How to measure organized crime?
A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.
Read more on globalinitiative.netCriminal markets
5.170.12
An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.
Human trafficking
5.000.00
Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.
Human smuggling
6.000.50
Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.
Extortion and protection racketeering
2.50 n/a
Crimes linked to exerting control over a territory/market including as a mediator and/or requesting a benefit in exchange for protection.
Arms trafficking
6.000.50
The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.
Trade in counterfeit goods
5.00 n/a
The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands.
Illicit trade in excisable goods
4.00 n/a
The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits.
Flora crimes
3.000.50
The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.
Fauna crimes
3.500.00
The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.
Non-renewable resource crimes
4.001.00
The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.
Heroin trade
4.000.00
The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.
Cocaine trade
8.000.50
The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cannabis trade
6.500.00
The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.
Synthetic drug trade
7.500.00
The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cyber-dependent crimes
6.00 n/a
Organized crimes that rely solely on using information communications technology with the aim of obtaining a monetary/material benefit.
Financial crimes
6.50 n/a
Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance.
Criminal actors
3.700.08
An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.
Mafia-style groups
3.000.00
Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.
Criminal networks
5.000.50
Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.
State-embedded actors
2.000.00
Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.
Foreign actors
5.000.00
State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.
Private sector actors
3.50 n/a
Profit-seeking individuals/entities who own/control a part of the legal economy free from the state, that collaborate with criminal actors.
Political leadership and governance
7.000.00
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
7.000.00
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
8.000.00
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
7.500.50
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
6.000.00
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
7.000.00
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
6.000.00
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
7.000.00
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
7.000.00
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
7.500.00
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
7.000.50
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
7.50-0.50
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Belgium is targeted by human trafficking networks for both transit and destination purposes, with demand for such activity being particularly prevalent in major cities like Brussels, Antwerp, and Liège. While the recorded number of presumed victims of human trafficking is relatively low and decreasing, it is uncertain whether this is due to underreporting or their decreasing prevalence. Human trafficking cases in Belgium are primarily related to sexual and labour exploitation, begging, and coercion-based crimes. However, the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine may result in a spike in human trafficking, as people who have been displaced by the war may be targeted by pre-existing trafficking networks, many of which operate through or within Belgium. The local human trafficking market is made up of different types of actors, including family networks, independent traffickers who cooperate with one another, and individuals. West African networks, which are largely involved in the illegal sex industry, are well-known for their significant dominance in the market. Chinese human smugglers are increasingly involved in trafficking, as well as smuggling, primarily for purposes of sex work.
Given its location, Belgium is not only a destination but also a transit country for human smuggling. Organized networks, many of which are based on kin, dominate the human smuggling landscape, and a growing number of minors has been smuggled into the country in recent years. The market for human smuggling has been growing, although significant law enforcement successes indicate that responses to this activity are becoming stronger. West African networks involved in human trafficking are also engaged in human smuggling, while Albanian smuggling networks are highly active. In terms of individuals transiting Belgium, there is a rising number of arrests of individuals from African states, primarily from Eritrea and Sudan, as well as from Libya, Morocco, Ethiopia, Somalia, and West African countries.
In contrast to human trafficking and smuggling, there appear to be few instances of extortion and protection racketeering in Belgium. No organized criminal groups are known to be involved in such activities. However, criminals who are involved in drug trafficking or other crimes in the country may be involved in extortion as part of their illegal business.
Belgium is a major source and transit country for arms trafficking in Europe due to its location and its history as a firearms producer and exporter. Most firearms are smuggled through Belgium to other European countries, and cross-border smuggling is considered the most significant source of supply for the Belgian illicit firearms market. The Balkan region is the primary source of weapons, but firearms also enter Belgium from neighbouring countries and other EU member states. The increased smuggling of weapons from the Balkans has led to a significant rise in the possession and use of military-grade assault rifles among criminals. Moreover, there has been an increased import of Flobert guns (a type of firearm that does not fire traditional ammunition), which are relatively easy to convert into higher-calibre firearms. The trafficking of firearms through 3D-printing and dark web acquisitions is also on the rise.
