People

The human trafficking market in Ukraine continues to be pervasive, with the country acting as a source, transit, and destination point for this activity. Trafficking victims of Ukrainian origin are exploited for sex trafficking and forced labour in Ukraine, Russia, Poland, and other parts of Europe, as well as the Middle East, and a small number of foreign nationals are exploited for forced labour in Ukraine. Human trafficking, which was already on the increase because of the country’s worsening economic conditions and resultant labour emigration, has been further exacerbated by the war waged by Russia in Ukraine. Although official data concerning human trafficking has become scarce since the Russian invasion, vast numbers of refugees have fled the country, especially women and children, as well as non-Ukrainians and non-EU citizens who were resident in Ukraine, and these people are extremely vulnerable to trafficking. Russian military personnel are reported to be actively involved in human trafficking, and Ukrainian children from occupied territories such as Donetsk and Luhansk have been taken to Russia.

Human smuggling activities have also been exacerbated by the Russian invasion, especially as non-EU citizens who were residing in Ukraine needed to make use of migrant smuggling networks in order to flee the country. This issue was resolved, however, by the introduction of temporary legal admittance into the EU. The legal framework banning Ukrainian men of military conscription age from leaving the country also created opportunities for smugglers. The smuggling of these Ukrainian men has become one of the most prevalent human smuggling activities in the country. The Russian invasion has made it difficult for people being smuggled from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria to enter Ukraine by air. Ukraine is on the migrant route from South East Asia and the Middle East towards Europe, and prior to the war large and well-developed human smuggling groups, made up of opportunistic individuals who were familiar with the paths across the borders and who collaborated with law enforcement officials, were active in the country.

Before the war, organized crime groups in Ukraine were involved in extortion and protection racketeering in various industries, including the mining sector, and these activities became part of a more widespread market after the start of the conflict. Ukrainian police have uncovered several gangs involved in various rackets and extortion.

Trade

With a substantial stockpile of weapons, few barriers to accessing arms, and millions of small arms and light weapons on the legal and black market, Ukraine is believed to have one of the largest arms trafficking markets in Europe. While it has long been a key link in the global arms trade, Ukraine’s role intensified after the 2014 conflict in the eastern part of the country. Seizures carried out in previous years indicated that most of the arms that proliferated throughout the country were Soviet-designed models; only a small percentage comprised recently produced firearms and ammunition. The current war is expected to have an adverse effect on this market, owing to the free circulation of arms among a population who took part in the response against the whole-scale Russian invasion, as well as increased additional supplies provided by European countries and the US. While evidence of the number of arms illegally circulating throughout the country is extremely limited, there are already signs that illegal guns are playing a greater role in crimes carried out both in Ukraine and in nearby regions in Russia.

Trade in counterfeit goods, including clothing, jewellery, luxury goods, and perfume, sourced from China and other Asian countries, is common in Ukraine. Rapid cash flows continue to be generated by this market, and the problem is exacerbated by the ongoing war, the lax enforcement of intellectual property rights, and the normalization of these products within Ukrainian society. However, the largest counterfeit goods markets, such as those in the surroundings of Odesa, where the main production and distribution points were situated, are currently not functioning because of the war. Ukraine has long been a transit country for illicit tobacco products being trafficked into Europe, and it is increasingly becoming a destination point as well, owing to the steady increase in excise taxes, record levels of inflation, and the effects of the ongoing war. A noticeable shift has been observed in this market, with greater volumes now entering through the western borders instead of the eastern ones. Smuggling routes connected to Russia and Belarus have decreased in significance, while those involving Poland, Romania and Moldova have seen an uptick in their involvement in illicit trade within Ukraine. Moreover, the temporary wartime ban imposed on alcohol sales resulted in an increased illicit market for these products, until the lifting of the ban.

Environment

Flora crime, primarily illegal logging, has long been a pervasive problem in Ukraine. In fact, prior to the war, the country was the main exporter of illegally logged trees to the EU. This illegal trade has been exacerbated by high levels of corruption, weak due diligence, and the country’s role as a transit point for illegal timber from Russia. Illegal logging was alleged to be carried out by Russian forces during the invasion of Crimea, and this activity is expected to increase during the ongoing war. Because of the current seaport blockade it has become difficult to transfer Ukrainian wood abroad by means of maritime routes, which has led traffickers to move these shipments by road.

