How to measure organized crime?
A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.
Read more on globalinitiative.netCriminal markets
5.10-0.25
An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.
Human trafficking
7.000.00
Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.
Human smuggling
7.500.50
Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.
Extortion and protection racketeering
5.00 n/a
Crimes linked to exerting control over a territory/market including as a mediator and/or requesting a benefit in exchange for protection.
Arms trafficking
8.500.50
The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.
Trade in counterfeit goods
5.00 n/a
The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands.
Illicit trade in excisable goods
4.50 n/a
The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits.
Flora crimes
1.500.00
The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.
Fauna crimes
3.500.00
The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.
Non-renewable resource crimes
8.001.00
The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.
Heroin trade
2.000.00
The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.
Cocaine trade
4.500.00
The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cannabis trade
6.000.00
The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.
Synthetic drug trade
7.500.50
The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cyber-dependent crimes
3.00 n/a
Organized crimes that rely solely on using information communications technology with the aim of obtaining a monetary/material benefit.
Financial crimes
3.00 n/a
Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance.
Criminal actors
5.90-0.48
An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.
Mafia-style groups
5.00-0.50
Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.
Criminal networks
6.500.00
Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.
State-embedded actors
8.500.00
Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.
Foreign actors
5.000.00
State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.
Private sector actors
4.50 n/a
Profit-seeking individuals/entities who own/control a part of the legal economy free from the state, that collaborate with criminal actors.
Political leadership and governance
3.00-0.50
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
2.00-0.50
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
5.000.00
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
3.000.50
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
2.000.00
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
2.500.00
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
3.00-0.50
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
2.000.00
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
2.000.00
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
1.000.00
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
1.000.00
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
2.500.50
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Political leadership and governance
3.00-0.50
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
2.00-0.50
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
5.000.00
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
3.000.50
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
2.000.00
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
2.500.00
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
3.00-0.50
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
2.000.00
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
2.000.00
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
1.000.00
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
1.000.00
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
2.500.50
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Human trafficking continues to be prevalent in Chad, particularly at the borders with Sudan and Libya. Human trafficking for the purposes of labour exploitation is largely linked to artisanal goldmining, but also to domestic servitude, agricultural work and artisanal fishing. Sexual exploitation is less frequent. Children, who are frequently entrusted to relatives or intermediaries to receive education and apprenticeship, have reportedly been forced to work in domestic servitude or cattle herding, begging, farm labour, gold mining and charcoal production. Irregular migrants, internally displaced people, returnees and asylum seekers moving across the country are also particularly vulnerable to trafficking.
Human smuggling through Chad mostly involves northbound movements towards Libya and northern Chad goldfields, with smugglers often offering travel on credit to prospective goldminers. This usually results in goldminers entering indentured labour agreements with gold site owners, which in turn puts them at high risk of labour trafficking. Most of those passing through the country are Chadian, although foreign migrants from Sudan, the CAR, and other neighbouring countries also travel in smaller numbers. Chadians would technically be authorized to travel within their country, but they often solicit the services of human smugglers because Chadian authorities have banned travel to northern Chad amid fears that Chadians could join rebel groups. Chad is the most common country of transit for migrants from Darfur and South Sudan. There are also high numbers of internally displaced persons who risk falling victims to smugglers in the country because of recurrent attacks by non-state armed groups, notably Boko Haram from Nigeria, in the Lake Chad region, as well as rapidly degrading climatic and environmental conditions.
Extortion is a key danger faced by irregular migrants in transit. Smuggled individuals regularly experience abuse at the hands of their smugglers and death from the perils of the journey. Extortion is also common in the country, mainly carried out by human smuggling networks as well as armed groups such as Boko Haram. These groups control security as well as fishing permits in certain regions.
The challenges presented by arms ownership and smuggling remain acute in Chad. The country’s borders are porous and ideal for the illegal exchange of arms. Several different corridors are used for trafficking arms, involving the majority of neighbouring countries, including Niger, Sudan and Libya, as well as Nigeria, Cameroon and the CAR. The proliferation of armed groups at most of the country’s borders has amplified the demand for arms. Chad has been affected by the overflow of the conflict in Libya (which began in 2011), the hostilities in neighbouring Darfur (since 2003), which leaked across the border and instability in the Lake Chad region that began in 2009 with the Boko Haram insurgency. Inter-communal violence is reported to be increasing in the country, driving new or heightened demand for arms. Unrest in Chad itself and in places like northern Nigeria, Côte D’Ivoire, Burkina Faso and Mali, instigated by non-state armed groups has increased the demand for small arms and light weapons and has significantly weakened the ability of central governments in the region to control their respective territories and the borders, heightening insecurity in the sub-region.