Belgium is also a significant destination for counterfeit goods in Europe, with the majority of seized products being shipped by sea. Toys and games are the most commonly counterfeited products. Moreover, counterfeit cigarettes represent a large portion of the market and their illegal production is becoming a growing business in Belgium. Young Belgians tend to buy more counterfeit products than the EU average. Technology plays a significant role in making these goods easily accessible over the internet. The sale and purchase of counterfeit goods in Belgium surged during the COVID-19 pandemic, and criminal networks quickly adapted to the new demand.
Excise fees in the country are imposed on alcoholic beverages, energy products, manufactured tobacco products, non-alcoholic beverages (such as soda and bottled water), and coffee. The illicit trade in these goods (with the exception of energy products) does exist, although to a lesser extent than the illicit trade in counterfeit goods. As a transit point for excisable and other types of goods that are smuggled to neighbouring countries, Belgium has maintained its fight against the illicit trade of these products.
Belgium is a source and transit point for illegal flora and timber in Europe, particularly through the port of Antwerp. Large amounts of illicit timber are shipped from Central Africa and imported by a number of Belgian companies, some of them reportedly collaborating with criminal organizations and militia groups. Belgium is also a destination for illegal flora, with plants for plant-based supplements and furniture made from North Indian rosewood being seized at Brussels’ Zaventem Airport. Belgium also plays a role in the illegal wildlife trade, acting as a transit point for traffickers moving wildlife products from Africa to Asia. These include, among others, ivory, pangolin scales, and big cat products. Additionally, the country is involved in the illegal trade of live birds and reptiles, as well as primate species. Bush meat is also smuggled through Zaventem airport to supply the African diaspora living in Belgium and beyond.
Belgium remains a central hub for the illegal trade of diamonds and gold, with criminal organizations operating in Antwerp. This has resulted in the smuggling of diamonds and money laundering through the jewellery sector. Although Belgium has taken steps to control the trade, these efforts are often circumvented by illicit actors who exploit loopholes in monitoring mechanisms. The diamond trade is critical to Belgium's economy, creating a conflict of interest between effective law enforcement and maintaining a profitable trade hub. Moreover, some gold traders in Belgium have been linked to the financing of violent conflict actors with ‘blood gold’ in Central Africa.
Belgium is mainly a destination for heroin, which enters the country via four different trafficking routes, with the Balkan and southern routes being the most significant ones. Despite relatively few seizures, the Belgian heroin trade remains prevalent, with recent cases involving the use of online delivery services for drug sales.
Belgium is a major hub for the cocaine trade on the continent and is responsible for a disproportionately large share of Europe’s cocaine seizures. The port of Antwerp has become a key trafficking point for cocaine, while Brussels and Liège airports are also important centres. Trafficking strategies include hiding drugs in containers of ordinary goods or transferring them to containers that are less likely to be inspected. Cocaine can also be ordered through call centres and delivered by Dutch drug couriers. There are also concerns over an increase in violence linked to this market in the country. Despite law enforcement successes, organized crime corruption payments to port workers and violence linked to the cocaine trade remain persistent problems.
Belgium is a source, transit and destination country for cannabis, but professional cultivation is also expanding, with some involvement of crime organizations. Most herbal cannabis consumed in Belgium is either cultivated locally or imported from Spain, the Netherlands and some North African countries; cannabis resin comes mostly from Morocco and is trafficked mainly by road through Spain and France. An increasing number of cannabis growers have moved from the Netherlands to Belgium in the hope of escaping law enforcement. Criminals from the Netherlands play an important role in the Belgian crime market for cannabis. However, Belgians themselves seem to be increasingly involved in supplying the domestic drug market.
The country is a major player in the synthetic drugs trade, with MDMA (Ecstasy) production being a key component, particularly in the Flanders region near the Dutch border. The synthetic drug market in Belgium is closely linked to that of the Netherlands, and conversion labs in Belgium are often run by Dutch organized crime groups. Online orders are sent from Belgium to recipients worldwide. Chemical waste dumping from Ecstasy production in Belgium indicates that it continues to be produced there, despite the dismantling of Dutch Ecstasy laboratories in the EU. In addition to Ecstasy, Belgium is also a notable transit zone for new psychoactive substances coming from China, and synthetic cannabinoid products have also been documented as being processed in the country. Although the Belgian production of methamphetamine and amphetamine is not predominant in their respective markets, synthetic drug production is expanding in the Belgian-Dutch border region.
