China

People

China remains a central player in the regional human trafficking market, acting as a source, transit and destination country. A wide spectrum of actors, including mafia-style groups such as triads, criminal networks, state-embedded actors and foreign criminal actors, are involved in the trade. Chinese criminal organizations exploit victims domestically and abroad, frequently engaging in forced labour, sexual exploitation and trafficking for criminality. A prominent trend involves Chinese nationals trafficked into forced labour, such as cannabis cultivation, in countries including the United States, Chile and Spain, with victims subjected to debt bondage and coercion by networks like the Bang group. Human trafficking is also closely tied to online scams in South East Asia. Compounds in Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos exploit Chinese nationals by means of deceptive recruitment tactics and forcing them to conduct online scams under the threat of extreme violence, including torture and even death for non-compliance. Domestically, there are also concerning reports pertaining to state-imposed forced labour. State-affiliated enterprises and authorities are accused of subjecting Uyghur, Tibetan and other minority groups to forced labour as part of mass detention and labour transfer schemes. Forced labour is also documented in China’s fishing industry, where both domestic and foreign workers endure harsh conditions. Offshore, Chinese-flagged vessels have been implicated in labour abuse of men from Asia and Africa. Trafficking of women and children persists at scale, particularly involving victims from North Korea, Vietnam and Myanmar who are coerced into forced marriages, prostitution and agricultural work in rural China. Sophisticated tactics including document forgery and online recruitment facilitate these crimes, with some cases involving state-affiliated personnel.

China also plays a notable role in the regional human smuggling market, functioning as a country of origin, transit and destination. Chinese nationals are smuggled to and through North America, Europe, Latin America and South East Asia, with the United States seeing a notable influx of Chinese nationals seeking economic opportunities. Smuggling is facilitated by complex criminal structures that intersect with trafficking operations. Foreign nationals from countries such as Myanmar and Thailand are smuggled into China under false promises, often ending in exploitation. In southern provinces like Yunnan and Guangxi, extensive border control infrastructure attempts to manage these flows, but corrupt local officials assist the smugglers’ operations. High smuggling fees, reaching tens of thousands of US dollars, are common, entrenching victims in cycles of debt.

Following sustained government campaigns, extortion and protection racketeering have declined in mainland China, and extortion is now typically limited to small-scale operations or isolated incidents by minor gangs. Historically, triads in regions like Hong Kong have relied on extortion as a major revenue stream. After losing control of territory and facing strong law enforcement pressure, they have largely shifted to more profitable criminal markets that receive less scrutiny. Nevertheless, suspicions remain that some triads continue to engage in extortion and racketeering, although not primarily for financial gain. This realm remains extremely opaque, but it seems to be used to further the ruling party’s political interests. Despite these issues, the broader social impact of extortion rackets in China appears to be in decline.

Trade

With strict domestic gun laws, China maintains a relatively low incidence of arms trafficking within its borders. However, the country is a notable exporter of firearms to conflict-prone regions. Chinese-manufactured weapons are routinely found in illicit markets across Africa, Western Asia and South East Asia. Online black markets in Asia also feature Chinese firearms. Despite some successful domestic crackdowns and seizures, arms trafficking continues at the regional level, with incidents of triads using firearms in drug or fraud operations.

China is the global epicentre for the trade in counterfeit goods, with well-established production and distribution networks operating both domestically and internationally. The market encompasses counterfeit medicines, cosmetics, electronics and foodstuffs, driven by high domestic and global demand. Triads are particularly active in distribution hubs such as Shenzhen and Hong Kong. Although there is legislation to criminalize intellectual property violations, enforcement remains inconsistent. However, enforcement efforts have intensified over the past year, with police uncovering a growing number of cases involving the online sale of counterfeit goods. Authorities have targeted key channels such as live-stream and e-commerce platforms, focusing on products that frequently generate consumer complaints, including food, medicine, cosmetics, electronics and children’s items.