Fauna crimes in general were moderately prevalent in Ukraine before the war. The country was a source and transit point for the illicit wildlife trade, as it was part of the trafficking route into the EU through the borders of Poland and Romania, with the former having been identified as a wildlife trafficking hotspot. Species seized included tigers, tarantulas, snakes, parrots, and corals, as well as elephant ivory. Prior to the war, Russian criminal groups were known to smuggle large quantities of illegal caviar into Europe via Ukraine, reflecting the country’s role as a transit point for illegal fish products. It is estimated that there has been an increase in poaching resulting from current insecurity and poor economic conditions.

Ukraine is a source of non-renewable resources, and a variety of these are illegally extracted, predominantly in the Rivne, Volyn, and Zhytomyr regions. The most pervasive of these markets is the illegal amber trade, with most of the demand coming from China, and a widespread criminal network carries out illegal mining of this resource in the north-west of Ukraine. Despite the ongoing war, these illicit activities continue, with law enforcement units unable to intercept the market. The illicit fuel market has also become more extensive, with the smuggling of large consignments of fuel to Ukraine from Belarus and Russia, as well as the presence of illegal filling stations that have been operating since the start of the war. Coal mining has increased, especially in the Donbas region, and illegal operations have been growing steadily. There are also reports indicating that Russian companies are illegally expropriating Ukraine’s national resources, such as anthracite, in occupied territories.

Drugs

Significant seizures made prior to the war indicate that Ukraine was a relatively important transit country for heroin. The drug entered Ukrainian territory along the Balkan and Northern routes, before being transported to Western and central Europe, mainly via the Black Sea. Because of its geographical position, Ukraine was naturally a transit country for Afghan heroin reaching Europe, but is considered a ‘spin-off’ of the more important Balkan route. Heroin trafficking has decreased during the war, as the high intensity of military hostilities has resulted in a diversion to alternative routes. However, the conflict and growing destabilization in the country may also boost attitudes of impunity in the illicit drug trade, leading to increased trafficking and production. Ukraine’s cocaine trade was limited, with a small consumer market, and has become close to non-existent following the start of the war, as most local consumers are believed to have moved to the EU. Prior to the war cocaine was moved through Ukrainian seaports and airports for both domestic use and transit to EU countries.

Before the Russian invasion, Ukraine’s cannabis market was extensive, with reports indicating the existence of numerous marijuana plantations across the country. Cannabis was produced locally as well as being smuggled in from Russia and Moldova. Ukraine was predominantly a destination country for synthetic drugs and psychotropic substances, particularly amphetamine-type stimulants, which were primarily trafficked from Poland, Lithuania, and the Netherlands, and the use of these substances had been growing consistently over the past decade. There was also evidence of clandestine local production, providing supply to the local market as well as, to some extent, neighbouring countries. Production carried out in clandestine laboratories located in the east of Ukraine was disrupted following the start of the war to a certain degree. This resulted in a subsequent shift in the location of laboratories, with an increased number of production sites in the centre and west of the country. It is important to note that because of a lack of data on the drug market, the effects of the war as well as current trends are difficult to assess. However, it is reported that the supply of both cannabis and synthetic drugs has not been affected by the war. On the contrary, local demand for such substances, especially cannabis and a designer drug called alpha-PVP, has been on the rise, in part because of extensive consumption among military personnel. Since the beginning of the war, Ukrainian authorities also reported notable seizures of mephedrone accross the country. The majority of these substances and their precursors are trafficked into Ukraine from China, the EU and the Middle East.

Cyber Crimes

Cyber-dependent crime is widespread in Ukraine, and the number of attacks has increased in recent years. Prior to the war, Ukraine had been used as a testing target for cyber warfare by countries such as Russia, Iran, North Korea, and China, as it had similar infrastructure to that found in Western Europe and North America, but limited resources to counter such attacks. Following the onset of Russian aggression, cyber-attacks targeting critical infrastructure, such as power grids and internet service providers, evidently aiming to undermine Ukraine’s ability to defend itself, have drastically increased. Russian hacking campaigns have also supported ground campaigns, and malware has been paired with missiles in several attacks, including against television stations and government agencies. The most common cyber-attacks used by hacker groups supporting Russia include data wiper malware, distributed denial-of-service attacks, and ransomware. Ukraine has also been a source for cyber-attacks targeting Russia. In addition to the ongoing cyber warfare, illegal activity around cryptocurrencies is also prevalent in the country, with these avenues mainly being used for money laundering purposes.

