People

Ukraine continues to be both a source and transit country for human trafficking, with the ongoing war exacerbating existing vulnerabilities. Ukrainian victims, particularly women and children, are exploited both domestically and abroad. Citizens are trafficked primarily to Russia, Poland, Germany, China, Kazakhstan and Western Asian countries, with a rising number of cases reported in several EU states. The displacement crisis caused by the war has intensified these risks, as traffickers specifically target refugees at border crossings, offering fraudulent assistance in exchange for forced labour or sexual exploitation. Reports indicate a significant increase in online searches for Ukrainian women involved in sex work, suggesting a surge in demand for trafficked victims. In Russian-occupied territories, women and girls have been abducted and forced into prostitution. Ukrainian children, especially unaccompanied minors and those evacuated from care facilities, are at a heightened risk of trafficking. They have fallen victim to forced labour and sexual exploitation, with authorities identifying multiple cases linked to child pornography. Local criminal networks, along with Russian criminal groups and military personnel, are involved in these trafficking operations. The economic downturn and the ongoing war have further heightened vulnerabilities, pushing more individuals into exploitative labour situations.

Ukraine’s human smuggling market has grown substantially since the onset of the war. While Ukrainian citizens can legally enter the EU under temporary protection measures, men aged 18–60 are prohibited from leaving the country due to martial law. This restriction has given rise to a large-scale smuggling industry that caters to those seeking to evade military service. Smugglers employ falsified medical documents and facilitate illegal border crossings. Many smuggling networks operate through encrypted messaging platforms, boasting thousands of members. Over 21 000 men have been apprehended while attempting to cross borders illegally, and dozens have lost their lives in the process of trying to escape conscription, drowning, for example, in the Tisa River along the Romanian border. The removal of the ‘residence abroad’ exception in June 2024 has further compelled individuals to pursue illegal migration routes.

Extortion is a well-established crime in Ukraine, affecting various sectors, including mining and energy. The ongoing war has worsened the situation, with reports indicating that Russian forces are extorting the families of Ukrainian soldiers through threats, kidnapping and torture. Additionally, criminal organizations have targeted the families of fallen soldiers, demanding money under false pretences. Organized crime groups, such as the Korostyshiv gang, which has been active since 2014, have been implicated in severe forms of extortion, including blackmail and kidnapping. The economic hardship resulting from the war has rendered both individuals and businesses increasingly vulnerable to extortion schemes perpetrated by organized crime groups that exploit financial distress.

Trade

The war has resulted in a surge of illegal weapons, although large-scale smuggling operations out of Ukraine have not been extensively documented. Recently, organized smuggling networks have begun to emerge, raising concerns about military personnel selling high-grade arms, including anti-aircraft weapons. Seizures near EU borders indicate a shift toward more structured trafficking operations. Reports suggest that hundreds of thousands of weapons have been lost or stolen, mostly in the eastern regions. A key concern is the potential for long-term diffusion of weapons into civilian society. Sales conducted through encrypted messaging platforms have increased, and some criminal actors disguise themselves as volunteers in order to acquire weapons. While isolated seizures of high-grade weaponry have occurred, there is currently no systemic trafficking network exporting arms from Ukraine.

Ukraine has a well-established market for counterfeit goods, driven by economic hardship and high consumer demand for cheap alternatives. Counterfeit tobacco, luxury items and pharmaceuticals remain prevalent. Criminal groups operate production hubs within the country, and large-scale raids have revealed significant quantities of counterfeit food, cigarettes and alcohol. These counterfeit products are smuggled into Ukraine through its ports and subsequently redistributed throughout Europe.

Illicit trade in excisable goods, particularly tobacco and alcohol smuggling, remains highly prevalent. The war has disrupted supply chains, leading to an increased demand for illegal excise goods. Smuggled tobacco and alcohol enter Ukraine and are then moved into Romania, Poland and Moldova. The illicit tobacco trade, in particular, has expanded, with Ukraine emerging as one of Europe’s largest sources of contraband cigarettes. Smuggling operations are sometimes concealed within military shipments. Authorities have seized vast quantities of contraband, including tons of alcohol and millions of packs of cigarettes. Additionally, increased taxation has further incentivized contraband markets, establishing Ukraine as a key regional hub for illicit excise goods.

Environment

Flora crimes in Ukraine involve illegal logging, which has surged due to weakened oversight in conflict-affected regions. Russian forces have also engaged in illegal logging and the smuggling of Ukrainian timber. Corruption remains rampant in the forestry sector, with officials facilitating the illicit export of timber. Recent reports have highlighted the involvement of state-owned enterprises in unauthorized deforestation activities. The absence of digital tracking systems allows for document falsification, further exacerbating the problem. The EU is contemplating designating Ukraine as a high-risk jurisdiction for timber trade violations.