Illicit trade in excisable goods including tobacco and alcohol is a major criminal market, given China’s long borders and significant variances in tariff regimes. The market thrives in coastal areas like Guangzhou, Hong Kong and Hainan, where duty-free regimes and smuggling incentives attract organized criminal networks. These groups disguise contraband among legitimate products and leverage legal businesses as fronts to evade taxes. Smuggling methods have grown increasingly sophisticated and digitalized, often using messaging platforms. Although authorities have launched repeated national crackdowns, enforcement is undermined by pervasive corruption within customs agencies, allowing politically connected actors to operate with impunity.

Environment

China plays a dominant role in flora crimes, particularly in the trade of illegal timber. As one of the world’s largest importers and processors of timber, China receives illegally logged wood from Africa, South East Asia and Latin America. Despite revisions to forestry laws, poor enforcement and supply-chain traceability facilitate the infiltration of illicit goods into the legal market. Criminal networks, often acting under legal business fronts, use bribery and collusion with officials to secure fraudulent permits. The rosewood trade is especially lucrative, with massive imports from West Africa continuing despite official bans. These activities have fuelled both environmental degradation and conflict, as in The Gambia and Senegal, where revenues from timber trafficking support rebel movements.

China is also a major driver of global fauna crimes. Demand for wildlife products for traditional medicine, food, fashion and exotic pets sustains extensive trafficking networks. Chinese actors operate across the value chain, as importers, processors and retailers, and their activities contribute to poaching and environmental destruction worldwide. Products such as ivory, rhino horn and pangolin scales remain in high demand. Despite revisions, legislation still permits the commercial breeding and exploitation of endangered species. While awareness of animal welfare is growing, the commercial use of endangered species persists, reinforcing global poaching networks. Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing continues to be rampant, with Chinese distant-water fleets actively involved in these practices – including shark finning and other exploitative activities – particularly in the Southwest Indian Ocean region.

In the realm of non-renewable resource crimes, China’s position as the leading importer and processor of critical minerals has been accompanied by illicit activities both domestically and abroad. The country dominates the market for rare earth elements, with illegal mining and smuggling deeply entrenched in its supply chain. Domestic regulation is undermined by poor local governance and corruption. Overseas, Chinese companies are implicated in environmentally damaging and exploitative mining activities across Africa, South East Asia, the Pacific and Latin America, with China serving as a key destination for illegally trafficked minerals extracted through these operations. Additionally, China’s involvement in oil smuggling, particularly through imports from Iran, Russia and North Korea, illustrates the overlap between state strategies and illicit trade.

Drugs

China’s heroin trade has historically been shaped by proximity to the Golden Triangle and the Golden Crescent. While domestic heroin use and production have declined due to stringent enforcement and public intolerance, trafficking persists along the Yunnan border, albeit under tighter controls. While recent efforts have constrained heroin inflows, Chinese organized criminal groups collaborate with actors across the region and new drug hubs in South East Asia have expanded their involvement in production and distribution abroad. Domestically, the use of heroin remains concentrated in specific areas and is significantly lower than that of other drugs.

Cocaine demand in China is relatively low, but the country is an increasingly important trans-shipment hub, especially through Hong Kong. Large seizures of liquid cocaine and a price drop in recent years suggest a growing market in the territory. Younger users are believed to be driving this trend, with cocaine now ranking as the second most abused drug in Hong Kong. International criminal groups collaborate with Chinese actors for transport, while profits are laundered through real estate and shadow banking systems.

The cannabis market in China is fragmented, largely due to strict law enforcement by police and local authorities. While China is a significant player in the industrial hemp and CBD sectors – legal for non-recreational use – its laws impose some of the world’s harshest penalties for recreational cannabis use, possession and distribution. As a result, Chinese criminal networks tend to operate primarily overseas, collaborating with foreign actors to establish transnational trade routes. Reports highlight the involvement of triads and other criminal syndicates, including Chinese diaspora groups, in cannabis operations across the United States, Canada and Latin America. Some of these networks exploit smuggled Chinese nationals as forced labourers. Although most cannabis-related activity occurs abroad, domestic recreational use is reportedly increasing among urban youth, particularly those who have returned from abroad.