Financial Crimes

Financial crime in the form of tax evasion, embezzlement, and corruption has long been pervasive in Ukraine, predominantly because of the existence of the oligarch class. Since the 1990s, oligarchs have seized key industries and sectors, creating monopolies protected by political corruption. They are also known to commit tax evasion, through offshore companies, with impunity. Cyber-enabled financial fraud as well as credit card theft are widespread in Ukraine. For instance, there has been an increase in the creation of malicious websites that trick victims into believing they are applying for EU financial assistance in order to access their banking details and personal information. Perpetrators also use call centres as a common method to defraud their victims.

Criminal Actors

State capture by criminal actors is a pervasive issue in Ukraine, with state-embedded actors either being directly involved in criminal activity or facilitating criminal markets, including drug trafficking, human trafficking, non-renewable resource crime, and goods smuggling. Criminal actors are also embedded in high-level positions in the state apparatus in order to influence the democratic process, by buying votes during elections, supporting and financing certain parties and candidates, and influencing the courts. In addition to state-embedded actors, decentralized and flexible criminal networks are also highly active in Ukraine, mainly in opportunistic crime such as drug trafficking, theft of state property, and robbery. The Russian invasion altered the structure of organized criminal groups, and some began to attempt to obtain higher status in the criminal hierarchy. There have also been reports of local criminal networks cooperating with Russian troops in order to gain more power in occupied territories.

Ukraine is a transit country for various criminal markets, and transnational crime elicits a high level of interaction and cooperation between local and foreign actors. As a result, there are a number of foreign criminal actors, with some of them originating from the Caucasus region, active in Ukraine’s larger cities. Moreover, extortion activities have been carried out by foreign actors in the occupied regions of the country. Ukraine has a strong but declining presence of organized mafia-style groups, headed by approximately 40 criminal bosses, known as vory-v-zakone or ‘thieves in law’, most of whom reside outside the country. These groups are active in multiple markets with a focus on drug trafficking and extortion. There are anecdotal reports of collaboration between small local mafia-style groups and Russian troops to enable the continuance of certain criminal channels in occupied territories. Mafia-style groups continue to wield political influence and have access to all levels of state power in Ukraine, which grants them protection and support in both their illegal and legitimate business. Moreover, some group leaders have become politicians or prominent businesspeople.

As for the involvement of private sector actors in illicit activities, companies owned by oligarchs are known to benefit from corruption, which enables the creation of monopolies in key sectors such as gas, oil, and electricity, among others, and the amassing of fortunes. Ukrainian oligarchs have long been used to strengthen pro-Russian politicians in the country. As the war continues, some oligarchs directly linked to Russian political elite have fled to Russia. Many others have remained in Ukraine to help the war effort, financing military infrastructure and medical aid, among other activities, despite their former stance. Private sector actors are also known to be involved in illicit activities such as tax evasion and money laundering.

Leadership and governance

The war waged by Russia since February 2022 has further undermined Ukraine’s stability, which had already been challenged by regional conflict over the past decade. Although some legislation targeting organized crime was introduced by the leadership, the political and economic establishment in the country has resisted reform. Ukraine has a long history of flourishing organized crime supported by high levels of corruption. However, the current administration has shown a high level of efficiency in organizing the defence and economy of the country during wartime. Despite the ongoing conflict, the government has continued to work at all state levels and to fulfil many international obligations. Moreover, various surveys suggest that trust in government officials has increased. Before the conflict, the government had declared a war on corruption and an objective to reduce the influence of oligarchs through the enactment of legislation. In addition, during the ongoing war, the appointment of independent heads of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office is considered to have been a crucial move in the country’s fight against corruption. Despite these changes, however, Ukraine continues to be considered one of the most corrupt countries in Europe, owing to rampant cases of intervention in justice, as well as bribery and corruption at all levels of the state.

