Criminal markets
5.530.36
An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.
Human trafficking
5.500.50
Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.
Human smuggling
6.500.50
Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.
Extortion and protection racketeering
3.000.50
Crimes linked to exerting control over a territory/market including as a mediator and/or requesting a benefit in exchange for protection.
Arms trafficking
6.500.50
The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.
Trade in counterfeit goods
6.001.00
The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands.
Illicit trade in excisable goods
5.001.00
The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits.
Flora crimes
3.500.50
The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.
Fauna crimes
4.000.50
The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.
Non-renewable resource crimes
4.000.00
The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.
Heroin trade
4.000.00
The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.
Cocaine trade
8.000.00
The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cannabis trade
6.500.00
The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.
Synthetic drug trade
7.500.00
The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cyber-dependent crimes
6.500.50
Organized crimes that rely solely on using information communications technology with the aim of obtaining a monetary/material benefit.
Financial crimes
6.500.00
Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance.
Criminal actors
4.100.40
An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.
Mafia-style groups
3.000.00
Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.
Criminal networks
5.500.50
Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.
State-embedded actors
2.500.50
Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.
Foreign actors
6.001.00
State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.
Private sector actors
3.500.00
Profit-seeking individuals/entities who own/control a part of the legal economy free from the state, that collaborate with criminal actors.
Political leadership and governance
7.500.50
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
6.50-0.50
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
8.500.50
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
7.500.00
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
6.500.50
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
6.50-0.50
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
6.000.00
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
7.000.00
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
7.000.00
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
8.000.50
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
7.500.50
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
7.500.00
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Belgium remains a central hub for human trafficking, with labour and sexual exploitation cases prevalent across several sectors. Economic exploitation has risen, particularly among vulnerable populations. Victims are trafficked from Asia, Eastern Europe and Africa, with Chinese and Vietnamese nationals notably exploited in nail salons. West African networks dominate Belgium’s illegal sex industry, while Thai organizations control Thai massage parlours. Belgian and Dutch children have also been subjected to sexual exploitation. Many victims are lured via social media, subjected to forced confinement, and experience physical and/or sexual violence. The country’s geographic proximity to France and the UK makes it a major conduit for Vietnamese trafficking networks. Debt bondage is common, particularly among Asian victims, and trafficking schemes frequently involve false self-employment or ‘mailbox’ companies.
Belgium is both a transit and destination country for human smuggling, particularly for migrants aiming to reach the UK. Smuggling networks include ethnic Albanians and actors from Asia and West Africa. The ‘impostor’ system, which involves smuggling migrants using authentic documents with similar photos, remains common. Criminal networks exploit legitimate businesses such as retail stores and transport companies to facilitate smuggling operations. Smugglers charge high fees, with some migrants paying extra for specialized ‘VIP’ smuggling services. Reports of physical and sexual violence against smuggled migrants continue, and debt repayment through forced labour is an emerging trend. Belgian law enforcement has prioritized the dismantling of smuggling networks, with national and international cooperation leading to significant arrests.
Extortion and protection racketeering are not widely reported in Belgium, though isolated cases have emerged. Cyber-enabled extortion schemes have been documented. Maritime workers, police and judiciary members have been implicated in criminal networks, sometimes having participated under coercion. Despite occasional reports, extortion is not considered a ‘stand-alone’ market but rather a supplementary tool used by organized crime groups to exert control.
Belgium is a significant player in arms trafficking as both a source and transit country. The port of Antwerp serves as a key entry point for illicit firearms, which are often smuggled alongside narcotics. The market has expanded in recent years, with Western Balkan and Italian criminal groups facilitating the trade. Firearms are commonly used in violent incidents linked to drug trafficking. Turkish non-lethal pistols, easily converted into lethal weapons, are widely available, and online sales of gun parts have increased. Despite regional efforts to curb arms trafficking, Belgium’s strategic location continues to make it a crucial hub for the illicit firearms trade.
The trade in counterfeit goods has grown substantially, with Belgium serving as a transit and distribution centre. Key counterfeit items include medicines, cosmetics, cigarettes and electronic parts. Foreign actors, mainly from China, Singapore, the UAE and Türkiye, dominate supply chains. The port of Antwerp is a major entry point for counterfeit products, while the city of Liège has become a hub for illicit e-commerce. Local production of counterfeit cigarettes has been uncovered, with factories linked to organized crime groups. Customs authorities remain overwhelmed by the influx of counterfeit shipments, and enforcement efforts have failed to match the scale of the problem.