Synthetic drugs represent China’s most significant and complex drug market. Despite stringent laws, the country continues to experience high production and trafficking volumes, especially of methamphetamine and ketamine. Authorities have implemented large-scale seizures and crackdowns, but the market has grown more sophisticated, with online platforms facilitating transactions. The use of legitimate businesses and complex laundering schemes further challenges enforcement efforts. New psychoactive substances and synthetic opioids – including nitazenes – have emerged as key threats. Chinese chemical suppliers export these substances using encrypted communications and offshore networks. Border regions such as Jilin have seen an influx of methamphetamine from North Korea, while triads and organized crime syndicates dominate the trade in the wider region. Domestically manufactured precursor chemicals also pose a significant challenge, as they are often diverted into the hands of traffickers and drug cartels worldwide. These groups use the chemicals to produce fentanyl and other synthetic opioids, which are then trafficked across borders. Transnational organized crime groups increasingly exploit the internet to source these precursors, conducting transactions on platforms including e-commerce websites, online marketplaces, social media and, to a lesser extent, darknet forums and marketplaces.

Cyber Crimes

Cyber-dependent crimes are widespread in China and rapidly evolving, placing the country among the top global actors in this market. The rapid adoption of technology has outpaced cybersecurity defences, making China a fertile ground for attacks that threaten both domestic innovation and export competitiveness. Offences include data breaches, ransomware and malware dissemination, with recent incidents targeting manufacturing and technology sectors. State-sponsored actors have been accused of cyberattacks against foreign governments and institutions, with groups like Volt Typhoon reportedly infiltrating critical infrastructure abroad. These activities involve advanced techniques and highlight the convergence of cybercrime and geopolitical strategy.

Financial Crimes

Financial crime in China is extensive, encompassing embezzlement, tax evasion and cyber-enabled fraud. While not among the world’s top markets, Chinese actors are deeply embedded in regional networks, generating substantial illicit revenues. Tax evasion is prevalent among private firms and high-profile individuals. Cyber-enabled schemes – ranging from ‘brushing’ schemes and fraudulent loans to sophisticated impersonation scams – are fuelled by inadequate personal data protection, producing a daily barrage of scam calls and texts. Organized criminal groups use dialect-specific scams and technologies like deepfakes to target vulnerable populations. South East Asia has become a hub for scam centres operated by Chinese and Taiwanese actors, leading to the trafficking of victims and widespread fraud. These centres use advanced technologies to deceive vulnerable groups, including the elderly, and coerce low-income migrants trafficked under false job promises. The operations frequently involve cryptocurrency and exploit weak regulations to obscure transactions.

Criminal Actors

Mafia-style groups are deeply entrenched in China’s criminal landscape. In mainland China, such entities are classified as ‘black societies’ and ‘evil forces’. Black societies are structured, resourceful organizations known for using violence and maintaining ties to officials to control local markets and territories. Evil forces, though smaller and less complex, display clear leadership and violent tendencies, often serving as precursors to larger groups. In Hong Kong, mafia-style groups operate under the well-known triad system. These generally decentralized organizations exhibit strict hierarchies, strong internal codes and substantial reach across illicit markets. Across all regions, mafia-style groups exploit legal businesses, launder money and extend their influence globally, engaging in drug trafficking and cybercrime and even enforcing state interests abroad. While direct violence is often constrained, they are known to use violence strategically, both to control rivals and suppress political dissent. Their territorial control remains localized, but their transnational networks – bolstered by corruption and cooperation with foreign actors – enable operations in South East Asia, North America and beyond. These groups continue to be well financed and enjoy political protection to control certain territories.

