Criminal markets
3.830.23
An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.
Human trafficking
4.000.50
Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.
Human smuggling
2.000.00
Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.
Extortion and protection racketeering
4.000.50
Crimes linked to exerting control over a territory/market including as a mediator and/or requesting a benefit in exchange for protection.
Arms trafficking
3.500.50
The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.
Trade in counterfeit goods
5.000.00
The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands.
Illicit trade in excisable goods
3.000.50
The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits.
Flora crimes
4.000.00
The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.
Fauna crimes
4.000.00
The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.
Non-renewable resource crimes
3.000.00
The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.
Heroin trade
4.000.00
The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.
Cocaine trade
2.500.50
The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cannabis trade
3.500.00
The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.
Synthetic drug trade
4.500.50
The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cyber-dependent crimes
5.000.00
Organized crimes that rely solely on using information communications technology with the aim of obtaining a monetary/material benefit.
Financial crimes
5.500.50
Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance.
Criminal actors
3.900.30
An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.
Mafia-style groups
3.500.50
Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.
Criminal networks
3.500.50
Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.
State-embedded actors
4.000.50
Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.
Foreign actors
3.000.00
State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.
Private sector actors
5.500.00
Profit-seeking individuals/entities who own/control a part of the legal economy free from the state, that collaborate with criminal actors.
Political leadership and governance
4.000.00
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
4.00-1.00
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
5.00-1.00
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
6.500.00
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
3.000.00
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
6.500.00
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
4.50-0.50
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
4.50-0.50
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
5.000.50
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
6.500.00
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
5.500.00
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
5.00-0.50
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Georgia is a source, transit and destination country for human trafficking. Georgian women and girls are exploited both abroad and domestically alongside foreign victims, particularly in the tourism sector. Labour trafficking affects Georgian nationals abroad, often owing to weak oversight of employment agencies and the absence of migrant worker protections. Children from marginalized communities and displaced populations are trafficked for forced begging and criminal activity. Georgia’s geographic location facilitates the transit of Central Asian victims to Türkiye, while outbound trafficking cases reportedly end in Iran. Despite a significant rise in prosecutions, limited detection, especially via online platforms, contributes to underreporting of trafficking cases.
Georgia functions primarily as a transit country in the human smuggling market, facilitating the movement of migrants from Asia and Africa into Türkiye and onward to Europe. In recent years, hundreds of individuals from various countries were apprehended for illegal border crossings. Georgian nationals have been implicated in smuggling operations abroad and repatriated after failed asylum attempts. Cases of Georgians being smuggled into the US via Mexico have been reported in recent years, but tightened asylum rules have hampered this trend. Weak border controls and proximity to conflict zones continue to enable such activities.
Extortion is a notable issue in Georgia, with law enforcement identifying numerous cases involving threats, firearms and intimidation for financial gain. These activities are frequently linked to the influence of ‘thieves in law’, whose reputations are exploited by other criminals to demand payments in exchange for protection. Authorities also reported several cases tied to criminal underworld membership and support for such networks. Experts believe these figures may underestimate the problem owing to victims’ reluctance to report. Evidence suggests extortion continues within prisons, and street gangs may be mobilized for voter intimidation and contributions to obshchaki (collective criminal funds derived from coerced payments).
Illegal arms trafficking has intensified in Georgia in recent years, with over a thousand cases of unlawful possession, trade and transport of firearms and ammunition recorded across multiple regions. This growth is tied to political instability, regional conflicts and weak enforcement of firearm regulations. Armed groups have become more active, expanding their arsenals. Authorities linked some illegal weapons seizures to terrorism investigations, notably involving suspects in Batumi associated with the Islamic State. Incidents have revealed illicit explosive materials and broader trafficking networks. Ongoing conflicts in areas such as Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as the war in Ukraine, continue to drive demand.
Georgia hosts a well-established counterfeit goods market, particularly in pharmaceuticals, apparel, footwear and cosmetics, driven in part by tourist demand and local acceptance. In recent years, authorities reported hundreds of customs violations, including trademark misuse and illicit goods circulation, although not all involved confirmed counterfeit items. The illicit trade in excisable goods in Georgia – particularly unstamped tobacco and alcohol – is relatively limited yet persistent. Although official data on seizures is scarce, repeated interceptions indicate the ongoing presence of this criminal market. Cross-border smuggling, especially from Türkiye, Armenia and Azerbaijan, fuels non-domestic cigarette consumption. In addition, separatist regions under Russian occupation, particularly Abkhazia, have become potential hubs for circumventing international sanctions, leveraging their isolation and ties to Russia to engage in and benefit from illicit economic activity.
