Nigeria
x
    Kyrgyzstan

    Profile

    Nigeria

    Capital

    Abuja

    Population

    232,679,478

    Gross domestic product (GDP - CURRENT $US MILLION)

    USD 187,640 million

    Area (KM²)

    923,770 km²

    7.320.04

    Criminality score

    8th of 193 countries 2

    3rd of 54 countries in Africa 1

    1st of 15 countries in West Africa 0

    Criminal markets

    7.33-0.04

    An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.

    Human trafficking

    8.000.50

    Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.

    Human smuggling

    6.500.50

    Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.

    Extortion and protection racketeering

    8.000.00

    Crimes linked to exerting control over a territory/market including as a mediator and/or requesting a benefit in exchange for protection.

    Arms trafficking

    8.00-0.50

    The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.

    Trade in counterfeit goods

    8.000.00

    The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands.

    Illicit trade in excisable goods

    6.50-0.50

    The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits.

    Flora crimes

    6.000.00

    The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.

    Fauna crimes

    7.500.50

    The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.

    Non-renewable resource crimes

    8.000.00

    The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.

    Heroin trade

    6.000.00

    The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.

    Cocaine trade

    7.500.50

    The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.

    Cannabis trade

    7.00-1.00

    The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.

    Synthetic drug trade

    8.500.00

    The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.

    Cyber-dependent crimes

    6.50-1.50

    Organized crimes that rely solely on using information communications technology with the aim of obtaining a monetary/material benefit.

    Financial crimes

    8.001.00

    Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance.

    Criminal actors

    7.300.10

    An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.

    Mafia-style groups

    6.501.00

    Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.

    Criminal networks

    8.00-0.50

    Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.

    State-embedded actors

    8.000.50

    Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.

    Foreign actors

    7.00-0.50

    State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.

    Private sector actors

    7.000.00

    Profit-seeking individuals/entities who own/control a part of the legal economy free from the state, that collaborate with criminal actors.

    5.46-0.33

    Resilience score

    56th of 193 countries 11

    5th of 54 countries in Africa 3

    3rd of 15 countries in West Africa 1

    Political leadership and governance

    5.500.00

    The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.

    Government transparency and accountability

    4.50-0.50

    The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.

    International cooperation

    7.500.00

    A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.

    National policies and laws

    7.00-0.50

    A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.

    Judicial system and detention

    4.50-0.50

    Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.

    Law enforcement

    5.500.50

    The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.

    Territorial integrity

    4.00-1.00

    The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.

    Anti-money laundering

    4.50-0.50

    A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.

    Economic regulatory capacity

    6.00-0.50

    The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.

    Victim and witness support

    4.50-0.50

    Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.

    Prevention

    5.500.00

    Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.

    Non-state actors

    6.50-0.50

    The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.

    5.46 7.30 7.33 5.46 7.30 7.33

    Analysis

    01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11

    People

    Nigeria is a major source, transit and destination country for human trafficking, driven by poverty, unemployment and insecurity. Traffickers primarily target women and children for sexual exploitation, forced labour and organ harvesting. Criminal networks operate domestically and transnationally, exploiting porous borders and corruption to facilitate movement. Child labour, including forced mining and domestic work, remains widespread despite legal prohibitions. Criminal groups, insurgents, such as Boko Haram and mafia-like organizations have a long history of trafficking women and children for sexual exploitation, which they use to finance their other activities. So-called ‘baby factories’ that deal in illegal adoptions are also becoming increasingly prevalent. Internal displacement, violence, growing poverty and inflation are all likely to exacerbate the vulnerability of trafficking victims and intensify trafficking activities.

    Nigeria has emerged as a major source of irregular migration from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe, North America and other regions, due to economic challenges and limited legal migration options. Human smuggling has surged since 2023, after the removal of fuel subsidies led to acute hardship. Smugglers in exploit migrants’ desperation, providing them with false documents through clandestine networks. Major routes pass northwards through hubs like Kano, a key transit point on overland routes through the Sahel towards Europe; southwards through Lagos, a key exit point by air and sea; and south-east via Cameroon. Although primarily a source country, Nigeria is also a destination for irregular migrants from within West Africa. These migrants often face exploitation, violence and the risk of being trafficked. Extortion and protection racketeering in Nigeria is pervasive, driven by the government’s inability to secure conflict-affected areas. Bandits in the north-west use extortion to finance their operations and buy weapons. They have taken control of vast swathes of agricultural land, which they farm by exploiting local communities through a mix of forced labour and protection racketeering. A constellation of armed insurgent and violent extremist groups across various regions of Nigeria also extort and exploit the communities under their influence. Kidnapping, including mass abductions, remains a major revenue source for extremist and bandit groups alike. Profits from extortion fund the acquisition of arms from the Sahel. Bandits also invest in local transport to consolidate their control. Although primarily concentrated in the north-west and north-east, the banditry phenomenon is spreading to north-central regions, reflecting the evolution of criminal tactics and the persistent challenge of maintaining government control.

