Sweden
x
    Kyrgyzstan

    Profile

    Sweden

    Capital

    Stockholm

    Population

    10,569,709

    Gross domestic product (GDP - CURRENT $US MILLION)

    USD 610,118 million

    Area (KM²)

    528,861 km²

    4.730.03

    Criminality score

    118th of 193 countries 0

    25th of 44 countries in Europe 1

    1st of 8 countries in Northern Europe 0

    Criminal markets

    4.670.07

    An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.

    Human trafficking

    5.000.00

    Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.

    Human smuggling

    6.000.00

    Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.

    Extortion and protection racketeering

    5.000.50

    Crimes linked to exerting control over a territory/market including as a mediator and/or requesting a benefit in exchange for protection.

    Arms trafficking

    6.500.50

    The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.

    Trade in counterfeit goods

    3.50-0.50

    The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands.

    Illicit trade in excisable goods

    3.500.00

    The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits.

    Flora crimes

    2.00-0.50

    The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.

    Fauna crimes

    4.000.50

    The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.

    Non-renewable resource crimes

    1.50-0.50

    The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.

    Heroin trade

    3.000.00

    The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.

    Cocaine trade

    6.000.50

    The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.

    Cannabis trade

    5.00-0.50

    The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.

    Synthetic drug trade

    6.000.00

    The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.

    Cyber-dependent crimes

    6.500.50

    Organized crimes that rely solely on using information communications technology with the aim of obtaining a monetary/material benefit.

    Financial crimes

    6.500.50

    Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance.

    Criminal actors

    4.800.00

    An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.

    Mafia-style groups

    5.500.50

    Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.

    Criminal networks

    6.500.50

    Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.

    State-embedded actors

    2.00-0.50

    Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.

    Foreign actors

    6.500.00

    State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.

    Private sector actors

    3.50-0.50

    Profit-seeking individuals/entities who own/control a part of the legal economy free from the state, that collaborate with criminal actors.

    7.38-0.08

    Resilience score

    21st of 193 countries 4

    15th of 44 countries in Europe 2

    7th of 8 countries in Northern Europe 0

    Political leadership and governance

    6.500.00

    The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.

    Government transparency and accountability

    8.500.00

    The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.

    International cooperation

    8.500.00

    A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.

    National policies and laws

    8.000.50

    A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.

    Judicial system and detention

    7.000.00

    Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.

    Law enforcement

    6.00-0.50

    The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.

    Territorial integrity

    8.000.00

    The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.

    Anti-money laundering

    8.000.00

    A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.

    Economic regulatory capacity

    7.000.00

    The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.

    Victim and witness support

    6.000.00

    Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.

    Prevention

    7.00-0.50

    Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.

    Non-state actors

    8.00-0.50

    The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.

    7.38 4.80 4.67 7.38 4.80 4.67

    Analysis

    01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11

    People

    Sweden is predominantly a destination country for human trafficking, with victims subjected to sexual and labour exploitation. Most victims come from West Africa, Eastern Europe and Asia, often misled by fraudulent recruitment schemes. Labour trafficking targets workers in sectors such as forestry, construction and automotive repair, where poor working conditions enable widespread abuse. Despite a strong state response, including victim identification efforts and legal enforcement, trafficking networks persist, exploiting gaps in asylum systems and demand for cheap labour. Human smuggling remains a notable and transnational market, with Sweden acting as both a destination and transit point for irregular migration. People from Afghanistan, Egypt, Morocco, West Africa and Eastern Europe make up a substantial share of the smuggled population. Sweden’s welfare system and legal protections make it an attractive destination, even as strict immigration controls limit legal entry. Smugglers use fraudulent documents, stolen identities and fake asylum claims to evade detection, and many migrants endure harsh conditions and exploitation in transit.

    Extortion and protection racketeering have grown significantly in Sweden, making it one of the most affected countries in Northern Europe. Urban criminal networks target local businesses, migrant communities and rival groups through coercive schemes. Data from EncroChat – a Europe-based encrypted communication network widely used by criminals before being infiltrated and dismantled – has revealed evidence of extortion-related violence, including homicides and arson attacks. Some reports suggest that foreign criminal actors have used such tactics for political leverage, targeting both businesses and individuals. Protection racketeering typically involves gangs demanding payments under threat of property damage or physical harm.

    Trade

    Sweden is a key hub for arms trafficking in Northern Europe, with illicit firearms fuelling organized crime and gang violence. This illicit market includes automatic and semi-automatic weapons, grenades and explosives, many of which originate from the Balkans and Eastern Europe. Criminal groups exploit weaknesses in border controls to facilitate a steady inflow of firearms. Improvised explosive devices have also become a growing concern, frequently used in gang-related attacks. Despite strict gun laws, weapons are acquired through theft from legal stockpiles or via illicit online platforms.

    The counterfeit goods market primarily involves fashion items, electronics and luxury goods, sourced from East Asia and Europe. Criminal networks operate through e-commerce platforms and social media, complicating enforcement. The trade is closely linked to fraud and money laundering, with profits often reinvested into other criminal ventures.

