People

Peru is both a source and destination for human trafficking, predominantly involving sexual and labour exploitation. Modern slavery is prevalent, with young girls the primary victims, especially in sexual exploitation. Foreign tourists are involved in these illicit activities particularly in Cusco, Lima and the Peruvian Amazon. Labour exploitation often targets vulnerable migrants, notably Venezuelans. Traffickers use social media to recruit and sexually exploit children online, with some involvement from foreign tourists. Victims suffer a variety of coercion strategies, including violence, debt, isolation, restriction of freedom of movement and withholding payment. Labour exploitation in Peru is facilitated by the endemic prevalence of informal labour. Forced labour occurs in sectors such as mining, agriculture, logging, manufacturing and domestic service, driven by the informal labour market. Corruption and official complicity undermine anti-trafficking efforts, as some officials, including specialized anti-trafficking unit members, have been implicated in bribery.

Peru serves as both a destination and transit country for human smuggling, attracting Venezuelans as a destination and Caribbean migrants, mainly Haitians and Cubans, en route to Brazil and Chile. Smuggling networks, including Venezuelan, Brazilian, Ecuadorian and Colombian groups, often overlap with human trafficking, exploiting travellers’ vulnerability. Some law enforcement officials have been implicated in facilitating smuggling through bribery. Migrants face increasing violence, including communal and police incidents, primarily targeting Haitians and Venezuelans. Recent measures have restricted legal entry and protection, prompting some Venezuelans to seek alternative destinations like the United States or Europe, reducing the numbers of Venezuelans in Peru.

Extortion in Peru has evolved into a lucrative and diversified market, with criminal organizations increasingly targeting businesses, transporters and residential complexes. Local and foreign groups, including the Venezuelan Tren de Aragua, dominate the market, particularly in Lima. Rivalries between foreign and local networks have fuelled violence, including grenade attacks and contract killings, with nearly half of Lima’s homicides linked to extortion in recent years. Businesses are confronted by demands for high monthly fees, profit-based charges and registration costs, hampering profitability and investment.

Trade

Peru is a key hub for arms trafficking, serving as both a source and transit point for weapons destined for Europe, Ecuador and Colombia. Smuggling routes originate near the Ecuadorian border, with weapons moving through Ecuador into Colombia. Foreign criminal groups, including Tren de Aragua and Ecuador’s Los Tiguerones, participate in alternating cooperation and conflict with local networks. Unregulated firearms, including unregistered and homemade firearms as well as ammunition and explosives, sustain organized crime, notably linked to illegal mining. The Tumbes and Piura regions have reported a surge in ammunition seizures, with a dramatic rise in recent years. Authorities also dismantled a clandestine factory in Villa El Salvador, revealing the prevalence of artisanal weapon production, which has been highly sought after due to their low costs.

Trade in counterfeit goods remains extensive in Peru, with major markets in Lima such as Gamarra Emporium and Polvos Azules serving as hubs. Despite police raids that seize significant quantities of counterfeit apparel, availability remains high. Online sales through websites and social media are also common. Counterfeit medicines are widespread, with notable seizures, such as a coordinated international operation near the Peru–Ecuador border. The value of smuggled goods has shown a general upward trend over the past decade, driven by activity in regions like Puno and northern areas. Legal advances have strengthened enforcement by granting investigative authority to police and prosecutors, but the trade continues to thrive amid persistent challenges. Peru also struggles with porous borders that facilitate the entry of excisable goods, often along the same routes used for drugs, gold and timber. Recent studies estimate that hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of excisable goods enter annually through its borders with Chile and Bolivia. The Puno region, bordering Bolivia, is a key hotspot for this trade, including Paraguayan cigarettes.

Environment

Illegal logging in Peru is widespread, exacerbating deforestation. It is driven by complex networks that falsify timber registries to transport wood regionally and internationally, notably to China. Human trafficking victims and indigenous communities are coerced into illegal logging and mining. Drug traffickers also exploit timber routes to disguise drug shipments, utilizing both Pacific and Atlantic ports for global distribution. Indigenous communities face increased vulnerability due to exploitation and environmental harm. Corruption within forestry management hinders enforcement. Sustainability certifications have been revoked amid human rights concerns that are linked to logging near isolated indigenous communities.

Peru serves as a major transit and export hub for illegal wildlife and shark fin trafficking. Driven by high demand, wildlife trafficking remains prevalent, especially of reptiles to Asia and exotic pets. Cultural factors also influence local wildlife commercialization. The export of shark fins, primarily sourced from Ecuador, has surged, making Peru one of the world’s largest exporters. The legal trade of Peruvian matamata turtles, facilitated by a 2015 change in the law, is exploited by Colombian traffickers who ‘launder’ turtles by means of cross-border smuggling. Enforcement gaps, corruption and resource limitations hinder effective regulation despite recent initiatives to strengthen monitoring.

