How to measure organized crime?
A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.
Read more on globalinitiative.netCriminal markets
5.300.15
An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.
Human trafficking
5.500.00
Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.
Human smuggling
6.50-0.50
Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.
Extortion and protection racketeering
5.00 n/a
Crimes linked to exerting control over a territory/market including as a mediator and/or requesting a benefit in exchange for protection.
Arms trafficking
6.000.00
The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.
Trade in counterfeit goods
4.50 n/a
The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands.
Illicit trade in excisable goods
5.50 n/a
The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits.
Flora crimes
4.500.00
The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.
Fauna crimes
3.50-0.50
The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.
Non-renewable resource crimes
4.001.00
The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.
Heroin trade
6.500.50
The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.
Cocaine trade
5.501.00
The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cannabis trade
6.000.50
The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.
Synthetic drug trade
6.000.50
The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cyber-dependent crimes
4.50 n/a
Organized crimes that rely solely on using information communications technology with the aim of obtaining a monetary/material benefit.
Financial crimes
6.00 n/a
Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance.
Criminal actors
6.40-0.23
An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.
Mafia-style groups
4.000.00
Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.
Criminal networks
6.00-0.50
Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.
State-embedded actors
8.000.00
Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.
Foreign actors
8.000.00
State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.
Private sector actors
6.00 n/a
Profit-seeking individuals/entities who own/control a part of the legal economy free from the state, that collaborate with criminal actors.
Political leadership and governance
4.001.00
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
3.50-0.50
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
6.001.00
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
4.000.00
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
2.00-1.50
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
3.500.00
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
4.000.00
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
3.50-0.50
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
3.500.00
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
4.000.00
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
4.500.50
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
4.00-0.50
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Political leadership and governance
4.001.00
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
3.50-0.50
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
6.001.00
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
4.000.00
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
2.00-1.50
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
3.500.00
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
4.000.00
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
3.50-0.50
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
3.500.00
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
4.000.00
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
4.500.50
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
4.00-0.50
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Bosnia and Herzegovina is a source, destination, and transit country for human trafficking, particularly for sexual exploitation and forced labour. Bosnian men are often victims of forced labour in the construction industry in Balkan and other European countries, and Bosnian women and girls are sex trafficked in private residences within the country. Moreover, victims from Afghanistan, Cuba, Gambia, Libya, Serbia, Sri Lanka, and neighbouring Balkan countries have been exploited in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Child trafficking continues to be a significant issue in the country with Roma and other children being forced into begging, sex trafficking, and exploitation in forced marriages for the purpose of domestic servitude.
As the country is situated on the main route for irregular migrants coming from the Middle East and Africa through the Western Balkans, on their way to the EU, human smuggling continues to be a notable issue in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although Bosnia and Herzegovina plays an important role as a transit country for human smuggling, thousands of smuggled individuals have found themselves stuck in the country because of the relatively strong border control of neighbouring countries such as Croatia. In recent years, there has been an increase in the number of irregular migrants in the country with most of the smuggled individuals originating from Afghanistan, Turkey, Burundi, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Cuba. The route through Serbia and Albania has remained the main avenue for illegal entries into the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Even though human smuggling does not cause violence between organized crime groups, cases of violence and intimidation against smuggled individuals along the Bosnian-Croatian border have been recorded. Organized crime actors with connections to the corrupt law enforcement officials, particularly border police officers, are known to assist smuggled individuals as they enter and leave the country, but local populations operating opportunistically also play an important role in the crime market. Extortion and racketeering are not uncommon in Bosnia and Herzegovina, usually conducted by criminal groups connected to high-level politicians. Racketeering is mostly imposed on restaurants and bars in all the major locations in Sarajevo and Banjaluka, and extortion is prevalent in the construction industry.
Recent seizures indicate that arms trafficking in the country is active, well organized, and transnational. Many arms from the 1990s remain in circulation and it is among the top countries globally in terms of the number of legal and illegal firearms in civilian possession. Additionally, Bosnia and Herzegovina is situated along one of the trafficking routes between large arms-supplying countries, such as Serbia and Montenegro, and destination countries for illegal firearms in Europe. Furthermore, Bosnia and Herzegovina is a known transit country for converted weapons. Organized crime groups are the dominant actors in the illegal firearms trafficking market, with evidence suggesting that the same groups are also involved in drug trafficking. Arms trafficking in the country has not been efficiently addressed because of corruption, a lack of political will, and the evident connections between politicians and criminal groups.