    High excise taxes have contributed to a thriving market for illicit alcohol and tobacco. Smuggling routes from Eastern Europe and the Baltic states supply untaxed goods, undermining Sweden’s regulated market. Both organized criminal groups and small-scale smugglers exploit border control loopholes. Experts note that although Swedish customs reported a sharp increase in cigarette interceptions in 2023 compared to the previous year, the overall illegal cigarette market is still perceived to be in decline.

    Environment

    Flora crimes in Sweden are primarily linked to illegal logging and the unregistered timber trade. While some large corporations have been implicated in supply chain violations, organized crime involvement remains limited.

    By contrast, fauna crime has seen an expansion in recent years, driven by illegal poaching and trophy hunting. Wolves, bears and lynx are frequent targets, with poaching operations largely overlooked by authorities. Environmental agencies have been criticized for pro-hunting policies, which have weakened the state’s ability to curb wildlife crime. Illegal fishing and overfishing also pose increasing threats to marine biodiversity.

    Non-renewable resource crimes are rarely reported in Sweden, but the discovery of rare earth elements, as well as graphite and iron deposits, has sparked concerns about illegal mining and resource exploitation. Although there is no evidence of organized crime involvement in these activities, advocacy groups have protested resource extraction projects, citing environmental damage and violations of indigenous rights.

    Drugs

    Sweden remains a destination market for heroin, with supply chains linked to Afghanistan via the Balkans. The market is relatively small, with consumption concentrated among long-term opioid users.

    The cocaine market, on the other hand, is expanding, driven by organized crime groups and transnational cartels. Trafficked from South America via European transit hubs, cocaine is primarily distributed through nightlife venues and private networks. The trade begins at ports south of Sweden and extends across the country, with Stockholm serving as the key hub. Profits are accrued by both local gangs and foreign actors, most notably Latin American cartels and ethnic Albanian criminal networks. Over the last decade, Sweden has seen a sharp rise in gang violence, with killings and bombings becoming more frequent, and a growing number of young people involved as both victims and perpetrators. The surge in gang activity is closely linked to Sweden's to the cocaine trade, fuelling inter-gang rivalries.

    The illegal cannabis market is commonplace, with Sweden acting as both a source and destination. Supply comes from domestic cultivation as well as imports, including hashish from Morocco and West Africa via Spain’s Canary Islands. Groups involved in cannabis trafficking are often also active in the cocaine, heroin and synthetic drug trades.

    Synthetic drugs, including methamphetamine, amphetamines and 3-CMC, are widely available. While large quantities are produced in the eastern Balkans and marketed across Europe, a significant share is also manufactured in Swedish laboratories. Distribution relies on darknet markets and encrypted online platforms, complicating enforcement efforts. Furthermore, authorities have reported an increase in overdoses involving synthetic opioids, highlighting the growing availability of these substances and the serious public health concerns associated with them.

    Cyber-dependent crimes

    Sweden has experienced a sharp rise in cybercrime, including ransomware attacks and data breaches. These offences are often transnational, with the country targeted by foreign hacker groups. Recent reports highlight the involvement of Russian actors in several cyber-attacks. Since joining NATO in March 2024, Sweden has also faced numerous influence operations and cyber disruptions.

    Financial Crimes

    Financial crime continues to increase in Sweden, with fraud the most common offence. Criminal networks have exploited welfare systems, particularly by establishing private clinics to embezzle public health funds. Reports from 2024 identify fraud as the fastest-growing crime type, marked by a surge in social engineering scams and card fraud. Identity theft has also become widespread, affecting a significant portion of the population in recent years.

    Criminal Actors

    Mafia-style actors in Sweden are largely limited to outlaw motorcycle gangs, which play a prominent role in drug trafficking and other illicit markets. Unlike loosely structured street gangs, these groups operate at a more sophisticated level, engaging in arms trafficking, the drug trade and more recently, financial crime, including welfare fraud. Reports show that members of these groups established private healthcare clinics as fronts to divert public funds. Illicit profits from these operations are estimated to be twice the value of the drug trade. Biker gangs maintain global affiliations, with ties to counterparts in Denmark and the US, while preserving an independent internal structure. Members display distinctive tattoos and clothing and operate under a strict hierarchy. While there is limited evidence of direct corruption within public institutions, these groups have infiltrated financial systems anonymously by setting up front companies to commit fraud.

    Swedish criminal networks are primarily composed of loosely organized street gangs, involved in drug trafficking, arms smuggling, human smuggling and extortion. These groups lack fixed hierarchies, often forming fluid alliances and engaging in internal conflict. They thrive in socially marginalized areas marked by unemployment, poverty and widespread school dropouts, conditions that drive youth recruitment into gangs. Gangs reportedly recruit over a thousand people annually, targeting minors and vulnerable youth. In November 2024, authorities reported a rise in gang violence, driven in part by the use of social media to recruit children as young as 11 for contract killings and drug distribution. This trend has fuelled an increase in gang-related homicides and violent crime. The proliferation of firearms and drive-by shootings has made Sweden one of the most gun-violent countries in Europe.