Illegal mining in Peru has become a significant economic and social challenge. Illegal mining has intensified in recent years, with increasing volumes of illegally mined gold and other metals. This is particularly the case in the Amazon and protected areas like La Pampa, where operations resumed despite earlier crackdowns. Smuggling along the Peru–Bolivia border and the involvement of local and transnational criminal groups have heightened illegal mining and related crime, including human trafficking and violence. Foreign criminal organizations, including Venezuelan, Brazilian, Ecuadorian and Colombian networks, exploit vulnerable populations and engage in violent confrontations with law enforcement and mining companies.

Drugs

To a limited extent, Peru serves as a source country for opium, which is cultivated in regions like Cajamarca and Amazonas, with transport routes extending to Ecuador. Peruvian groups mainly export opium, as they lack the laboratories needed to process it into heroin.

By contrast, it is the world’s second-largest coca producer, with trafficking routes originating in the country primarily going through the Amazon, where the cocaine is sent via rivers to Brazil. Cocaine is then sold on the local market or shipped to Europe, including Belgium and Türkiye. Domestic and foreign criminal groups, including remnants of Sendero Luminoso and foreign cartels, dominate trafficking networks, using remote airstrips and river routes. Criminal organizations vertically control the supply chain and frequently resort to violence, including murder. Foreign criminal networks include Colombian, Brazilian, Venezuelan, Mexican and Italian groups, coordinating shipments to North America, Europe and Asia. Cocaine production has severe impacts on indigenous communities, endangering isolated tribes and causing environmental destruction, particularly in the Amazon region.

Cannabis is grown alongside coca in Peru, but there has been no reported increase in cannabis cultivation. Despite limited data on the cannabis market’s size and value, it is known to operate through loosely organized domestic criminal networks with transnational connections. These networks transport cannabis from Peru’s La Libertad region to Chile, primarily via the Panamericana Sur highway, using trucks and vans.

The synthetic drug market remains limited in size and value, with occasional seizures of Tusi (‘pink cocaine’). Concerns of potential fentanyl smuggling from Ecuador have arisen recently, and pharmacies in Lima were alleged to sell fentanyl without prescriptions. Overall, Peru accounts for a small percentage of synthetic drug shipments originating from Latin America and the Caribbean on the darknet.

Cyber-dependent crimes

Peru has recently emerged as a target for cyberattacks, with most major breaches being ransomware attacks. The Peruvian police recently suffered a ransomware attack, but there is limited information on the authorities’ response. Regional and international cybercrime networks significantly influence these activities.

Financial Crimes

Peru faces significant challenges related to tax evasion, financial fraud and counterfeit currency production. High levels of informal labour contribute to substantial tax evasion. The country is ranked high globally for phishing. Additionally, Peru is a major producer of counterfeit US dollars. Clandestine operations exporting fake currency to neighbouring countries and the United States have recently been seized. Corruption and embezzlement involving law enforcement and local officials also result in significant financial losses.

Criminal Actors

Alongside an unknown number of mafia-style actors, remnants of the terrorist group Sendero Luminoso also operate a mafia-like structure. Domestic family clans are mostly engaged in the production of cocaine for foreign traffickers, particularly from Colombia, Mexico and Brazil. Mafia-style groups maintain partial control over local populations and frequently use violence against their opponents, including indigenous communities. Criminal syndicates maintain significant access to firearms, fostering an environment of intimidation and impunity.

Loosely organized networks are very influential and primarily concentrated in Lima, the Amazon region and near the Ecuadorian border. Criminal networks, including illegal mining groups, cooperate with private and foreign actors. These groups engage in human trafficking, extortion, illegal mining and contract killings in mining areas like Pataz. Transnational influences are prominent, with Peruvian networks collaborating with Ecuadorian groups in arms trafficking, Brazilian and Colombian organizations in wildlife smuggling and Chilean networks in cannabis distribution. The fluid, decentralized structure of such groups complicates enforcement and facilitates cross-border criminal enterprises. In the first two months of 2024, 1 405 criminal gangs were dismantled by the National Police, signalling an extensive presence of loosely organized criminal networks.

Organized crime in Peru is deeply entrenched within state institutions, with law enforcement, politicians and judiciary members frequently implicated in criminality. Corruption permeates various levels, cultivating an environment where criminal organizations operate with impunity. Systemic vulnerabilities are illustrated by high-profile cases, such as former presidents accused of influence peddling and money laundering. Law enforcement corruption is pervasive, from facilitating human trafficking within penitentiaries to ignoring falsified permits for illegal wildlife trade. Environmental and police authorities often fail to enforce regulations. Some officers manipulate evidence to coerce suspects’ cooperation. These practices reveal how state actors, even when not directly involved in criminal markets, significantly enable and sustain organized crime. Whether by complicity or negligence, they complicate efforts to dismantle criminal networks.