Even though Bosnia and Herzegovina remains a source and transit country of counterfeit clothes of famous brands, the production is usually aimed at the local market and is rather small. Counterfeit pharmaceuticals are a widespread problem in the country and the rest of the region. Similarly, the illicit trade in excise goods in Bosnia and Herzegovina is moderately pervasive and is not connected to larger criminal groups. Cross-border smuggling of tobacco products is the most common type of illegal trade in this criminal market, with the country being a source and transit point for illicit tobacco headed for EU markets. Illegal products are reported to account for around 20% of tobacco consumption in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Bosnia and Herzegovina is a source country for illegal timber in Europe, specifically for neighbouring countries such as Serbia. The crime is facilitated by gaps in legislative and customs regulatory frameworks, shortcomings in border control, and corruption. In addition to organized crime groups, private sector actors are involved in this market through the falsification of documents. The high rate of illegal logging relates to the firewood markets which involve different actors in different territories who illegally harvest the wood from state and private forests. Limited fauna-based illicit markets are known to exist, the most prevalent of which is the trade in endangered species. The market for quail has become popular because of hunting tourism. However, there is no clear evidence suggesting any involvement of transnational organized crime actors in the illegal fauna market. Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing is common in the country, and there is a considerable illicit caviar market.
Trade in commodities such as fuel oil and natural minerals is known to occur at the borders between Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, and Montenegro. Within Bosnia and Herzegovina, there is a small but noteworthy amount of illegal extraction of minerals, coal, and gravel. In addition to the involvement of criminal groups in this market, private sector actors in the mining sector carry out illegal mining activities through extraction of more coal and gravel than is legally permitted. Nonetheless, the impact of the market is limited to only those sectors of society that accrue value from it.
Bosnia and Herzegovina is a country of transit and a final destination for heroin and precursor chemicals. This market is overseen by criminal groups with connections to other Balkan criminal groups, as well as Turkish and Qatari criminal groups. The heroin market and heroin prices have remained stable because of low levels of seizures by law enforcement, which is a result of corruption and the fragmentation of police forces. New patterns of heroin smuggling from the Netherlands to Bosnia and Herzegovina suggest an increased demand for heroin in the country. As the cocaine market is less pervasive than the markets for other drugs in the country, Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to be predominantly a transit route for the drug coming from Montenegro and passing towards the EU. There is an increasing involvement of criminal organizations in the cocaine market, especially Eastern Balkan organized crime groups. Seizures of large quantities of cocaine directly connected to Bosnia and Herzegovina were recorded in recent years, suggesting a rise in the trafficking and presence of cocaine within the country, either for transit or domestic consumption.
Bosnia and Herzegovina is a transit and destination country for cannabis, which is the most used and seized drug in the country. Cannabis enters the country from Albania and is subsequently trafficked to Western European countries. Furthermore, Bosnia and Herzegovina has recently become a source of sour cannabis, a stronger strain, with reports of emerging indoor cultivation and growing production in the southern and western parts of the country. Over the past few years, there has been a rise in violent conflicts between criminal organizations engaged in the production and trade of cannabis with an aim to exert dominance in the illicit market. Similarly, the country has increasingly become a source country for synthetic drugs with the increased production of Ecstasy (MDMA), on top of its role as a transit country in the region. Chemical components for MDMA, including rare crystal powder, are imported from EU countries such as the Netherlands and Germany and are used for MDMA production in the country.
Even though there has been a major increase in cyber-dependent crimes in the country in recent years, the cybercrime market in Bosnia and Herzegovina is at the very early stages and no major cybercriminal groups or cybercrimes have been detected. Reported incidents have mostly originated abroad and generally consist of smaller-scale ransomware and malware attacks. However, there are indications of the involvement of organized crime groups in such activities. The low rate of cyber-attacks is mostly because of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s undeveloped cyber-infrastructure, and the fact that most government services operate predominantly with hard-copy materials or offline.