Illegal logging and related environmental crimes are prevalent in Georgia, with numerous cases of unlawful timber activities and widespread violations by sawmills and transporters recorded in recent years. These crimes are concentrated in regions such as Kakheti and Tbilisi and are often facilitated by systemic corruption and weak enforcement. Loopholes in forest governance and the exploitation of legal ambiguity enable illicit operations within the broader logging sector. The unsustainable collection of endemic plants for food, medicine and ornamental use further contributes to biodiversity loss. Several species, including the Caucasian elm, face critical threats owing to habitat destruction and commercial overharvesting.
Georgia’s fauna crimes market is moderately developed, with illegal fishing, hunting and wildlife trafficking posing ongoing challenges. Violations of fishing and hunting laws are recorded in the country, with anchovy fishing off the Abkhazian coast – often involving Turkish vessels – highlighting regulatory ambiguities and the scale of the illicit trade in fish products. Wildlife crimes also include the trapping and smuggling of birds for falconry, a formerly traditional practice now largely driven by profit, with tens of thousands of birds affected annually through domestic capture and cross-border trafficking.
The illegal trade of non-renewable resources, particularly gold, silver and diamonds, does exist in Georgia, with seizures revealing connections to neighbouring countries and transnational criminal networks. Authorities have confiscated varying amounts of precious metals, including gold and silver in significant although sometimes unspecified amounts. Some of these materials are illicitly integrated into legal markets, obscuring the distinction between lawful and unlawful trade. Georgia’s geographic location makes it vulnerable as a transit corridor for smuggling operations.
Georgia serves primarily as a regional transit point for opiate trafficking, particularly Afghan heroin moving from Asia to Europe via the Caucasus and Black Sea routes. Although domestic heroin consumption appears limited, Georgia’s role in transnational smuggling networks is notable. The country also reports internal drug circulation, with tens of thousands of residents injecting drugs. Heroin trafficking through Georgia continues despite declines in opium production in Afghanistan, with evidence of large shipments moving to Europe through neighbouring countries, underscoring Georgia’s strategic geographic vulnerability.
Although smaller than other drug markets, Georgia’s cocaine market is growing, with increasing seizures indicating its role as a regional transit hub. Several high-profile shipments originating from Ecuador were intercepted in recent years, some even linked to the ’Ndrangheta syndicate. Despite limited domestic consumption, the country has a documented local market and demand appears to be rising. The sharp increase in drug-related offences further reflects this trend. in addition, cocaine trafficking is closely tied to money laundering operations, with illicit proceeds being invested in foreign real estate, particularly in Cyprus, through shell entities.
Georgia’s cannabis market is also active, pointing to persistent domestic demand and production. Despite personal consumption having been decriminalized, the illegal acquisition, transport and sale of cannabis remains punishable, particularly as the country is also a destination rather than just a transit point. Cannabis cultivation, both indoor and outdoor, occurs on a small scale, and some reports link this market to criminal groups involved in extortion and violence. However, experts caution that cannabis is often a secondary seizure during operations targeting more serious drugs. Although cannabis consumption is socially tolerated to a degree, trafficking activity remains widely condemned.
Similarly, Georgia has a notable synthetic drug market, evidenced by frequent seizures of substances such as buprenorphine, methamphetamine, MDMA, Alpha-PVP and other new psychoactive drugs. Despite strong social stigma and health concerns being linked to these drugs, domestic demand is persistent. Synthetic drugs, particularly MDMA and amphetamines, are increasingly available, with some being laced with fentanyl. Reports indicate fentanyl is often sourced via the dark web and delivered by mail, with unconfirmed accounts of fatal overdoses pointing to evolving risks in the local market.
Cyber-dependent crimes are common in Georgia, involving unauthorized access to computer systems and data manipulation for financial gain. Criminal operations include malware deployment and hacking attacks targeting both the public and private sector. The continued presence of this market underscores Georgia’s exposure to digital threats and the rising sophistication of cyber- and data-related crime in the region.