    Trade

    Nigeria serves as a core destination and transit hub for illicit arms within West Africa and beyond the region. The trade is driven by a combination of political instability, conflict and organized crime. Corruption and porous borders are key enablers of the arms trade, while artisanal weapons manufactured in country further expand the market. Armed groups, including Boko Haram, Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and armed bandits, play a number of key roles in the arms trade – as traffickers, transporters and users of weapons. Law enforcement operations have made sporadic seizures and uncovered illegal arms factories, but their overall impact remains unclear. Arms trafficking fuels a range of issues like violent crime, human trafficking, illegal mining and civil unrest. Major smuggling routes through Nigeria include corridors from Libya, Mali, Niger and Cameroon, as well as maritime routes through the ports at Lagos and Onne. The trade in counterfeit goods is significant, driven by weak regulation, corruption, economic hardship and the declining value of the Naira. Nigeria functions as both a transit and production hub, with counterfeit items primarily imported from Asia, particularly China and India. Key products include pharmaceuticals, with substandard antibiotics and antimalarials posing significant health risks. Counterfeit electronics are also widespread. Local production, including of fake cosmetics products, is expanding due to demand for cheaper goods and often involves experienced manufacturers who leverage online platforms for distribution. Despite occasional large-scale seizures and factory closures, counterfeit goods continue to proliferate, facilitated by criminal networks and limited law enforcement capacity. Nigeria struggles with the illicit cigarette and alcohol trade, exacerbated by weak border controls and high taxation which is aimed at reducing consumption. Smuggling networks involve foreign importers and domestic distributors, with border crossings facilitated through bribing officials. Sporadic seizures of cigarettes – originating from China end entering via Benin – and alcoholic beverages have highlighted the popularity of smuggled excisable goods, particularly in border states. Although Nigeria primarily acts as a destination for illicit goods, there is a limited export of locally produced cigarettes. Social acceptance and minimal enforcement foster an open retail market, where single-stick sales are more profitable than pack sales.

    Environment

    Nigeria's illegal logging industry, driven by domestic and overseas demand for timber, is facilitated by corruption and weak forest governance, the prevalence of armed groups, including bandits, and economic challenges. Criminal networks, private sector actors and foreign players, particularly from Asia, make significant profits from illegal logging and charcoal production. Bandit groups also profit indirectly, by taxing the networks and local workers involved in logging for access to protected forested areas. The industry serves as a vital financial resource for low-income communities despite the risks. Violent confrontations, including armed clashes and targeted attacks by militants, highlight the industry's volatile nature. Despite government efforts, illicit logging persists. The loss of primary forests, as a key national resource, and substantial carbon emissions through deforestation has both an environmental and socio-economic impact.

    The country is also a major source and transit hub for illegal wildlife trafficking, particularly pangolin scales and ivory tusks destined for Asian medical markets. Weak enforcement, corruption and lack of public awareness facilitate trafficking, while illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing by foreign nationals threatens maritime resources. The growing demand for bushmeat endangers wildlife, with both physical and online markets evading detection. Recent investigations revealed the use of cryptocurrency in illicit transactions. Law enforcement operations since 2021 have led to significant seizures, including 11 tonnes of pangolin scales and ivory, and numerous arrests. Nigeria’s role as a source and transit point for West, Central and Southern African wildlife to Asia is contributing to the loss of biodiversity and destruction of ecosystems across the continent, including the extinction of giraffes, rhinoceros and cheetahs. Nigeria is also a source and transit point for non-renewable resources. Illegal mining and petroleum smuggling are widespread, and involve criminal networks and armed groups like Boko Haram. These activities finance armed conflicts and fuel violent rivalries between groups for control. Authorities have seized minerals and crude oil, and dismantled illegal refineries but enforcement is undermined by corruption and the significant involvement of foreign nationals. Oil bunkering (supplying fuel to ships) sustains low-income populations but leads to environmental damage, including oil spills and land degradation. Efforts to curb illegal activities are counteracted by socio-economic pressures.

    Drugs

    Illicit shipments of heroin arrive in Nigeria via East and Southern Africa from Asia. Although there is some, albeit limited, domestic consumption, shipments are largely for onward distribution to neighbouring states, Europe, Western Asia and North America. In late 2023, police operations dismantled a heroin trafficking network reaching across Africa, Europe and America, with record seizures at Lagos and Abuja airports. The heroin trade intersects with other illicit activities, including cocaine and cannabis trafficking, with proceeds being laundered through stock investments and real estate. This has led to asset seizures linked to the drugs trade. Nigeria is a major transit and emerging consumer hub for cocaine – strategically positioned between South America and the large consumer markets of Europe and, to a lesser extent, Western Asia. Nigerian traffickers collaborate with Latin American and European groups, utilizing airports, seaports and land borders to move cocaine through West Africa. Cocaine consumption (including in the form of crack) has risen significantly in major cities, and traffickers employ diverse money-laundering methods involving foreign companies, money couriers and financial institutions to hide the profits.

    Nigeria is a large source, transit and destination country for cannabis, locally known as ‘Indian hemp’ or ‘skunk’. Cultivation is concentrated in south-western states due to favourable growing conditions, and distributed throughout the country. Despite strict criminalization, domestic consumption remains high. Trafficking of cannabis from Ghana to Nigeria, usually via Benin, continues to be reported. Although authorities have reportedly destroyed hundreds of hectares of cannabis plantations in recent years, traffickers continue to smuggle the drug into and out of the country, often employing sophisticated concealment methods. Nigeria is also a manufacturing, transit and destination hub for an increasing variety of synthetic drugs. Tramadol and tapentadol are largely imported from overseas, particularly from India and Pakistan, by air and maritime routes. A proportion is trafficked north overland into neighbouring states. Domestic consumption is also significant. Methamphetamine production has traditionally been concentrated in the south, but may have spread to other areas as domestic consumption has increased, and is exported to international consumer markets. Ecstasy use is also reportedly on the rise, with imports from overseas. The range of synthetic drugs available on Nigerian retail markets is expanding, in line with regional trends.