Cyber-dependent crimes are a significant concern in Belgium, with ransomware and coordinated cyber-attacks being increasingly observed in recent years. Businesses are also targeted, with up to three times more cyber-dependent attacks occurring in Belgium since early 2020. Most attacks focus on data theft, and the government and financial institutions are prime targets for cybercriminals. Cross-border law enforcement operations are common in Europe, as most cyber-dependent crimes in Belgium and the EU are perpetrated by loosely organized criminal groups that operate across borders. However, local police forces in Belgium are not equipped or trained to deal with such cases, and the federal police are understaffed and lack resources.
Financial crimes in Belgium are typically committed by loosely organized criminal networks, with identity fraud and Ponzi schemes being the most common types of fraud. However, there are also numerous cases of international tax fraud. Moreover, cyber-enabled financial crimes have been on the rise in recent years with the cloning of fuel cards, online Ponzi schemes, phishing and smishing attacks being increasingly observed. Despite various policies implemented by the Belgian authorities to address these crimes, a lack of resources often leads to most financial crimes going uninvestigated or unprosecuted.
Smaller, informal criminal networks in Belgium are the dominant type of criminal organizations in the country, primarily involved in drug trafficking. The networks are relatively widespread but are concentrated more in city areas, such as Brussels and Antwerp, or at the Dutch border. They are known to use violence, including shootings, and are also known to cooperate with their international counterparts, specifically with Albanian and Dutch organized crime groups. Overall, foreign actors also have an important presence in organized crime markets. Balkan organized crime groups collaborate with Italian mafias and Turkish organized criminal groups, mainly involving drug trafficking, arms trafficking, and human smuggling. Dutch organized crime groups are involved in all aspects of drug trafficking, including cannabis production, import and export, cocaine production and export, and synthetic drugs export, as well as money laundering and labour exploitation. Romanian organized crime groups are involved in human trafficking, the sexual exploitation of women, and labour exploitation of men. Competition between Italian and Albanian organized crime actors has intensified violent attempts to control the drug trafficking market, with longer-term implications and actor shifts during the COVID-19 pandemic. The highly sophisticated command structures of foreign actors make them well suited to adapt to changes and exploit economic and social vulnerabilities.
Belgium has a number of mafia-style groups, including biker gangs, which engage in criminal activities such as arms and drug trafficking, as well as sexual exploitation. Despite efforts by the German and Dutch governments to crack down on these groups, recent arrests and seizures suggest that they are still active in Belgium and are often involved in transnational organized crime flows. There is also collaboration with Spanish criminal groups, and there are concerns that these groups may have overlapping membership with lower-level state institutions.
Even though the involvement of private sector actors in criminal markets is limited, there are reports indicating these actors’ involvement in money laundering schemes both within and outside of the country, specifically in Dubai through the use of the real estate sector. The influence of state-embedded actors in Belgium is reportedly minimal, although a few recent cases have been reported.
Belgium has recognized organized crime as a significant issue and has taken measures to combat it, with the government declaring it a priority. The country is also known for its good governance and commitment to protecting human rights, with EU institutions based in Brussels making it the centre of Europe. Although Belgium has low corruption levels, there is room for improvement in the transparency of parliamentarians' and third parties' contacts and the publication of parliamentarians' asset declarations. Additionally, ministers lack integrity policies or codes of conduct, and their private office staff's recruitment and remuneration are solely at their discretion. In recent years, Belgium has seen the rise of xenophobia, which is a major concern.