Belgium has also seen an increase in illicit trade in excise goods, particularly tobacco products. The country is among the top EU nations for illicit tobacco consumption. Smuggling of these goods occurs daily, with the country serving as a gateway to both the local market and other European countries, and Chinese online sales platforms have compounded the issue. Despite sustained enforcement efforts, customs authorities remain understaffed, making it difficult to reduce the scale of illicit trade.
Belgium plays a transit role in flora crimes, acting as a major hub for timber trafficking. The port of Antwerp facilitates the import and export of illegal timber, particularly from Africa. Legal timber imports have increased, but illegal timber imports continue, often disguised as legitimate shipments. Organized crime groups and private-sector actors collaborate to launder illicit timber through legal supply chains.
Belgium also functions as an entry and transit point for wildlife trafficking, due to links to its former colonial territories. Illegal wildlife trade through Belgium includes exotic birds, reptiles and ivory. The port of Antwerp and Brussels Zaventem Airport serve as major entry points for illicit wildlife products, which are often destined for Asian markets. Local demand for exotic pets and bushmeat contributes to the market’s persistence. The online wildlife trade remains insufficiently regulated, and this limits the capacity of enforcement agencies to combat such trafficking.
The country is also a major hub for diamond and gold trafficking, particularly in Antwerp due to its historic role in the diamond trade. Illicit diamonds from conflict zones enter Belgium by obscuring their origins. The diamond industry’s economic significance complicates enforcement efforts, and there are concerns about its involvement in money laundering and its ties to cocaine trafficking. Efforts to regulate the trade remain politically sensitive, particularly in connection to Russian diamond imports. Non-renewable resource crimes in Belgium are also associated with economic crimes and tax evasion, as illustrated by a recent case in which authorities arrested individuals over a multimillion-euro biodiesel fraud. The suspects were part of a criminal network that misdeclared the origin and type of biodiesel to evade EU duties and gain environmental benefits.
Belgium is primarily a destination for heroin. Although heroin trafficking remains secondary to other drugs, including cocaine, recent trends show an increase in opioid imports from Iran. The port of Antwerp continues to be a key entry point, with mafia-style actors and criminal networks overseeing distribution. The drug is also transported via cargo and trucks through the Caucasus and the Balkan Peninsula, often hidden in legitimate shipments. Heroin consumption is lower than that of other illicit substances, and its related violence is less prevalent than cocaine-related violence. But local consumption has increased, and its use appears prevalent among young males in precarious communities.
Cocaine trafficking is the largest drug market in Belgium, with Antwerp serving as the main European entry point for South American shipments. Corruption among customs and law enforcement officials has facilitated the trade. Western Balkan groups and the ‘Mocro Mafia’ play a significant role in distribution, often collaborating with Italian and French networks. Cocaine-related violence has increased in recent years, particularly in Antwerp and Brussels, as groups compete for control. Despite frequent seizures, authorities have struggled to curb the flow of cocaine into the country.
Belgium is both a transit and destination country for cannabis. The market is dominated by the ‘Mocro Mafia’ and Western Balkan groups, with local cultivation on the rise. While cannabis remains the most widely used drug, its impact is less severe than that of cocaine. Social acceptance of cannabis use is high, and law enforcement prioritizes more destructive drug markets. Despite large seizures, authorities have not been able to disrupt trafficking networks significantly.
The country also plays a major role in the synthetic drug trade, with production centred along the Belgian-Dutch border zone. Criminal networks, including Dutch and Western Balkan groups, oversee production and export operations. Synthetic drugs, particularly amphetamines and Ecstasy, are frequently trafficked alongside other narcotics. Online sales and parcel-based distribution methods have expanded, making enforcement more challenging.
Cybercrime is a serious concern in Belgium, with transnational criminal networks increasingly targeting local businesses. Ransomware attacks are widespread and small businesses in the country are particularly vulnerable. Although law enforcement cooperation with international partners has led to successful dismantling of cybercriminal networks, local police remain under-equipped to handle the scale of cyber threats, and this allows the market to continue expanding.
Financial crimes in Belgium encompass various forms including phishing, investment fraud (boiler room scams), spoofing, and online credit-card fraud. Phishing stands out as the most prevalent cyber-enabled scam, while newer forms of computer fraud like investment fraud, invoice fraud, help-wanted fraud and high-security account fraud are also on the rise. These illicit activities are known to be perpetrated by loosely organized criminal networks who exploit the country’s role as an EU financial centre.