Ukraine has signed most of the relevant international treaties against organized crime and cooperates with several international organizations. Despite the war, Ukraine continues or is sincerely attempting to fulfil its international obligations. Politically, Ukraine has substantially increased its cooperation with the G7 countries, the EU, and NATO. The government has managed to move forward with Ukraine’s application for EU candidacy, and to establish an advanced dialogue with Western leaders and societies on several issues, ranging from the war effort to anti-corruption measures. On a national level, Ukraine has legislation to deal with all relevant criminal markets, criminalizing the acts and providing processes for investigation, prosecution, and penalties. Their implementation and effectiveness, however, have been questioned, a situation adversely affected by widespread corruption in the judicial system.

Criminal justice and security

Corruption in the judicial system continues to be widespread in Ukraine, and recent reform initiatives have stalled or fallen short of expectations. In general, courts have historically failed to establish any meaningful independence, with judges being pressured or influenced for political purposes. Despite an increase in public trust in several governmental bodies and branches, trust in the country’s judicial system continues to be low. Regarding Ukraine’s penitentiary system, human rights violations occur, conditions are poor, and there are high levels of pre-trial detention. There are also allegations of illegal incarceration and torture in some detention centres in occupied territories such as Donetsk, Luhansk and Crimea.

The vast majority of law enforcement officers continue to defend Ukraine from Russian aggression; these agencies are continuing their regular duties as well as performing additional responsibilities such as road checkpoints and pursuing saboteurs, Russian agents and commandos. Since state resources are focused on defence, specialized units against organized crime are currently underfunded. Moreover, there are difficulties in the policing of de-occupied territories because of the presence of explosives and a lack of police training regarding these conditions. Ukraine suffers from low levels of trust in law enforcement, owing to widespread corruption, but police officers in some cities in eastern Ukraine have significantly improved this situation by adopting a more humanitarian approach.

The Russian invasion has undermined Ukraine’s territorial integrity, with certain regions in the east and south, such as Luhansk and Donetsk, being compromised. Although Russian troops were able to reach the outskirts of Kyiv at the start of the war, subsequent improvements in security and defence efforts have led to the retaking of certain areas, and Russian attacks have decelerated recently. Ukraine has proved to be resilient to cyber warfare and increased cyber-attacks targeting its critical infrastructure, and has rapidly built up its cyber defences.

Economic and financial environment

Before the Russian war, Ukraine was considered a high-risk country for money laundering, with widespread corruption and limited progress in modifying legislation and practices to tackle these issues. However, because of the wartime limits on money transfers abroad, there has been no recent evidence of notable money laundering activity.

Ukraine’s economic and business environments have been severely affected by the conflict. In response, immediately after the invasion, the Ukrainian state offered relief to the country’s crippled economy, operating under shelling and martial law; and eased the regulatory regime for job providers. The National Bank of Ukraine froze the exchange rate, restricted cash withdrawals, and limited most cross-border transactions. Despite international aid, Ukraine continues to face serious financial strain, since hostilities are taking place in territories that contribute 60% of the country’s GDP. Moreover, substantial damages to infrastructure such as airports, seaports, and bridges have crippled Ukraine’s ability to trade with other countries. Despite these issues, and the consequent rise in inflation and unemployment rates, the economic regulatory capacity of the Ukrainian administration has managed to prevent the complete collapse of the national economy. In fact, banks, factories, and businesses continue to function outside the occupied territories, and as most businesses, regardless of their specialization, have been supporting the military effort.

Civil society and social protection

Ukraine’s already insufficient system of victim and witness support, including medical, psychological, and legal assistance as well as temporary shelter, has considerably weakened following the start of the war. Victim support services are largely being directed to war victims, rather than victims of organized crime. Prior to the war, the government demonstrated mixed efforts in victim protection and relied on international organizations and NGOs to identify victims and provide protection and assistance. There have been no changes to organized crime prevention strategies in the country. However, Ukraine has been collaborating with international counterparts to prevent the cyber-attacks that form part of the ongoing warfare.