    Cyber-dependent crimes

    Local organized crime groups, sometimes with the help of state and private sector actors, are engaged in cyber-dependent crimes. Recent reports have shown that malware aimed at stealing banking credentials online has been used by local cybercriminals. Most criminal groups have demonstrated sophisticated new tactics to breach security measures. Importantly, there is evidence of a growing convergence between cyber-dependent and cyber-enabled crimes, since most of the criminal actors involved in cyber-dependent crimes, such as cryptocurrency fraud and hacking, are also perpetrators of identity fraud and mass marketing scams. The core driver appears to be economic hardship, as the removal of fuel subsidies and devaluation of the Nigerian currency have pushed many young people towards cybercrime as a source of income. Cyber-dependent attacks tend to intensify during electoral cycles, with both domestic and international actors using distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks and other sophisticated methods to target government systems throughout the election period.

    Financial Crimes

    Financial fraud and corruption among public officials in Nigeria thrive due to weak accountability and monitoring systems, which enables embezzlement and illicit collaboration with private sector companies, including financial institutions and construction firms. Embezzled funds are often transferred abroad, facilitated by a culture of impunity and weak judicial oversight. Internet fraud, known locally as ‘Yahoo Yahoo’, is prevalent, targeting victims abroad, and to a lesser extent domestically, through scams, often involving false identities on social media. Some fraud schemes are linked to cult and gang activity, as fraudsters use so-called ‘selectors’ to handle stolen funds in their bank accounts and hire local gangs to intimidate third-party collectors who fail to hand over funds. Real estate and bogus consultancy firms are utilized for money laundering, with public officials exploiting these channels to conceal illicit wealth.

    Criminal Actors

    Boko Haram and ISWAP operate primarily in north-eastern Nigeria, controlling areas on the shores of Lake Chad and Sambisa Forest. They impose taxes on residents, extort fishermen and farmers, and exploit non-renewable resources. Both groups engage in arms trafficking, human trafficking, child soldier recruitment, and orchestrate deadly attacks. Clashes between the two escalated in 2024, while their expansion into north-western regions has heightened the potential for alliances with local bandit groups, creating complex security challenges. These groups operate across northern Nigeria amid a growing constellation of ideologically driven groups that also partake in criminal activity. Armed bandit groups engage in various illicit markets, with kidnapping for ransom – now increasingly shifting from rural to urban areas – serving as a key source of revenue for diverse criminal networks. Bandit groups are also increasingly involved in artisanal gold mining, both directly, and more commonly by taxing mining communities. In the south-east, Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) militants mount attacks on both security forces and civilians. Some cultist groups also display mafia-style characteristics. Most operate in southern Nigeria and are involved in online fraud, human trafficking and drugs markets. For example, the Black Axe group, with its stronghold in Benin city, is deeply embedded in Nigerian politics and operates domestically and globally in trafficking, romance scams and other largely online fraudulent activities. Loosely structured criminal networks are also involved in various illicit markets such as drugs trafficking, arms trafficking, counterfeiting, extortion and exploitation of non-renewable resources. Corruption remains pervasive among political and corporate actors, particularly in public procurement. Financial misconduct is widespread in the public sector, involving senior civil servants, ministers and executives of state-owned companies. Common offences include embezzlement and procurement fraud, with stolen funds often transferred to foreign accounts to circumvent regulatory oversight. High-profile cases have revealed the complicity of public officials in laundering funds abroad, with repatriation efforts occasionally recovering substantial amounts. Corruption within law enforcement is a big factor in enabling organized crime, with some officials ignoring criminal activities or even directly participating in them. Media reports have highlighted the involvement of law enforcement and prison officials in drug trafficking. The role of state actors in organized crime thus continues to undermine governance and facilitate the entrenchment of organized crime in Nigeria. Foreign actors are also an important component of the criminal landscape, particularly as far as the non-renewable resources sector is concerned. Chinese nationals are heavily involved in illegal mining operations, leading to environmental degradation and community disruption. Their operations have been linked to mercury pollution and the destruction of farmland. Nigerien and Chadian actors also participate in illegal mining in the north-west. Foreign influence also extends to financial crimes, including grand corruption and fraudulent activities. The private sector, including real estate, financial institutions, transport and the stock exchange, is used by drug traffickers to launder illicit income. Meanwhile, terrorist financing is facilitated through Nigerian commercial banks, crowdfunding, betting platforms and faith-based charities, with funds channelled via online banking for ticket purchases, ransom payments and international crowdfunding.

    Leadership and governance

    The government has undertaken efforts to combat organized crime through law enforcement and policy development, but faces significant challenges from ethnic and religious tensions, political divisions, armed conflict and corruption. Security threats are exacerbated by transnational crime, particularly in areas significantly affected by conflict – such as the North West, North East and Niger Delta regions – where arms smuggling, drug trafficking and illegal mining are prevalent. Government officials have been linked to organized crime, and recent elections were marked by irregularities, widespread intimidation and political violence. Armed groups maintain control over large areas of territory, imposing informal governance, while citizens have little trust in government institutions. Despite government commitments, corruption is pervasive, especially in the petroleum sector, undermining public sector integrity. Nigeria’s legal framework contains penalties and other anti-corruption measures, but is undermined by a cultural acceptance of bribery and facilitation payments. Public procurement remains particularly vulnerable. The oversight of the auditor-general is limited, and state legislatures face undue executive influence. Wealthy political patrons manipulate decision-making through their support networks and patronage systems. The Freedom of Information Act has empowered civil society to expose misconduct, but corruption remains entrenched. Smuggling and bribery are widespread at border crossings, fuelled by collusion from public officials.