Criminal networks in China are typically loose and decentralized, yet highly adaptable and influential across a range of illicit economies. These groups engage in drug trafficking, human smuggling and trafficking, wildlife trafficking, illegal mining and illicit trade in excisable goods. Their financial sophistication is notable, particularly in money laundering through front companies, casinos and real estate ventures. These criminal networks are often transnational, focusing on specific areas within the country and collaborating with foreign actors or forming part of larger international networks. They also extend their reach beyond China’s borders, operating in regions such as South East Asia, Latin America and Africa.

State-embedded actors represent a significant vulnerability in China’s criminal ecosystem. While the state may not overtly participate in criminal activity, state structures often enable and shield criminal actors – particularly, as mentioned above, mafia-style groups like the triads. These actors, in return, engage in operations aligned with government objectives, such as disrupting dissent, gathering intelligence or promoting geopolitical interests abroad. Corruption is a persistent issue across multiple levels of government. Although anti-corruption campaigns have led to arrests, these are perceived as selective, enabling the state to manage which criminal entities are permitted to operate.

Foreign actors have limited influence within China. Although criminal networks operating across borders collaborate with Chinese entities, they typically do not exert control over domestic criminal markets. In general, foreign actors play a facilitative role, supporting Chinese groups in laundering money, smuggling goods or trafficking wildlife.

Private sector actors, including legitimate businesses and financial intermediaries, play a critical role in enabling organized crime in China. Many criminal organizations use legal enterprises, such as gambling establishments and real estate ventures, to conceal illicit activities. Financial crimes, smuggling and the use of illegal labour are facilitated by weak regulatory oversight in sectors such as real estate, high-value goods and cryptocurrency. Capital controls that limit Chinese nationals to transfers of approximately US$50 000 per year have contributed to widespread illicit financial flows. Wealthy individuals circumvent the restrictions by engaging with laundering schemes, often facilitated by foreign cartels, to trade their Chinese currency for US dollars. These schemes offer cheaper alternatives to formal remittance channels and contribute to transnational money laundering networks. As such, private sector actors – both complicit and negligent – constitute a crucial link in the broader architecture of organized crime within and beyond China.

Leadership and governance

China’s leadership has consistently prioritized the suppression of organized crime in their political agenda. Authorities have undertaken extensive campaigns, including the dismantling of thousands of criminal organizations. These efforts, which reflect a high degree of centralized control that is reinforced by cross-border collaboration with neighbouring South East Asian countries, have resulted in joint operations to dismantle scam centres and human trafficking networks. Dissidents abroad have voiced criticism of ties between the state and criminal groups such as the triads. International observers echo this, raising concerns about the use of organized criminal actors to pursue strategic interests, highlighting a complex intersection of political power and illicit networks. Although China’s political system remains outwardly stable and centralized, economic slowdowns have posed challenges to public confidence in the government, especially regarding socioeconomic outcomes.

China’s anti-corruption efforts are led by the central commission for discipline inspection, the highest supervisory body of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), rather than the country itself. Key initiatives include enforcement of anti-bribery regulations, expansion of corporate compliance programmes and amendments to the criminal law to impose stricter penalties for corruption-related offences. The commission has been instrumental in prosecuting high-profile cases. Nonetheless, its nature and a lack of oversight raise questions about the propriety and legality of its processes. This complex dynamic between anti-corruption work and its potential abuse is demonstrated by China’s switch from the shuanggui to the liuzhi detention regime. Shuanggui, an extrajudicial disciplinary process sitting within the CCP rather than the formal legal framework, was widely criticized as a method to bypass due process and was associated with coercion and torture. The liuzhi system of detention ostensibly moved that process from the CCP into the better-regulated state realm but, in fact, it extended the range of people who fall under the authority of the new national supervision commission from party members to anyone working in or associated with the public sector. Although the anti-corruption landscape has generally improved, transparency in governance has declined. The removal of court judgments from public databases and the retroactive deletion of policy documents have significantly reduced public access to legal and governmental information. Data sharing, particularly in sensitive political areas, is increasingly restricted. Consequently, while anti-corruption policies are robust, transparency remains a key vulnerability in China’s governance framework.