Ukrainian civil society remains vibrant, and since the onset of Russian aggression has been cooperating closely with public authorities and the government. In fact, civil society activities have sharply increased: a great number of NGOs provide support to victims, refugees, and the military, while also publicizing cases of corruption and violations of law. However, civil society representatives are currently at severe risk, as there are reports of the detention and torture of activists by Russian troops in the occupied territories. The Ukrainian media typically showcased a wide range of opinions. Wartime censorship has since been introduced that restricts coverage of the situation at the front, but there are independent media outlets that remain relatively free. Before the war, journalists were occasionally subjected to physical violence, especially during protests. This situation has worsened following the start of the war, as journalists have been purposefully targeted, resulting in an increase in the number of journalists killed or injured.

People

Poland is a source, transit and destination country for human trafficking. Forced labour is the main form of trafficking and male foreigner nationals are usually targeted. Women and children, especially from Eastern and south-eastern Europe as well as South America, are mainly trafficked for sexual exploitation in the country. Criminal groups often recruit Polish, Ukrainian and Russian women through advertisements on the internet and then force them into prostitution. Polish victims are also forced into begging, stealing, or extorting credit and social benefits.

Human smuggling in Poland has become a significant source of income for organized crime groups and funds received from such activities are often used for other criminal practices. Smuggling routes usually cross the Belarussian and Ukrainian borders to Poland, to continue further west. On the Belarusian border, massive pushbacks of migrants coming from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan and lack of cooperation between the two countries, combined with the involvement of state actors in these practices, have increased opportunities for human smugglers. In addition, the war in Ukraine brought millions of Ukrainians to Poland and the sudden influx and chaotic humanitarian operations in the first months of the crisis made the refugees vulnerable to smugglers and traffickers. Extortion and protection racketeering are recorded in the country, although such criminal activities are limited to rare incidents and are carried out in an opportunistic and unorganized manner.

Trade

Although still relatively modest in scale, arms trafficking is increasing in and through Poland, despite the strict regulations and the military’s control of the arms market. The southern border, with its well-established trafficking routes, is a particular source of concern for Poland. There is a small but steadily developing illegal arms market in the country, with guns being trafficked from Slovakia and Czechia. There is also an emerging trend of the illegal transport of firearms out of Poland, mainly to Ukraine and Libya. Furthermore, arms trafficking is linked to other forms of trafficking, mainly drugs and excise goods. Illegal weapons are smuggled from the US to Poland and other European countries though the darknet. There is also an emerging market in 3-D-printed weapons, with illegal workshops set up across the EU.

Counterfeit goods in Poland are a growing challenge and are either produced locally or, more often, imported from China. A good percentage of Polish consumers accept that they buy counterfeit goods, predominantly clothes, leather goods and cosmetics as well as toys, games, sport equipment, food, medicine and electronics. The COVID-19 pandemic increased trade in counterfeit products, as many consumers started to use e-commerce websites, while highly specialized criminal networks adjusted their marketing and production strategies.

Trade in excise goods in Poland is carried out along with trade in counterfeits. However, it is seen as an opportunistic activity in the country, while international trade is more organized. Poland is a popular destination for illegal trade in cigarettes and alcohol without excise. The market for cigarettes is, for the most part, fed by products produced in illegal factories. Nevertheless, occasional attempts to smuggle large quantities of cigarettes occur both by road transport, mainly from Belarus, and by sea. This illicit market is mostly operated by Polish citizens and those from neighbouring countries.

Environment

The market for illicit trade in flora is not well developed in Poland. There is, however, a growing concern about the illegal flora trade on the internet. In the last two years, an increase in illegal logging across the entire country has been noted. There have been cases in which crime groups are reported to supply illegally logged timber to sawmills where timber is converted into planks. Furthermore, since the war in Ukraine, Polish companies are reported to circumvented EU sanctions by paying Belarusian companies to import timber with false documents, which claim that the wood comes from Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan instead of Russia.

Poland is both a destination and transit point for wildlife trafficking, which is increasingly expanding in the country. Live birds, reptiles and caviar are some of the most illegally traded wildlife and wildlife-derived products. Crime groups involved in this market distribute produce though courier networks to Western European countries. This indicates the presence of structured criminal supply chains involved in the illegal wildlife trade in Poland. The country’s border with Ukraine has been identified as a critical wildlife trafficking hotspot. In addition, some organized crime groups are involved in illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing in Poland. This is a lucrative business and the crime groups involved sometimes use violence against law enforcement officials.