Foreign groups are also highly influential in the country. Actors from Venezuela, Ecuador, Colombia and the Balkans, as well as Mexican cartels, have expanded their presence in Peru, highlighting systemic vulnerabilities in border control and law enforcement and exacerbating transnational organized crime dynamics. Venezuelan criminal groups, notably Tren de Aragua, dominate multiple criminal markets, including human trafficking, extortion, arms trafficking and cocaine trade. Colombian groups, including remnants of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, exert significant influence over cocaine trafficking. Brazilian gangs, including the Comando Vermelho and the Primeiro Comando da Capital, are entrenched in border regions.

As for private-sector actors, legal logging and gold-mining companies in Peru are known to facilitate organized crime by falsifying certificates and faking transactions to launder gold and timber. Timber bosses exploit indigenous communities under the guise of employment, while illegal timber trafficking networks involving businessmen and public officials profit from labour exploitation. The illegal gold-mining sector operates as an intricate network of miners, intermediaries and concession owners. Financial institutions, such as fake cooperatives, are also involved in criminal activities, particularly through fraudulent schemes that exploit clients with false promises of high returns.

Leadership and governance

Peru faces a severe security crisis marked by escalating organized crime, with nearly half of the reported murders occurring in Lima. Contract killings and extortion have surged, prompting increased government funding for law enforcement and the inauguration of ballistic identification laboratories to track firearms. The government has deployed military and special police forces in response to rising violence and threats from Venezuelan extortion gangs. Despite these efforts, opposition parties criticize the administration’s measures as superficial and ineffective. Simultaneously, the country faces a constitutional crisis, with low approval ratings for both the president and Congress. Corruption allegations and controversial constitutional changes only intensify public dissatisfaction and political instability.

Corruption remains a pervasive issue, undermining public trust in government and political institutions. Most citizens identify corruption as Peru’s primary problem. During the reporting period, investigations targeted high-level politicians including the president, several former presidents and numerous legislators, with many facing corruption or related charges. Nevertheless, government officials often prevent and evade investigations into corruption allegations, including arbitrary removals of lead prosecutors in high profile cases. Transparency has declined, with reduced access to budget and procurement data and increased opacity under the current administration.

Peru actively addresses organized crime through international cooperation, legal frameworks and capacity-building initiatives. During the reporting period, Peru joined regional security efforts, including the Andean security network, which is intended to coordinate border operations against transnational crime with its neighbouring countries. It also participated in a US-led training initiative for law enforcement to enhance digital evidence handling. The United States supports elite police training, logistics and intelligence, with DEA presence in Lima. Peru has extradition treaties with 18 countries and collaborates with UN agencies and INTERPOL, hosting the UN Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean to bolster international law enforcement coordination.

Peru’s legal framework against organized crime continues to be robust yet contentious. Legislation addresses drug trafficking and environmental crimes, including wildlife trafficking. Anti-drug efforts have been strengthened through specialized task forces and a long-term national strategy. However, illegal logging regulations were weakened by amendments despite widespread opposition. Relaxed gun laws led to increased arms smuggling, prompting a state of emergency at the border with Ecuador. Peru also lacks a national cyber security strategy, or policies related to countering cybercrime. Controversial laws restricted prosecutors’ ability to investigate certain low-penalty crimes as organized crime, raised crime classification thresholds and shifted preliminary investigations from prosecutors to police, sparking criticism for potentially undermining efforts against corruption organized crime.

Criminal justice and security

Peru’s judiciary faces widespread corruption and a compromised rule of law, with constitutional guarantees unevenly upheld and inadequate legal representation for non-Spanish speakers. During the reporting period, a ruling diminished judicial review and enhanced congressional power, and political interference undermined judicial independence. Despite challenges, an integrity programme was introduced to combat corruption. Specialized courts address corruption crimes, and new flagrancy units aim to expedite justice. However, chronic underfunding hampers effectiveness and illegal mining investigations remain stalled. The prison system lacks state control, with criminal activities persisting within facilities, exacerbated by corruption and overcrowding. A planned mega-prison is meant to address severe overpopulation and poor living conditions.

While Peru made substantial efforts to combat organized crime, its law enforcement continues to face challenges related to the size, funding and training of specialized police units. Collaborative initiatives, such as the transnational criminal investigative unit and special joint anti-drug task operational groups, were established to strengthen anti-crime operations. Environmental crime measures were intensified through regional cooperation against illicit finance. Law enforcement funding increased, reflecting a prioritization of public security. However, trust in the police and armed forces remains low due to abuse and corruption. High turnover rates further hinder their effectiveness. Community policing in remote areas has proven ineffective. Despite anti-corruption measures, the deactivation of the division for investigating highly complex crimes raises concerns about political interference.