Belgium has ratified various international conventions against organized crime and the European Convention on Extradition, including its first and second protocols (its third and fourth protocols have not been signed). The country also has bilateral extradition agreements with many countries. To combat organized crime, Belgium collaborates with Europol and Interpol and participates in several regional cooperation bodies. Belgium’s national legal framework covers all major crime markets of interest, apart from non-renewable resource crimes, and its criminal code criminalizes any involvement in organized-crime activities. A National Security Strategy (NSS) was adopted in early 2022, which includes, in its 10-15 years long-term vision, the fight against organized crime as a national priority
Belgium’s judiciary is fully independent and guarantees due process in criminal trials. Belgium's federal public prosecutor's office has a dedicated section for organized crime, one of four sections in the office. The section covers the whole of Belgium and is directly supervised by the minister of justice. Belgium has an integrated police service divided into federal and local levels that work together to provide law enforcement. The federal judiciary police units at the local level detect, investigate, and destabilize criminal organizations, specializing in human trafficking, smuggling, drug trafficking, arms trafficking, and other organized crime activities. The federal police have set up three information centres to complement the criminal, judicial, and financial tools to tackle organized crime. However, both the federal and local police are understaffed and due to recent budget cuts have insufficient resources to deal with organized crime at different levels.
Belgium's vulnerability to organized crime is due to its location on major trafficking routes for drugs and human smuggling. The country’s ports and airports are key transit hubs for illicit products and have been identified as attractive targets for organized crime. In terms of cyber-security, Belgium has had cyber-security strategies for more than a decade, focused on improving defences and incident response. However, changes in the cyber-security landscape have left Belgium vulnerable to cyber-infiltration. The new cyber-security strategy includes clear points that focus on improving the country's protection systems and identifying cybercrimes and cyber-attacks as risks of national priority.
The country has the relevant mechanisms to combat money laundering. The Belgian financial intelligence unit receives tens of thousands of disclosures of suspicious transactions annually and has reported an increase in files on organized crime transferred to judicial authorities. Despite having a solid legal framework and preventative mechanism to combat money laundering, the public prosecution office has faced criticism for prioritizing the investigation and prosecution of predicate offences over money laundering. To address this issue, a new collaborative platform against money laundering has been launched, which aims to exchange information, share expertise, and serve as a reference point for common objectives and feedback structures for anti-money laundering legislators. Recently, the Belgian Parliament amended its anti-money laundering act to further regulate specific crypto-service providers, with an aim to improve the country's resilience to money laundering and terrorist financing.
In recent years, Belgium's competitiveness has improved. However, tax rates, restrictive labour regulations, and tax regulations remain problematic for doing business. The country's communication infrastructure is highly developed, with major roads, railways, waterways, airports, seaports, and one of the most advanced broadband telecommunication networks in Europe. The workforce in Belgium is highly qualified, with a strong education and training system that fosters business sophistication and innovation. Belgium is a small but open economy, dominated by the growing importance of the services sector; however, the budgetary deficit remains a growing concern.
Belgium has policies in place to assist victims of human trafficking and punish their perpetrators. The victim procedure and victim status provide temporary and permanent residency rights to victims who cooperate with authorities and break off all contact with suspected perpetrators. While Belgium is one of the leaders in Europe in providing mechanisms to support victims exiting modern slavery, the low number of individuals who have entered the victim procedure can be attributed to beliefs in migration myths, victims’ dependence on smugglers, and police officers' lack of knowledge and limited opportunities to offer appropriate victim support.
Belgium has implemented a range of preventive strategies to combat organized crime, including specific plans targeting human trafficking, human smuggling, and drug trafficking. The federal government has devised a national action plan to combat crimes, which is executed through regional consultation bodies comprising various law enforcement and social services. Civil society in Belgium plays an important role in providing support services to vulnerable groups. In fact, civil society remains very active and collaborates with political leaders and public authorities in addressing the threat of transnational organized crime. However, press freedom in Belgium has retreated due to increasing police violence, online hate against journalists, and a government directive that violates the Constitution's stipulation of press freedom. Journalists covering demonstrations against public health measures imposed during the COVID-19 pandemic have been subjected to intimidation and violence from protesters, leading some journalists to quit altogether or refuse to cover specific topics.
Criminal markets
4.73-0.02
An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.
Human trafficking
6.500.50
Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.
Human smuggling
6.500.50
Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.
Extortion and protection racketeering
2.00 n/a
Crimes linked to exerting control over a territory/market including as a mediator and/or requesting a benefit in exchange for protection.