Poland has a pervasive market for the illegal extraction and smuggling of natural resources. The country’s key non-renewable resources include coal, silver, natural gas, amber, copper and salt. Organized criminal networks, mafia-style networks and private sector actors participate in illegal trade of non-renewable resources in Poland, predominately fuel. Polish criminal groups are also involved in the illegal trade of coal and amber. Due to the coal crisis and high heating fees in Poland, there is a resurgence in the phenomenon of illegal mining. In addition, diesel, mainly imported from the east, is laundered and sold as a biofuel in Poland. The perpetrators of the crimes take advantage of the differentiation of excise tax rates for diesel and heating oil, as well as the tax exemptions for other fuels. Smugglers use land and maritime routes; source countries are based in Western, southern and Eastern Europe, as well as the Black Sea region.

Drugs

Poland is a source, destination and transit country for heroin. However, while domestic heroin is mostly produced for the Polish market, heroin arriving in the country originates from Afghanistan and is transited through the Balkans to Germany or the United Kingdom. The heroin market is dominated by organized mafia-style groups dispersed across Europe who are often involved in numerous criminal markets. However, there is a decline in heroin consumption in Poland, which may be related to the significant increase in the popularity of drugs derived from cannabis.

Poland is primarily a transit and destination country for smuggling of cocaine from South America to Western European countries. The illicit cocaine trade in Poland is a dynamic and international market, where distribution is flexible in a loose, horizontally structured network, allowing more small distributors who employ a variety of marketing strategies to enter the market. However, cocaine is considered a luxury drug in Poland due to its high price and it is mostly consumed by affluent individuals. Cocaine is commonly smuggled in containers containing legal products, such as food, wood, industrial machinery and citrus fruit, which are received by legally operating Polish or international companies. Polish citizens are also used as couriers for cocaine smuggling using the mail or the ‘ingestion’ method.

Poland is a source and transit country for cannabis products including hashish, resin and dried leaves. Medical use of marijuana is legal in Poland and it can be obtained at pharmacies with a prescription. The illegal cultivation and production of cannabis products is predominantly run by organized criminal groups including groups composed of citizens from various Asian countries. However, members of Polish criminal groups are also organizers of cannabis cultivation outside Poland’s borders, especially in Spain. In recent years, the smuggling of cannabis-related drugs from cannabis from Spain, Belgium and the Netherlands has become a regular part of the earnings of Polish citizens who, when leaving the country, transport precursors for the production of synthetic drugs and when returning to Poland transport marijuana and hashish.

The illicit synthetic drugs market is the largest drug market in Poland. The most common synthetic drugs are amphetamine, methamphetamine, MDMA, Ecstasy, GBL, BMK and other designer drugs. The illegal synthetic drug market (primarily focused on amphetamine, methamphetamine and MDMA) is controlled by organized criminal groups or mafia-style groups with international ties. Additionally, amphetamine is produced in Poland for European markets, while amphetamine in liquid form is smuggled into the country. Polish criminal groups import it because it is easy to process into an inhalable form. Another drug frequently imported into Poland is Ecstasy pills. It comes overland from the Netherlands and Belgium transported by couriers who use their own vehicles.

Cyber Crimes

Cyber-dependent crimes in Poland mostly consist of ransomware. Due to the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine, the number of cyber-attacks has drastically increased. Perpetrators use the cyber vulnerabilities created by the Russia–Ukraine war to commit both financially motivated and politically motivated crimes. Perpetrators target individuals with assets, such as crypto wallets. They also attack government agencies’ websites and online resources, satellite operations and critical infrastructure, such as state institutions and banks.

Financial Crimes

Financial crimes in Poland are on the rise. The country has had numerous cases involving VAT fraud carried out by organized crime groups. Schemes include mis-invoicing, trade in fictitious goods, forging VAT documents and similar activities, which have earned vast amounts of money for the perpetrators. Goods involved in illegal or fictitious trade include the purchase and sale of services, including transport, construction, IT and commercial goods, fuel, food and beverages, event services and the trade in steel products. In terms of property crime, many crimes are committed in cyberspace or using electronic communications. Furthermore, organized criminal groups conduct scams on the internet, such as ‘remote desktop’ scams that are built around investments. The pandemic period also had a tremendous impact on the increase in cybercriminals’ activity, who improved known and implemented new online fraud mechanisms.

