The Organized Crime Index | ENACT
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Denmark
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    Profile

    Denmark

    Capital

    Copenhagen

    Gross domestic product (GDP)

    USD 398,303.00 million

    Income group

    High income

    Population

    5,856,733

    Area

    42,920 km²

    Geography type

    Coastal

    GINI Index

    27.5

    4.020.15

    Criminality score

    151st of 193 countries -1

    34th of 44 countries in Europe-1

    3rd of 8 countries in Northern Europe-1

    Criminal markets

    4.330.48

    An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.

    Human trafficking

    4.000.00

    Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.

    Human smuggling

    5.000.50

    Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.

    Extortion & protection racketeering

    4.50 n/a

    Crimes linked to exerting control over a territory/market including as a mediator and/or requesting a benefit in exchange for protection.

    Arms trafficking

    5.001.00

    The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.

    Trade in counterfeit goods

    4.00 n/a

    The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands.

    Illicit trade in excisable goods

    4.00 n/a

    The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits.

    Flora crimes

    2.000.50

    The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.

    Fauna crimes

    2.000.00

    The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.

    Non-renewable resource crimes

    2.000.00

    The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.

    Heroin trade

    4.50-0.50

    The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.

    Cocaine trade

    6.000.50

    The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.

    Cannabis trade

    6.001.00

    The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.

    Synthetic drug trade

    5.000.00

    The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.

    Cyber-dependent crimes

    6.50 n/a

    Organized crimes that rely solely on using information communications technology with the aim of obtaining a monetary/material benefit.

    Financial crimes

    4.50 n/a

    Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance.

    Criminal actors

    3.70-0.18

    An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.

    Mafia-style groups

    5.500.50

    Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.

    Criminal networks

    4.500.50

    Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.

    State-embedded actors

    2.000.00

    Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.

    Foreign actors

    5.000.50

    State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.

    Private sector actors

    1.50 n/a

    Profit-seeking individuals/entities who own/control a part of the legal economy free from the state, that collaborate with criminal actors.

    8.13-0.08

    Resilience score

    4th of 193 countries 0

    4th of 44 countries in Europe-1

    3rd of 8 countries in Northern Europe-1

    Political leadership & governance

    9.000.00

    The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.

    Government transparency and accountability

    9.000.00

    The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.

    International cooperation

    8.00-0.50

    A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.

    National policies and laws

    9.000.00

    A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.

    Judicial system and detention

    7.500.00

    Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.

    Law enforcement

    7.50-0.50

    The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.

    Territorial integrity

    8.00-0.50

    The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.

    Anti-money laundering

    6.000.50

    A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.

    Economic regulatory capacity

    8.500.00

    The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.

    Victim and witness support

    7.500.00

    Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.

    Prevention

    8.500.00

    Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.

    Non-state actors

    9.000.00

    The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.

    8.13 3.70 4.33 8.13 3.70 4.33

    8.13-0.08

    Resilience score

    4th of 193 countries 0

    4th of 44 countries in Europe-1

    3rd of 8 countries in Northern Europe-1

    Political leadership & governance

    9.000.00

    The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.

    Government transparency and accountability

    9.000.00

    The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.

    International cooperation

    8.00-0.50

    A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.

    National policies and laws

    9.000.00

    A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.

    Judicial system and detention

    7.500.00

    Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.

    Law enforcement

    7.50-0.50

    The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.

    Territorial integrity

    8.00-0.50

    The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.

    Anti-money laundering

    6.000.50

    A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.

    Economic regulatory capacity

    8.500.00

    The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.

    Victim and witness support

    7.500.00

    Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.

    Prevention

    8.500.00

    Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.

    Non-state actors

    9.000.00

    The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.