    Nigeria has demonstrated a strong commitment to international cooperation in combating organized crime. It has ratified numerous international conventions related to corruption, drug trafficking, arms trading and wildlife crimes, and maintains bilateral agreements with multiple countries on human trafficking and extradition. Nigeria works actively with international partners, such as INTERPOL and several national governments, leading to major joint operations like Operation Jackal III in 2024, which targeted the Black Axe network. The country also contributes significantly to UN peacekeeping missions. There is a comprehensive legal framework to combat organized crime in place, which aligns closely with the relevant UN conventions. Despite capacity challenges in gathering financial intelligence, investigations and prosecutions, the government continues to introduce new policies and revise existing its frameworks. Recent developments include new legislation on data protection and ongoing revisions to cybercrime laws to incorporate emerging technologies like artificial intelligence and virtual assets. Efforts to address environmental crimes include the 2022–2026 national strategy on wildlife and forest crime, emphasizing multi-stakeholder collaboration. However, the effectiveness of these measures has been limited by capacity constraints and inconsistent implementation.

    Criminal justice and security

    The judicial system suffers with a complex court hierarchy, outdated legal doctrines, inadequate technology, limited resources and poor working conditions, leading to trial delays and prolonged pretrial detentions. Judges often lack standardized training, particularly regarding anti-trafficking laws, contributing to inconsistent legal outcomes and corruption. Political interference has eroded public trust, especially in electoral cases. Prisons suffer from overcrowding, corruption and poor conditions, leading to protests and violent incidents among inmates. Nigeria’s law enforcement system comprises federal and state agencies tasked with general and specialized policing. The Nigerian Police Force is the primary federal force, while various dedicated agencies address specific issues, including anti-corruption, trafficking and public safety. State governments have frequently established quasi-independent security forces that operate with minimal accountability, creating conflicts with federal jurisdictions and hindering unified security efforts. Challenges include inadequate remuneration, poor housing, corruption and human rights abuses. Despite these issues, collaborations between local and foreign enforcement agencies have led to successful operations against organized crime, including human trafficking rings and internet fraudsters. Nigeria’s porous and under-patrolled northern borders, particularly with Niger and Chad, have become hubs for organized crime and arms smuggling. The vast, forested and riverine terrain in these areas hampers enforcement, while only about half of approved international border points in the North East and North West regions are patrolled. Local authorities also cite border insecurity as enabling terrorism, kidnappings and communal violence.

    Economic and financial environment

    Nigeria remains on the Financial Action Task Force's (FATF) ‘grey list’ for increased monitoring, though progress has been noted in certain areas. The country has made strides in implementing some recommendations, including legislative improvements, enhanced risk assessments and the enforcement of targeted financial sanctions. Collaborative efforts, such as partnerships between the Central Bank and mobile money agents, aim to curb fraudulent transactions by integrating ‘know your customer’ measures into payment terminals. Authorities also examined illicit financial flows linked to drug trafficking. Discussions between key financial crime agencies have taken place to strategize an exit from FATF monitoring. Nevertheless, the widespread use of cryptocurrency in Nigeria, fuelled by the declining value of the Naira, has heightened the country’s vulnerability to money laundering.

    The business environment faces challenges from a lack of transparency and favouritism in licensing and public procurement processes. While recent reforms have improved credit access, registration processes and tax filing, bribery remains prevalent, which discourages business investment. High levels of inflation and currency depreciation continue to hold back the expansion of legitimate businesses, despite the Central Bank’s efforts to maintain exchange rates. Land ownership is undermined by constitutional ambiguities, customary laws disadvantaging women and pervasive corruption, which has facilitated land grabs and complicated compensation claims. Despite efforts to diversify the economy, oil remains the dominant industry, while regulatory burdens limit private sector growth. Labour is concentrated in the public and energy sectors, reflecting structural stagnation and constrained economic freedom.

    Civil society and social protection

    Nigeria has adopted protocols and minimum standards to improve the quality of care services for trafficked persons abroad and works with civil society to train authorities in victim support. Shelters, despite providing comprehensive care, face criticism for restricting residents’ freedom of movement and housing suspects in proximity to victims. Anti-trafficking laws exempt victims from punishment for forced crimes, but inadequate identification of trafficking victims has led to some arrests and deportations. Legal aid hubs have been established in key states, and repatriation support provided. Drug abuse victims receive care from hospitals and clinics. The National Drug Law Enforcement Agency operates a 24/7 addiction helpline and rehabilitation programmes for people with drug dependencies, including both facility-based treatment and community recovery initiatives. The agency continues to work with the government, private sector and NGOs to broaden access to rehabilitation services nationwide. There is no standalone law covering witness protection but it is incorporated in some legal provisions and procedural guidelines. Despite this, independent assessments note that practical implementation remains uneven. Trials are still undermined by witness intimidation, and many cases involving organized crime do not produce clear outcomes.

    The government cooperates with foreign counterparts and conducts awareness campaigns on trafficking in major languages through various media. Nevertheless, significant issues persist. Corruption is prevalent within anti-trafficking institutions, and regulatory measures for private employment agencies are inadequate and fail to curb exploitation. The authorities have introduced dedicated databases and training programmes to strengthen counterfeiting and cybercrime prevention. Drug prevention efforts were intensified during the reporting period, emphasizing sensitization campaigns in schools, religious centres and workplaces. Civil society in Nigeria remains active despite funding challenges and political obstacles. However, many initiatives lack sustainable local support. The government encourages partnerships with civil society organizations in combating organized crime, but political affiliations sometimes undermine the credibility of these efforts. Moreover, civil society groups, often supported by foreign donors often advocate for reforms but lack contextual understanding, limiting their effectiveness. Media freedom, although constitutionally protected, is often threatened by government interference, censorship and violence against journalists, particularly during elections and periods of economic hardship. Human rights violations persist, including unlawful killings, torture, arbitrary arrests and gender-based violence.