Criminal Actors

Organized crime networks are fairly widespread in Poland, but groups in bigger cities dominate the main illicit economies. Criminal networks are most prevalent in drug-related crimes and economic offences. Depending on the illicit market, often in the drug trade, these groups have moved onto the darknet and other forms of social media platforms, to maintain anonymity. Furthermore, football hooligans occupy a stable space in the criminal networks landscape in Poland. Members of a local Silesian football club were charged with participation in organized criminal groups along with other charges including drugs and firearms trafficking, robbery and money laundering.

There is little information in governmental and media sources on the potential involvement of private-sector and state-embedded actors in criminal activities. However, an increasing number of reports on high-level corruption provide a troublesome picture of state actors engaging in, if not criminal, at least questionable ventures. Some state-owned companies in the country, in particular those involved in the oil industry, are suspected of distorting market rules and engaging in corrupt practices to generate more profits. Also criminal activities conducted by private sector actors in Poland include various financial crimes, such as tax evasion.

Many foreign national actors participate in the trade of narcotics and human trafficking using their international links in Poland. Most criminal diasporas in the country run locally organized criminal activities but are equally involved in international criminal activities. Illegal trade in narcotics is still believed to be the focus of foreign national groups, along with high levels of cigarette smuggling. Additionally, Georgian and Ukrainian organized crime groups, participate in the illegal smuggling of migrants across Poland’s eastern border. Furthermore, Poland continues to be free from domestic mafia-style groups, as two of the most famous ones, Pruszkow and Wolomin, were dissolved early in the first decade of the 2000s. However, older members of these groups sometimes attempt to get back into their business after being released from prison. In 2021, the Polish Police Central Bureau of Investigation arrested in Warsaw a man associated with the 'Old Pruszkow' mafia.

Leadership and governance

The Polish government and political parties continue to express the desire to fight organized crime. However, in practice, organized crime is not a priority, nor is it an issue raised in political debates. The impetus to fight organized crime is to halt financial crime and close the VAT tax gap, which the Polish government hopes will make additional funds available for social welfare programmes. However, recent reports suggest that the available VAT tools have not had the desired effect in eliminating organized tax fraud. Furthermore, political parties and the government are the least-trusted institutions in the country. The Central Anti-Corruption Office in Poland has been working to combat public and economic corruption at various levels, though they are perceived as ‘political police’. Other institutions, including the border guard, the military gendarmerie, the military counter-intelligence service and the national revenue administration, are also responsible for combatting corruption in the country. Documentation relating to national budgets, legislative changes, public procurement and legislative processes are publicly available through information bulletins and government websites. However, even though international reports indicate improvement in corruption management in the country, public perception continues to believe in a worsening situation. There are also reports showcasing an increase in the number of corruption scandals linked to the current government and gradually normalized corrupt practices among those in power.

Poland has ratified and adopted various international statutes pertaining to various forms of organized crime. As a member of the EU, Poland participates in the implementation of EU policies relating to counteracting and combating crime, including economic crime. The country’s internal security agency cooperates internationally within the Anti-Terrorist Centre and is also a part of the EU’s counter-terrorism strategy. Furthermore, the Polish police participates in the work of the Task Force for Combating Organized Crime in the Baltic Sea Region, in which Polish Central Police Investigation Bureau officers actively participate. Poland also has extradition agreements with several countries and various bilateral cooperation agreements in the fight against organized crime. Poland’s regulatory framework criminalizes acts of organized crime, including drug offences; obstruction of justice; participation in organized criminal groups; smuggling of migrants; illegal trade in cultural property; and people trafficking. Poland also has an anti-corruption strategy, a programme combating economic crime, an anti-drug strategy, a strategy to develop state security, and a national plan to combat human trafficking.

Criminal justice and security

Poland’s justice system consists of a supreme court, common courts, administrative courts and military courts, all of which are allowed to pass judgment against organized crime. Penalties and prison sentences are imposed effectively. There have been reports of visible levels of destabilization in the judiciary in Poland. Notably, judicial proceedings are typically lengthy, and, as organized crime cases are often more complex, these can take a toll on the judicial system. The judiciary reforms implemented by the current government are not compatible with EU law and planned changes to the legal system may further undermine democracy in Poland. The treatment of prisoners in Poland is not in line with EU standards, nor with international human rights standards.