    Analysis

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    People

    Denmark serves as a destination and transit country for human trafficking, playing a crucial role as a link between mainland Europe and Scandinavia. Most trafficking victims in Denmark are women, with Nigerians accounting for over half of the total. Other victims generally originate from countries in Eastern Europe, such as Romania; South East Asia, especially Thailand and the Philippines; or North Africa. They include undocumented workers, asylum seekers, young men, unaccompanied children, individuals engaged in commercial sex work and members of the LGBTQ+ community. While sexual exploitation remains the most prevalent form of trafficking, forced criminality and labour exploitation are also common. Semi-legal companies in sectors like construction and transport facilitate trafficking for forced labour. Furthermore, cybercriminal activity has increased, with certain aspects of the market shifting to online platforms.

    Denmark primarily serves as a destination and transit country for human smuggling, particularly to neighbouring countries like Sweden, where immigration laws are more relaxed. Debt plays a key role in driving voluntary human smuggling, although deception often complicates the determination of which workers, such as those in the sex industry, are smuggled willingly. Voluntarily smuggled individuals typically originate from countries such as Ukraine, the Philippines, Afghanistan, Nigeria and Bangladesh. Compared to its neighbours, Denmark has a relatively smaller domestic market for human smuggling. The country’s stricter immigration laws and efforts to repatriate refugees, including those from Syria, make it less popular as a destination for refugee smuggling.

    While gang-related criminal activities such as extortion and protection racketeering are not widespread, they have created a sense of uncertainty in Danish society. Recent cases affecting reputable companies have confirmed that incidents of this nature are not isolated. The most common cases registered by authorities are those of coercive control, threats and usury.

    Trade

    Denmark serves as a destination and transit country for arms trafficking, particularly to Norway and Sweden. Weapons are frequently sourced from countries such as Hungary, Slovakia, Serbia and Turkey. Transnational criminal networks, reminiscent of mafia-style organizations, transport firearms and explosives through Denmark, establishing a strong presence in illegal arms markets across the Nordic region. Although the domestic demand for arms in Denmark is relatively small, there has been a recent increase in arms trafficking in Scandinavia. Firearms, primarily Turkish converted blank-firing guns, are smuggled into Denmark for sale or transit rather than immediate use. These weapons are often converted within Denmark or in makeshift workshops to minimize the risk of detection during trafficking. The demand for illicit weapons mainly comes from organized-crime groups and political extremists, as political terrorism remains a threat in the country. Extensive arms trafficking occurs between Denmark and Sweden. It is predominantly controlled by criminal gangs, including biker clubs and networks using arms as a supplementary income source, for personal use, or for customization.

    Recent studies in Denmark indicate that young people demonstrate a noteworthy willingness to purchase counterfeit goods. In fact, the percentage of young Danes intentionally buying counterfeit products has increased compared to previous years and surpasses the EU average. This phenomenon has even extended to counterfeit sweets, manufactured by the so-called ‘Gummy Bear gangs’. Reports have highlighted the presence of substances like glue, dust and dirt in these products. Efforts to combat the trade in counterfeit goods in Denmark are robust. Authorities have reported seizing of various counterfeit products, including perfumes and clothing imitating renowned international brands. The rightful owners are entitled to receive reasonable compensation for these counterfeit goods, which, if distributed in the market, would have amounted to billions of Danish kroner.

    The illicit trade in excise goods has also become a concern in Denmark. Cigarette smuggling has seen a significant increase, driven by soaring cigarette prices. The illicit trade of cigarettes has doubled in recent years, leading to substantial tax revenue losses for the state. Other illicit trade activities have also been observed, such as the smuggling of medicinal products, as evidenced by German customs seizing narcotic oxycodone near the Danish–German border. Statistics indicate an increase in criminal offences related to licensing and trade.

    Environment

    Flora-related crimes are limited in Denmark due to the enforcement of local and international regulations by Danish government agencies. However, it has been discovered that some Danish timber companies are involved in illegal timber imports. Since Denmark has little to no domestic timber production, there continues to be a risk of illegal timber being imported from countries such as Russia and Brazil. The perpetrators of these crimes are often Danish flooring and timber companies.