Concerning fauna crimes, Ukraine functions as both a transit and source country for wildlife trafficking. Species such as bears, parrots, snakes and cheetahs are smuggled through Ukraine en route to the EU, Asia. Additionally, the country faces challenges with sturgeon poaching along the Danube River, despite ongoing enforcement efforts.

Non-renewable resource crimes in Ukraine encompass illicit amber mining, primarily concentrated in the north-western regions. Smuggled amber is typically laundered through Poland and sold mainly to China. Reports indicate that the war has significantly disrupted the illicit amber market due to stricter border controls and increased military oversight. However, coal and oil smuggling continue to be substantial issues, particularly in Russian-occupied territories where unauthorized extraction is rampant. Oil smuggling, in particular, has intensified, with Ukrainian networks collaborating with Balkan groups to distribute illicit fuel. Although gold smuggling is not as prominent, it persists at lower levels.

Drugs

Heroin trafficking in Ukraine has decreased due to the ongoing war. Supply shortages have driven up prices, prompting many users to turn to methadone and synthetic opioids. Consequently, heroin is now sold in minimal quantities, leading to a significant decline of the domestic criminal market.

Ukraine was a transit hub for cocaine before the war, but disruptions in Black Sea port operations have reduced trafficking and led to a decrease in availability. Initially, cocaine prices surged but later stabilized as new routes emerged. Recent police operations suggest a resurgence in trafficking, with seizures increasing in the western border regions. Prices remain higher than those in Western Europe, reflecting ongoing supply constraints.

Despite disruptions caused by war, cannabis production and consumption have remained stable. Domestic cultivation has encountered challenges, but demand persists. Prices have risen sharply, reflecting a growing social acceptance of cannabis. Recently, parliament approved legislation for medical cannabis, signalling potential regulatory changes. Reports suggest that soldiers on the frontlines are using cannabis, occasionally mixed with stimulants.

The war has intensified the production and consumption of synthetic drugs, as amphetamine-type stimulants and synthetic opioids increasingly replace heroin. The prevalence of synthetic drugs has surged, accompanied by a rise in the seizure of precursor chemicals. Ukraine has emerged as a key regional producer, with clandestine laboratories expanding and online drug sales proliferating through encrypted messaging platforms and the darknet. Authorities have dismantled major synthetic drug networks, highlighting the growing domestic production and distribution of these substances.

Cyber-dependent crimes

Ukraine is a significant global hub for cybercrime, ranking among the top nations in terms of cyber threats. State-sponsored hacking campaigns target government institutions, infrastructure and financial entities. Pro-Russian cyber groups frequently launch attacks that disrupt digital systems. Additionally, Ukraine has seen an increase in ransomware groups targeting foreign victims. Despite ongoing efforts to combat cybercrime, the industry remains highly lucrative.

Financial Crimes

Financial crimes, including corruption, embezzlement, tax evasion and fraud, are systemic in Ukraine. The war has exacerbated these issues, creating an environment where illicit financial activities thrive. Corruption scandals involving high-ranking officials continue to emerge. Fraudulent procurement schemes have exploited military funds, with investigations revealing extensive misuse of defence budgets. Tax evasion costs Ukraine billions annually, with schemes involving VAT fraud and offshore tax havens contributing to systemic financial losses. Additionally, Ukraine is reportedly home to thousands of call centres engaged in fraudulent schemes, each employing between 15 and 200 staff members, with larger operations generating up to one million euros per week. While these scams initially targeted Russian citizens, they have increasingly expanded their focus to include EU and British nationals. As Ukraine navigates the challenges of war and economic recovery, authorities have increased enforcement efforts, but financial crimes continue to pose a pressing challenge.

Criminal Actors

Before the war, Ukraine had a strong but fragmented landscape of mafia-style groups, with varying degrees of influence across different cities. These organizations included traditional criminal hierarchies such as the vory v zakone (thieves-in-law) and avtoritety (criminal authorities who blend business with illicit activities). While some of these groups have suffered disruptions due to the war, such as losing key territories and members, others have adapted by shifting to new illicit activities or relocating their operations to safer regions. The vory maintain a deep connection to the criminal subculture, strictly adhering to a code of conduct, while the avtoritety leverage their influence through economic and political connections. Historically, these groups controlled various sectors of organized crime, including extortion, drug trafficking and illegal resource extraction. However, the war has forced many to restructure, resulting in a reduction of their overall dominance compared to pre-war levels.

Ukraine has long been home to more loosely structured and adaptable criminal networks, many of which lack strict hierarchical leadership. These networks typically operate through personal, familial or opportunistic connections, facilitating a broad range of illicit activities. Unlike traditional mafia-style groups, they are highly flexible, making them resilient to law enforcement pressure and the upheaval caused by war. Rather than halting criminal operations, the war has reshaped them. Some networks have capitalized on war-related opportunities, such as smuggling essential goods and exploiting supply chain disruptions.