Arms trafficking
4.501.00
The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.
Trade in counterfeit goods
4.00 n/a
The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands.
Illicit trade in excisable goods
4.00 n/a
The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits.
Flora crimes
4.000.50
The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.
Fauna crimes
4.00-0.50
The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.
Non-renewable resource crimes
3.500.00
The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.
Heroin trade
5.000.50
The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.
Cocaine trade
5.000.00
The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cannabis trade
5.500.00
The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.
Synthetic drug trade
6.000.50
The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cyber-dependent crimes
5.00 n/a
Organized crimes that rely solely on using information communications technology with the aim of obtaining a monetary/material benefit.
Financial crimes
5.50 n/a
Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance.
Criminal actors
4.500.25
An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.
Mafia-style groups
1.000.00
Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.
Criminal networks
4.000.00
Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.
State-embedded actors
7.000.00
Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.
Foreign actors
5.500.50
State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.
Private sector actors
5.00 n/a
Profit-seeking individuals/entities who own/control a part of the legal economy free from the state, that collaborate with criminal actors.
Political leadership and governance
4.500.00
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
3.500.00
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
4.50-0.50
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
5.00-0.50
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
5.000.00
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
5.00-1.00
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
6.50-0.50
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
5.500.00
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
4.500.00
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
4.500.00
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
6.000.00
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
4.000.00
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Hungary is a major source and transit country for human trafficking, which is among the country’s largest criminal markets. Victims of human trafficking are primarily subjected to sexual exploitation and forced labour. Foreign nationals who come to the country in pursuit of work are increasingly subjected to domestic labour trafficking in rural Hungary. Meanwhile, Hungarian nationals are trafficked for forced labour within the country and outside it in the UK, Belgium and the Netherlands. Hungarian women lured into sham marriages with third-country nationals in Europe are also reportedly subjected to forced prostitution, while men are subjected to labour trafficking in agriculture, construction and factories in Western Europe. Hungarian Roma women are often manipulated by perpetrators into sex trafficking, while child sex trafficking victims generally come from state-provided childcare institutions and correctional facilities. The criminal market is mainly run by transnational organized crime groups, criminals and repeating criminal offenders.
The human smuggling market in Hungary is growing and has been exacerbated by the effects of the war in Ukraine. Most human smuggling in Hungary takes place along the Hungarian–Serbian border, which has become a point of tension amid the European migrant crisis. Hungary is a transit and source country for human smuggling, especially by land, and irregular border crossings are reportedly increasing at the Hungarian–Slovakian border. Irregular migrants, often from Syria, Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan, are known to regularly enter Hungary by sea, usually in fishing boats, in the Danube Delta region, through Türkiye to Romania. Criminal gangs from Bulgaria are known to recruit Ukrainian and Georgian nationals to carry out such smuggling activities. In addition, Serbian, Turkish and Hungarian smugglers are also involved in this criminal market.
Extortion and racketeering are not common practices in Hungary. However, small-scale extortion occurs in the private sector, but is prevented in the public sector, which is heavily controlled by the state. Private-sector extortion and racketeering are connected to local gangs and criminal groups, who usually work on their own and extort from local businesses, such as restaurants and bars. Racketeering is conducted in specific markets, such as construction and small-scale sales.
Hungary has seen a decrease in the number of registered criminal offences involving firearms and ammunition. However, it remains a source country for illicit firearms destined for countries such as Romania. In addition, blank-firing weapons are acquired without a licence in Hungary to be trafficked to other European countries. Small weapons manufacturers have been accused of selling illegal firearms, mainly stockpiles of old military weapons after the fall of the Soviet Union. Criminals involved in other forms of trafficking and far-right groups are known to also be involved in arms trafficking in Hungary. The war in Ukraine is expected to have consequences on the arms trafficking market in Hungary in the coming years.
The market for the trade of counterfeit goods in Hungary is not large. This is mostly due to the heavy regulation of the legal market. However, there is a considerable market for counterfeit products transited through the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe. The most common counterfeit goods in the country, which are also considered dangerous to public health, are perfumes, cosmetics, clothing, toys, car parts and pharmaceutical products.