The police in Poland cooperate with the military police and the military information services in the fight against organized crime, and the national prosecutor’s office has a department for organized crime and corruption. The activities undertaken by the Polish police’s central bureau of investigation are aimed at combating organized crime of a cross-border nature that are related to terrorist acts. The internal security agency was established to protect the internal security of the state and its citizens, and deals with recognizing structures, undertakings and methods of operation of organized crime. Nevertheless, law enforcement is not effective enough in countering organized crime and face challenges with political interference. Furthermore, Poland’s ruling party recently introduced new legislation that effectively allows mass surveillance, which is against EU law. In December 2021, reports emerged about the government’s use of the Israeli spyware Pegasus to keep many Polish opposition figures under surveillance.

Poland’s position on the eastern border of the European Union makes it attractive for the smuggling many products, such as tobacco and cigarettes. Despite this position, Poland is an independent country with no challenges to its territorial integrity. The scale and dynamics of crime on Poland’s eastern border are determined by political decisions on the rules relating to border crossings and are also determined by economic factors, such as differences in the price of excise goods. The Polish border guard is a well-organized and functioning institution that cooperates with many counterparts in neighbouring countries, as well as with Frontex, Europol and Eurojust. However, Poland’s cyberspace is threatened by the increase in cyber-dependent crimes, which was exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia–Ukraine war. To ensure the integrity of its national cyberspace, Poland makes efforts to systematically strengthen and develop its national cyber-security system. These efforts include the establishment of a new cyberspace defence force that is being developed by the National Cyberspace Security Centre, as a specialized component of the Polish armed forces.

Economic and financial environment

The Polish system of counteracting money laundering and the financing of terrorism is shaped by both national and EU regulations. The General Inspector of Financial Information is the mandated authority to verify suspicions of money laundering or terrorist financing contained in reports issued by various local and foreign institutions and finance investigating units. The national tax administration, the internal security agency, the central anti-corruption bureau and the central investigation bureau are also tasked with investigating irregularities and enforcing the relevant regulations. However, the authorities have limited understanding of money laundering and terrorism financing, and this renders the regulatory framework ineffective. Recent changes were introduced in the Law on Counteracting Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism and certain other laws to improve the functioning of the laws on anti-money laundering and anti-financing of terrorism. Nevertheless, the effects of these amendments are yet to be observed. Legitimate businesses are reported to be influenced by criminal groups carrying out activities in Poland. The government fails to protect legitimate businesses due to a lack of effective regulations. Furthermore, the grey economy has continued to grow in recent years, fuelled by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Civil society and social protection

Poland has victim assistance measures in place. The Minister of Justice recently approved a programme to assist victims of crime in response to a diagnosed need to introduce uniform standards of assistance to crime victims and witnesses. Poland has also adopted a national action plan against trafficking in human beings. However, the Fund for Victims’ Aid and Post-Penitentiary Assistance’s financial management was conducted in violation of the principles governing public finance, as some of the funds were spent to achieve other goals rather than to help victims of crime. Currently, there are 16 main assistance centers that provide support in the form of free legal, psychological, social and other services to people who have been victimized by crime. Various NGOs and other organizations provide witness protection and support victims of organized crime.

Poland has several strategies in place that relate to the prevention of drugs crimes, economic crimes, corruption and human trafficking. Many programmes and strategies directly or indirectly aim to fight organized crime. For instance, the Polish police has initiated a training cycle to raise awareness about human trafficking victims among crime prevention services. There are also various local programmes and workshops raising awareness about human trafficking and drug use. However, not enough evaluation of the effectiveness of these efforts has been done.

Civil society organizations are an important component of maintaining the balance of power, exposing irregularities and working to moderate against government actions in political and social life. Researchers and scientists in criminology or law prepare many studies on organized crime. Meanwhile, media independence from the government plays a significant role in the disclosure of organized crime. However, the media have experienced unprecedented harassment and government intimidation in various forms, including requests to remove news articles uncovering corruption, suing newspapers and taking control of national TV, spreading disinformation and promoting the ruling party.