State-embedded actors continue to be one of the most significant enablers of organized crime in Ukraine, characterized by a high prevalence of corruption among state officials, law enforcement and political figures. The country's public institutions have long been plagued by bribery, nepotism and financial crimes, which undermine anti-crime initiatives and regulatory oversight. Before the war, law enforcement officials were frequently implicated in drug trafficking, prostitution and resource exploitation, often monopolizing illicit markets instead of dismantling them. More recently, major corruption scandals have continued to surface. Notably, in January 2024, Ukraine’s Security Service uncovered that defence ministry officials and weapons suppliers embezzled millions of US dollars intended for military procurement. Similarly, high-ranking politicians have faced allegations of diverting funds from humanitarian aid and military spending. Despite wartime crackdowns on corruption, Ukraine remains vulnerable to state-embedded actors who manipulate legal and financial systems to facilitate organized crime. The Zelenskyy administration has taken steps to remove key officials linked to corruption. Still, systemic challenges persist, making it difficult to sustain reform efforts in the face of deeply entrenched criminal interests.

Foreign criminal organizations have long been involved in Ukraine’s illicit markets, particularly those from Russia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Türkiye. The war has further expanded opportunities for transnational crime, with foreign actors exploiting Ukraine’s instability to smuggle drugs, weapons and other contraband. One of the most influential transnational groups is Khimprom, a Russian–Ukrainian network specializing in synthetic drugs and chemical precursors. Operating across Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, Khimprom has established itself as a dominant player in Ukraine’s drug trade. The group utilizes online platforms, particularly encrypted messaging platforms and dark web marketplaces, to distribute narcotics. Despite increased scrutiny from law enforcement, Khimprom’s leadership has successfully relocated abroad while maintaining control over its operations. Between January and June 2024, Ukrainian authorities dismantled approximately 10 transnational criminal groups; despite this, foreign actors remain deeply entrenched. Their adaptability and cross-border networks render them formidable players in Ukraine’s criminal ecosystem, often outmanoeuvring local law enforcement efforts.

Ukraine’s private sector actors, particularly oligarchs, have historically played a significant role in organized crime. Before the war, oligarchs maintained near-total control over key industries, including gas, oil and banking, using their wealth to influence the political and judicial systems. The war has altered power dynamics, diminishing the direct political influence of oligarchs. With martial law in place, the government has consolidated power, reducing the ability of business elites to manipulate state institutions. However, this has not completely eradicated oligarchic influence. Many oligarchs have repositioned themselves as war financiers, donating resources to military efforts, whether out of patriotism, strategic reputation management or attempts to maintain influence in the post-war landscape. Since 2014, Ukraine has sought to curtail oligarchic power, and the ongoing conflict has accelerated these efforts. Key figures have faced unprecedented legal actions. Despite these crackdowns, private-sector actors continue to exert influence, particularly in finance, defence procurement and smuggling networks. While some have fled to Russia or been arrested, others remain embedded in Ukraine’s wartime economy, strategically positioning themselves for future political and economic leverage.

Leadership and governance

Ukraine’s political leadership has undergone significant transformations due to the ongoing war, which has impacted its resilience against organized crime. Despite the challenges posed by the conflict, the government has continued to implement measures aimed at countering criminal networks and corruption. However, longstanding issues such as patronage, clientelism and corruption persist, limiting the effectiveness of governance reforms. The country has a history of organized crime infiltrating politics, with some criminal figures gaining political influence over the years. While the war has diminished the hold of some oligarchs on politics, corruption remains deeply embedded in the political system. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s administration has taken steps to address these issues, particularly in the fight against smuggling and economic crimes. Public trust in the government has fluctuated significantly during the war, peaking at 90% in mid-2022 before stabilizing at around 59% in May 2024. While the government maintains democratic structures, concerns persist regarding political transparency and accountability, particularly in the context of wartime governance.

Ukraine has made notable progress in enhancing transparency, particularly through anti-corruption initiatives and the implementation of digital governance tools. The National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine and the National Agency on Corruption Prevention have played crucial roles in pursuing high-profile corruption cases. However, these agencies have encountered internal leaks, political interference and credibility issues, which have undermined their ability to operate independently. Legislative measures have been implemented to strengthen accountability, including laws that expand the powers of anti-corruption agencies and reinstate public asset declarations. Despite these efforts, public officials in both the executive and legislative branches continue to misuse their positions for personal gain, as demonstrated by recent scandals. In August 2024, a Deputy Minister was arrested in connection with a corruption case in the coal industry, highlighting ongoing vulnerabilities. Public perception reflects a mix of progress and scepticism, with many Ukrainians viewing corruption as a significant obstacle to EU integration and post-war recovery.