Peru’s geographical diversity of mountainous terrain, dense jungles and complex river systems poses significant challenges for border control. The country’s strategic location makes it a major criminal market and transit point for trafficking to Asia, North America and Europe. During the reporting period, border security measures were strengthened, including enhanced monitoring on the Ecuadorian border and the establishment of a tripartite border-control post at the juncture with Chile and Bolivia. Remote sensing and satellite technology are being employed to detect illegal activities. Despite these efforts, border porosity remains a critical issue, particularly in the Amazon and along the borders with Brazil, Colombia and Bolivia. Corruption within transport infrastructure exacerbates vulnerabilities.

Economic and financial environment

Peru remains a focal point for money laundering concerns. While the Financial Action Task Force has not listed it as having strategic anti-money laundering (AML) deficiencies, it is categorized as ‘a jurisdiction of primary concern’ by the US State Department. During the reporting period, Peru strengthened its AML framework through public–private partnerships with major financial institutions and the development of investigative guidelines with European technical support. Legislative measures to enhance financial transparency and prevent illicit activity include regulations on gambling and crowdfunding. However, high-profile investigations continue to link former and current government officials to money laundering and illegal campaign financing. Peru’s commitment to addressing financial crime is evident, yet challenges persist in enforcement and accountability. Peru maintains economic regulations that support trade and investment to a certain extent. The government has invested in digital infrastructure to enhance regulatory efficiency and transparency, focusing on online business-registration and licencing systems. However, corruption and weak rule of law continued to impede property rights enforcement. Once a key driver of economic growth, the construction sector stagnated amid rising violence and increased extortion. Criminal control over land acquisition has surged, with illegal land sales generating significant illicit revenue due to heightened demand for industrial and commercial-use properties. Informal employment is still prevalent, and wage levels were mostly below the legal minimum.

Civil society and social protection

Despite progress, challenges persist. There is limited funding and inadequate training for victim identification and protection. Victim care measures include identity protection, legal aid and psychological support, but resource disparities hinder consistent implementation. As indigenous communities face increased threats from illegal activities, the mechanisms to protect them are underfunded and poorly coordinated, pushing them to boost self-defence strategies. Civil society organizations assist victims and conduct investigations, with mobile units offering immediate support in remote areas. The Peruvian government implemented various measures to combat organized crime, focusing on human trafficking, wildlife trafficking and drug trafficking. Prevention efforts include a national policy against human trafficking and a strategy to reduce illegal wildlife trafficking. A national drug control strategy targets interdiction, eradication and demand reduction, with cooperation from the United States. The Interior Ministry’s Central Única de Denuncias allows anonymous crime reporting through multiple channels. Despite these initiatives, organized crime has surged, including trafficking and environmental violence. NGOs in Peru face challenges in promoting social inclusion, environmental protection and human rights. Despite cooperation between the government and civil society organizations in victim support, state interference hindered investigations into corruption and criminal markets. Proposed legislative changes threaten the right of association by allowing the executive branch to dissolve organizations receiving international funding without judicial oversight, raising concerns about misuse of power. Press freedom is constitutionally protected, yet it remains compromised as journalists face violence and harassment, particularly during protests. The government’s increasing repression of CSOs and the mainstream media’s negative portrayal of demonstrators have heightened tensions and weakened democratic principles.

People

Human trafficking remains a significant issue in Ecuador, with criminal organizations exploiting vulnerabilities in migration policies. Victims, both domestic and foreign, are trafficked within Ecuador and across borders for purposes of sex trafficking and forced labour. Women and children are particularly vulnerable, with trafficking occurring in labour-intensive industries such as agriculture, domestic work and fishing. Criminal networks operate in border regions and urban centres, employing various tactics, including social media, to recruit victims. Corruption within certain institutions has facilitated trafficking activities, with some private-sector entities indirectly benefiting from exploited labour. Trafficking routes frequently involve movement between Ecuador, Colombia and Peru, with some victims continuing onward to Central America and beyond.

Human smuggling has intensified as Ecuador remains a key transit and origin point for irregular migration, especially to the United States. Criminal networks, including Tren de Aragua and Clan del Golfo, profit from these flows, charging high fees and leveraging Ecuador’s porous borders. Smuggling routes through both Colombia and Peru allow for clandestine movement of individuals. Private-sector actors, particularly in the transportation and hospitality sectors, facilitate smuggling operations. Informal crossings into Colombia and Peru allow smugglers to operate with minimal state interference, with corrupt officials reportedly providing false documentation for smuggled individuals.

Extortion and protection racketeering have surged, with mafia-style groups such as Los Choneros, Los Lobos and Los Tiguerones increasingly relying on extortion for revenue. Criminal groups, some operating from prisons, impose protection payments known as vacunas on businesses, transport companies and mining operations. Violence accompanies these extortion schemes, with reports of bombings and kidnappings linked to non-compliance. Despite increased militarization, law enforcement has struggled to curb this trend. In fact, state-embedded actors are known to facilitate extortion schemes by shielding criminal groups from prosecution or providing them with sensitive law enforcement data. Loansharking – locally known as chulcos – also remains widespread, often operated by mafia-style and private-sector actors.