Corruption in the form of preferential treatment in tenders and public contracts is well documented in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Additionally, public money has reportedly been channelled to NGOs and civil society organizations based on political favouritism. Brcko, a self-governing district of the country, is reported to suffer notable financial corruption, with many examples of local political parties with connections to corrupt financing of civil society organizations being reported. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, employment tax evasion is widely reported. In these cases, employees are officially paid the minimum wage which is supplemented with cash payments. Around 30% of all workers receive salaries in cash in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Business owners in the country have reported that entrepreneurs reduce their legal profit by using fake invoices and employment contracts.
Organized crime groups from the Balkans play a prominent role in a variety of criminal markets in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with most of them originating from Kosovo, Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia, and to a lesser extent Albania. Additionally, Turkish criminal actors also wield notable influence over criminal markets in the country, particularly in the realms of smuggling activities and financial crimes. Corruption continues to be pervasive in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with close connections between the government and criminal groups providing a level of protection to such groups. Some members of criminal groups are employed in state institutions and others are members of dominant political parties. Political groups and criminal networks often have overlapping interests. State-embedded actors exert control over private sector actors through racketeering and the use of administrative methods such as inspections and audits.
Even though their involvement in organized crime is limited, private sector actors who have close ties with high-level politicians are known to enjoy preferential treatment from the government in public procurement processes. Recently, there has reportedly been an increase in the country of preferential treatment given in public procurement. Procurement documentation adjustments are reportedly made to suit specific bidders, a widespread phenomenon with serious implications for the transparency of the sector and for the country’s prospects of development.
Smaller criminal networks are heavily engaged in crime markets across Bosnia and Herzegovina, though the crimes are more low-level than those of the larger mafia-style actors. These networks are divided mainly along ethnic lines − between Serbs, Bosniaks, and Croats – which exacerbates external influence. The number of recorded organized crime groups operating in the markets of drug trafficking, human smuggling, economic crime, corruption, arms trade, computer crime, human trafficking, and property crime in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been growing in recent years. There is a significant number of criminal networks in the country that are very well networked and whose cooperation is mostly fluid. These networks are also known to collaborate with organized criminal groups from other countries in the region, especially from Serbia, Montenegro and Croatia. Mafia-style groups are also prominent in Bosnia and Herzegovina, albeit to a limited extent. Their presence in the country is facilitated by the widespread corruption and inefficient security system in the country. These groups are mostly involved in drug trafficking across the country. Mafia-style groups active in Bosnia and Herzegovina also operate in other European countries and have direct links to Latin American organized crime groups.
Bosnia and Herzegovina has a unique political architecture, with a tripartite presidency that consists of one Bosniak, one Serb, and one Croat who act as the head of state on a rotating basis. Under this system, unity continues to be difficult to maintain and there have been many instances in which the three presidents have disagreed on policy. This deepens the ethnic division in the country and obstructs the decision-making process. As the political system of Bosnia and Herzegovina is highly decentralized, a substantial amount of power lies with the cantons. Although leaders have vowed to fight crime, they have ultimately lacked the ability to take national leadership on the issue. There is a lack of coordination and cooperation on all levels of government, which has become particularly visible in the response to the COVID-19 pandemic. With several cantonal governments, it is difficult to root out political corruption and nepotism, which enables a high degree of state capture by organized crime actors. Although the country has adopted satisfactory policies against corruption and organized crime on paper, independent safeguards against corruption are weak, and grand corruption and state capture remain systemic issues. Lack of government obligation to publish documents pertaining to government plans and secrecy in procurement processes prevent proper scrutiny of the government.
At the international level, Bosnia and Herzegovina has ratified nearly all the relevant organized crime treaties, however, low levels of cooperation exist between Bosnia and Herzegovina and other countries, in large part because of the divergent foreign policy agendas of various government entities. Nonetheless, Bosnia and Herzegovina participates in INTERPOL and Europol investigations. The country is a signatory to the Police Cooperation Convention for Southeast Europe, operational and strategic agreements with Europol, and a number of bilateral agreements with its neighbours, including on joint patrols, cooperation mechanisms, and local border traffic. Even though more concrete steps are required to be taken, the country continues to cooperate with neighbouring countries as well as other EU countries to tackle several forms of organized crime. At the national level, although laws and policies are generally sufficient and updated, implementation is severely lacking. Moreover, the country’s ability to effectively dismantle organized crime groups is impeded by the lack of harmonization between legislations pertaining to organized crime, as well as a lack of up-to-date legal framework on certain organized criminal markets such as drug trafficking, anti-money laundering, and cybercrime, among others.