Ukraine continues to prioritize international cooperation in combating organized crime and enhancing governance. The country is a signatory to major international treaties, including the UN Convention Against Corruption and the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. Since 2022, Ukraine has received extensive financial, military and humanitarian aid from the EU, NATO and allied states to sustain its war effort and governance reforms. In 2024, Ukraine signed bilateral security agreements with multiple nations, including the US, Japan and several European countries. Additionally, international law enforcement cooperation has been strengthened through partnerships with Europol and neighbouring EU states, particularly in efforts to combat arms and human trafficking. However, discussions on NATO membership remain stalled.

Ukraine’s national legal framework criminalizes organized crime, including human trafficking, smuggling, arms and drug trafficking, illegal logging, cybercrime and financial offences. However, enforcement is undermined by corruption, political interference, limited resources and the ongoing conflict. Although recent amendments have strengthened some policies, laws against child exploitation and abuse remain under-enforced due to gaps in detection, support and prevention. Martial law, imposed in 2022, introduced further restrictions on movement, assembly and media, constraining fundamental freedoms.

Criminal justice and security

Ukraine’s judicial system remains weak and vulnerable to corruption, with judges and prosecutors frequently implicated in bribery and political favouritism. Despite constitutional amendments aimed at strengthening judicial independence, political influence over judicial appointments persists in undermining fairness. Public trust in the judiciary remains low, with 73% of Ukrainians expressing distrust in 2024. The country’s penitentiary system faces severe resource shortages, which the ongoing conflict has exacerbated. Several prisons suffer from poor living conditions, inadequate medical care and delays in judicial proceedings, resulting in 36% of detainees being held in pretrial detention. In Russian-occupied areas, reports of torture and inhumane treatment within detention facilities further complicate the situation.

Despite the war, Ukraine’s law enforcement agencies continue to operate, maintaining a high level of public trust in the Armed Forces and National Guard. However, confidence in the National Police remains comparatively low, reflecting widespread concerns about corruption and abuse of power within civilian law enforcement structures. The war has stretched law enforcement resources, shifting focus from organized crime prevention to military defence. Specialised units responsible for tackling financial crimes and human trafficking are underfunded, which negatively impacts their effectiveness. OSCE

Ukraine’s territorial integrity remains significantly compromised due to the Russian occupation and ongoing military battles in several key regions. These areas have become hotspots for transnational organized crime, including money laundering, illegal gambling and arms smuggling. Corruption at border checkpoints further weakens territorial security, facilitating illicit trade. The war has also weakened state capacity, adversely affecting the monitoring of smuggling routes and border security operations.

Economic and financial environment

Ukraine has strengthened its anti-money laundering (AML) framework to align with international standards. The country has implemented customer due diligence measures and transaction monitoring systems. However, corruption within financial institutions and law enforcement agencies continues to pose a challenge. Although the Financial Action Task Force evaluation found Ukraine to be largely compliant with international AML regulations, concerns remain regarding the enforcement of financial crime laws and the effectiveness of asset recovery efforts.

The war has severely undermined Ukraine’s economic stability and regulatory capacity. In response, the government has implemented tax reforms and increased reliance on foreign aid; however, fiscal imbalances continue to pose challenges. Despite these disruptions, Ukraine’s economy demonstrates some degree of resilience. Nevertheless, inflation, infrastructure damage from missile attacks and declining purchasing power remain significant economic risks.

Civil society and social protection

Ukraine has maintained victim protection services despite budgetary constraints. The government has allocated funds for trafficking victims; however, most support is provided by NGOs and international organizations. Efforts to assist victims appear to have improved, but the lack of government-run trafficking shelters remains a challenge. Furthermore, Ukraine has increased anti-trafficking awareness campaigns with assistance from the OSCE and international donors, while also enhancing prosecutions against traffickers. Nevertheless, gaps in law enforcement training and victim identification remain.

Ukraine relies heavily on international organizations and NGOs for crime prevention and awareness campaigns, with these efforts strained by the ongoing war. While Ukraine does not fully meet minimum standards for eliminating trafficking, it continues to make significant efforts, including a new national action plan, resumed labour inspections, strengthened prosecutions and extensive awareness campaigns with international partners like the OSCE. However, challenges remain, such as lenient sentences. Additionally, the large veteran population poses risks of organized crime involvement, including drug use, arms trafficking and joining criminal groups, exacerbated by limited support and unclear policies. A comprehensive veterans’ strategy focusing on demobilization, disarmament and reintegration is needed to reduce these risks and support their return to civilian life.

Civil society plays a crucial role in Ukraine’s resilience, with NGOs supporting defence efforts and providing humanitarian aid. However, government regulations, including AML disclosure requirements for NGOs, have raised concerns about potential interference. Press freedom remains constrained, with journalists facing targeted discrediting campaigns and legal intimidation. Despite some progress, wartime censorship, media monopolization and legal restrictions continue to pose risks to independent reporting.