    By contrast, state-embedded actors play a limited role in Sweden’s organized crime landscape. While isolated cases of bribery and corruption involving public officials have been reported, there is no evidence of systemic corruption at the institutional level.

    Foreign actors are a significant presence in Sweden’s organized crime landscape, particularly in drug trafficking and firearms smuggling. There is considerable overlap between foreign criminal groups and local gangs, often based on first- or second-generation migrant backgrounds. Most foreign groups originate from the Western Asia or the Balkans, adding a transnational dimension to Sweden’s criminal networks. Ethnic Albanian organizations also play a central role in controlling smuggling routes through Swedish ports, facilitating drug trafficking from Latin America into Europe. These networks are concentrated in urban centres such as Stockholm, Malmö and Gothenburg, but also operate in smaller cities such as Sundsvall, Uppsala and Helsingborg.

    Private-sector involvement in organized crime remains limited, though concerns persist regarding biker gangs using private companies to commit welfare fraud and exploit Sweden’s tax system. Reports suggest some career criminals manage multiple businesses, using them as financial vehicles for illicit activities. While there is no direct evidence that these enterprises are used to launder drug profits, they appear to operate as independent financial crime ventures.

    Leadership and governance

    Sweden maintains a strong governance framework, consistently demonstrating respect for the rule of law and other fundamental principles, reflecting the country's commitment to political rights and civil liberties. However, rising gang-related violence has prompted discussions about expanding the role of security forces. The growing presence of organized criminal groups in urban areas has drawn attention ongoing challenges in law enforcement. Measures to track and counter criminal activity have included cooperation with the EU on facial recognition initiatives. Despite these efforts, persistent gang-related activity has raised concerns about the formation of parallel societies in some urban areas. Reports also indicate that biker gangs are engaged in activities affecting state resources, including fraud involving fictitious private healthcare companies. In July 2024, the government introduced stricter penalties for gun crimes and established security zones to address rising violence. Broader discussions around a more comprehensive approach have since emerged in response to ongoing security challenges.

    Sweden remains one of the least corrupt countries globally. It upholds transparency in public expenditure, audits and private-sector contracting, with constitutional protections ensuring access to official documents. Despite this, experts have identified areas where public access to information could be improved, particularly in conflict-of-interest disclosures and oversight mechanisms.

    The country is also highly engaged in international cooperation to combat organized crime, participating actively in Europol and INTERPOL, and maintaining established extradition agreements and intelligence-sharing mechanisms. Sweden has ratified key international treaties, including the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, the Arms Trade Treaty and the CITES convention on wildlife trafficking. In November 2024, it moved to join the Macolin Convention, aimed at combating match-fixing and corruption in sport. This aligns with broader efforts to strengthen anti-corruption measures, particularly in the financial crimes sector.

    Sweden has a comprehensive legal framework addressing drug trafficking, arms smuggling, human trafficking and terrorism. However, certain legal provisions present challenges, including relatively lenient sentences for organized crime offences. These factors have contributed to Sweden's appeal for some criminal groups. In February 2024, the country introduced its first national strategy explicitly targeting organized crime, alongside efforts to strengthen its cybersecurity framework. Investments in new cybersecurity agencies aim to counter rising cyber threats. Financial crime also remains a priority, particularly fraud within the healthcare system, where persistent vulnerabilities continue to be exploited.

    Criminal justice and security

    Sweden’s judicial system remains robust, but concerns have emerged regarding judicial independence and prison capacity. Reports highlight overcrowding, particularly among youth offenders involved in organized crime. Rehabilitation opportunities remain limited, though plans to expand prison infrastructure have been announced.

    In response to escalating gang violence, the government has intensified law enforcement efforts in recent years, including the deployment of military personnel to support police operations. The Swedish police authority leads national law enforcement, with specialized units for financial crime and cybercrime. However, staffing shortages persist, and instances of officers leaking information to criminal networks have been documented. A 2024 investigation identified security risks involving at least 30 officers, resulting in dismissals.

    Sweden's geographic position and open Schengen borders make it a key transit point for organized criminal groups trafficking illicit goods across Scandinavia and into Europe. Its proximity to major ports, including Rotterdam, heightens its exposure to drug trafficking risks. In response to rising insecurity from gang violence and terrorism concerns, Sweden has reintroduced border controls and tightened security at key entry points. The country is also strengthening its defence and emergency preparedness, emphasizing regional cooperation through NATO. In the cyber domain, Sweden has a solid legal and institutional framework, though challenges remain in fully protecting its digital infrastructure despite significant investment.

    Economic and financial environment

    Sweden maintains a highly developed anti-money laundering framework, with strict financial reporting requirements and stepped-up enforcement measures introduced in 2024. However, recent violations identified by regulatory authorities have exposed weaknesses in risk assessments and monitoring of money laundering threats. While the country has strong market oversight, concerns about criminal infiltration of the private sector have grown, particularly in the healthcare industry.