Mafia-style groups operating in Belgium include several largely domestic outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMGs), who are involved in illicit activities, particularly drug and firearms trafficking. Notable OMGs in Belgium include the Outlaws, Hells Angels, No Surrender, El Diablo and the Bandidos. These groups operate with a hierarchical structure, engage in criminal initiation rituals, and use distinctive biker clothing to assert their presence. Their activities also extend to cannabis production, synthetic drug manufacturing and sexual exploitation. While crackdowns in Germany and the Netherlands in the previous decade have made Belgian chapters less visible, recent seizures and arrests indicate that these groups remain active in transnational organized crime. Despite the significant setback for mafia-style groups following the 2021 dismantling of Sky ECC, competition for trafficking territories persists, and their access to firearms continues. While territorial control is generally loose and limited to specific trafficking areas, conflicts between rival groups occasionally escalate into violence. Attempts to corrupt officials have been reported, though they remain infrequent.
Criminal networks in Belgium are mainly composed of small, loosely structured groups, particularly in the drug-trafficking arena. Belgian nationals in these groups play a major role in cannabis cultivation and synthetic drug production, while their involvement in the cocaine trade is secondary to that of foreign actors. These networks often resort to extreme violence, including shootings, surpassing the levels of violence seen among more structured organized crime groups. Informal criminal networks frequently involve foreign contacts and are heavily engaged in drug trafficking between Belgium and the Netherlands. They operate mainly in urban centres, with significant concentrations in Antwerp and Brussels, and along the Dutch border. These networks maintain strong ties to organized crime groups based in the Netherlands, facilitating the movement of illicit goods across national borders. Despite law enforcement efforts, the impact of these groups persists, and their activities continue to shape Belgium’s organized crime landscape.
State-embedded actors have limited involvement in Belgium’s organized crime landscape, with minimal evidence suggesting significant collusion between government officials and criminal organizations. However, recent cases indicate that attempts to bribe public officials, while not widespread, are becoming more apparent. Police officers, customs agents and even members of the public prosecutor’s office have been implicated in trafficking-related offences. While such incidents remain isolated, they do point to vulnerabilities within Belgium’s security infrastructure.
Foreign actors play a dominant role in Belgium’s organized crime markets, accounting for the majority of criminal actors in the country. The most significant foreign influence comes from Dutch nationals, who control the majority of the cocaine trade destined for Belgium. Deep ties exist between Dutch and Belgian drug trafficking networks, particularly in Antwerp and Brussels. Albanian-speaking criminal groups are key players in cocaine procurement at the port of Antwerp, facing increasing competition from Italian groups and the ‘Mocro Mafia’, a generic and controversial term for local Dutch and Belgian criminal networks with ethnic Moroccan members. Major Italian mafias active in Belgium include the Camorra, Cosa Nostra and the ‘Ndrangheta. These groups operate across different Belgian cities, engaging in drug trafficking and money laundering. The Italian ‘Ndrangheta, in particular, is mainly involved in drug trafficking, arms smuggling and human trafficking. Foreign criminal networks connected to the ‘Mocro Mafia’ wield substantial influence in cannabis and cocaine trafficking. Similarly, mafia-style groups originating from the Western Balkans and Nigerian criminal organizations play a critical role in drug distribution, arms trafficking and human smuggling.
Organized crime groups in Belgium frequently exploit legitimate businesses to launder illicit funds. Companies in sectors such as car washes and the luxury goods trade serve as key channels for money laundering. Criminal organizations involved in drug trafficking often launder proceeds through businesses in Belgium and offshore locations such as Dubai. Professional facilitators, including accountants, notaries and lawyers, occasionally appear in organized crime cases, though reporting of suspicious transactions remains low. The Belgian Financial Intelligence Processing Unit (CTIF) has expressed concerns about the under-reporting of money-laundering activities by these professionals. In markets such as diamond and timber trafficking, registered private companies have also been implicated. Hence there are notable intersections between legitimate business activities and organized crime in Belgium.
Belgium upholds strong governance principles, aligning with broader European values that emphasize human rights protection. The country hosts key EU institutions in Brussels, reinforcing its role as the ‘heart’ of Europe. However, rising public distrust in political institutions has been observed due to factors such as corruption scandals, increasing xenophobia and perceptions of government inertia. While political rights and civil liberties are largely respected, problems such as terrorism threats and economic instability have contributed to growing public dissatisfaction. Belgium has taken a proactive stance in combating organized crime, particularly through its National Security Strategy, which complements the existing National Security Plan. The Belgian government has identified drug trafficking as a national priority, leading to increased police deployment, stronger customs operations and enhanced screening measures for individuals in sensitive positions. Legislation has also focused on empowering local authorities to shut down illicit businesses linked to criminal activities. Despite all these efforts, there remains a perception that criminal organizations are infiltrating state institutions, although Belgium is not classified as a narco-state.