People

Poland serves as a source, transit and destination country for human trafficking, with forced labour being the most prevalent form of exploitation. Victims primarily include foreign nationals, particularly from Africa, Asia and other Eastern European countries, with notable increases in trafficking involving individuals from Belarus, Ukraine, Vietnam and North Korea. Women and children from Eastern and south-eastern Europe remain especially vulnerable to sexual exploitation and forced prostitution. Domestic victims, often from marginalized communities, are trafficked abroad to Western and Northern Europe for labour exploitation, forced begging and benefit fraud. Criminal groups frequently use online advertisements to recruit individuals, subsequently coercing them into exploitative conditions, such as the confiscation of identity documents, poor living and working environments, unpaid labour and cycles of debt. The influx of Ukrainian refugees has increased vulnerabilities, with millions crossing into Poland and becoming potential targets for traffickers. Reports indicate an increase in exploitation through deceptive employment offers, transportation scams and coerced sex work. Corruption among state officials, including labour inspectors and border guards, has contributed to the persistence of forced labour cases.

Human smuggling networks exploit Poland’s position as a major transit country, particularly along the Belarusian border. Routes originating from the West Asia and Africa and pass through Belarus, Türkiye or Russia before reaching Poland and continuing toward Western Europe. Most irregular crossings involve third-country nationals, primarily entering through land borders, with a growing trend in attempts through air travel. In 2023, the primary nationalities of migrants included Syrians, Ukrainians, Turks, Georgians and Afghans. The involvement of foreign state actors has further exacerbated migration flows, with smugglers utilizing fraudulent documentation, cash-for-visa schemes and covert transport networks. While Poland has intensified border controls in 2024, it remains a key transit hub for organized smuggling operations, although the volume of crossings has slightly declined.

Extortion and protection racketeering continue to exist in Poland, although they are largely opportunistic rather than systematically controlled by criminal organizations. There has been a rise in cyber-related extortion, particularly involving fraudulent loan schemes and digital threats. Organized groups have started to shift their extortion activities to online platforms, leveraging the dark web for illicit financial operations.

Trade

Poland functions as both a transit and, to a lesser extent, a destination country for arms trafficking. Criminal groups exploit Poland’s geographical position and the open borders of the EU to smuggle firearms, ammunition and deactivated weapons. Recent trends indicate an increase in illegal arms exports to Sweden, Ukraine and Libya. While there is some evidence suggesting that the demand for firearms is rising within the country, the local market primarily operates online and on a smaller scale through individually concealed weapons caches located throughout Poland. While law enforcement has dismantled several trafficking networks, the country continues to face emerging risks associated with illicit 3D-printed firearms and increased arms flows due to regional conflicts.

The counterfeit goods market in Poland remains extensive, driven by high public demand and the prevalence of e-commerce platforms. Poland ranks among the top destinations in the EU for counterfeit imports, with significant volumes of counterfeit toys, clothing and cosmetics circulating within the country. Organized networks utilize Poland as both a production and transit hub, employing carousel fraud schemes that connect Polish companies to broader European counterfeit distribution networks. Notably, counterfeit tobacco production is particularly prominent, with Polish factories manufacturing illicit cigarettes for export to Western European markets.

Illicit trade in excise consumer goods, including cigarettes and alcohol, continues to be an issue. Poland functions as a source, transit and destination country for untaxed tobacco and alcohol products, with smuggling routes linking Belarus, Ukraine and Russia. Criminal networks exploit tax discrepancies between Poland and its neighbouring states, and despite government crackdowns, the illicit cigarette trade continues to thrive. While Poland's internal market for illegal goods is relatively small, the country remains a significant hub for transit and sourcing of various illicit products, particularly cigarettes destined for Western and Northern Europe.

Environment

Illegal flora trade in Poland remains relatively limited, but concerns persist regarding timber smuggling. Criminal groups have engaged in fraudulent documentation schemes to bypass EU sanctions, allowing timber of Russian origin to enter Polish markets under false claims of originating from Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan. Reports indicate that organized actors launder illicit timber through legitimate sawmills before exporting it to EU destinations.

Poland is both a transit and, to a lesser extent, a destination country for wildlife trafficking. Smuggling networks import protected species, including live birds, reptiles and caviar, before distributing them to Western Europe. Loopholes in Poland’s permit system have enabled traffickers to exploit legal breeding permits for illicit wildlife shipments. The Polish–Ukrainian border remains a hotspot for illegal wildlife trade, with a growing number of seizures of protected specimens, including corals, snake-derived products and medicinal items containing animal derivatives.