    Civil society and social protection

    Sweden’s victim and witness support framework operates through the Swedish crime victim authority, in coordination with courts and NGOs. However, witness intimidation by organized crime groups remains a challenge, with victims often hesitant to testify due to fear of retaliation. To address this issue, in October 2024, the Swedish government proposed new measures allowing anonymous testimonies in gang-related trials. Child recruitment by gangs continues to be an issue, with limited intervention mechanisms in vulnerable communities. Support for human trafficking victims has been strengthened, including funding for NGO-led shelter programmes. However, legal identification of trafficking victims remains restricted to law enforcement agencies, making asylum-seekers reluctant to report crimes due to deportation fears. Sweden enforces strict drug laws, which have contributed to high drug-related mortality rates. Harm reduction efforts remain limited, and hospitalization rates for heroin and cocaine cases remain high, reflecting ongoing demand for medical intervention.

    Sweden’s crime prevention strategies are built on multi-agency cooperation involving municipalities, schools and police, with tailored approaches depending on the crime type. Efforts to combat sex and labour trafficking include 24-hour hotlines, dedicated funding and partnerships with labour unions and international civil society. A national task force brings together law enforcement, civil society and government agencies to enhance prevention. Technologies such as facial recognition and drones are employed to address gang violence, yet preventative measures against gang recruitment remain limited. Frustration with centralized, top-down strategies has led local communities – especially in suburban areas – to take a more active role through awareness campaigns and youth engagement initiatives. Nonetheless, challenges persist, particularly due to the concentration of welfare and policing services.

    The country upholds strong political and civil liberties, maintaining a free press and multi-party democracy. However, anti-immigrant sentiment and far-right extremism have increased in recent years, contributing to a rise in hate crimes. Despite its global reputation for media freedom, journalists covering gang violence and migration issues face threats and intimidation. Media ownership is highly concentrated, with five companies controlling most national news outlets, raising concerns about press diversity. Civil society remains active in crime prevention, with NGOs playing a key role in victim assistance programmes. The 2024 National Strategy against Organized Crime includes provisions to enhance civil society involvement, reinforcing multi-stakeholder engagement in Sweden’s crime prevention initiatives.

    Profile

    Kyrgyzstan

    Capital

    Bishkek

    Population

    7,224,614

    Gross domestic product (GDP - CURRENT $US MILLION)

    USD 17,491 million

    Area (KM²)

    199,950 km²

    5.25-0.07

    Criminality score

    85th of 193 countries 4

    25th of 46 countries in Asia 1

    2nd of 8 countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus 0

    Criminal markets

    4.900.27

    An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.

    Human trafficking

    7.000.00

    Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.

    Human smuggling

    5.500.00

    Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.

    Extortion and protection racketeering

    4.501.00

    Crimes linked to exerting control over a territory/market including as a mediator and/or requesting a benefit in exchange for protection.

    Arms trafficking

    3.500.00

    The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.

    Trade in counterfeit goods

    5.500.50

    The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands.

    Illicit trade in excisable goods

    4.500.50

    The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits.

    Flora crimes

    2.500.00

    The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.

    Fauna crimes

    4.000.50

    The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.

    Non-renewable resource crimes

    6.500.00

    The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.

    Heroin trade

    7.00-0.50

    The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.

    Cocaine trade

    2.000.00

    The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.

    Cannabis trade

    6.000.00

    The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.

    Synthetic drug trade

    5.500.50

    The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.

    Cyber-dependent crimes

    3.001.00

    Organized crimes that rely solely on using information communications technology with the aim of obtaining a monetary/material benefit.

    Financial crimes

    6.500.50

    Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance.

    Criminal actors

    5.60-0.40

    An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.

    Mafia-style groups

    5.50-1.00

    Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.

    Criminal networks

    5.50-0.50

    Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.

    State-embedded actors

    8.500.00

    Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.

    Foreign actors

    4.500.00

    State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.

    Private sector actors

    4.00-0.50

    Profit-seeking individuals/entities who own/control a part of the legal economy free from the state, that collaborate with criminal actors.

    3.79-0.04

    Resilience score

    141st of 193 countries 0

    32nd of 46 countries in Asia 1

    6th of 8 countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus 0

    Political leadership and governance

    3.000.00

    The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.

    Government transparency and accountability

    2.00-0.50

    The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.

    International cooperation

    4.500.00

    A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.

    National policies and laws

    4.000.00

    A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.

    Judicial system and detention

    3.000.00

    Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.

    Law enforcement

    3.500.50

    The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.

    Territorial integrity

    4.500.50

    The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.

    Anti-money laundering

    3.500.50

    A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.

    Economic regulatory capacity

    4.00-1.00

    The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.

    Victim and witness support

    4.000.00

    Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.

    Prevention

    5.000.00

    Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.

    Non-state actors

    4.50-0.50

    The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.