Trade in counterfeit goods such as pharmaceutical products is prevalent due to the porous nature of the borders as well as supplies coming from India and Nigeria. Illicit trade in excise goods, especially alcohol, is becoming a common criminal activity, with potentially damaging effects on the national economy.
The illicit flora trade has continued to be limited in the past two years compared to that in other countries in Central Africa. There are forest ecosystems scattered in the south of the country, but cases of flora crime are not reported. Non-state armed groups continued to move timber to Sudan in order to purchase weapons. Although there is no recent data reflecting the degree of imports of illicit timber from Cameroon, it is assumed that the trade is ongoing.
The levels of fauna crime remain unaltered. Chad is still threatened by large-scale poaching of large mammals to satisfy the international demand for ivory and other trophies from protected species. Poachers include heavily armed local groups coming from Sudan, the CAR and Cameroon. While elephants still present an attractive poachable resource, the presence of rangers has led to a decrease in poaching in recent years. There is also a widespread practice in northern Chad of capturing falcons and selling them to Middle Eastern buyers.
Goldmining across northern Chad is largely informal and takes places in remote areas that lay mostly beyond the reach of national authorities with a long history of rebellion and armed mobilisation. Goldmining areas are also located at the crossroads of regional trafficking routes. Most drug flows transit across northern Chad, with goldfields serving as key logistical hubs. As a result, these areas are associated with high levels of violence and illicit activity. However, although these goldmining activities remain for the most part illicit, they also represent crucial employment opportunities in a context where alternative livelihoods are scarce. Levels of violence linked to this illicit market are high, predominantly a result of the recurrent clashes between local armed groups and military forces to control goldfields in the country's north. Fuel smuggling also takes place in northern Chad to supply goldmining areas.
Chad is considered to be a transit country for heroin, though the overall level of heroin trafficking is considered to be minimal. Some links exist between domestic and regional terrorist organizations and illicit drug trafficking, including heroin, through the Sahel routes of Northern Africa, with destinations in European and North American markets.
Cocaine trafficking in Chad is not so widespread but remains more prevalent than heroin, with the country playing a role as a transit point for the drug. In the east and south of the country, armed groups have been profiting from both the heroin and cocaine trafficking, as well as from other illicit activities, such as the smuggling of migrants and vehicles.
The cannabis trade, which is present along most of Chad’s southern borders, has remained steady in recent years. Cannabis has been produced along the borders with Nigeria, Cameroon, the CAR and Sudan and has also been trafficked into Chad from these countries. It is largely trafficked from Nigeria and there has been some production in southern Chad and in the Lake Chad region. Although the conflict in the central Sahel has contributed to a slight decline in trafficking, consignments of cannabis have been seized in recent years.
While there are no official statistics, Tramadol consumption is reportedly a persistent problem, with levels increasing in recent years due to its availability and affordability. Although more than half the country’s pharmacies have been shut down in recent years, some of them having been involved in the clandestine sale of Tramadol, evidence suggests that the shutdown has had a limited effect on the consumption of the drug. Tramadol trafficking is also fuelled by demand in labour-intensive areas such as goldfields. Artisanal miners in the informal gold mining sector use Tramadol as a way to increase productivity and suppress hunger. The non-medical use of pharmaceutical opioids has triggered new health threats in the past few years, reaching a crisis point.
Despite the fact that the internet is more expensive in Chad than in other African countries, organized crime groups are taking advantage of the possibilities it offers to defraud or swindle the population and hacking and fraudulent activities involving crypto currencies are increasing in the country.
Financial crimes in the form of embezzlement of public funds, large-scale corruption, cyber-enabled fraudulent schemes and low-level tax evasion are pervasive. State-embedded actors are working together with foreign actors in more sophisticated tax evasion schemes.
Several armed gangs, groups and rebels who are interconnected and linked with foreign actors operate in Chad, specifically in the north and east of the country. These poly-criminal groups are taking advantage of the instability in Libya as well as in Chad, where they have bases, to expand their activities. They are heavily involved in various trafficking activities, including drug trafficking and gold smuggling. There is a proliferation of unorganized and informal traffickers, bandits, criminals, robbers and road gangs in the country’s far north and east.