    The illegal fauna market in Denmark is relatively small and limited in scale. As a high-income country, Denmark is more likely to be a destination rather than a source country for illegal fauna trade. Most illegally imported animals, including hunting trophies, come through Copenhagen Airport, where they are intercepted and confiscated by customs authorities. Individual perpetrators, such as enthusiasts or small-scale specialised smugglers, are the main criminal actors involved. Denmark is also known for its strict anti-ivory trading laws compared to neighbouring countries, although the EU has recently implemented stricter regulations to curb this trade. Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing is not a major problem.

    Non-renewable-resource crimes are not an extensive criminal market in Denmark. However, there has been an increase in copper theft over the past decade, particularly involving the cutting of cables between train tracks. These thefts are often carried out in an organized manner by criminal networks specializing in stealing precious metals, with many groups originating from Eastern Europe. Denmark has a notable number of dealers in precious metals and stones, and there are indications that valuable minerals are also used for money-laundering purposes. While Danish companies have been implicated in non-renewable- resource crimes, such as illegal bunker trading in Nigeria and illegal gold mining in Ghana, the domestic illegal trading of non-renewable resources is not a significant problem. The Danish energy market is highly regulated, and the monetization of non-renewable resources primarily occurs through large-scale projects that are subject to environmental regulations.

    Drugs

    Denmark serves as both a destination and transit point for heroin. Criminal networks, including the Albanian mafia and smaller organized-crime groups, play a prominent role in smuggling heroin into and through Denmark. They utilize routes such as the Balkan and Silk routes, entering from the southern borders shared with Germany. The domestic market is controlled by Danish mafia-style groups that act as distributors and organizers, outsourcing certain tasks to street gangs and trafficked individuals. Despite a decline in the market due to drug users spending less on imported heroin, the Danish heroin trade remains an ongoing issue. The COVID-19 pandemic has prompted criminal networks to adapt to the circumstances by leveraging digital technologies to facilitate distribution and conceal financial transactions, showcasing their ability to adapt and sustain their operations.

    Denmark plays a dual role in the cocaine trade as both a transit and destination country. The demand for cocaine primarily stems from the young population, where it is popular as a party drug. The consumption of cocaine saw a slight increase during the COVID-19 pandemic and has become a more noteworthy issue. The smuggling of cocaine into Denmark occurs through various land routes from other European countries, with maritime routes primarily accessing ports in Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain as entry points. The online market for cocaine has also experienced growth, especially due to COVID-19 restrictions. Criminal networks, including mafia-style groups and ethnic gangs from South America, West Africa and Southern Europe, dominate the cocaine trade in Denmark. However, it remains somewhat fragmented, with smaller entrepreneurs and dealers also active. Cocaine use per capita in Denmark is slightly higher than the EU average, comparable to Italy and the Netherlands.

    Denmark serves as both a destination and transit country for cannabis, with a significant portion of the drug being smuggled to Norway. While limited quantities of cannabis are cultivated within the country, the independent neighbourhoods of Christiania in Copenhagen have been a focal point for the cannabis trade for many years. Initially dominated by local residents, organized-crime groups have increasingly taken control of the market. The trade in Christiania has led to violence and conflicts, prompting periodic crackdowns by authorities. However, illegal activities persist, with multiple criminal actors involved. Cannabis demand in Denmark exceeds local supply, with a substantial amount imported from countries like Morocco and Libya through Southern Europe. Cannabis use is prevalent among Danish citizens, with over one-third of the population having tried it at least once, which is a higher figure than the EU average.

    The synthetic-drug trade in Denmark primarily relies on imports from the Netherlands and central and Eastern Europe. Although some small-scale amphetamine production facilities for personal use have been discovered, most amphetamines on the Danish market are sourced from other countries. The Netherlands is a prominent producer of synthetic drugs, which are then transported to Denmark by mafia-style groups and criminal networks, primarily through land routes. While there is evidence of amphetamine production within Denmark, the scale of this production remains uncertain. The rise of online drug markets has altered the dynamics of the domestic synthetic-drug trade, with users directly purchasing drugs from foreign distributors and receiving them by mail. Local drug dealers have adapted to these changes by utilizing open social-media platforms to sell synthetic drugs.