Non-renewable resource crimes in Poland encompass the illegal mining of coal, amber and minerals. While Poland’s coal industry remains heavily regulated, the emergence of unauthorized mining pits has heightened concerns regarding the involvement of organized crime. The illicit amber trade, which involves smuggling raw materials primarily from Ukraine, is then processed in Polish workshops and sold in international markets, yielding significant profits for criminal networks. Additionally, Poland serves as a key transit country for fuel smuggling, with organized groups laundering diesel and gasoline imports to evade excise taxes.

Drugs

Poland primarily functions as a transit country for heroin trafficking, with supply routes originating in Afghanistan and passing through the Balkans and Türkiye before reaching Western Europe. While domestic consumption remains relatively low and further decreasing, organized crime groups continue to facilitate heroin smuggling to Germany and the UK. The decline in local heroin use is largely attributed to reduced availability caused by disruptions in trafficking routes, particularly due to the war in Ukraine, as well as a growing preference for cannabis and synthetic drugs among users.

Cocaine trafficking has surged, with Poland emerging as both a transit and destination country. Latin American suppliers transport cocaine through Polish ports, concealing shipments within legitimate cargo. Nigerian and European criminal networks oversee distribution, and domestic consumption is rising despite the drug's high cost. Major seizures in 2024 indicate Poland’s expanding role in the European cocaine market.

The cannabis market in Poland is notable, encompassing both domestic cultivation and imports from Western Europe. Criminal networks operate sophisticated indoor plantations, often concealing operations within legitimate agricultural enterprises. Polish traffickers also collaborate with Czech and Spanish groups to smuggle cannabis into Poland. Despite the legalization of cannabis for medical use, the illicit market remains robust, with smuggling routes linked to broader drug distribution networks and illegal cultivation.

Poland is a key producer and transit country for synthetic drugs, particularly amphetamines. Polish laboratories manufacture synthetic stimulants for export, primarily to Scandinavian countries, as well as Germany, the UK and Ireland, leveraging Poland’s well-established supply chains. In 2024, law enforcement dismantled a record number of synthetic drug laboratories, revealing the scale of domestic production. While amphetamine use remains relatively low in Poland, the emergence of synthetic opioids and new psychoactive substances presents growing challenges. The discovery of a large-scale methadone production facility highlights Poland’s evolving role in synthetic drug manufacturing.

Cyber-dependent crimes

Cybercrime in Poland has increased, driven by ransomware attacks and malware. Cybercriminals are targeting financial institutions, e-commerce platforms and individuals, employing sophisticated hacking techniques. The landscape of cybercrime in Poland has been shaped by geopolitical factors, with state-sponsored actors and hacktivist groups. The proliferation of underground hacking forums and illicit digital marketplaces continues to pose challenges for law enforcement.

Financial Crimes

Financial crimes in Poland continue to pose a significant challenge, with VAT fraud and tax evasion schemes inflicting considerable economic damage. Organized criminal networks exploit loopholes to engage in invoice fraud, carousel schemes and investment scams, draining state resources. Notably, investment fraud has surged, with criminals impersonating prominent individuals and institutions to lure victims into fraudulent schemes that promise high returns. The growing use of advanced technologies, including deepfake videos and AI-generated content, has enhanced the credibility of these scams, making them more difficult to detect. Additionally, other cyber-enabled financial crimes, such as fictitious online stores and remote desktop scams, have become increasingly sophisticated, further complicating law enforcement efforts. Corruption remains a persistent issue, with investigations uncovering links between high-profile political figures and fraudulent financial activities.

Criminal Actors

Poland remains largely free from traditional mafia-style groups, as the once-prominent Pruszków and Wołomin mafias have lost much of their influence due to effective law enforcement operations. However, remnants of these groups persist, with older members attempting to regain influence after their release from prison. Their reintegration efforts have been met with varying degrees of success, as newer, more decentralized criminal networks have taken control of many illicit markets. These successor groups often consist of smaller gangs linked to sports clubs and football hooligan communities, focusing on drug trafficking and money laundering. While their structure is less hierarchical than that of traditional mafia groups, their adaptability presents new challenges for law enforcement. Despite high levels of police infiltration, public fears of mafia-style groups persist and are sometimes exploited for political narratives. Reports from the Central Investigation Bureau of Police confirm that the terminology in official discourse has shifted toward organized criminal groups rather than mafia-style organizations.

Poland’s criminal networks operate in a highly flexible and opportunistic manner, engaging in a wide range of illicit activities, including human trafficking, drug smuggling and arms trafficking. These groups exploit Poland’s strategic position as a European transit hub, facilitating the movement of illicit goods and people across borders. These networks encompass local, regional and transnational actors and have demonstrated remarkable adaptability to geopolitical and socio-economic changes, such as the war in Ukraine and the Belarusian–EU border crisis. They frequently integrate legitimate business structures into their operations, leveraging legal loopholes and corrupt connections to facilitate illicit trade and financial crimes. Criminal networks are deeply embedded throughout Poland, with major urban centres such as Warsaw, Kraków, Wrocław and Poznań serving as key hubs for organized criminal activities. While some groups employ violent enforcement tactics, the majority prefer to operate discreetly, laundering illicit proceeds through front businesses and legitimate enterprises to evade detection.