    3.79 5.60 4.90 3.79 5.60 4.90

    Analysis

    01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11

    People

    Kyrgyzstan is a source, transit and destination country for human trafficking, with forced labour and sexual exploitation being the most prevalent forms. Socio-economic conditions, including poverty and entrenched gender practices, exacerbate vulnerabilities. The criminal market is facilitated by organized crime groups, foreign actors, corrupt officials and private-sector enablers. Victims, including Kyrgyz nationals and foreign individuals from Uzbekistan, Bangladesh and Russia, are subjected to forced labour in agriculture, construction, the textile industry and domestic work. Human trafficking is closely linked with other criminal markets, particularly arms and drug trafficking. Child labour and bride kidnapping (ala kachuu) are concerning practices and contribute to exploitation cycles. Authorities dismantled a child trafficking ring in 2024, but gaps in victim services, coupled with legal enforcement challenges, continue to hinder anti-trafficking efforts.

    Kyrgyzstan’s porous borders, weak migration controls and geographic location contribute to a growing human smuggling market. Criminal networks, private-sector actors and corrupt officials facilitate irregular migration, often leading to exploitation in destination countries. Counterfeit documents and illicit migration channels have increased since Kyrgyzstan’s accession to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Russia is the primary destination for Kyrgyz migrants, with many facing rights violations and discrimination. Recently, an increasing number of Kyrgyz migrants have opted for the US as a destination, relying on organized smuggling routes through Mexico. However, such attempts have become increasingly difficult owing to strengthened US enforcement efforts, resulting in fewer successful crossings. Telegram and other social media platforms are used to advertise illegal migration services.

    Mafia-style groups and criminal networks engage in extortion and protection racketeering, targeting businesses and individuals. High-profile cases illustrate the market’s scale. Entrepreneurs have been coerced into paying significant sums, and law enforcement has arrested members of criminal groups extorting both private businesses and government officials. Protection racketeering extends into public institutions, including schools. Criminal groups have also colluded with law enforcement to cover up extortion schemes. Despite some progress in dismantling these networks, the long-term impact remains uncertain.

    Trade

    The country serves as both a transit and source location for illicit arms, particularly small arms and ammunition. Criminal networks, foreign actors and corrupt officials facilitate the trade, often in connection with drug trafficking and counterfeit goods. Operations such as INTERPOL’s transnational enforcement efforts have resulted in major seizures, but localized trafficking persists. Firearms, including Kalashnikov rifles, are sold in informal markets, with some caches discovered in rural regions. Following the Taliban’s resurgence in Afghanistan, arms trafficking risks in Kyrgyzstan have intensified. Corruption within border enforcement remains a significant challenge in curbing this criminal market.

    Kyrgyzstan has a key role in the trade of counterfeit goods, with criminal networks exploiting its position along Central Asian trade routes. Key sectors affected include electronics, clothing and pharmaceuticals. Markets such as Dordoi Bazaar serve as hubs for counterfeit imports from China, often re-exported under fraudulent documentation. Smuggling channels and corruption within customs authorities facilitate the market. Intellectual property protections exist, but enforcement is weak; no successful prosecutions for violations have been recorded.

    The illicit tobacco and alcohol markets are entrenched within Kyrgyzstan’s underground economy. Smuggling networks are widespread, with clandestine factories operating in multiple regions. The country also serves as a transit hub for illicit alcohol within the EAEU, with shipments regularly seized at borders. Digital tracking measures have been introduced to combat the trade, yet enforcement gaps persist owing to collusion between officials and traffickers. Revenue losses due to the illicit cigarette market are estimated at several million dollars annually.

    Environment

    Illegal logging and deforestation, particularly in walnut-fruit forests, threaten Kyrgyzstan’s biodiversity. The country, mainly a source for flora crimes, has experienced extensive forest degradation from illegal logging, overgrazing and firewood harvesting. Weak enforcement and regulatory loopholes allow private-sector actors and criminal networks to exploit timber resources. Despite protection measures, illegal harvesting continues, in particular in the Dzheti-Oguz and Karakol regions, although at limited scope and scale.

    Kyrgyzstan is both a source and a transit country for wildlife trafficking, but the scale appears limited. Snow leopards, argali, and Siberian ibex are frequently poached for trophy hunting and international trade. Seizure records show ongoing smuggling to countries such as Kazakhstan, Serbia and China, with transnational networks involving both domestic and foreign actors. Kyrgyzstan also re-exports high volumes of wildlife commodities, primarily from China. Law enforcement has made high-profile seizures, but corruption hampers effective control, especially in remote areas.

    Illegal gold and coal mining is highly prevalent in Kyrgyzstan, driven by unemployment and weak regulatory oversight. These activities, concentrated in southern regions, involve diverse actors. The extractives sector remains a focal point of corruption, with government actors as well as private-sector actors implicated in illegal mining and facilitating illicit financial flows. Smuggled oil and illicit mineral exports further entrench criminal networks. Local communities often find themselves embroiled in this illicit economy, participating in illegal mining despite the inherent dangers. Kyrgyzstan’s strategic geographical location not only makes it a hub for internal illegal mining but also creates transit routes for trafficked minerals from neighbouring countries such as Afghanistan and Tajikistan. In addition, oil is smuggled from Kazakhstan to Tajikistan through Kyrgyzstan, which underscores the complexity of the illicit resource trade networks.