    Cyber Crimes

    The threat posed by cyber-dependent crimes in Denmark is considered to be high. Ransomware attacks are the primary concern. The number of ‘double extortion’ schemes, where stolen data is not only encrypted but also sold to the highest bidder, is growing. Authorities have identified numerous fraudulent websites posing as those of Danish authorities, designed to deceive individuals and steal their personal information. Foreign and domestic hacker groups have targeted the hospitality and retail sectors, engaged in data breaches in private companies, and employed keyloggers to obtain personal information. Russian cybercrime gangs have been indicated as among the most active criminal groups. However, authorities have observed an extensive level of collaboration among hacker groups, indicating a well-developed ecosystem supported by the emerging concept of crime-as-a-service.

    Financial Crimes

    Financial crimes in Denmark have raised concerns due to the occurrence of various fraudulent activities. One emerging trend involves scam calls where individuals impersonate police officers and exploit victims financially. Although there is no evidence of large transnational networks being involved, the perpetrators are often young Danish nationals who possess strong technological skills. In addition, there have been instances of Danish authorities being defrauded through dividend trading schemes. The number of registered cases related to financial crimes has substantially increased, particularly in embezzlement and fraud cases. Furthermore, reports of tax evasion and fraud by major corporations and leading banks have surfaced in recent years.

    Criminal Actors

    Denmark is home to several mafia-style groups involved in a range of illegal activities, including drug trade, extortion, economic crimes, robbery, human trafficking and arms trafficking. Despite existing rivalries among these groups, agreements have been made to minimize violence in order to avoid government bans that would lead to their dismantlement. While the number of gangs with criminal affiliations has increased in Denmark over the past five years, the total membership has decreased, with individuals frequently switching between gangs. These groups typically operate in designated residential areas in the suburbs and often employ legal business structures for money laundering and the sale of stolen goods. Drug trade is a prominent criminal market, with Denmark serving as a crucial transit route from mainland Europe to Scandinavia.

    Foreign actors play a major role in Denmark’s criminal landscape, particularly within mafia-style groups known as ‘migrant gangs’. These gangs primarily recruit members of second-generation diaspora communities in lower socio-economic neighbourhoods. Collaboration between foreign and domestic criminal actors occurs when transnational connections are required, particularly in human-trafficking and smuggling operations. While foreign actors may benefit from organized crime in Denmark, domestic actors largely control markets driven by domestic demand. Rivalries and alliances between Danish and Swedish criminal groups often lead to conflicts, occasionally escalating into gang-related shootings. Money-laundering, fraud and cyber-security threats from foreign entities further contribute to the complex criminal landscape in Denmark.

    Smaller criminal networks perpetrate a variety of criminal activities and often maintain connections with dominant gangs through family ties or affiliations with parent criminal groups abroad. These networks find refuge in suburban areas, providing shelter to family members and protecting criminal actors from law enforcement. Their criminal endeavours commonly involve copper and precious metal theft, human trafficking, human smuggling, drug trafficking and weapons trafficking. International connections are vital in these illicit markets due to Denmark’s position as a transshipment point. Money laundering within financial institutions is also suspected to involve individuals linked to criminal networks associated with Azeri and Moldovan actors.

    In contrast, the involvement of state-embedded actors in criminal markets is limited. Denmark is recognized as one of the least corrupt countries globally, with organized crime having minimal ties to public services or the government. There is also no information regarding private-sector actors engaging widely in organized criminal activities.