    Profile

    Kyrgyzstan

    Capital

    Bishkek

    Population

    7,224,614

    Gross domestic product (GDP - CURRENT $US MILLION)

    USD 17,491 million

    Area (KM²)

    199,950 km²

    5.25-0.07

    Criminality score

    85th of 193 countries 4

    25th of 46 countries in Asia 1

    2nd of 8 countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus 0

    Criminal markets

    4.900.27

    An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.

    Human trafficking

    7.000.00

    Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.

    Human smuggling

    5.500.00

    Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.

    Extortion and protection racketeering

    4.501.00

    Crimes linked to exerting control over a territory/market including as a mediator and/or requesting a benefit in exchange for protection.

    Arms trafficking

    3.500.00

    The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.

    Trade in counterfeit goods

    5.500.50

    The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands.

    Illicit trade in excisable goods

    4.500.50

    The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits.

    Flora crimes

    2.500.00

    The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.

    Fauna crimes

    4.000.50

    The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.

    Non-renewable resource crimes

    6.500.00

    The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.

    Heroin trade

    7.00-0.50

    The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.

    Cocaine trade

    2.000.00

    The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.

    Cannabis trade

    6.000.00

    The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.

    Synthetic drug trade

    5.500.50

    The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.

    Cyber-dependent crimes

    3.001.00

    Organized crimes that rely solely on using information communications technology with the aim of obtaining a monetary/material benefit.

    Financial crimes

    6.500.50

    Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance.

    Criminal actors

    5.60-0.40

    An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.

    Mafia-style groups

    5.50-1.00

    Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.

    Criminal networks

    5.50-0.50

    Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.

    State-embedded actors

    8.500.00

    Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.

    Foreign actors

    4.500.00

    State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.

    Private sector actors

    4.00-0.50

    Profit-seeking individuals/entities who own/control a part of the legal economy free from the state, that collaborate with criminal actors.

    3.79-0.04

    Resilience score

    141st of 193 countries 0

    32nd of 46 countries in Asia 1

    6th of 8 countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus 0

    Political leadership and governance

    3.000.00

    The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.

    Government transparency and accountability

    2.00-0.50

    The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.

    International cooperation

    4.500.00

    A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.

    National policies and laws

    4.000.00

    A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.

    Judicial system and detention

    3.000.00

    Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.

    Law enforcement

    3.500.50

    The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.

    Territorial integrity

    4.500.50

    The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.

    Anti-money laundering

    3.500.50

    A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.

    Economic regulatory capacity

    4.00-1.00

    The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.

    Victim and witness support

    4.000.00

    Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.

    Prevention

    5.000.00

    Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.

    Non-state actors

    4.50-0.50

    The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.

    3.79 5.60 4.90 3.79 5.60 4.90

    Analysis

    01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11

    People

    Kyrgyzstan is a source, transit and destination country for human trafficking, with forced labour and sexual exploitation being the most prevalent forms. Socio-economic conditions, including poverty and entrenched gender practices, exacerbate vulnerabilities. The criminal market is facilitated by organized crime groups, foreign actors, corrupt officials and private-sector enablers. Victims, including Kyrgyz nationals and foreign individuals from Uzbekistan, Bangladesh and Russia, are subjected to forced labour in agriculture, construction, the textile industry and domestic work. Human trafficking is closely linked with other criminal markets, particularly arms and drug trafficking. Child labour and bride kidnapping (ala kachuu) are concerning practices and contribute to exploitation cycles. Authorities dismantled a child trafficking ring in 2024, but gaps in victim services, coupled with legal enforcement challenges, continue to hinder anti-trafficking efforts.

    Kyrgyzstan’s porous borders, weak migration controls and geographic location contribute to a growing human smuggling market. Criminal networks, private-sector actors and corrupt officials facilitate irregular migration, often leading to exploitation in destination countries. Counterfeit documents and illicit migration channels have increased since Kyrgyzstan’s accession to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Russia is the primary destination for Kyrgyz migrants, with many facing rights violations and discrimination. Recently, an increasing number of Kyrgyz migrants have opted for the US as a destination, relying on organized smuggling routes through Mexico. However, such attempts have become increasingly difficult owing to strengthened US enforcement efforts, resulting in fewer successful crossings. Telegram and other social media platforms are used to advertise illegal migration services.

    Mafia-style groups and criminal networks engage in extortion and protection racketeering, targeting businesses and individuals. High-profile cases illustrate the market’s scale. Entrepreneurs have been coerced into paying significant sums, and law enforcement has arrested members of criminal groups extorting both private businesses and government officials. Protection racketeering extends into public institutions, including schools. Criminal groups have also colluded with law enforcement to cover up extortion schemes. Despite some progress in dismantling these networks, the long-term impact remains uncertain.

    Trade

    The country serves as both a transit and source location for illicit arms, particularly small arms and ammunition. Criminal networks, foreign actors and corrupt officials facilitate the trade, often in connection with drug trafficking and counterfeit goods. Operations such as INTERPOL’s transnational enforcement efforts have resulted in major seizures, but localized trafficking persists. Firearms, including Kalashnikov rifles, are sold in informal markets, with some caches discovered in rural regions. Following the Taliban’s resurgence in Afghanistan, arms trafficking risks in Kyrgyzstan have intensified. Corruption within border enforcement remains a significant challenge in curbing this criminal market.

    Kyrgyzstan has a key role in the trade of counterfeit goods, with criminal networks exploiting its position along Central Asian trade routes. Key sectors affected include electronics, clothing and pharmaceuticals. Markets such as Dordoi Bazaar serve as hubs for counterfeit imports from China, often re-exported under fraudulent documentation. Smuggling channels and corruption within customs authorities facilitate the market. Intellectual property protections exist, but enforcement is weak; no successful prosecutions for violations have been recorded.