    Drugs

    Kyrgyzstan has a critical role in the heroin trade along the northern route between Afghanistan and Russia. State-embedded actors, mafia-style groups and transnational networks dominate the market. Large-scale seizures recorded in recent years highlight the ongoing presence of this trade in the country. Corruption within this market is a challenge, with traffickers exploiting law enforcement and border officials. The cocaine trade in the country is insignificant owing to people struggling economically and the prevalence of cheaper alternative drugs. Nevertheless, migration flows from Russia as an effect of the Russia–Ukraine war may have impacted the local demand for the drug. In contrast, Kyrgyzstan is a producer, transit and consumption country for cannabis, with cultivation widespread in rural areas. Hashish serves as a cash crop, feeding domestic and international markets. Law enforcement has targeted trafficking networks, but the trade remains resilient. Synthetic drug consumption and production have risen sharply. Digital platforms facilitate sales, with law enforcement increasingly dismantling online drug distribution networks. Recent operations have uncovered domestic production laboratories, signalling a shift from reliance on foreign imports.

    Cyber-dependent crimes

    Kyrgyzstan has experienced a rise in cyber-dependent crimes, including ransomware attacks and cryptocurrency fraud. Attacks often target local websites and there is a growing involvement of transnational actors, including criminal networks and foreign private-sector participants, who exploit weak cybersecurity infrastructure. Despite government efforts, including a 2024 cybersecurity strategy that aims to enhance digital security, limited awareness of and poor performance by national cybersecurity exacerbate the risks. Hacktivist groups have also escalated attacks on state and private systems, affecting banks, telecommunications and educational institutions. Bishkek is a focal point, with emerging risks tied to technologies such as illegal cryptocurrency exchanges.

    Financial Crimes

    Financial crimes are widespread in Kyrgyzstan, encompassing diverse illicit activities. These include cyber-enabled offences such as email fraud, digital identity theft and payment and corporate data breaches, all of which result in significant financial losses for citizens. Criminal networks are increasingly relying on cyber-enabled methods, with phishing emerging as the most common tactic. In addition, tax evasion – often facilitated by corrupt state officials – is a pervasive issue in the country.

    Criminal Actors

    Mafia-style groups in Kyrgyzstan are prominently represented by ‘thieves in law’, a hierarchical and deeply entrenched criminal subculture that stems from the Soviet era. The group, led by Kamchy Kolbayev, epitomized this structure, operating across multiple illicit markets, including drug trafficking, smuggling and robbery. His arrest in 2022 and subsequent death during a special operation in 2023 marked a pivotal moment, disrupting the internal cohesion of mafia-style groups. This action prompted coordinated crackdowns in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, highlighting the transnational ties of regional organized crime. Despite such setbacks, mafia-style groups maintain considerable influence in correctional institutions and retain public visibility, as evidenced by prisoners publicly commemorating Kolbayev. However, their traditional dominance has been increasingly challenged by state actors consolidating control over criminal markets. The weakening of mafia-style groups following the fall of figures like Kolbayev and the broader campaign to eliminate rival criminal players suggest a shift in power, although not a comprehensive dismantling of their structure.

    Criminal networks in Kyrgyzstan are decentralized and opportunistic. These loosely affiliated networks specialize in illicit activities such as drug trafficking, racketeering and smuggling of goods, with distinct regional specializations: southern groups focus on narcotics and northern ones, particularly in Bishkek, engage in extortion and control over illicit trade in Chinese products. Their transnational collaboration is evident in ties with criminal counterparts in Russia, China, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. These networks also encroach on civic structures by extracting protection fees from small business owners and positioning themselves as informal mediators in local disputes. Although recent mass arrests have also targeted network leaders following Kolbayev’s death, such enforcement has proven selective, with prominent figures released under lenient conditions. The enduring influence of these networks, coupled with their adaptability and local embeddedness, underscores systemic vulnerabilities in law enforcement efforts.

    State-embedded actors represent a critical component of Kyrgyzstan’s organized crime landscape, often wielding more influence than traditional criminal groups. Organized crime in Kyrgyzstan is deeply entwined with state structures, with hundreds of civil servants dismissed for suspected affiliations with criminal groups. The current leadership’s anti-corruption campaign has led to high-profile arrests, including a political figure’s extradition in 2024. Nonetheless, doubts persist regarding the true intent of these crackdowns, as many detained individuals were subsequently released after paying fines, suggesting a monetized approach to justice.

    Foreign actors contribute to Kyrgyzstan’s organized crime dynamics, particularly with regard to drug trafficking and illicit trade in natural resources. The country’s geographic location makes it a critical node in the regional drug corridor, where local groups collaborate extensively with foreign entities from Afghanistan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and China. Ethnic-based networks – including Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Tajik, Azeri, Chechen and Russian groups – are especially active in drug trafficking, leveraging familial and cultural links across borders. The influence of transnational families further illustrates the convergence of global capital and organized crime. Despite moderate direct operational control by foreign actors, their strategic and financial influence on Kyrgyz criminal markets is significant and persistent.