Hungary is predominantly a source country for the alcoholic drinks illegally produced and smuggled inside the EU. Hungary is also a transit and destination country for the cheaper tobacco products smuggled from the Western Balkans and Belarus. Recent cases have shown that increasing quantities of tobacco from domestic production are also being illegally traded in the local market. This trend can be seen in the patterns of offences already detected and is also reflected in the declining volume of legal sales recorded by registered domestic tobacco producers.
There has been an increase in flora crimes in Hungary. The country is an important source of illegal logging in Europe, which has resulted in an 11% decrease in tree cover in Hungary. Illegal logging in the country has been linked to loose organized crime networks. Since the war in Ukraine, illegal logging committed by local communities for firewood has also increased, due to high energy prices. Protected plants such as snowdrops and Carpathian saffron enter or transit the country predominantly by road for subsequent sale on the black market.
Even though Hungary is considered a source, destination and transit country for fauna crime, the market is not extensive and poaching has shown a decreasing trend in recent years. However, smuggling of endangered species for medicinal and decorative use, bird and avian by-products, mammal and reptile by-products, and coral derivatives are still common forms of fauna crime in the country. Furthermore, Italian hunters, assisted by their Hungarian counterparts, are reported to shoot protected birds in great quantities, to smuggle them into Italy. The high level of corruption and the developed shadow economy facilitate the activities of crime groups involved in fauna crimes in Hungary. Some of them are also involved in illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing activities in the country.
Coal, oil, gas and manganese, in limited amounts, are some of Hungary’s key natural resources. The country has seen a recent spike in petrol prices due to raised fuel taxes, which resulted in an increase in petrol smuggling by illegal entrepreneurs. There are reports of a criminal group purchasing low-grade fuel oil in Poland and selling it at marked-up prices in Hungary, avoiding VAT, while using foreign companies as a front. Cases of gold laundering have also been reported.
Hungary has traditionally been a transit country for heroin, originating in Afghanistan and trafficked via the Balkan route to Western Europe. However, the heroin market in Hungary is not consolidated. Turkish organized crime groups continue to be the main importers and facilitators of heroin distribution in the country, often utilizing a northern branch of the Balkan route from Bulgaria and Romania to Hungary, Austria, the Czech Republic, Poland or Germany for transportation. Over the past decade, the number of cocaine seizures has risen continuously, particularly during the drug’s distribution at the retail level. Cocaine is mainly transported by road from Spain or the Netherlands or is directly imported by air from South America. However, in tandem with the increase in general online shopping that occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic, the illicit cocaine market is also flourishing online.
Cannabis is the most used illicit substance among young adults aged between 18 and 34 in Hungary. Cannabis is increasingly trafficked into Hungary by Vietnamese organized crime groups based in the Czech Republic, the Western Balkans and the Netherlands. Moreover, substantial amounts of cannabis have also been intercepted entering Hungary through its shared border with Serbia. Though Hungary is primarily a destination country for cannabis, reports indicate that cannabis is cultivated on a small scale. In recent years, new psychoactive substances compete with established drugs and continue to be a source of concern. While new psychoactive substances shipments are mainly imported from China, synthetic drugs, such as amphetamine and MDMA/Ecstasy, are primarily imported from Belgium and the Netherlands. Furthermore, the use of synthetic drugs has spread among the youth in the poorest parts of the country, particularly since designer drugs like synthetic cannabinoid and cathinone are reportedly cheaper than alcohol.
Cyber-dependent crime is a growing criminal market in Hungary. The frequency of data breaches has quadrupled in a few years, with malicious software infection and ransomware attacks being the most common forms of cybercrime. However, there is no indication that major criminal groups are involved in the market. Instead, it is mostly individual hackers or small hacker groups targeting private persons who are active in this criminal market.
In Hungary, the financial crimes market is frequently connected to the embezzlement and misuse of funds, including both public and corporate funds. These acts primarily involve individuals and small groups, who are not part of the larger organized crime groups. Corruption based on personal connections between business owners and high-ranking public officials and politicians appears to facilitate the illegal financial crimes market. In recent years, allegations have been made of corrupt activities in governmental procurement contracts and tender processes.