    The illicit tobacco and alcohol markets are entrenched within Kyrgyzstan’s underground economy. Smuggling networks are widespread, with clandestine factories operating in multiple regions. The country also serves as a transit hub for illicit alcohol within the EAEU, with shipments regularly seized at borders. Digital tracking measures have been introduced to combat the trade, yet enforcement gaps persist owing to collusion between officials and traffickers. Revenue losses due to the illicit cigarette market are estimated at several million dollars annually.

    Environment

    Illegal logging and deforestation, particularly in walnut-fruit forests, threaten Kyrgyzstan’s biodiversity. The country, mainly a source for flora crimes, has experienced extensive forest degradation from illegal logging, overgrazing and firewood harvesting. Weak enforcement and regulatory loopholes allow private-sector actors and criminal networks to exploit timber resources. Despite protection measures, illegal harvesting continues, in particular in the Dzheti-Oguz and Karakol regions, although at limited scope and scale.

    Kyrgyzstan is both a source and a transit country for wildlife trafficking, but the scale appears limited. Snow leopards, argali, and Siberian ibex are frequently poached for trophy hunting and international trade. Seizure records show ongoing smuggling to countries such as Kazakhstan, Serbia and China, with transnational networks involving both domestic and foreign actors. Kyrgyzstan also re-exports high volumes of wildlife commodities, primarily from China. Law enforcement has made high-profile seizures, but corruption hampers effective control, especially in remote areas.

    Illegal gold and coal mining is highly prevalent in Kyrgyzstan, driven by unemployment and weak regulatory oversight. These activities, concentrated in southern regions, involve diverse actors. The extractives sector remains a focal point of corruption, with government actors as well as private-sector actors implicated in illegal mining and facilitating illicit financial flows. Smuggled oil and illicit mineral exports further entrench criminal networks. Local communities often find themselves embroiled in this illicit economy, participating in illegal mining despite the inherent dangers. Kyrgyzstan’s strategic geographical location not only makes it a hub for internal illegal mining but also creates transit routes for trafficked minerals from neighbouring countries such as Afghanistan and Tajikistan. In addition, oil is smuggled from Kazakhstan to Tajikistan through Kyrgyzstan, which underscores the complexity of the illicit resource trade networks.

    Drugs

    Kyrgyzstan has a critical role in the heroin trade along the northern route between Afghanistan and Russia. State-embedded actors, mafia-style groups and transnational networks dominate the market. Large-scale seizures recorded in recent years highlight the ongoing presence of this trade in the country. Corruption within this market is a challenge, with traffickers exploiting law enforcement and border officials. The cocaine trade in the country is insignificant owing to people struggling economically and the prevalence of cheaper alternative drugs. Nevertheless, migration flows from Russia as an effect of the Russia–Ukraine war may have impacted the local demand for the drug. In contrast, Kyrgyzstan is a producer, transit and consumption country for cannabis, with cultivation widespread in rural areas. Hashish serves as a cash crop, feeding domestic and international markets. Law enforcement has targeted trafficking networks, but the trade remains resilient. Synthetic drug consumption and production have risen sharply. Digital platforms facilitate sales, with law enforcement increasingly dismantling online drug distribution networks. Recent operations have uncovered domestic production laboratories, signalling a shift from reliance on foreign imports.

    Cyber-dependent crimes

    Kyrgyzstan has experienced a rise in cyber-dependent crimes, including ransomware attacks and cryptocurrency fraud. Attacks often target local websites and there is a growing involvement of transnational actors, including criminal networks and foreign private-sector participants, who exploit weak cybersecurity infrastructure. Despite government efforts, including a 2024 cybersecurity strategy that aims to enhance digital security, limited awareness of and poor performance by national cybersecurity exacerbate the risks. Hacktivist groups have also escalated attacks on state and private systems, affecting banks, telecommunications and educational institutions. Bishkek is a focal point, with emerging risks tied to technologies such as illegal cryptocurrency exchanges.

    Financial Crimes

    Financial crimes are widespread in Kyrgyzstan, encompassing diverse illicit activities. These include cyber-enabled offences such as email fraud, digital identity theft and payment and corporate data breaches, all of which result in significant financial losses for citizens. Criminal networks are increasingly relying on cyber-enabled methods, with phishing emerging as the most common tactic. In addition, tax evasion – often facilitated by corrupt state officials – is a pervasive issue in the country.

    Criminal Actors

    Mafia-style groups in Kyrgyzstan are prominently represented by ‘thieves in law’, a hierarchical and deeply entrenched criminal subculture that stems from the Soviet era. The group, led by Kamchy Kolbayev, epitomized this structure, operating across multiple illicit markets, including drug trafficking, smuggling and robbery. His arrest in 2022 and subsequent death during a special operation in 2023 marked a pivotal moment, disrupting the internal cohesion of mafia-style groups. This action prompted coordinated crackdowns in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, highlighting the transnational ties of regional organized crime. Despite such setbacks, mafia-style groups maintain considerable influence in correctional institutions and retain public visibility, as evidenced by prisoners publicly commemorating Kolbayev. However, their traditional dominance has been increasingly challenged by state actors consolidating control over criminal markets. The weakening of mafia-style groups following the fall of figures like Kolbayev and the broader campaign to eliminate rival criminal players suggest a shift in power, although not a comprehensive dismantling of their structure.