    Leadership and governance

    Denmark is recognized as a highly stable country, boasting a long-standing democracy and a robust public administration. It stands as one of the most stable nations globally, maintaining peaceful relations with its neighbouring countries, without any border conflicts. The Danish government places significant emphasis on collaboration with law enforcement agencies and politicians from neighbouring nations to combat organized crime effectively. In this regard, it has introduced measures such as ‘gang packages’ aimed at restricting the activities of convicted gang members and facilitating their reintegration into society. Legislative changes addressing organized crime typically garner bipartisan support, highlighting the country’s respect for the democratic process. Collaboration and coalitions among opposition parties further exemplify the strong democratic foundations of Denmark. While violence levels remain generally low, there is concern regarding the convergence of organized crime and terrorism, with ongoing monitoring of individuals who fought alongside the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. Additionally, the rise of extremist right-wing groups presents a potential security threat. Denmark has gained international acclaim for its high level of government transparency and accountability. The country’s public sector is widely regarded as one of the least corrupt and most transparent globally. Rigorous oversight mechanisms are in place, encompassing the judicial system, media scrutiny and international entities. Institutions and whistle-blower protocols play vital roles in safeguarding the rights of workers and citizens, while continual efforts are made to enhance oversight capabilities. Denmark has effectively established mechanisms to combat corruption and uphold accountability. However, certain areas require improvement, such as the implementation of an asset disclosure regime aligned with global standards and enhanced requirements for politicians to disclose conflicts of interest.

    Denmark actively engages in international cooperation to combat transnational crime. As a member of various alliances and international organizations, the country partakes in coordination efforts with other nations concerning security matters, border control and organized crime. Denmark has signed and ratified relevant treaties and actively collaborates with foreign authorities and law enforcement agencies, including partnerships with EU agencies. The country has implemented a series of laws and measures to combat organized crime, although these have raised concerns and garnered attention from international human-rights organizations. Notable legislative initiatives include anti-gang laws encompassing temporary visitation zones and the eviction of residents from designated ‘ghettos’, aimed at regulating the percentage of foreign-born citizens in publicly subsidized housing. The legal framework includes specific penalties for gang-related crimes and emphasizes the transnational dimension of organized crime, leading to border checks for individuals travelling from Sweden into Denmark to prevent the entry of those associated with organized crime and terrorism. Recent legal amendments introduce stricter penalties for using firearms or explosives in public places, restrictions on gang members’ residency in certain municipalities, closure of biker clubhouses, and enhanced protection for citizens who report or testify against organized crime.

    Criminal justice and security

    Denmark’s judicial system operates in a unified structure without specialized courts for organized crime. Cases are primarily determined by geographical location or the nature of the crime rather than the perpetrator’s affiliation. In recent years, there has been an increase in convictions and longer sentences for members of mafia-style groups due to new laws targeting gang membership. Some gang members have received harsh sentences, including up to 20 years in prison for attempted murder. The Danish prison system is under firm control of the state, with limited incidents of corruption, money laundering and gang violence compared to global standards. However, international monitoring agencies have expressed concern over the use of isolation, particularly for minors. Danish prisons prioritize the re-integration of prisoners into civilian life by allowing temporary exits for family visits, educational facility visits or job interviews. However, overcrowding has become a challenge. In 2021, the decision to rent prison cells in Kosovo, with the purpose of easing overcrowding in Denmark’s jails, was met with criticism, with activists saying the move was problematic as Denmark should not be sending unwanted foreign convicts to other countries, or far away from their families, and Danish standards were not likely to be maintained in those prison accommodations.

    The Danish law enforcement authorities are regarded as efficient, professional, well-equipped and well-coordinated in their efforts to combat organized crime. The national investigation centre serves as the special investigation authority for organized-crime cases, while two specialized units handle complex cases involving organized crime in specific regions. Danish law enforcement is adequately resourced and collaborates with international partners to combat organized crime. The police’s efforts against organized crime have shown relative success, with approximately a third of Denmark’s gang members currently incarcerated, reflecting growing confidence in the authorities and institutional systems.

    Denmark maintains strict control of its land borders and actively participates in EU border patrol. The country’s territorial integrity remains largely unchanged, with organized-crime operations primarily focused on trafficking people and goods across land borders. While crime poses some challenges, the main concern for Danish territorial integrity is geopolitics, particularly in relation to Greenland. Denmark is responsible for defending Greenland’s territorial integrity, which has become increasingly difficult due to its emerging geostrategic importance and pressure from other non-Nordic Arctic nations. However, Denmark exercises overall high control of its territory, supported by an efficient coast guard and navy, and collaboration with neighbouring countries. While Denmark is part of the Schengen Agreement, occasional border controls with passport requirements have proven somewhat effective in addressing the threats of organized crime and terrorism.