Government transparency in Belgium remains relatively strong, with the country maintaining stable rankings in corruption perception and press-freedom indices. Belgium’s Central Office for the Repression of Corruption (OCRC) and the CTIF oversee corruption investigations and suspicious capital flows. However, high-profile corruption cases surrounding misappropriation of public funds by parliamentarians and bribery allegations against European Parliament members, are concerning. Regulatory weaknesses persist, particularly on lobbying practices and conflicts of interest, and integrity checks within the Federal Police remain outdated. The legal framework governing foreign donations and gifts also remains underdeveloped.
Belgium is a committed participant in international legal frameworks against organized crime. It has ratified major treaties, including the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), the UN Convention against Corruption and the Arms Trade Treaty. Belgium actively engages in Europol and Interpol operations and has established bilateral extradition agreements. However, there has been controversy about Belgium’s decisions to extradite certain individuals, particularly in cases that may violate human rights. In 2024, the Belgian EU Council Presidency launched the European Port Alliance, a regional initiative aimed at addressing drug trafficking. Belgium has also engaged in diplomatic efforts with Latin American countries to counter cocaine trade networks.
The Belgian Criminal Code criminalizes participation in organized crime, with specific laws addressing drug trafficking, human smuggling and financial crimes. However, there are shortcomings in legislation related to non-renewable resource crimes. In 2024, Belgium adopted a law allowing municipalities to screen applicants for business licences in high-risk economic sectors. While this measure strengthens oversight, bureaucratic obstacles are reportedly hindering effective enforcement.
Belgium’s judicial system plays a crucial role in prosecuting organized crime, with the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office (OC Section) handling high-profile cases. The office has been instrumental in investigating transnational crime, including operations against encrypted communication networks used by criminal groups. However, Belgium’s prison system faces significant challenges, including overcrowding and understaffing. The inmate population exceeds the system’s capacity, and government plans to construct four new prisons by 2030 to alleviate pressure on existing facilities.
Belgium’s law enforcement structure consists of federal and local police forces, with police zones across the country operating autonomously. The Central Directorate for the Fight Against Serious and Organized Crime is tasked with disrupting criminal groups and prioritizing offences such as human trafficking, drug smuggling and cybercrime. In 2024, Belgium expanded its Expertise and Information Centres to every judicial district, aiming to enhance administrative approaches to combating organized crime. But resource shortages and fragmented policing structures remain problematic, particularly as drug trafficking and organized crime-related violence escalate.
Belgium’s strategic location and porous borders make it an attractive transit point for smuggling operations. The Port of Antwerp and Brussels Zaventem Airport serve as major hubs for illicit goods. Schengen Area membership, while facilitating legitimate trade, also poses security risks by reducing border controls. Cyber threats have also become an increasing concern, prompting Belgium to strengthen national cybersecurity measures through updated protection systems and law enforcement coordination.
Belgium has a robust anti-money laundering framework, with the CTIF leading investigations. It processes approximately 30 000 suspicious transactions annually, and recent measures have improved information-sharing between law enforcement and financial institutions. However, Belgium remains listed as a high-risk jurisdiction for money laundering, particularly due to its focus on predicate offences rather than direct money-laundering prosecutions.
The country has a strong economic regulatory environment, ranking highly in global competitiveness. But rising public debt and fiscal instability are risk factors. Belgium has a well-developed transportation and trade infrastructure, but criminal groups exploit these advantages to facilitate illicit financial transactions. The Belgian government has faced European Commission scrutiny for budgetary deficits, with proceedings initiated in 2024 to address fiscal concerns. Still, no specific information on the links between the Belgian economy and organized crime has been found for the reporting period.
Belgium has a comprehensive victim and witness support system, particularly for human trafficking cases. Specialized shelters provide psychosocial, medical and legal assistance, with the Federal Centre for Migration overseeing victim protection programmes. Victims identified through law enforcement or NGOs can access temporary residence permits and long-term legal protections if they cooperate in criminal investigations. However, the high costs of legal representation have deterred many victims from seeking compensation. Shelters for trafficking victims, while government-funded, face capacity constraints. Lastly, Belgium's national anti-drug strategy emphasizes supporting victims, with the organization ‘Infor-Drogues’ providing anonymous information, assistance and advice regarding drug use. Protective measures are in place to safeguard witnesses who fear reprisals, including options for partial or complete anonymity.
