and social protection

Poland has victim assistance measures in place. The Minister of Justice recently approved a programme to assist victims of crime in response to a diagnosed need to introduce uniform standards of assistance to crime victims and witnesses. Poland has also adopted a national action plan against trafficking in human beings. However, the Fund for Victims’ Aid and Post-Penitentiary Assistance’s financial management was conducted in violation of the principles governing public finance, as some of the funds were spent to achieve other goals rather than to help victims of crime. Currently, there are 16 main assistance centers that provide support in the form of free legal, psychological, social and other services to people who have been victimized by crime. Various NGOs and other organizations provide witness protection and support victims of organized crime.

Poland has several strategies in place that relate to the prevention of drugs crimes, economic crimes, corruption and human trafficking. Many programmes and strategies directly or indirectly aim to fight organized crime. For instance, the Polish police has initiated a training cycle to raise awareness about human trafficking victims among crime prevention services. There are also various local programmes and workshops raising awareness about human trafficking and drug use. However, not enough evaluation of the effectiveness of these efforts has been done.

Civil society organizations are an important component of maintaining the balance of power, exposing irregularities and working to moderate against government actions in political and social life. Researchers and scientists in criminology or law prepare many studies on organized crime. Meanwhile, media independence from the government plays a significant role in the disclosure of organized crime. However, the media have experienced unprecedented harassment and government intimidation in various forms, including requests to remove news articles uncovering corruption, suing newspapers and taking control of national TV, spreading disinformation and promoting the ruling party.