    Private-sector actors are implicated in the laundering of criminal proceeds, particularly through construction, telecommunications and wholesale trading enterprises. Following the killing of Kolbayev, authorities initiated a broad crackdown on business elites suspected of facilitating organized crime. This included the arrests of high-profile figures and directors from construction companies and telecommunications firms. Investigations uncovered systematic efforts to legalize illicit assets through business ventures, with some suspects compensating the state in exchange for release. These developments underscore the complicity of business leaders in the growth of organized crime and suggest that anti-crime measures, while impactful, may be undermined by selective enforcement and financial settlements. The extensive entwinement of private enterprise with criminal financing reflects broader systemic weaknesses in corporate oversight and regulatory enforcement.

    Leadership and governance

    Kyrgyzstan faces significant political instability, characterized by weak governance and widespread corruption. The state is highly susceptible to the influence of organized crime, facilitated by a small group of elites who dominate the political landscape through competing patronage networks. Efforts to combat corruption and organized crime have been marred by a lack of transparency, political favouritism, and what experts describe as a selective or retaliatory application of justice. Despite official announcements of crackdowns on criminal elements, experts question the legitimacy and motivations behind such operations, citing low public trust in leadership and inconsistent enforcement.

    Corruption is deeply embedded across all levels of society in Kyrgyzstan, often functioning as a means for the ruling elite to retain control. Laws to promote transparency and access to information are poorly enforced. Oversight, especially in areas such as public procurement and asset declarations, is insufficient, allowing corrupt practices to persist; recent legal reforms have sparked concerns that they may facilitate rather than curb corruption. Although there have been high-profile arrests, the lack of consistent judicial outcomes and unclear asset recovery processes have cast doubt on the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures. Overall, the country is experiencing a decline in transparency and accountability, signalling a shift away from democratic governance.

    Kyrgyzstan participates in several international treaties and frameworks targeting transnational organized crime, drug trafficking, human trafficking and environmental protection. The country has ratified several key conventions, including the UN Convention against Corruption and the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. It also engages with organizations such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on regional security and anti-crime cooperation. Bilateral and multilateral extradition agreements have enhanced its ability to cooperate in cross-border investigations, particularly concerning narcotics and human smuggling. However, the implementation of commitments remains inconsistent. Notably, despite proposals to establish a regional organized crime centre in Bishkek, no concrete steps have followed. While Kyrgyz authorities collaborate in anti-trafficking and border management initiatives, their efforts are limited in scope and often rely on international actors. As such they fail to comprehensively address all criminal markets, including extractive sector governance, where transparency standards remain unmet.

    Kyrgyzstan has a comprehensive legal framework addressing organized crime, human trafficking, drug offences and environmental crimes, but enforcement is inconsistent. Laws criminalize the formation of criminal organizations, trafficking, illegal migration and arms offences, often with enhanced penalties when committed by organized groups. Despite ratifying international treaties and updating legislation, gaps persist, particularly in child sex trafficking definitions and implementation of anti-organized crime measures. Other measures, such as economic amnesties and firearms reform, reflect a mixed approach.

    Criminal justice and security

    The judicial system in Kyrgyzstan is widely considered one of the most corrupt institutions in the country. Reports consistently highlight bribery, political interference and the influence of organized crime in judicial appointments and verdicts. The presumption of innocence is regularly disregarded, and courts often operate under a presumption of guilt. Legal procedures are undermined by violations such as coerced confessions, denial of legal counsel and trials proceeding without sufficient or reliable evidence. Prison conditions further reflect systemic issues, with prison gangs exerting significant control over inmate discipline and resource distribution, often with the tacit consent of corrupt officials. Torture and abuse in detention facilities are reported, with several high-profile cases involving political detainees drawing attention to the lack of oversight.

    Kyrgyzstan’s law enforcement agencies are structurally tasked with combating various forms of organized crime, but are hampered by endemic corruption, a lack of resources and deep-rooted political interference. Public trust in the police is low, with arbitrary arrests, bribery and abuse of power, particularly in southern regions, frequently being reported. Effective law enforcement is further diminished by nepotism and informal arrangements with criminal actors, which reportedly include the systematic collection and distribution of bribes. Police also reported weakened crime-fighting capacity due to policies that have prioritized economic recovery. The state’s initiatives to combat narcotics trafficking and other forms of organized crime have had limited success, in part owing to the reluctance of officials to disrupt profitable criminal arrangements. International training programmes continue to fill critical gaps in capacity, especially in emerging areas such as cybercrime. However, reliance on external support highlights the structural weaknesses within domestic institutions. In addition, some law enforcement operations appear politically motivated, targeting businesspeople and opponents under broad corruption or criminal charges.