Belgium has prioritized crime-prevention strategies at the national and municipal levels. Programmes focusing on awareness campaigns, early intervention and cross-sector collaboration are available. The Flemish Centre of Expertise for Alcohol and Drugs has developed training initiatives to prevent cocaine use. Belgium’s National Action Plan on Organized Crime outlines four strategic objectives, including improving research methodologies, expanding investigative capabilities and enhancing inter-agency cooperation. While they are promising, the effectiveness of these strategies remains to be fully evaluated.
Belgium has a very active civil society sector, with NGOs playing a central role in combating organized crime. Organizations have been instrumental in shaping national and EU-level policies. Civil society initiatives have also targeted wildlife trafficking, financial crime and drug prevention. Following a decline in public trust in Belgian media, a media literacy programme was introduced to address concerns over bias and misinformation. Despite this, Belgium continues to have an independent and trustworthy media. Nevertheless, journalists continue to face online threats and violence at protests.
Criminal markets
4.53-0.20
An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.
Human trafficking
6.00-0.50
Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.
Human smuggling
6.500.00
Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.
Extortion and protection racketeering
1.50-0.50
Crimes linked to exerting control over a territory/market including as a mediator and/or requesting a benefit in exchange for protection.
Arms trafficking
4.00-0.50
The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.
Trade in counterfeit goods
4.500.50
The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands.
Illicit trade in excisable goods
4.000.00
The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits.
Flora crimes
3.50-0.50
The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.
Fauna crimes
3.50-0.50
The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.
Non-renewable resource crimes
2.50-1.00
The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.
Heroin trade
4.00-1.00
The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.
Cocaine trade
5.000.00
The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cannabis trade
5.00-0.50
The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.
Synthetic drug trade
6.000.00
The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cyber-dependent crimes
5.500.50
Organized crimes that rely solely on using information communications technology with the aim of obtaining a monetary/material benefit.
Financial crimes
6.501.00
Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance.
Criminal actors
4.700.20
An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.
Mafia-style groups
1.000.00
Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.
Criminal networks
4.000.00
Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.
State-embedded actors
7.500.50
Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.
Foreign actors
5.500.00
State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.
Private sector actors
5.500.50
Profit-seeking individuals/entities who own/control a part of the legal economy free from the state, that collaborate with criminal actors.
Political leadership and governance
4.00-0.50
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
3.500.00
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
4.00-0.50
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
5.500.50
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
5.000.00
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
5.000.00
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
6.500.00
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
5.500.00
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
4.500.00
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
4.00-0.50
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
6.000.00
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
4.000.00
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Hungary serves as a source, transit and destination country for human trafficking, with victims being exploited for sexual purposes and forced labour. Hungarian nationals – particularly women and minors from marginalized communities – are especially highly vulnerable, while foreign nationals from Eastern Europe and Asia are also affected. Both Hungarian and foreign victims are subjected to labour trafficking, particularly in the agriculture, construction and hospitality sectors. According to official reports, domestic labour trafficking is on the rise, with individuals in extreme poverty, undereducated young adults, asylum seekers, single mothers, children in state-run institutions, people with disabilities, homeless men and members of the LGBTQI+ and Roma communities being particularly at risk. Hungarian victims are frequently identified abroad, with Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK serving as primary destination countries. Recently, Denmark, Finland and Sweden have emerged as new destinations for sex trafficking, indicating an expanding trend towards the Nordic region. Hungarian traffickers operate both domestically and internationally, with victims identified across multiple Western European countries. Recruitment often occurs through social media and fraudulent job offers, further exacerbating the risks faced by vulnerable populations.
Hungary serves as a key transit country for human smuggling, with daily attempts to cross its borders, particularly from Serbia and Romania en route to Western Europe. The market for smuggling has expanded due to increased migratory pressure and heightened border controls. Smuggling networks involve both domestic and foreign actors, including Romanian, Moldovan, Bangladeshi, Iraqi, Afghan, Moroccan and Syrian nationals. Reports indicate links between Afghan smuggling groups and Taliban intelligence services. Smuggling operations are often violent, with criminal groups arming themselves with illicit weapons sourced from Albanian and Serbian networks, resulting in clashes. The redirection of smuggling routes to Bosnia and Herzegovina suggests a shift in the region's dynamics. While authorities have conducted joint operations, Hungary’s recent release of over 2 000 convicted smugglers, reportedly due to EU budgetary pressure, has been criticized for undermining deterrence.
Extortion and protection racketeering are not widely reported in Hungary. While minor cases have been noted in the private sector, extortion practices are declining due to improved detection measures. Criminal actors have shifted towards economic crimes, thereby reducing their reliance on traditional extortion rackets.