Corruption within Poland’s state institutions has enabled various forms of organized crime, including human trafficking, arms smuggling and financial fraud. Some state-embedded actors have contributed to these crimes by issuing fraudulent work permits, assisting in smuggling operations or misusing public funds. A high-profile scandal in 2023 exposed large-scale visa fraud involving Polish consulates in Africa and Asia, with state officials implicated in the improper issuance of over 200 000 work visas. This scheme raised concerns about the extent to which state actors may be complicit in human smuggling and trafficking operations. Additionally, reports indicate that some border enforcement officials have enabled the smuggling of illicit goods, including weapons and drugs. Financial crimes linked to state-embedded actors include VAT fraud and the misallocation of public funds. Investigations have uncovered instances where officials manipulated tax regulations and engaged in fraudulent financial schemes, thereby exacerbating Poland’s challenges in combating organized crime.

Foreign criminal actors play a moderate role in Poland’s organized crime landscape, particularly in human trafficking, drug smuggling, arms trafficking and the distribution of counterfeit goods. Due to Poland’s strategic location within Europe, these groups exploit the open borders of the EU to facilitate illicit trade. Many foreign networks collaborate with domestic criminal organizations to enhance their operations. Vietnamese and Filipino nationals have been involved in forced labour schemes, while individuals from Syria, Iraq and Georgia are linked to human smuggling networks operating through Poland. Russian-speaking organized crime groups, including those from Georgia and Ukraine, have also participated in smuggling migrants across Poland’s eastern border. The influx of refugees from Ukraine has provided new opportunities for criminal networks engaged in human trafficking. Foreign actors are also active in Poland’s narcotics trade, with Dutch criminal organizations exerting significant influence over the country’s drug markets. Additionally, the Italian mafia, particularly the ‘Ndrangheta, has been linked to occasional arrests in Poland, indicating limited but noteworthy connections to Polish criminal networks.

Private-sector actors in Poland play a role in facilitating organized crime, particularly in financial crimes such as VAT fraud, money laundering and counterfeit goods trafficking. Criminal networks frequently use legitimate businesses as fronts for illicit activities, exploiting regulatory gaps to evade law enforcement. One of the most prevalent financial crimes in Poland is VAT fraud, with organized groups engaging in carousel fraud schemes and employing shell companies to circumvent tax regulations. Offshore accounts, intermediary banking services and cryptocurrency exchanges are commonly used to launder illicit proceeds. The production and distribution of counterfeit goods, including clothing, electronics and pharmaceuticals, continue to pose significant challenges. Many counterfeit products are either produced locally or imported before being sold through e-commerce platforms and physical markets.

Additionally, businesses involved in transportation and logistics have been implicated in facilitating the smuggling of excise goods such as alcohol and tobacco. Human trafficking and labour exploitation also intersect with private-sector activities, particularly in industries that rely on undocumented workers. Some businesses have been found to engage in exploitative labour practices, taking advantage of gaps in labour protections for migrant workers. On a broader scale, the infiltration of private-sector entities by criminal networks remains a critical issue, with businesses being used as vehicles for money laundering and fraud.

Leadership and governance

Poland’s political leadership has demonstrated a commitment to combating organized crime, although its prioritization remains inconsistent. While all major political parties recognize the necessity of addressing organized crime, concrete policy actions often focus on economic crime, particularly efforts to close the VAT tax gap. This approach reflects a broader effort to recover lost revenues rather than a strategic crackdown on organized criminal networks. Additionally, public trust in political institutions is low, driven by ongoing corruption scandals, judicial controversies and the ruling party’s influence over state institutions. The October 2023 parliamentary elections, which resulted in a victory for a centrist coalition, marked a shift in governance. However, the new administration’s primary focus remains on economic and political restructuring rather than directly addressing organized crime.

Transparency and accountability in governance have raised concerns, particularly regarding judicial reforms initiated by the former ruling party. While the new government has dissolved the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (CBA), citing its politicization, broader systemic challenges persist. The state’s anti-corruption efforts have faced criticism for their perceived lack of impartiality, with ongoing investigations primarily targeting former officials. Although Poland has introduced technical measures to improve transparency, such as the national e-invoicing system and public access to parliamentary proceedings, systemic issues regarding accountability remain unaddressed.

Poland actively participates in international efforts to combat organized crime by collaborating with organizations such as Europol, INTERPOL and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office. The country has ratified key international treaties, including the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Arms Trade Treaty. Poland’s recent decision to strengthen cooperation with NATO in response to regional security threats highlights its evolving approach to international security cooperation.