Financial crime in Georgia is extensive and expanding, involving tax evasion, embezzlement and fraud. Notable cases during the reporting period involved fraudulent claims for state aid and misuse of public funds. The call-centre scam market is a growing concern, with transnational fraud networks operating from Georgia targeting EU citizens. Joint operations with foreign agencies have recently led to multiple arrests, asset seizures and the dismantling of illicit enterprises, with defendants facing substantial prison terms for fraud.
Despite official claims to the contrary, evidence indicates the continued presence of mafia-style groups within Georgia’s criminal underworld. These groups, often linked to the ‘thieves-in-law’ tradition, operate through extortion, particularly targeting local businesses, and exert influence both domestically and from abroad. Their activities span several illicit markets, including drug and arms trafficking, human smuggling and the trade in counterfeit and excisable goods. Structural vulnerabilities such as corruption and weak prison oversight enable these actors to exert control within penitentiary systems, reinforcing criminal hierarchies and coordinating activities.
Georgia hosts a range of loosely structured criminal networks engaged in illicit activities such as drug trafficking, human smuggling, extortion and environmental crimes. These groups often lack formal hierarchies but are active across multiple illicit markets. Although violence is typically limited and used to enforce compliance, operations involving transnational networks – particularly in the drug, arms and human trafficking trades – can escalate to more severe forms, including coercion and lethal force. Georgian networks maintain international linkages, adapting their structures depending on the activity: drug trafficking follows a chain model involving foreign actors, whereas extortion and gambling rely on a wheel structure led by external bosses. This transnational reach poses persistent challenges for law enforcement across Europe and North America.
State-embedded actors in Georgia are also notably involved in facilitating organized crime by leveraging their positions within government to enable illicit activities. Their involvement includes direct participation in criminal markets such as embezzlement and extortion, as well as indirect facilitation through abuse of power and collusion with criminal networks. Corruption is particularly pronounced in public procurement, where state funds are funnelled to politically loyal businesses. This system reinforces control over state institutions and suppresses dissent.
Foreign criminal actors are also active to a certain extent in Georgia’s illicit economy, particularly in human trafficking, smuggling, arms trading, counterfeit goods and cybercrime. They often collaborate with local networks, facilitating cross-border criminal operations. Urban centres such as Tbilisi and Batumi are key operational hubs due to their infrastructure and connectivity. Criminal groups with origins in Russia, China, Türkiye, Armenia and South East Asia are active in various sectors: Russian networks in trafficking and extortion; Chinese in counterfeit trade; and South East Asian groups in drug trafficking and human smuggling. Furthermore, foreign transport companies and travel agencies are used to support irregular migration, whereas offshore financial entities help obscure the origins of illicit capital, reinforcing Georgia’s role in transnational criminal networks.
Organized crime in Georgia is enabled by private-sector actors who launder illicit revenues through sectors such as real estate, finance, hospitality and construction. These actors create legal facades for illicit funds, offering organized crime groups access to legitimate economic structures. In addition, domestic private actors collaborate with foreign entities to facilitate criminal enterprises, particularly in human smuggling and financial crimes.
Georgia continues its efforts to combat organized crime through measures such as adopting a national strategy and action plan, strengthening cooperation with Europol, and issuing numerous implementation guidelines to executive agencies. Despite these efforts, organized crime is not a central political issue, overshadowed by concerns around governance, corruption and political polarization. Perceptions of elite influence, particularly by oligarchic figures, have raised questions about institutional integrity. Although Georgia has in the past engaged with European institutions, increasing alignment with Russian-style policies has prompted criticism. The country continues to face governance challenges, electoral controversies and declining democratic indicators. In late 2024, Georgia experienced widespread unrest following the government’s decision to pause EU accession talks until 2028, citing concerns over national sovereignty. The move sparked mass protests, public discontent over governance and election legitimacy, and clashes with police. The situation has drawn international criticism and raised concerns about growing political instability and potential alignment with Russian interests.
Georgia introduced anti-corruption reforms, including the establishment of the Anti-Corruption Bureau and endorsement of a de-oligarchization action plan. However, corruption remains entrenched across public institutions, aggravated by elite influence, limited judicial independence and opaque oversight mechanisms. Investigative bodies often fail to address corruption involving senior officials or those close to the ruling elite. Although international recommendations have been issued, several remain unimplemented. The Anti-Corruption Bureau lacks investigative authority and is perceived as politically influenced, which raises concerns about its effectiveness. Legislative gaps persist in access to information and protection for whistle-blowers. Civil society groups have been targeted ahead of elections, prompting criticism over declining transparency. High-level corruption cases often remain unresolved, undermining public trust and hindering institutional accountability.