Trade

Arms trafficking in Ecuador has expanded due to rising demand from criminal organizations. Firearms are sourced from Peru and the United States, with security forces implicated in arms diversion. The black market for weapons has grown alongside gang-related violence, with seizures of firearms and ammunition increasing. Ecuador’s relaxed regulations on carrying arms have further fuelled demand. Smuggling routes exploit Ecuador’s maritime and land borders, and illicit arms are frequently recycled within security forces before being resold to criminal groups. Cross-border arms trafficking with Colombia has been identified as a major concern, with dissident factions of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) involved in these operations. Additionally, weapons trafficking is facilitated by corruption among certain security officials, who supply arms directly to organized crime groups.

The counterfeit goods market in Ecuador is sustained by smuggled textiles, pharmaceuticals and electronics. Criminal organizations collaborate with private-sector actors to distribute fake medicines and alcohol, often sourced from Asian markets. Smuggling networks exploit Ecuador’s weak border enforcement, and authorities continue to struggle to dismantle these operations. Operations targeting counterfeit liquor rings and fake pharmaceutical distributors have highlighted the extent of the problem. Informal markets in urban centres, including Guayaquil, serve as key distribution hubs for counterfeit goods, with local criminal networks ensuring their circulation. The market for counterfeit medicines has grown notably during the reporting period, with criminal organizations collaborating with foreign suppliers, particularly from Asia.

The illicit trade in excise goods, particularly cigarettes and alcohol, has expanded. Smugglers use the country’s ports and informal crossings to move goods from Asia, Paraguay and Colombia. Mafia-style groups and criminal networks are increasingly participating in this market, importing and trading illicit goods within the country. These groups often source products from foreign actors, particularly from Asian countries, due to the lower costs and high availability. The participation of corrupt security forces and private-sector actors, who facilitate the importation of these goods through established links with suppliers, further exacerbates the problem. Despite efforts to combat this trade, it continues to grow, with Ecuador reaching a historic peak in illicit cigarette trade, now accounting for most of the market. This widespread prevalence has turned Ecuador into both a consumption hub and a transit point for these illicit goods. Additionally, reports indicate that proceeds from excise goods smuggling are used to fund other illicit activities, including drug trafficking and money laundering operations.

Environment

Flora crimes in Ecuador are driven by illegal logging, particularly in the Amazon and coastal forests. The trade in precious woods such as mahogany and cedar is facilitated by bribery and weak enforcement. Criminal networks and foreign actors exploit Ecuador’s forests, often using timber shipments to launder illicit profits. The illegal timber trade is closely tied to narcotics smuggling, with traffickers using lumber exports to conceal drug shipments. Reports suggest that state-embedded actors provide falsified permits to allow illegal timber to enter formal markets.

Fauna crimes, including the illegal trade in wildlife and marine species, remain significant. Ecuador’s Amazon and Galápagos Islands are major hotspots for wildlife trafficking, with species such as jaguars and turtles targeted for international markets. Shark finning persists, with substantial under-reporting of shark fin exports despite international regulations. Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing by foreign fleets, particularly Chinese vessels near the Galápagos, has strained Ecuador’s marine resources. Ecuadorian ports are frequently used to facilitate the trans-shipment of illegally caught marine species to Asian markets. Investigations suggest that some legal fishing enterprises serve as fronts for laundering illicitly obtained marine resources, further complicating enforcement efforts.

Non-renewable resource crimes are largely driven by illegal gold mining, which has expanded across 17 provinces. Criminal groups, including dissidents from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), extort and control mining operations. Mercury use in illegal mining has caused severe environmental damage, with efforts to dismantle operations proving ineffective. Oil theft has also become a growing issue, with organized crime actors siphoning diesel for use in drug trafficking operations. Corrupt state officials have been implicated in facilitating these activities, further undermining enforcement efforts. Reports indicate that illegal mining networks often operate with impunity, taking advantage of remote terrain and limited state presence.

Drugs

Heroin trafficking persists in Ecuador, primarily as a transit activity. Most heroin originates from Colombia, but Ecuadorian groups are increasingly involved in distribution. Recent seizures indicate a decline in volume, although consumption remains stable. Criminal networks exploit ports and logistical infrastructure, often using the same channels as other drug trades. Local consumption is concentrated among youth in urban centres and is often linked to dangerous substances such as fentanyl. The widespread use of heroin, particularly among youth in urban centres, is contributing to a growing public health issue.