As Hungary is a transit country for various criminal markets, foreign criminal organizations operate in the country to varying degrees. For instance, Italian, Albanian and Georgian mafia-style groups are presently active in Hungary and engage in money laundering and cannabis trafficking. Criminal actors from the Turkish diaspora influence the heroin market, while both Slovakian and Bulgarian actors influence the human smuggling market. Domestic loose criminal networks are pervasive in almost all criminal markets present in Hungary, primarily in human trafficking and human smuggling, but also drug trafficking and petty theft. These networks are known to be involved in flora and fauna crimes as well, alongside opportunistic perpetrators.
Through informal patron–client networks, members of the Hungarian economic elite influences not only major political institutions, but also controls lower-level institutions, such as local government and civil society groups. Corruption is an ongoing problem and new legislation limiting the definition of public funds could result in further challenges, as many of the companies in Hungary with close government links are supported by public funds. Furthermore, high-level politicians are connected to the oligarchs and use this connection to obtain control over certain markets, like the media. Connections between the government and private-sector actors are traditionally strong, and the government has a stronghold over private businesses. This is reflected in the preferential treatment some businesses receive from the government and the flouting of taxation and customs duty regulations. There is no evidence to suggest domestic mafia-style groups exist in Hungary.
The state of governance and political leadership in Hungary is generally associated with the growth of illiberal populism. Political leaders use migration as a key campaign issue, drawing parallels between migration, crime and human smuggling in ways that critics claim stoke xenophobia and racism. The government’s control over supposedly independent institutions such as the judiciary, along with the adoption of anti-migrant and anti-LGBT+ policies, and laws that hamper the work of opposition groups, journalists, universities and NGOs critical of the government, have resulted in a lack of progress in the country. In addition, independent journalists, lawyers, politicians and businesspeople in Hungary have allegedly been targeted by secret surveillance in recent years using spyware. Corruption in the political system is rampant, with several political leaders being accused of corrupt practices. The recently re-elected Prime Minister and his political party have been considered responsible of putting in place various measures that have decreased transparency and accountability. The public procurement sector is also prone to a high risk of corruption and manipulation, with companies indicating that irregular payments and bribes were commonplace in the awarding of government contracts and licences. In addition, government prosecution services have ignored or refused to investigate cases of state corruption.
Hungary has ratified all relevant international treaties and conventions on organized crime and cooperates in joint investigations with Dutch, Belgian, Swiss and British authorities, and has worked with non-EU countries in training and capacity building. Moreover, Hungary actively cooperates with Europol and other countries’ law enforcement to prevent the smuggling of migrants, arms and drugs. In 2021, Hungary took part in the largest international law enforcement operation to date working to prevent the use of encrypted information in organized crime networks, which resulted in the confiscation of drugs, cash and cryptocurrency in Hungary. The country has various laws and policies in place to address organized crime, including drug trafficking and flora and fauna crimes, among others. Sex and labour trafficking is criminalized under law, but its legal definition is inconsistent with international law. Recent reforms have been made in the criminal code to combat human trafficking and money laundering more effectively. However, the implementation of both national and international legislation on organized crime matters is still lacking.
The Hungarian judicial system is at a moderate risk for corruption, as bribes and irregular payments in return for favourable judgments sometimes occur. The current government has significantly weakened the judiciary and the Constitutional Court, and the politically influenced appointment of new Constitutional Court judges has raised concerns. Trust among the commercial sector in the independence of the judiciary has sharply declined. Furthermore, rulings not in line with party interests are harshly criticized by pro-government media and government officials. As for the penitentiary system, there are no reports suggesting overcrowding, subpar conditions and ill-treatment.
Hungarian law enforcement has a special unit dedicated to combatting organized crime and an asset recovery office that is tasked to detect and freeze assets originating from criminal acts or assets in the possession of organized crime groups, as well as supporting investigations of financial crime-related cases. However, efforts need to be intensified in order for law enforcement officials to more effectively confront with the challenges posed by organized crime. Hungarian territorial integrity also continues to be challenged by criminal activities due to the country’s role as a transit hub. The country’s southern and western borders, including its border with Serbia, remain hotspots for overland migrant smuggling. Hungary is moderately equipped to withstand cyber-attacks. The Special Service for National Security manages cyber-security incidents and is the home of the computer security incident response team. In case of a cyber-security incident, this service has broad controlling rights, while other parties must cooperate with them.