China has demonstrated a firm commitment to international cooperation against organized crime, having ratified a range of conventions including the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, the United Nations Convention Against Corruption and key arms and narcotics treaties. It has also engaged in regional bilateral cooperation, such as extradition agreements with 45 countries and joint law enforcement efforts, including the extradition of nearly 50 000 telecom fraud suspects from Myanmar between 2023 and 2024. However, critics have noted that China at times uses bilateral frameworks to target political dissidents. China’s engagement with South East Asian countries has intensified – especially concerning cyber fraud and drug-related crimes operated by Chinese nationals – but broader international trust in China’s cooperative intentions is sometimes hindered by its domestic practices. As the government aims to reposition itself as a central player in global security dialogues, international perceptions of its compliance with core human rights and anti-trafficking standards remain mixed.

China has enacted a range of laws addressing organized crime, including the anti-telecom and online fraud law and criminal code provisions targeting intellectual property violations, drug trafficking and organized criminal groups. China enforces strict drug laws, including capital punishment for major offenders, although implementation remains uneven. Certain forms of trafficking, especially those involving forced labour and women, are frequently prosecuted under less severe legal provisions, such as labour contract violations or domestic abuse statutes, resulting in comparatively lenient sentences. Amendments to wildlife and mineral resource laws aim to tackle trafficking and illegal exploitation. However, the revised wildlife protection law continues to permit the commercial use of endangered species, raising concerns among conservation and anti-trafficking advocates. In the mining sector, national and provincial campaigns have sought to curtail illegal production, but challenges persist due to voluntary adherence to due diligence guidelines and limited transparency in strategic mineral regulation. While legal structures are in place, enforcement inconsistencies and policy ambiguities hamper their effectiveness.

Criminal justice and security

China’s judiciary is centralized and effectively enforces laws targeting organized crime. The courts generally deliver convictions and the ministry of justice maintains oversight of the prison system. However, policy changes that restrict public access to court rulings have raised concerns about judicial transparency. The CCP maintains control over the judicial system, with courts at all levels overseen by party political–legal committees. These committees exert influence over the appointment of judges, court operations and the outcomes of cases. Many judges have reported interference from local officials seeking to protect powerful litigants, shield key industries or avoid personal liability. Although corruption among prison officials is occasionally reported, the prison system remains under strong state control. NGOs continue to report poor conditions and abuses, particularly in facilities associated with so-called poverty alleviation or vocational training programmes for Uyghurs and other minority groups. While there are no dedicated judicial units for organized crime, courts regularly process high-profile cases, contributing to a functioning, albeit opaque, criminal justice system.

Law enforcement agencies in China operate with significant state backing and are well equipped to combat organized crime. Surveillance and enforcement capacities have been bolstered by a dedicated national office and public reporting platforms. The ministry of state security and military intelligence agencies conduct both domestic and international intelligence operations, although with limited transparency about information sharing. Despite these capabilities, concerns persist regarding the selective enforcement of laws and political motivations behind police actions.

Territorial integrity remains a central issue in China’s resilience framework, given its extensive and porous borders. The country has implemented robust controls in sensitive regions such as Yunnan and Guangxi to combat trafficking linked to the Golden Triangle. Border inspections, airport controls and port surveillance are routine, contributing to substantial seizures of drugs and weapons. Despite these efforts, corruption in border provinces undermines comprehensive enforcement. Human smuggling, trafficking and drug-related activities continue along borders with North Korea, Afghanistan and South East Asian countries. Border policies are further complicated by geopolitical tensions, including territorial disputes in the South China Sea and along the India–China frontier. Moreover, China continues to experience periodic unrest driven by underlying social tensions. Amid sporadic acts of violence and a rise in public protests, concerns are growing over the country’s social stability. In the cyber domain, China maintains strict digital border controls and possesses advanced offensive cyber capabilities. Although its approach to territorial integrity is multifaceted and largely effective, vulnerabilities persist where enforcement overlaps with political or strategic interests.