Cocaine trafficking is highly pervasive in Ecuador. The country serves as a key transit hub for the transnational market due to its location between Colombia and Peru. Ports such as Guayaquil and Manta are central nodes in global trafficking networks. Criminal actors include mafia-style groups, foreign cartels (Sinaloa, Jalisco) and Balkan networks, often supported by corrupt state and private-sector actors. Cocaine is exported in fruit shipments and maritime containers. Violence in Ecuador has surged alongside the expansion of the cocaine trade. Homicide rates have risen dramatically, and territorial control is contested by rival groups. The economic benefits of the trade have fostered local acceptance, especially in marginalized communities where micro-trafficking is widespread. The growing cultural normalization of criminal actors in public discourse, particularly through social media, contributes to the entrenchment of the cocaine economy in Ecuador.

Ecuador has a large domestic cannabis market. Despite a legal parallel market introduced in 2020, the illegal trade has expanded, largely driven by organized crime. Criminal groups import, cultivate and distribute cannabis, with foreign suppliers playing a supporting role. Corrupt officials facilitate operations. High domestic demand, particularly among youth, sustains the market. Border provinces such as Carchi, Sucumbíos and El Oro are key trafficking zones. The legal market suffers from competition with illicit actors, and cannabis is often trafficked using the same infrastructure as other narcotics.

Synthetic drugs, including 2CB, ecstasy and LSD, represent a growing market. Consumption is concentrated among youth and tourists, particularly in Quito and Guayaquil. Ecuador also serves as a transit hub for synthetic drugs, supplied by actors from Colombia and Chile. Domestic distribution is handled by subcontracted networks under mafia-style groups. Despite large-scale seizures and identified trafficking routes, the market continues to expand. Prices for synthetic drugs are significantly higher than in neighbouring countries, making the trade highly profitable.

Cyber-dependent crimes

Ecuador has emerged as a target for cyber-dependent crimes, with both domestic and foreign actors involved in ransomware attacks, hacking and malware use. Cybercriminals exploit weaknesses in banking and retail systems, using malware to steal funds. Reports indicate that hacker groups with links to international criminal networks are increasingly active in Ecuador. There has been a surge in cyberattacks targeting critical infrastructure, including energy companies and public institutions, with state-embedded actors reportedly involved in some cyber-espionage activities. Cybercriminal groups have also been implicated in cryptocurrency fraud, using digital assets to launder illicit proceeds while evading financial oversight mechanisms.

Financial Crimes

Financial crimes in Ecuador span tax evasion and fraudulent investment schemes. These schemes thrive on economic vulnerability and impunity, with victims concentrated in urban centres such as Pichincha. The dollarized economy and high informality rate facilitate cross-border cash movements and obscure financial flows. State-embedded actors, including high-ranking officials, have been implicated in tax evasion and fraud, deepening public distrust. Recent cyber-enabled crimes such as identity theft, phishing schemes and scams account for a significant share of arrests. Despite regulatory frameworks, enforcement remains weak and financial crime continues to undermine Ecuador’s economy and institutions.

Criminal Actors

Ecuador’s criminal landscape is dominated by powerful mafia-style groups that exert substantial influence over illicit markets and state institutions. Among these, Los Choneros, Los Lobos and Los Tiguerones stand out as the most prominent and violent organizations, each with a significant presence in drug trafficking, extortion, arms trafficking, illegal mining and human trafficking. These groups operate within Ecuadorian prisons, which serve as command centres for their criminal enterprises. Their internal structures remain fluid due to frequent leadership assassinations and factional disputes, leading to the proliferation of violent splinter groups. Recent notable law enforcement operations revealed the extent of these groups’ infiltration into Ecuador’s judicial and political systems, highlighting their ability to influence court rulings and finance election campaigns. The growing fragmentation and conflicts between these groups have fuelled Ecuador’s escalating homicide rates. Despite recent government interventions, including militarization strategies, mafia-style groups continue to thrive.

Unlike the hierarchical mafia-style organizations, criminal networks in Ecuador function as intermediaries, facilitating illicit transactions across various markets without exerting territorial control. These groups play a key role in cocaine trafficking, arms smuggling and human trafficking, often operating between mafia-style groups and foreign actors. They specialize in logistics, enabling the transportation of drugs through ports, establishing clandestine airstrips and creating storage facilities for illicit goods. Recent developments highlight their growing influence. The killing of a prominent Ecuadorian gang leader in 2024 intensified violent disputes in Durán, Ecuador’s most dangerous municipality, where rival networks compete for control of local drug trafficking routes. Similarly, internal divisions within the Chone Killers have exacerbated instability, reflecting a broader trend of power struggles within Ecuador’s underworld. Criminal networks have expanded into Esmeraldas and Sucumbíos, two key provinces near the Colombian border, which serve as strategic zones for purchasing cocaine from Colombian producers. These networks also facilitate the movement of international trafficking organizations, providing armed enforcers and intermediaries for foreign criminal groups seeking access to Ecuador’s illicit economies. Despite their significance, authorities have historically underappreciated the role of these fluid and adaptable networks, focusing primarily on the high-profile violence of mafia-style groups.