    Kyrgyzstan’s geography presents significant challenges to effective border control, with porous frontiers in mountainous southern regions providing natural routes for trafficking. The country’s strategic location and proximity to drug-producing and transit regions make it a key node in transnational smuggling networks, with criminal groups operating in known hubs such as Talas, Bishkek and Osh. The government has taken steps to improve border monitoring through policy reforms and partnerships with the International Organization for Migration, but significant gaps remain. Weak infrastructure and smugglers’ reliance on low-technology transport routes, including horses and tunnels, hinder enforcement efforts. Recent seizures of smuggled goods and coordinated actions with neighbouring states indicate attempts to control cross-border flows, yet these remain reactive rather than systemic.

    Economic and financial environment

    Kyrgyzstan has continued to make noteworthy progress in improving its anti-money laundering frameworks in 2024 since its removal from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)’s grey list a decade before. Legal reforms have aligned national standards with FATF recommendations; however, significant deficiencies persist in implementation, particularly in risk understanding, domestic coordination and the confiscation of criminal proceeds. The volume of money laundering investigations and convictions is low, and parallel financial investigations are rarely conducted. Although authorities express readiness to support mutual legal assistance, law enforcement capacity is insufficient to address complex financial crimes. Ongoing concerns include limited oversight of financial intermediaries, weak supervision of cross-border flows and the continued presence of shadow economic actors. These issues highlight a disconnect between legislative strength and institutional capacity to deter financial crime effectively.

    Kyrgyzstan’s economic environment is characterized by corruption, state capture and a substantial shadow economy. Legislative reforms such as a new tax code and digitization efforts aim to formalize business practices and reduce informality, yet implementation is inconsistent. The mining sector is particularly politicized and prone to criminal influence, as evidenced by racketeering and informal governance by criminal groups. The state has taken controversial steps to assert national control, such as nationalizing major mining operations and banning foreign participation in future projects, but these actions have raised concerns about transparency and investor confidence. There are also emerging concerns about Kyrgyzstan’s potential role in facilitating sanctions evasion, particularly in relation to the re-export of dual-use goods. Despite recent efforts to regulate trade more strictly, challenges remain in ensuring full compliance. Government initiatives to combat corruption and promote fair competition are hindered by a lack of enforcement, ongoing political interference, and a judiciary that lacks the independence needed to hold economic actors accountable.

    Civil society and social protection

    Kyrgyzstan has taken steps to improve victim and witness protection through cooperation with international organizations such as the OSCE. An office for witness protection exists within the interior ministry, but operational transparency is limited. NGOs have a critical role in delivering services to victims of trafficking and other organized crime, offering legal, psychological and medical support. However, gaps in victim identification, inconsistent application of protection procedures, and inadequate shelter services – particularly for male and child victims – remain pressing issues. Victims often face pressure to withdraw complaints, and many are penalized for crimes committed under coercion. Recent legislative changes, including laws that restrict foreign funding and increase reporting requirements for NGOs, may undermine the work of victim support organizations, raising further concerns about the erosion of protective infrastructure.

    Although Kyrgyzstan has adopted a national action plan to combat human trafficking and maintains awareness campaigns, prevention efforts are hindered by underfunding and limited institutional capacity. The labour inspectorate faces legal constraints that limit its ability to conduct unannounced inspections, and penalties are inconsistently enforced. The Center for Employment of Citizens Abroad, supported by international partners, provides migrants with information on safe employment and pre-departure training, contributing to trafficking prevention. Nonetheless, the absence of a unified data system and poor coordination across agencies limit the government’s ability to measure and improve the effectiveness of these programmes. The country’s drug policy is also challenged by limited harm reduction services, high drug use rates and human rights concerns in enforcement practices. Laws to protect whistle-blowers exist on paper but are not enforced, and those reporting corruption often face retaliation. Despite the existence of prevention strategies, gaps in implementation and the lack of state-led initiatives hinder systemic progress in addressing root causes of trafficking and drug-related vulnerabilities.

    Civil society activity in Kyrgyzstan is becoming increasingly constrained. Journalists, human rights defenders and minority advocates operate under growing threats, including harassment, detention and legal prosecution. Recent legislation expands government oversight of NGOs and media outlets that receive foreign funding and engage in broadly defined ‘political activities’. Press freedom has declined in recent years, with several journalists arrested or convicted for covering opposition protests or publishing content critical of the government. Convictions based on vague laws concerning the dissemination of false information have been condemned by international human rights organizations. Media diversity is also declining, especially among outlets publishing in Uzbek or Russian. Despite this, NGOs continue to provide vital services, including assisting trafficking victims and human rights advocacy. However, their reliance on international funding and the increasing regulatory burden threaten their sustainability. The space for independent voices is shrinking, as legal and informal pressures converge to limit dissent, raising concerns about the long-term viability of civil society.

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    The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to 10. The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel.

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    This project was funded in part by a grant from the United States Department of State. The opinions, findings and conclusions stated herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State.

    ENACT is funded by the European Union and implemented by the Institute for Security Studies and INTERPOL, in affiliation with the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.