Corruption is omnipresent in the Chadian administration, with those involved playing a significant role in the prevalence of financial crimes, and customs and law enforcement officials are known to accept bribes from traffickers. There are also reports of wildlife officers being involved in the illicit ivory trade. As for foreign actors, Chad is at the epicentre of cross-border crime in the region. Incursions of Sudanese groups and nationals from the CAR are common. There are also small autonomous foreign militias in the country who are known to be involved in wildlife poaching, human trafficking, arms and mineral trafficking, banditry and kidnapping.
Foreign actors of Asian origin are becoming increasingly involved in trafficking minerals and ivory and in money laundering. Increased instability in the country has created opportunities for armed groups based in neighbouring countries to launch incursions. Several private-sector actors are also involved in organized crime activities, with the timber, pharmaceutical, petroleum and mining industries being the most affected.
The regulatory and institutional framework for addressing the prevalence of organized crime in Chad has been weak. The government has taken some steps to tackle the threat of armed groups, albeit using a solely securitized approach. Also, the goal has not necessarily been to tackle criminality itself but rather to combat armed politico-military opposition or secure access to artisanal gold mining areas. Following the death in April 2021, of President Idriss Dèby, who was allegedly killed on the battlefield while leading troops against the Front for Change and Concord in Chad, the army suspended the Constitution, dissolved parliament and the government and placed Dèby’s son, Mahamat Idriss Dèby, at the helm of a Transitional Military Council. Overall, government transparency continues to be limited and the country is perceived to have one of the highest levels of corruption in the world. Oversight mechanisms and accountability are almost non-existent. Public administrations, from the top to the bottom, neither respond to nor take responsibility for the extent of transnational organized crime (TOC). However, officers from the military and other security agencies have been tried, imprisoned and fined for their involvement in drug-trafficking activities.
Chad has given clear indications of promoting international cooperation in combating TOC. The country has had extensive relationships with a wide array of international organizations in the fight against both TOC and terrorism in the Sahel. The EU, France and the US view the country as an essential partner in the fight against terrorism and organized crime in the wider region and Chad is one of the major proponents of the G5 Sahel alliance. Chadian forces have also been essential to UN peacekeeping missions, specifically in Mali, and the country has ratified several international treaties related to organized crime. Domestically, while Chad does have some legal frameworks to counter organized crime, implementation remains a challenge. Moreover, in some areas of the country traditional practices give legitimacy to certain activities such as labour trafficking.
There are no specialized judicial units in Chad specifically aimed at countering organized crime. The presence of the state and the judiciary in certain areas of the country where armed rebellions occur is extremely weak. Law enforcement continues to be confined to major cities and has remained geographically and functionally limited. Attempts to enforce the law often results in conflict in areas where traditional religious laws take precedence. Despite this, special task forces with specific geographical or thematic focuses have been created and have had some success in addressing criminality. However, the country still lacks specialized organized crime law enforcement units.
Chad’s territorial integrity has remained generally stable in recent years, though vast areas in the north and far north and corridors on the border with Sudan are still partially or totally beyond the control of the country's central government, with criminal markets flourishing. The far northern area, weakly controlled by the central state, remains largely under the control of local armed groups and sees regular incursions by Libya-based rebel groups.
In 2018 Chad’s National Assembly passed a law against money laundering and terrorist financing, which provides for provisional and repressive measures. The country’s economic regulatory capacity remains weak. There has been no significant progress in the correlation between economic regulation and the fight against organized crime, as security remains a major priority for the state. Conducting business within Chad is extremely difficult because of its weak economic regulatory capacity.
Victim and witness support in Chad remains limited and focused on key geographic areas. The government has worked with international organizations to support victims of human trafficking. However, no significant updates have been registered in recent years in relation to victim support and there is no functional system that legally supports the victims. Preventive measures against organized crime continue to be weak and those tools and mechanisms that do exist are neither effective nor productive. Some civil society groups have tried to be proactive in this regard, but their actions remain geographically limited.
Efforts made by the government and by NGOs include preventative measures pertaining to cyber-dependent crimes, fauna crimes, counterfeit fuel and alcohol. A handful of organizations focus their activities on human rights, human trafficking and fauna crime. As for the media, journalists are often arrested or attacked for negative reporting about the government.
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The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to 10. The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel.
A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.
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give us your feedbackThe opinions, findings and conclusions stated herein are those of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State.