The penetration of organized crime into Ecuador’s state institutions remains a critical challenge. Corrupt officials at multiple levels – police, judiciary and political leadership – facilitate the operations of criminal groups through bribery, information leaks and active participation in illicit activities. Recent high-profile investigations have revealed deep-rooted corruption, exposing narco-generals within the security forces and the manipulation of judicial appointments by criminal organizations. Reports indicate that state-embedded actors play a pivotal role in arms trafficking, where corrupt security officials resell military-grade weapons, including those previously seized from criminal groups. Leaks from law enforcement agencies continue to compromise anti-mining operations, with officials tipping off criminals before raids on illegal gold-mining sites. The involvement of state actors in political corruption is also evident. Criminal groups finance electoral campaigns and maintain influence over local governance structures, particularly in coastal provinces like Guayas and Esmeraldas. This collusion between officials and organized crime weakens state resilience, making Ecuador increasingly vulnerable to criminal governance and illicit financial flows.

Numerous foreign criminal organizations are attracted by Ecuador’s strategic location, each seeking to exploit the country’s ports, border crossings and financial systems. Mexican cartels such as Sinaloa and Jalisco New Generation have solidified their presence, partnering with Ecuadorian mafia-style groups to transport cocaine to international markets. Similarly, Balkan mafias leverage Ecuador’s banana export routes to smuggle narcotics into Europe. The Colombian Clan del Golfo and FARC dissidents have become increasingly active, particularly in northern Ecuador, where they engage in drug production, arms smuggling and extortion of local businesses. Venezuelan gangs, most notably Tren de Aragua, have also attempted to establish operations in Ecuador, though authorities officially deny their presence. Beyond direct criminal engagement, foreign actors influence Ecuador’s criminal landscape through financial networks. Money laundering operations linked to Colombian and Mexican organizations exploit Ecuador’s dollarized economy, using real estate, construction firms and agriculture to disguise illicit funds. The interplay between domestic and foreign actors has made Ecuador a pivotal hub in the global drug trade.

Private-sector entities, particularly in transportation, agriculture and finance, play a crucial role in enabling organized crime, either through negligence or direct collusion. The banana export industry remains a key conduit for cocaine trafficking, with shipments frequently used to conceal narcotics destined for Europe. Shipping companies and logistics firms facilitate human smuggling by providing safe passage, often in exchange for bribes. Illegal gold mining is another sector where private enterprises contribute to criminal economies. Mining companies have been implicated in the use of illegally extracted minerals, while local businesses engage in money laundering to obscure the origins of illicit gold. Reports indicate that fuel companies and fishing fleets also engage in illicit activities, supplying vessels linked to IUU fishing operations – a market heavily influenced by external actors.

Leadership and governance

Ecuador’s political leadership has been tested by the deep infiltration of organized crime into the country’s institutions and political sphere, which became starkly evident following high-profile assassinations, violent attacks and prison riots that shook public confidence. Organized crime has increasingly shaped political, social and economic debates, particularly during elections and amid an ongoing security crisis. Despite efforts to combat these threats through militarized security measures and declaring an internal armed conflict against criminal groups, violence has escalated both inside prisons and across cities and mining regions, with rising extortion, kidnappings and homicides in areas previously less affected. Governance has also been undermined by a persistent financial crisis, weak institutional planning and a de-institutionalization process that neglected critical state functions, limiting the state’s capacity to respond effectively. Corruption at multiple levels of government has further eroded institutional effectiveness, with investigations uncovering links between political and judicial actors and organized crime, weakening transparency and oversight. While partnerships and reforms aim to strengthen Ecuador’s response, the security and governance challenges remain severe and evolving. Government transparency and accountability mechanisms function within a context of judicial inefficiencies and reports of political interference. Public confidence in state institutions has been affected by corruption cases and limited prosecution of high-profile figures. The Organic Law of Transparency and Access to Public Information provides a framework for transparency, but enforcement remains inconsistent across state institutions. Recent restrictions on public data access have raised concerns regarding oversight, particularly regarding security operations and crime statistics.

Ecuador engages in international cooperation initiatives to counter organized crime through agreements with the United States, Colombia and the European Union, as well as participation in multilateral organizations such as the United Nations and INTERPOL. The country has received financial and security assistance, including technical training and military aid, to strengthen its capabilities against drug trafficking and other transnational crimes. Furthermore, the country also maintains security partnerships with other South American countries. For example, in 2024, a binational council with Colombia was established to address environmental and organized crime in border regions. Despite these efforts, limitations in inter-agency trust and operational coordination have been noted, particularly with the US, Peruvian and Colombian counterparts in border security operations. Furthermore, Ecuador’s diplomatic ties with Mexico were severed in 2024 following a police raid on the Mexican Embassy in Quito, which led to the suspension of relations between the two countries.