    Criminal networks in Kyrgyzstan are decentralized and opportunistic. These loosely affiliated networks specialize in illicit activities such as drug trafficking, racketeering and smuggling of goods, with distinct regional specializations: southern groups focus on narcotics and northern ones, particularly in Bishkek, engage in extortion and control over illicit trade in Chinese products. Their transnational collaboration is evident in ties with criminal counterparts in Russia, China, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. These networks also encroach on civic structures by extracting protection fees from small business owners and positioning themselves as informal mediators in local disputes. Although recent mass arrests have also targeted network leaders following Kolbayev’s death, such enforcement has proven selective, with prominent figures released under lenient conditions. The enduring influence of these networks, coupled with their adaptability and local embeddedness, underscores systemic vulnerabilities in law enforcement efforts.

    State-embedded actors represent a critical component of Kyrgyzstan’s organized crime landscape, often wielding more influence than traditional criminal groups. Organized crime in Kyrgyzstan is deeply entwined with state structures, with hundreds of civil servants dismissed for suspected affiliations with criminal groups. The current leadership’s anti-corruption campaign has led to high-profile arrests, including a political figure’s extradition in 2024. Nonetheless, doubts persist regarding the true intent of these crackdowns, as many detained individuals were subsequently released after paying fines, suggesting a monetized approach to justice.

    Foreign actors contribute to Kyrgyzstan’s organized crime dynamics, particularly with regard to drug trafficking and illicit trade in natural resources. The country’s geographic location makes it a critical node in the regional drug corridor, where local groups collaborate extensively with foreign entities from Afghanistan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and China. Ethnic-based networks – including Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Tajik, Azeri, Chechen and Russian groups – are especially active in drug trafficking, leveraging familial and cultural links across borders. The influence of transnational families further illustrates the convergence of global capital and organized crime. Despite moderate direct operational control by foreign actors, their strategic and financial influence on Kyrgyz criminal markets is significant and persistent.

    Private-sector actors are implicated in the laundering of criminal proceeds, particularly through construction, telecommunications and wholesale trading enterprises. Following the killing of Kolbayev, authorities initiated a broad crackdown on business elites suspected of facilitating organized crime. This included the arrests of high-profile figures and directors from construction companies and telecommunications firms. Investigations uncovered systematic efforts to legalize illicit assets through business ventures, with some suspects compensating the state in exchange for release. These developments underscore the complicity of business leaders in the growth of organized crime and suggest that anti-crime measures, while impactful, may be undermined by selective enforcement and financial settlements. The extensive entwinement of private enterprise with criminal financing reflects broader systemic weaknesses in corporate oversight and regulatory enforcement.

    Leadership and governance

    Kyrgyzstan faces significant political instability, characterized by weak governance and widespread corruption. The state is highly susceptible to the influence of organized crime, facilitated by a small group of elites who dominate the political landscape through competing patronage networks. Efforts to combat corruption and organized crime have been marred by a lack of transparency, political favouritism, and what experts describe as a selective or retaliatory application of justice. Despite official announcements of crackdowns on criminal elements, experts question the legitimacy and motivations behind such operations, citing low public trust in leadership and inconsistent enforcement.

    Corruption is deeply embedded across all levels of society in Kyrgyzstan, often functioning as a means for the ruling elite to retain control. Laws to promote transparency and access to information are poorly enforced. Oversight, especially in areas such as public procurement and asset declarations, is insufficient, allowing corrupt practices to persist; recent legal reforms have sparked concerns that they may facilitate rather than curb corruption. Although there have been high-profile arrests, the lack of consistent judicial outcomes and unclear asset recovery processes have cast doubt on the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures. Overall, the country is experiencing a decline in transparency and accountability, signalling a shift away from democratic governance.

    Kyrgyzstan participates in several international treaties and frameworks targeting transnational organized crime, drug trafficking, human trafficking and environmental protection. The country has ratified several key conventions, including the UN Convention against Corruption and the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. It also engages with organizations such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on regional security and anti-crime cooperation. Bilateral and multilateral extradition agreements have enhanced its ability to cooperate in cross-border investigations, particularly concerning narcotics and human smuggling. However, the implementation of commitments remains inconsistent. Notably, despite proposals to establish a regional organized crime centre in Bishkek, no concrete steps have followed. While Kyrgyz authorities collaborate in anti-trafficking and border management initiatives, their efforts are limited in scope and often rely on international actors. As such they fail to comprehensively address all criminal markets, including extractive sector governance, where transparency standards remain unmet.

    Kyrgyzstan has a comprehensive legal framework addressing organized crime, human trafficking, drug offences and environmental crimes, but enforcement is inconsistent. Laws criminalize the formation of criminal organizations, trafficking, illegal migration and arms offences, often with enhanced penalties when committed by organized groups. Despite ratifying international treaties and updating legislation, gaps persist, particularly in child sex trafficking definitions and implementation of anti-organized crime measures. Other measures, such as economic amnesties and firearms reform, reflect a mixed approach.

    Criminal justice and security

    The judicial system in Kyrgyzstan is widely considered one of the most corrupt institutions in the country. Reports consistently highlight bribery, political interference and the influence of organized crime in judicial appointments and verdicts. The presumption of innocence is regularly disregarded, and courts often operate under a presumption of guilt. Legal procedures are undermined by violations such as coerced confessions, denial of legal counsel and trials proceeding without sufficient or reliable evidence. Prison conditions further reflect systemic issues, with prison gangs exerting significant control over inmate discipline and resource distribution, often with the tacit consent of corrupt officials. Torture and abuse in detention facilities are reported, with several high-profile cases involving political detainees drawing attention to the lack of oversight.