Illicit arms trafficking is not a significant market in Hungary. Criminal networks operate discreetly and avoid large-scale transactions. However, there have been reports of arms trafficking to Romania, including the shipment of illicit firearms through courier services. Recent investigations have uncovered a network supplying weapons to multiple counties in Romania.
Hungary serves as both a transit and a destination country for counterfeit goods. The domestic consumer market for counterfeit goods in Hungary is limited as the legal market is extremely regulated. Nevertheless, Hungary ranks among the top transit points in Europe for counterfeit products, including clothing, pharmaceuticals and electronics. Customs seizures of counterfeit goods remain substantial, with the majority of items originating from East Asia.
The illicit trade in excisable consumer goods, particularly tobacco and alcohol, remains prevalent. Despite an overall decline in smoking rates, the illegal cigarette market has expanded, with seizures in 2024 tripling compared to the previous year. Although it is unclear whether this reflects an actual market expansion or improved law enforcement effectiveness, the higher volumes suggest that tax evasion remains a significant driving factor. Reports suggest that organized crime networks control this trade, while illegal alcohol production for export to Western Europe constitutes a substantial portion of the market.
Illegal logging has increased in Hungary, largely driven by rising energy costs since 2019. While most cases involve local communities harvesting firewood rather than organized crime, some criminal networks operate in Hungary’s Carpathian Forest, targeting high-value timber for international sale. Conservationists warn of the impact on biodiversity, particularly during breeding and growing seasons.
Although the scope and scale of fauna crimes is not extensive, poaching appears to be an issue in Hungary, especially in rural areas. The most commonly targeted species include deer and wild boar, with illegal hunting driven largely by local demand for meat and sport. The scale of illegal hunting is difficult to quantify due to underreporting; however, financial losses are estimated to be in the millions. Hungary’s role in songbird trafficking to Italy has diminished, and overall, the country's involvement in transnational fauna crimes appears to be declining.
Non-renewable resource crimes have decreased in Hungary. Large-scale smuggling of fuel and minerals, once significant, has diminished due to stronger regulations and industry decline. However, smaller-scale fuel smuggling from Poland and Austria continues to pose risks.
Hungary continues to serve as a transit country for heroin, primarily smuggled along the Balkan route toward Western Europe. The domestic heroin market is relatively small, with heroin-related offences constituting a minor portion of drug-related crimes. The ongoing war in Ukraine is anticipated to further decrease the volume of heroin trafficked through Hungary.
The number of cocaine seizures has risen continuously, particularly during the drug’s distribution at the retail level. Cocaine is mainly transported by road from Spain or the Netherlands, or is directly imported by air from South America. Recent seizures of substantial volumes of cocaine highlight Hungary’s role as a transit point for cocaine moving eastward. While online cocaine sales are on the rise, consumption rates in Hungary remain among the lowest in Europe.
Cannabis is the most widely used illicit drug in Hungary. The country functions as a transit and destination point for cannabis shipments originating from the Netherlands and the Western Balkans. While most cannabis is trafficked into Hungary, domestic production is on the rise. Authorities have dismantled local cannabis plantations, indicating that Hungary may be evolving into a minor source country. Nevertheless, the country’s cannabis market is still described as moderate, with a low-level cannabis production industry.
Hungary serves as a key transit hub for synthetic drugs, including amphetamines and methamphetamines, as they move from Western Europe to the Western Balkans. Precursors also transit through Hungary in significant volumes. The use of synthetic cannabinoids has surged, particularly among marginalized communities. The COVID-19 pandemic has further accelerated the growth of online drug markets, with synthetic substances often sold through darknet platforms. A major seizure of precursor chemicals at the Austrian border highlights Hungary’s role in regional trafficking.
Cybercrime is on the rise in Hungary, with businesses increasingly becoming targets of ransomware attacks. Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks against independent media outlets raise concerns about cybercrime being used as a means of political interference. Reports indicate that cyber-dependent crimes are primarily committed by individuals or small domestic groups, rather than large organized crime networks. Nevertheless, the sophistication of cyber threats is increasing, particularly with the advent of artificial intelligence.
Financial crimes in Hungary are primarily linked to corruption, embezzlement, and the misuse of public and EU funds. High-profile scandals have implicated politically connected businesses, raising allegations that state procurement processes are manipulated to benefit select bidders. The European Anti-Fraud Office has identified Hungary as having the highest rate of financial recovery recommendations among EU member states. While certain regions have seen a decrease in financial crimes, major urban centres continue to report elevated levels of fraudulent activity.