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s judiciary continues to be weak and often suffers from political interference. Lack of political will to institute judicial reform and the poor functioning of the judicial system continue to undermine the fulfilment of human rights and the fight against corruption and organized crime. Shortcomings concerning appointment, appraisal, and disciplinary procedures are adversely affecting judicial independence and prosecutorial autonomy in the country. Widespread corruption within the judiciary as well as negligence by actors in the judicial system hinder the country’s judicial capacity to combat organized crime. As for the penitentiary system, ill treatment of prisoners in detention facilities continue to be reported.
Because of the administrative structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina, there are 16 security agencies operating in the country on different administrative levels. The ability to effectively dismantle criminal organizations is seriously hampered by a lack of coordination between the many authorities in the country. Investigative capacities among law enforcement entities are generally weak because of the lack of capacity, specialization, and equipment and, in some cases, police have been found to be highly corrupt and to engage in criminal activity.
Furthermore, Bosnia and Herzegovina lacks the infrastructure and cooperation with its neighbouring countries to control its borders, making it difficult to fight illicit flows. Corruption among the police and administrative divisions as well as a lack of human resources render it difficult to ensure territorial security. Calls from representatives of Republika of Srpska to secede from Bosnia and Herzegovina and unify with Serbia pose a significant threat to the country’s internal stability and territorial integrity. Bosnia and Herzegovina lacks the necessary legal framework, mechanisms and strategies to combat cybercrime or to detect cyber-attacks that are threatening the cyberspace of the country.
Even though the legal framework pertaining to money laundering is in place, its implementation continues to be inadequate as institutions generally fail to apply anti-money laundering laws. Audit and tax administration reports continue to be used in a non-systematic and reactive, rather than proactive, manner. Financial investigations are not launched systematically in corruption cases and the overall anti-money laundering framework is not fully aligned with Financial Action Task Force standards. There is still a lack of understanding, expertise and institutional capacities on illicit financial flows, their channels, and methods.
Administrative complexities, high levels of corruption, weak institutional capacities, and weak rule of law make Bosnia and Herzegovina a relatively difficult place to do business and a somewhat unattractive investment destination. Moreover, although cross-border trading and resolving insolvency are fairly simple, the processes of paying taxes as well as starting a business and obtaining construction permits are cumbersome. The limitations imposed by economic regulations and the selective implementation of fair competition regulations because of preferential treatment have created a convenient ecosystem for the creation of monopolies or oligopolies, and for the seizing of control by state actors.
Efforts have been made by the government to improve the status of child victims of human trafficking by combining the domestic and foreign victim funds and disbursing funds to anti-trafficking NGOs, and drafting guidelines to standardize victim assistance. Nonetheless, Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to lack administrative and institutional capacity, and resources, to provide support for victims of organized crime, a result primarily of a high degree of fragmentation among the relevant agencies. Although victim and witness support in courts has been improved in recent years, the lack of harmony between various legal frameworks across the country continues to engender differences in the scope of protection, as well as inequalities in access to justice for all types of proceedings. Despite the incorporation of non-penalization standards under the national policies, authorities lack knowledge and experience frequent staff changes and so continue to penalize victims for unlawful acts that traffickers compelled them to commit. The country lacks adequate witness protection programmes.
Crime prevention mechanisms remain inadequate, although dedicated corruption-prevention bodies have been set up across Bosnia and Herzegovina because of problems encountered with the implementation of current anti-organized crime legislation. The existing prevention efforts include the provision of training to monitoring teams as well as awareness campaigns.
Civil society organizations continue to play a prominent role in the response to organized crime, particularly when it comes to victim support. Nevertheless, the inclusion of civil society in decision-making continues to be inadequate. As for the media environment, journalists have been facing an extremely unfavourable political and economic environment. The hostile media environment in the country is exhibited by verbal attacks, defamation suits, and intimidation targeting journalists, as well as influence over the public media and regulatory bodies which has resulted in the deterioration of the quality of journalism in the country. Many media outlets avoid critical journalism because of their difficult economic position and their dependence on political and economic support.
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The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to 10. The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel.
A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.
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give us your feedbackThe opinions, findings and conclusions stated herein are those of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State.