    Kyrgyzstan’s law enforcement agencies are structurally tasked with combating various forms of organized crime, but are hampered by endemic corruption, a lack of resources and deep-rooted political interference. Public trust in the police is low, with arbitrary arrests, bribery and abuse of power, particularly in southern regions, frequently being reported. Effective law enforcement is further diminished by nepotism and informal arrangements with criminal actors, which reportedly include the systematic collection and distribution of bribes. Police also reported weakened crime-fighting capacity due to policies that have prioritized economic recovery. The state’s initiatives to combat narcotics trafficking and other forms of organized crime have had limited success, in part owing to the reluctance of officials to disrupt profitable criminal arrangements. International training programmes continue to fill critical gaps in capacity, especially in emerging areas such as cybercrime. However, reliance on external support highlights the structural weaknesses within domestic institutions. In addition, some law enforcement operations appear politically motivated, targeting businesspeople and opponents under broad corruption or criminal charges.

    Kyrgyzstan’s geography presents significant challenges to effective border control, with porous frontiers in mountainous southern regions providing natural routes for trafficking. The country’s strategic location and proximity to drug-producing and transit regions make it a key node in transnational smuggling networks, with criminal groups operating in known hubs such as Talas, Bishkek and Osh. The government has taken steps to improve border monitoring through policy reforms and partnerships with the International Organization for Migration, but significant gaps remain. Weak infrastructure and smugglers’ reliance on low-technology transport routes, including horses and tunnels, hinder enforcement efforts. Recent seizures of smuggled goods and coordinated actions with neighbouring states indicate attempts to control cross-border flows, yet these remain reactive rather than systemic.

    Economic and financial environment

    Kyrgyzstan has continued to make noteworthy progress in improving its anti-money laundering frameworks in 2024 since its removal from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)’s grey list a decade before. Legal reforms have aligned national standards with FATF recommendations; however, significant deficiencies persist in implementation, particularly in risk understanding, domestic coordination and the confiscation of criminal proceeds. The volume of money laundering investigations and convictions is low, and parallel financial investigations are rarely conducted. Although authorities express readiness to support mutual legal assistance, law enforcement capacity is insufficient to address complex financial crimes. Ongoing concerns include limited oversight of financial intermediaries, weak supervision of cross-border flows and the continued presence of shadow economic actors. These issues highlight a disconnect between legislative strength and institutional capacity to deter financial crime effectively.

    Kyrgyzstan’s economic environment is characterized by corruption, state capture and a substantial shadow economy. Legislative reforms such as a new tax code and digitization efforts aim to formalize business practices and reduce informality, yet implementation is inconsistent. The mining sector is particularly politicized and prone to criminal influence, as evidenced by racketeering and informal governance by criminal groups. The state has taken controversial steps to assert national control, such as nationalizing major mining operations and banning foreign participation in future projects, but these actions have raised concerns about transparency and investor confidence. There are also emerging concerns about Kyrgyzstan’s potential role in facilitating sanctions evasion, particularly in relation to the re-export of dual-use goods. Despite recent efforts to regulate trade more strictly, challenges remain in ensuring full compliance. Government initiatives to combat corruption and promote fair competition are hindered by a lack of enforcement, ongoing political interference, and a judiciary that lacks the independence needed to hold economic actors accountable.

    Civil society and social protection

    Kyrgyzstan has taken steps to improve victim and witness protection through cooperation with international organizations such as the OSCE. An office for witness protection exists within the interior ministry, but operational transparency is limited. NGOs have a critical role in delivering services to victims of trafficking and other organized crime, offering legal, psychological and medical support. However, gaps in victim identification, inconsistent application of protection procedures, and inadequate shelter services – particularly for male and child victims – remain pressing issues. Victims often face pressure to withdraw complaints, and many are penalized for crimes committed under coercion. Recent legislative changes, including laws that restrict foreign funding and increase reporting requirements for NGOs, may undermine the work of victim support organizations, raising further concerns about the erosion of protective infrastructure.

    Although Kyrgyzstan has adopted a national action plan to combat human trafficking and maintains awareness campaigns, prevention efforts are hindered by underfunding and limited institutional capacity. The labour inspectorate faces legal constraints that limit its ability to conduct unannounced inspections, and penalties are inconsistently enforced. The Center for Employment of Citizens Abroad, supported by international partners, provides migrants with information on safe employment and pre-departure training, contributing to trafficking prevention. Nonetheless, the absence of a unified data system and poor coordination across agencies limit the government’s ability to measure and improve the effectiveness of these programmes. The country’s drug policy is also challenged by limited harm reduction services, high drug use rates and human rights concerns in enforcement practices. Laws to protect whistle-blowers exist on paper but are not enforced, and those reporting corruption often face retaliation. Despite the existence of prevention strategies, gaps in implementation and the lack of state-led initiatives hinder systemic progress in addressing root causes of trafficking and drug-related vulnerabilities.

    Civil society activity in Kyrgyzstan is becoming increasingly constrained. Journalists, human rights defenders and minority advocates operate under growing threats, including harassment, detention and legal prosecution. Recent legislation expands government oversight of NGOs and media outlets that receive foreign funding and engage in broadly defined ‘political activities’. Press freedom has declined in recent years, with several journalists arrested or convicted for covering opposition protests or publishing content critical of the government. Convictions based on vague laws concerning the dissemination of false information have been condemned by international human rights organizations. Media diversity is also declining, especially among outlets publishing in Uzbek or Russian. Despite this, NGOs continue to provide vital services, including assisting trafficking victims and human rights advocacy. However, their reliance on international funding and the increasing regulatory burden threaten their sustainability. The space for independent voices is shrinking, as legal and informal pressures converge to limit dissent, raising concerns about the long-term viability of civil society.

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    The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to 10. The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel.

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    This project was funded in part by a grant from the United States Department of State. The opinions, findings and conclusions stated herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State.

    ENACT is funded by the European Union and implemented by the Institute for Security Studies and INTERPOL, in affiliation with the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.