There are no documented hierarchical criminal organizations involved in activities such as drug trafficking, extortion or territorial control that would qualify as mafia-style groups.
Loose criminal networks are prevalent across various illicit markets in Hungary. These groups are particularly active in human trafficking, human smuggling, drug trafficking and crimes involving flora and fauna. They operate opportunistically, adapting to market demands while evading centralized control. Additionally, available information indicates that loosely organized hacker groups are contracted by state-affiliated actors to carry out cyberattacks, particularly DDoS attacks targeting independent media outlets.
Hungary faces a well-documented issue with corruption among state-embedded actors, particularly in financial crimes and public procurement fraud. The country has one of the highest levels of perceived corruption within the EU, with state actors diverting public and EU funds to businesses with political connections. Recent corruption cases underscore the extent to which high-ranking officials are implicated in financial misconduct. Additionally, political elites reportedly utilize informal patron–client networks to extend their influence over lower-level institutions, including local governments and various economic sectors. There are also indications that state actors have engaged domestic hacker groups to suppress independent media through targeted cyberattacks.
Foreign criminal groups maintain a presence in Hungary, particularly in the areas of money laundering and illicit trade. Reports indicate that Italian, Albanian and Georgian mafia-style groups are active within the country. In early 2023, Hungarian law enforcement, in cooperation with Eurojust, conducted an operation targeting the ‘Ndrangheta, which resulted in multiple arrests and the seizure of assets linked to international money laundering activities. Additionally, reports also suggest that members of the Camorra, Cosa Nostra and Sacra Corona Unita have engaged in criminal activities in Hungary, especially in money laundering and illegal lending operations. Hungarian and Serbian criminal groups work together in drug trafficking and migrant smuggling, highlighting strong regional criminal ties. Furthermore, organized smuggling groups from West Asia and Afghanistan are active in transporting individuals through Hungary, with some reports of violent altercations occurring at the country’s borders.
The private sector in Hungary is closely intertwined with political influence, particularly regarding corruption and public procurement. Business entities with strong ties to the ruling political elite often receive preferential treatment, benefiting from state contracts and access to public funds. These practices have drawn criticism from international watchdogs, which allege that Hungary has systematically funnelled EU resources to politically connected businesses. While many of these activities remain within legal frameworks, they contribute to systemic corruption and economic distortions. Companies affiliated with the ruling party have a significant presence across various economic sectors, reinforcing concerns about the intersection of politics and financial crime.
Hungary’s political leadership is characterized by a strong central government, supported by a two-thirds parliamentary majority. This majority enables the ruling party to take decisive action, particularly in matters of border security and law enforcement. Since the onset of the Ukraine war, the government has maintained a state of emergency, which allows it to issue decrees with minimal restrictions. Critics argue that this has resulted in an excessive concentration of power, with over a thousand emergency decrees enacted, many of which are unrelated to the war. Hungary's governance has faced criticism for corruption, with reports indicating that state power has been used to monopolize markets and sustain oligarchic control. International observers have deemed the 2022 parliamentary elections severely flawed. Concerns about transparency persist, as the government has implemented only minimal reforms to meet EU funding requirements. Accusations of espionage against the opposition leader in 2024, including allegations of surveillance and attempts to discredit him, further highlight governance concerns.
Transparency and accountability remain significant issues. Although recent reforms which were a precondition for accessing EU funds were implemented in recent years, they are perceived as inadequate for restoring the rule of law. The National Protective Service has been effective in tackling low- and mid-level corruption; however, it is regarded as politicized and ineffective against high-level state actors. The national anti-corruption strategy fails to address corruption among top officials, and the lack of transparency regarding ministerial cabinet remuneration remains a concern. Despite recent legal changes, public access to government information has been further restricted, and the asset declaration system has been weakened.
Hungary has ratified international treaties concerning organized crime, including agreements with the UN and OECD. The country actively cooperates with Europol, Eurojust and INTERPOL, with Budapest serving as the location for an INTERPOL National Central Bureau. However, Hungary’s failure to implement decisions from the European Court of Human Rights, delays in judicial reforms, and tensions with the EU over migration policy and frozen EU funds have strained international cooperation. Additionally, Hungary has also lobbied to ease sanctions on Russia, further complicating its relationship with European partners.
Hungary’s legal framework addresses various forms of organized crime, including human trafficking, money laundering and drug-related offences. Recent amendments have aligned the country’s human trafficking laws with international standards; however, provisions regarding child sex trafficking remain inconsistent with global norms. While laws against human smuggling are enforced, the controversial decision to release over 1 400 convicted smugglers in 2024 has raised concerns about the government’s commitment to combating this issue. Environmental crimes are covered under statutory provisions, with recent changes to hunting regulations affecting poaching laws. Cybercrime strategies have been in place since 2013, with updates in 2018, but gaps remain in tackling corruption at high levels.