Economic and financial environment

China’s anti-money laundering framework is overseen by a national authority under the state council, with relevant agencies tasked with responsibilities within their respective jurisdictions. While this structure reflects a coordinated approach, there are documented questions about the effectiveness of China’s global engagement in addressing money laundering risks. In November 2024, the national people’s congress approved a major revision of the anti-money laundering law. This overhaul replaces the original law, which had been in force since 2007. The revised legislation aims to prevent money laundering, combat related criminal activities, enhance regulatory measures and safeguard financial stability, public interests and national security.

The country’s economic environment is heavily regulated, with state control shaping market operations and curbing the direct influence of organized crime. The post-pandemic economy has shown mixed performance, with industrial growth outpacing domestic consumption and mounting concerns over unemployment and real estate instability. There is no indication that specific economic sectors are dominated by criminal groups, nor of criminal infiltration into economic regulation. However, various vulnerabilities within the regulatory and financial systems have been identified. Capital controls have led to the emergence of parallel financial schemes. Smuggling from low-tariff regions like Hong Kong also presents persistent risks. Intellectual property rights (IPR) are legally protected, but counterfeiting remains a significant challenge. China has made strides to strengthen its legal framework and enforcement mechanisms, but inconsistencies and loopholes persist, making it a complex landscape for businesses seeking to protect their IPR. Although expropriation of land remains a problem, especially in the absence of legal redress, criminal infiltration into economic regulation is not extensively documented. Amid isolated incidents of violence linked to economic pressures, China has also faced accusations of violating international sanctions, particularly through oil imports from sanctioned states, raising further questions about regulatory consistency and enforcement.

Civil society and social protection

China has made progress in aligning its victim protection policies with international standards, including the provision of legal aid and participation rights in judicial processes. However, significant gaps remain. The treatment of trafficking victims remains inadequate, especially for non-citizens, who risk deportation and even the possibility of capital punishment upon return to their home countries. Complaints about law enforcement’s handling of victims suggest insufficient sensitivity and responsiveness. Implementation of verdicts in civil cases is reportedly weak, and compensation for victims of violent crime is limited. Domestic violence cases are often prosecuted under alternative legal frameworks, reducing the severity of penalties imposed on perpetrators. Legal implementation remains inconsistent, and victim support services outside major cities are often inadequate. Nevertheless, treatment and support services for individuals with drug addictions continue to improve.

Although national strategies to prevent organized crime are not widespread, local initiatives such as community policing and public reporting websites have emerged. Awareness campaigns related to weapons possession and fraud are also in place. The country plays a prominent role in global drug control efforts, upholding a zero-tolerance policy towards drugs and proactively working to prevent a resurgence of drug-related problems. Its approach includes tightening border controls, regulating precursor chemicals and synthetic substances like fentanyl, and preventing the diversion of controlled chemicals through international trade. As part of its efforts to combat human trafficking, the Chinese government introduced a 2021–2030 action plan against human trafficking, which aims to establish a long-term mechanism that integrates prevention, law enforcement, victim rescue, resettlement and rehabilitation. While the government has adopted action plans and legislation targeting various forms of trafficking, China continues to fall short of international standards.

The role of non-state actors in combating organized crime remains extremely constrained in China. Civil society organizations operate under severe restrictions, particularly due to a regulatory framework that significantly curtails the capacity of NGOs to act independently. The state’s consolidation of power has fostered a climate that restricts civic space and entrenches authoritarian governance. The media is ultimately state controlled and freedom of expression is highly restricted, particularly in the digital space. The government maintains extensive online surveillance and censorship, creating a heavily monitored environment in which dissent is rapidly suppressed. The state’s continued crackdown on online freedom of expression has significantly curtailed citizens’ ability to access information and exercise their freedom of thought and speech. The government remains the primary actor in combating organized crime, often encouraging citizens to report criminal activities. Occasionally, private companies, whose interests conflict with organized criminals, also incentivize citizens to report certain crimes. However, the media, being state-controlled, plays no significant role in this regard.