National policies and laws that address organized crime include legislation targeting human trafficking, money laundering and drug trafficking, with varying levels of enforcement. Ecuador’s 2023 anti-human-trafficking law has strengthened prevention and protection measures, although implementation challenges remain. The Phoenix Plan, announced by the government, outlines security strategies, but limited public information on its operational scope has raised concerns about transparency. In terms of its environmental policies and laws, CITES issued an ultimatum to Ecuador to implement measures ensuring sustainable shark fishing in late 2024. In response, Ecuador announced initiatives to regulate the practice. However, an absence of transparency regarding the findings of CITES-mandated studies has compounded concerns raised in 2019 by the European Union’s ‘yellow card’ for the country’s failure to control illegal fishing.

Criminal justice and security

The judicial system in Ecuador faces challenges in handling organized crime cases, with reports of bribery and coercion affecting judicial decisions. Corruption allegations include case dismissals and favourable rulings obtained through financial influence. Ecuador’s criminal investigation system has been described as relying on in-flagrante arrests rather than long-term investigations, limiting its capacity to dismantle complex criminal organizations. Additionally, 35% of the prison population is in preventive detention, with over half facing drug-related charges. The penitentiary system remains a focal point of organized crime activity, with high-profile gang leaders operating from within prisons. Frequent escapes and prison massacres have been linked to gang conflicts and the presence of illicit arms within detention centres. The government has implemented emergency security measures in response, including transferring inmates between facilities and deploying military personnel. However, these have not fully curtailed gang control over prisons, as evidenced by ongoing security breaches.

Law enforcement agencies have conducted operations targeting organized crime, with a focus on anti-narcotics and counter-extortion efforts. However, cases of corruption within police ranks have been documented, including instances of collusion with criminal groups. Intelligence-sharing and coordination between different branches of law enforcement have been affected by trust issues and information leaks. The government has initiated reforms, including the rotation of police officials, to mitigate corruption risks. While these measures have led to arrests of high-profile figures, operational challenges persist in containing the expansion of organized crime.

Territorial integrity is affected by criminal organizations operating along key border regions and strategic trafficking routes. Informal crossings facilitate the movement of arms, narcotics and smuggled individuals. State presence remains limited in some areas, enabling criminal groups to establish control. The government has increased joint security operations with neighbouring countries, but arms trafficking from Peru and transnational criminal networks remain persistent issues.

Economic and financial environment

Ecuador’s anti-money laundering framework includes regulatory measures aimed at preventing financial crimes, but enforcement has been inconsistent. Financial networks tied to drug trafficking continue to exploit real estate, commercial enterprises and informal financial systems. The government has taken steps to expand financial oversight, including reforms to enhance banking-sector compliance with anti-money laundering regulations. Nevertheless, Ecuador remains particularly vulnerable to money laundering, largely due to the overall ineffectiveness and limited impact of its recent efforts to combat it.

The economic regulatory environment includes oversight mechanisms for financial transactions and tax compliance. However, informal markets and tax evasion remain challenges that disrupt economic stability. Reports have highlighted instances of corruption within regulatory bodies, hindering the enforcement of financial laws. Ecuador has received international assistance to strengthen its financial intelligence capabilities, but legal loopholes continue to be exploited by organized crime groups.

Civil society and social protection

Resources and implementation for victim and witness support services in Ecuador vary across regions. The national system for the protection of and assistance to victims and witnesses provides legal and psychological support, though limitations in security measures for key witnesses in high-profile cases have been noted. The murder of witnesses, including state officials, in organized crime cases has created a disincentive for participation in judicial processes. In recent years, efforts have been made to improve victim identification and access to specialized services, including the creation of two new task forces, though both remain understaffed and under-resourced. For drug users, interagency and multisectoral programmes promote social inclusion, early intervention, treatment and rehabilitation, but lack recovery support. Additionally, the absence of mechanisms to coordinate, collect, and analyze information on these services makes it difficult to assess the effectiveness of victim support systems.

Although the central government has yet to establish a definitive policy on crime prevention, several municipal authorities have proactively developed their own plans and policies. Many of these initiatives have been formulated with the support and collaboration of civil society partners. These include community-based programmes and security sector reforms. A criminal policy council coordinates national efforts in crime prevention, though its long-term impact is still under assessment. Reports indicate that efforts to combat forced labour and human trafficking have been impaired by enforcement challenges. The 2023 human trafficking law included enhanced prevention measures, but access to specialized victim services remains limited in some regions.

Non-state actors, including civil society organizations and investigative media, have played a role in exposing corruption and organized crime. Ecuador’s media continue to report on governance and security challenges, despite legal pressures and security risks for journalists and activists. Documented threats and violence against reporters covering organized crime have led to cases of self-censorship. Civil society organizations engage in transparency and accountability initiatives, including advocacy for anti-corruption measures and judicial integrity. The government has announced an integrity strategy to regulate CSOs, with implications for operational oversight. Some activists have raised concerns regarding potential restrictions on freedom of association under its framework. Despite these challenges, non-state actors continue to monitor crime trends and advocate for governance reforms.