The country’s legislative framework criminalizes various forms of organized crime, including human trafficking, drug trafficking and cybercrime. However, enforcement gaps remain, particularly in areas such as wildlife trafficking, where poaching and illegal trade are not formally recognized as criminal offenses. Recent amendments to the Penal Code have increased penalties for corruption and financial crimes; however, stakeholders have raised concerns about the proportionality of these measures. Additionally, Poland has introduced new cybersecurity regulations to address the growing threat of cyber-enabled crimes.

Criminal justice and security

Poland’s judicial system plays a crucial role in combating organized crime, but it faces significant structural challenges. Judicial independence has long been a concern, as previous government reforms have undermined the separation of powers. Recent efforts to restructure the judiciary aim to restore independence and transparency, although their effectiveness remains uncertain. The backlog of organized crime cases and protracted judicial proceedings continue to strain the system, raising questions about efficiency and the guarantees of a fair trial.

Law enforcement agencies, including the Central Bureau of Investigation and the Internal Security Agency, are actively involved in combating organized crime. However, inter-agency coordination remains weak, with fragmented data-sharing mechanisms impeding efficiency. The planned redistribution of the CBA’s responsibilities to other agencies aims to depoliticize anti-corruption efforts but presents challenges in maintaining operational continuity, especially in complex, cross-border investigations. Poland participates in international law enforcement cooperation, leveraging resources from Europol and INTERPOL to target transnational criminal networks.

Poland’s location along the eastern border of the EU makes it a key entry point for the smuggling of various goods, particularly tobacco and cigarettes. Its border security has come under further strain due to regional crises, including the Belarus-EU border tensions and the Russian invasion of Ukraine – both of which have been exploited by criminal groups to facilitate human smuggling and trafficking. Despite these pressures, the Polish Border Guard remains a well-organized and operationally capable institution, having increased patrols and enhanced cooperation with partners such as neighbouring countries, Frontex, Europol and Eurojust. The Polish government has also intensified border control efforts, particularly along the border with Belarus, to manage migration flows – though these measures have raised concerns over potential human rights violations. Nevertheless, Poland continues to face persistent challenges in fully detecting and intercepting illicit cross-border activities.

Economic and financial environment

Poland’s anti-money laundering framework has undergone improvements, although enforcement remains inconsistent. The General Inspector of Financial Information is tasked with monitoring suspicious financial transactions and coordinating with law enforcement agencies. However, international assessments have identified weaknesses in Poland’s ability to disrupt illicit financial flows. A limited understanding of money laundering risks, combined with the lack of a comprehensive national coordination platform, continues to pose challenges. Moreover, the country is also struggling to align its national policies with EU anti-money laundering regulations.

The economic regulatory environment in Poland has been influenced by recent global and regional economic challenges, including the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine. The country’s grey economy has expanded, particularly in sectors such as construction, transportation and hospitality. This expansion has created vulnerabilities that organized criminal groups exploit, including unregistered employment and tax evasion.

Civil society and social protection

During the reporting period, the Polish government enhanced victim protection efforts, offering shelter, medical and psychological care, legal aid and reintegration support. Victim identification tools were improved with updated, trauma-informed procedures, and a national referral mechanism was finalized, pending approval. Authorities screened vulnerable groups, including migrants, though controversial pushbacks at the Belarus border raised concerns about unidentified trafficking victims being returned. Funding for victim services increased for the first time since 2015, with additional resources allocated to train social workers. However, gaps remained in support for unaccompanied children and in shelter capacity for male victims. Efforts to prevent organized crime in Poland primarily focus on public awareness campaigns, as well as drug prevention and harm reduction initiatives. The government has also collaborated with NGOs to develop intervention strategies aimed at preventing exploitation. However, these prevention efforts are often fragmented, characterized by inconsistencies in regional implementation and a lack of sustained funding, which limits their long-term effectiveness. Drug prevention strategies have also been expanded, with campaigns highlighting the dangers of narcotics and synthetic drugs being rolled out. However, access to rehabilitation programs remains uneven, particularly in rural areas where the availability of substance abuse treatment is limited.

Non-state actors, including civil society organizations and media outlets, play a crucial role in exposing organized crime and holding authorities accountable. However, press freedom has faced notable restrictions, particularly under the previous administration, which exerted substantial pressure that further limited independent journalism. Nevertheless, the newly elected Parliament passed a resolution calling for the restoration of impartiality in public media, which has taken important steps in this regard. However, the media's ability to report on organized crime in Poland has been significantly undermined by the systematic marginalization of journalistic investigations into misconduct within key state institutions, including those overseeing internal security, the judiciary and law enforcement. Despite these challenges, civil society organizations remain vocal in advocating for anti-corruption measures and stronger protections for victims of organized crime, often filling the gaps left by state institutions.