Georgia is a signatory to major international conventions on organized crime, excluding the UN Firearms Protocol, and maintains active cooperation with the EU and other international partners. The country also participates in intelligence-sharing initiatives and uphold several extradition treaties. The State Security Service emphasizes international collaboration on transnational threats, including terrorism and corruption. Nevertheless, following the political turmoil as a result of the election results, the relationship between Western allies, including the US and the EU, were strained. Western partners have imposed sanctions on senior officials for human rights violations and undermining democratic processes, raising concerns about the future of international cooperation. In response, the Georgian government announced a halt in its EU accession process, while continuing their commitment to the implementation of the EU accession reforms. Despite this, joint efforts continue, such as anti-trafficking awareness campaigns led by international organizations, focusing on vulnerable communities and safe migration practices.
As for the national policies, Georgia maintains a generally liberal drug-policy environment focused on treatment and harm reduction, including free methadone clinics. However, experts note the need for stronger legislative frameworks to support preventive strategies and the full implementation of the national drug policy. Georgian criminal law addresses various forms of organized crime, including human trafficking, arms smuggling and irregular migration, with penalties ranging from two to 20 years’ imprisonment depending on severity and aggravating factors such as involvement of organized groups. Despite comprehensive legislation, enforcement is hindered by corruption among lower-level officials and legal loopholes, limiting the state’s ability to effectively identify and prosecute criminal activity.
Georgia’s judiciary face structural challenges, including interference from other branches of power, limited transparency and questions regarding impartiality. Although reforms are underway, enforcement of criminal penalties is inconsistent, particularly in cases involving organized crime. The penitentiary system struggles with internal criminal governance, with influential inmates running informal hierarchies that undermine prison authority. Corruption among prison staff and poor conditions (e.g., limited medical services and sanitation issues) further contribute to criminal influence within facilities. Despite some progress in addressing torture and improving detention standards, illicit practices such as extortion, gambling and forced dependencies persist, particularly in specific high-risk prisons.
Georgia has maintained specialized law enforcement units targeting organized crime, including those focused on trafficking, illegal migration and asset recovery. Cooperation with international actors such as Europol, NATO and EU member states supports capacity-building and intelligence sharing. The State Security Service and Financial Intelligence Unit are central to counterterrorism and anti-money laundering (AML) efforts, although limited resources hinder the latter’s effectiveness. Law enforcement strategies incorporate community policing and modernization initiatives. However, concerns persist over political influence, particularly by oligarchic actors, undermining institutional independence. Allegations of excessive force against protesters and appointments of politically affiliated officials have raised questions about law enforcement impartiality.
Georgia faces persistent border security challenges owing to its strategic location and unresolved territorial conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. These areas, under Russian control, remain outside effective Georgian oversight, creating vulnerabilities exploited by organized criminal networks involved in smuggling, trafficking and money laundering. Smuggling of weapons, narcotics and counterfeit goods is prevalent along porous borders. Similar to its border control, Georgia’s cybersecurity capabilities are limited, hindered by ongoing geopolitical tensions and regional instability, particularly in light of Russia’s continued influence and military presence in separatist territories.
Georgia has advanced its AML framework, aligning national policies with international standards. A multi-pronged strategy emphasizes financial oversight, enhanced software tools, risk-based supervision of gambling, and public–private information sharing. Common laundering methods include the use of shell companies, forged documentation and illicit fund transfers disguised as legitimate transactions. The rising use of cryptocurrency and crypto-mining remains unregulated, with no formal investigations launched into crypto-based laundering. Although Georgia’s legal framework meets international obligations, recent tax code amendments facilitating offshore capital inflow have sparked concern over potential misuse and decreased transparency in financial oversight.
Georgia’s economy is moderately free, with policies encouraging entrepreneurship and trade, although impeded by weak judicial independence, transparency issues and persistent concerns over political favouritism. Global economic ties are expanding and the country maintains 16 free-trade agreements and 34 bilateral investment treaties. Experts highlight entrenched collusion between political elites and private interests, which undermines fair competition, complicates dispute resolution and raises concerns about state capture in the business environment. Furthermore, although authorities have denied facilitating sanctions evasion, there have been reports of Georgian entities allegedly assisting Russian individuals and companies in circumventing international restrictions.