Hungary is a member of the Financial Action Task Force and has implemented various international standards and legislation to keep money-laundering and terrorist financing under control. The assistance provided by the Hungarian Financial Intelligence Unit significantly bolsters efforts to detect and disrupt money laundering threats and deprive criminals of these proceeds. Despite these efforts, Hungary is at medium risk of money laundering and terrorist financing, as law enforcement and other authorities have failed to use financial intelligence appropriately to investigate cases of money laundering.
Hungary has a sizable informal economy and lacks transparency and predictability to encourage financial investments. Multinational corporations have complained of excessive red tape as well as preferential treatment and favouritism for Hungarian and government-linked firms. The government has tried to keep secret the contracts and finances of some state-owned companies, stating that the release of information would constitute a competitive disadvantage in the marketplace. In addition, reports suggest that the government’s strong anti-migrant rhetoric and actions have made it difficult for international companies to obtain approval for new investments. Corruption in Hungary presents a significant risk to businesses, particularly in the tax administration and public procurement sectors. Companies report that unofficial payments are sometimes necessary to resolve certain administrative tasks, and public procurement is vulnerable to irregularities at the local level, because of strong informal relationships between businesses and political actors.
Victim assistance services in Hungary, especially for trafficking victims remain scarce, uncoordinated and inadequate, exposing victims to the risk of re-victimization. A national crisis telephone service (OKIT) – a 24-hour hotline for assisting victims of domestic violence, prostitution, child abuse and human trafficking – is operational, although the telephone line only offers services in Hungarian and English. The government has various acts and regulations in place that provide shelters as a victim support service. The government is committed to open three new shelters each year to build a nationwide network that includes trained staff, victim registration, a victim support hotline, as well as witness counselling, monetary aid and certificates indicating victim status. Furthermore, new provisions on the protection of witnesses and victims were introduced that lay out the criteria for special treatment and the protection of witnesses and victims. However, the lack of a transparent framework and resources devoted to regulating foreign-national labour recruitment have a negative influence on the effectiveness of the assistance provided for male victims of labour trafficking. A recovery-oriented approach is adopted when providing assistance to drug users, with an emphasis on enhancing the availability and quality of treatment services, with a particular focus on young people. Treatment is carried out by the healthcare system and social services with the participation of non-governmental institutions.
Hungary’s measures to prevent organized crime, especially in the protection of human rights, have stagnated in the past few years. However, multiple awareness and preventive measures are in place, along with thorough customs inspections to address organized crime relating to flora and fauna. Although government-sponsored efforts exist, including law enforcement-implemented awareness campaigns geared towards children, funding of the related national action plan has been reduced.
The Hungarian government adopted a series of laws that hamper the operations of opposition groups, journalists, universities and NGOs critical of the government. Nonetheless, NGOs supported by the state assist human trafficking victims, running a 24-hour hotline in English and Hungarian. As for the media landscape in the country, a significant cause for concern is that the media is increasingly concentrated in the hands of oligarchs allied with the government. The ruling party has seized de facto control of 80% of the country’s media through political-economic manoeuvers and the purchase of news organizations by oligarchs close to the government. Recently, a law was introduced that conflates homosexuality and gender-identity expression with paedophilia, while also banning discussion of sexual diversity in schools, the media and elsewhere. This came in the wake of a new anti-LGBT+ law that prevents transgender or intersex people from legally changing their gender – putting them at risk of harassment, discrimination and even violence in daily situations when they need to use identity documents.
For a better experience, please rotate your device.
The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to 10. The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel.
A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.
Read more on globalinitiative.netWe're constantly working to improve the Index. By participating in this survey, you will be providing us with insights and suggestions that will help us make the Index an even better resource.
give us your feedbackThe opinions, findings and conclusions stated herein are those of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State.