Hungary’s judiciary faces challenges related to independence and the preservation of due process. Recent judicial reforms prompted the EU to unfreeze cohesion funds; however, concerns remain over political pressure exerted on the courts. Prosecutors have shown reluctance to investigate allegations of misuse of EU funds. The appointment of the Constitutional Court, which is composed entirely of nominees from the ruling coalition, has raised further questions about the judiciary’s independence and impartiality. Additionally, high-level officials and pro-government media have publicly criticized court rulings that contradict the government's interests. Regarding the penitentiary system, the Hungarian detention centres have been grappling with overcrowding in recent years.
The Hungarian National Police investigates organized crime through specialized units, including the National Bureau of Investigation and the Asset Recovery Office, which focus on financial crimes as well as a National Environmental Security Taskforce to combat environmental crimes, among others. The Coordination Centre Against Organized Crime CCAOC analyzes crime trends; however, its operational impact remains unclear due to a lack of publicly available data. However, concerns persist regarding the politicization of law enforcement and reports of police misconduct.
As the country continues to be a key transit hub in the region, territorial integrity remains a priority, with a strong border control approach. Hungary’s government has erected a border wall and increased patrols to combat irregular migration, although these measures have inadvertently fuelled the human smuggling industry. Clashes between smugglers and border forces have risen.
Hungary’s anti-money laundering framework is overseen by the National Tax and Customs Administration and the Hungarian Financial Intelligence Unit. The country is a member of the Financial Action Task Force and has implemented the EU anti-money laundering directives. However, despite improvements in compliance with international standards, enforcement remains inconsistent. The complexity of the regulations may hinder small businesses, and the framework does not fully address emerging financial technologies. Hungary's economic regulatory environment receives mixed assessments. While the country is integrated into the European Single Market, concerns regarding corruption and state capture persist. The Integrity Authority, established in 2022, monitors fraud and corruption but possesses limited enforcement powers. The government has been accused of favouring domestic ownership over foreign investment, particularly in strategic sectors such as banking, media and energy. Public procurement remains a key area of concern, with a high percentage of contracts awarded through single-bidder tenders, often involving businesses linked to the government. Despite regulatory improvements, access to EU funds remains uncertain due to ongoing concerns regarding financial transparency.
Hungary’s victim and witness support systems face challenges. Despite improvements in human trafficking protection mechanisms, gaps persist in the identification and support of victims, particularly for foreign nationals lacking legal residency. Victim assistance is generally limited, raising concerns about the treatment of children in state institutions. Systemic issues within the child protection system contribute to these vulnerabilities, including underfunding and overcrowding. The dismantling of Hungary’s asylum system has driven refugees toward organized crime networks, further exacerbating the situation. Hungary implemented a new 2024-2034 National Crime Prevention Strategy, identifying several priority areas for action, including public safety and education. In its efforts to combat human trafficking, Hungary continued to implement its national anti-trafficking action plan, allocating responsibilities across agencies and setting goals, including creating specialized services for male victims. Nonetheless, gaps persist in areas such as victim screening and prosecutions, among others. In response to the influx of Ukrainian refugees, the government disseminated anti-trafficking materials in key transit areas. While drug policy emphasizes prevention and treatment, it is hindered by limited harm-reduction services and high mortality rates. Cybercrime awareness is lower than the EU average, despite Hungary’s heightened risk of regional exposure.
Civil society organizations operate under significant constraints, particularly those involved in human rights and refugee support efforts. NGOs assisting asylum seekers have faced legal restrictions under Hungary’s ‘Stop Soros’ laws, which have been deemed a violation of EU law but continue to limit NGO operations. The government frequently scapegoats independent organizations, accusing them of being influenced by foreign interests. Press freedom is also a concern, as the government controls a significant portion of the media landscape. Independent outlets face political, economic and regulatory pressures that limit their ability to hold authorities accountable. State-aligned media dominate election coverage, marginalizing opposition voices. Disinformation campaigns have been extensively employed in political narratives, particularly during the 2024 European Parliament elections. Despite these challenges, civil society organizations continue to provide essential services, particularly in human trafficking victim support and advocacy. However, legal and regulatory pressures remain significant barriers to their operations. Media restrictions further hinder investigative journalism, making transparency and accountability increasingly difficult to achieve.
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The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to 10. The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel.
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