    Economic and financial environment

    Denmark has a unified framework for anti-money laundering (AML) and financial legislation but lacks a national strategy against this crime. Despite an increase in inspections, assessments and reports, financial crime has been on the rise. While Denmark’s AML performance is positive, there are strategic shortcomings that need to be addressed, including sectoral risks that have not been adequately tackled, and a lack of operational autonomy for the Financial Intelligence Unit. Billions of euros are laundered in Denmark’s economy annually, with VAT fraud being a notable concern. Recent scandals involving suspected transactions in large banks have damaged Denmark’s reputation, leading to increased resources and powers for agencies to combat financial crime. However, Denmark’s overall risk for money laundering and terrorism financing is low. Like other European countries, Denmark faces the challenge of balancing data protection, privacy and law enforcement efficiency within the AML framework, sparking debates among professionals.

    Denmark’s economic regulatory environment is highly favourable for businesses, contributing to its status as one of Europe’s wealthiest countries. There is no systematic evidence of organized-crime groups infiltrating legal businesses, and the government has established efficient regulatory systems that promote entrepreneurship and protect property rights. With robust non-market institutions such as healthcare and independent judiciaries, Denmark has experienced steady economic growth and maintains a strong foundation for further development. Additionally, the country is considered one of the freest economies in the world. While Denmark’s economy operates predominantly within the legal realm, regulations against financial corruption are informal to some extent and have yet to undergo rigorous stress testing comparable to other countries. Moreover, Denmark’s international economic relations have been diversifying, with a shift away from traditional trade partners like Germany, the UK and Sweden. Instead, Denmark is forging new relationships with Eastern European countries, China and Turkey, reflecting a reduced reliance on neighbouring nations.

    Civil society and social protection

    The Danish government has implemented strategies to support victims of organized crime, focusing on areas such as human trafficking and drug addiction. The Danish Security and Intelligence Service provides witness protection services, including security guards and identity changes. Victim protection is taken seriously, and victims can seek compensation through the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board. However, foreign nationals who are victims of human trafficking are repatriated to their home countries rather than allowed to stay in Denmark. Regarding drug addiction, Denmark has implemented harm reduction measures such as ‘fix rooms’ and temporary housing services for drug users. Law enforcement prioritizes targeting drug distributors rather than addicts. Free rehabilitation programmes are available, and addicts can access guidance through hotlines to enter rehabilitation promptly.

    The Danish government has taken advanced measures to prevent organized crime. Denmark, in particular, has a history of legalizing certain activities, such as sex work, and providing safe drug injections for unsuccessful rehabilitation cases. Prevention efforts also include providing educational materials to school youth, promoting exit programmes, conflict management and support groups. Local prevention initiatives focus on deterring youth from engaging in criminal activities and gang involvement by offering education, recreational opportunities and support for those who have been involved in criminal situations.

    Denmark is recognized for its high levels of freedom and press freedom. Despite recent challenges related to limited incidents of intimidation against journalists or cases of sexism in the media landscape, Denmark’s civil society is well-organized and well-financed. Non-governmental organizations, civil-society organizations (CSOs) and volunteers play a crucial role in crime prevention, particularly in addressing youth involvement in organized crime. Collaborations between the state and CSOs, such as outreach workers, contribute to knowledge and support for vulnerable youth. CSOs also provide exit programmes and support for victims. Denmark values participation in associations and has a long-standing tradition of engaging with civil society.

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    The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to 10. The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel.

    How to measure organized crime?

    A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.

    Read more on globalinitiative.net
    How to measure organized crime?

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    This report was funded in part by a grant from the United States Department of State.

    ENACT is funded by the European Union and implemented by the Institute for Security Studies and INTERPOL, in affiliation with the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.

    The opinions, findings and conclusions stated herein are those of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State.