During the reporting period, Georgia continued to offer support services to victims of organized crime, including shelter, legal aid and medical care through dedicated state agencies and crisis centres. Inter-agency collaboration contributes to anti-trafficking coordination, with international assessments acknowledging compliance with global standards. Witness protection frameworks formally exist but remain ineffective in practice, contributing to low reporting rates and limited victim cooperation. Civil society organizations appear to have an important role in delivering treatment and support, particularly in areas related to drug addiction and trafficking. However, recently adopted laws targeting civil society and marginalized groups raise concerns about reduced access to essential services and victim protection.
Georgia implements national strategies for drug prevention and anti-trafficking. Despite efforts such as the European Prevention Curriculum and a national drug prevention strategy, experts deem regulatory frameworks weak and poorly enforced. Drug-related crimes have increased in the reporting period, with a notable rise in positive drug-test results, although it remains unclear whether this reflects higher usage or improved enforcement. Prevention campaigns, legal reforms and collaboration with local communities and international bodies are key pillars of Georgia’s crime-prevention approach.
Civil society organizations are active in countering organized crime, despite facing increasing political pressure and restrictions. Although their efforts contribute to exposing corruption and promoting accountability, government hostility – through discrediting campaigns, restrictive legislation and legal intimidation – appear to significantly constrain their role. The law on foreign influence has been criticized for undermining civil society and violating EU principles, negatively affecting Georgia’s EU candidacy. Media outlets and journalists also appear to face escalating repression, with verbal attacks and physical threats contributing to a deteriorating environment for press freedom. This growing polarization has been linked to Georgia’s geopolitical pivot towards Moscow.
Criminal markets
6.130.20
An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.
Human trafficking
6.500.50
Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.
Human smuggling
7.501.00
Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.
Extortion and protection racketeering
4.500.00
Crimes linked to exerting control over a territory/market including as a mediator and/or requesting a benefit in exchange for protection.
Arms trafficking
6.500.50
The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.
Trade in counterfeit goods
7.000.00
The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands.
Illicit trade in excisable goods
6.000.50
The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits.
Flora crimes
4.000.00
The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.
Fauna crimes
5.500.00
The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.
Non-renewable resource crimes
5.000.00
The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.
Heroin trade
5.50-0.50
The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.
Cocaine trade
7.500.50
The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cannabis trade
7.000.00
The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.
Synthetic drug trade
6.500.50
The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cyber-dependent crimes
6.500.00
Organized crimes that rely solely on using information communications technology with the aim of obtaining a monetary/material benefit.
Financial crimes
6.500.00
Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance.
Criminal actors
5.700.00
An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.
Mafia-style groups
5.50-0.50
Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.
Criminal networks
6.500.00
Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.
State-embedded actors
3.500.00
Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.
Foreign actors
7.500.50
State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.
Private sector actors
5.500.00
Profit-seeking individuals/entities who own/control a part of the legal economy free from the state, that collaborate with criminal actors.
Political leadership and governance
6.500.00
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
6.50-0.50
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
8.500.00
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
7.500.00
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
6.500.00
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
7.000.00
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
5.500.00
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
8.000.00
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
8.000.00
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
6.001.00
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
7.500.50
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
7.000.00
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
France remains a significant hub for human trafficking, with a well-entrenched criminal market involving international organized crime syndicates. The country serves as a source, transit and destination for victims, many of whom are subjected to sexual exploitation, forced labour and forced begging. The market mainly targets vulnerable groups such as migrants, children and financially precarious individuals, with growing numbers of child victims. Most trafficked individuals are foreign nationals and are engaged in commercial sex in the country. Nigerian groups, including Black Axe Confraternity and Eiye syndicate, as well as Romanian, Bulgarian and Chinese criminal networks, are key players in the human trafficking market and operate extensively. Online platforms are increasingly used for trafficking ¬– a pattern that has been described as the ‘uberization’ of the sex trade. The increasing use of debt bondage, psychological coercion and cultural manipulation has made the non-monetary impact of human trafficking in France particularly complex.
Human smuggling is highly organized and lucrative in France, which serves as a key transit point for migrants attempting to reach the UK, with smuggling networks operating sophisticated logistics, including small-boat journeys across the English Channel. In recent years, authorities have seen an increase in the number of dismantled smuggling networks, providing evidence of the scale of this market. Vietnamese and Iraqi networks have strengthened their presence, exploiting diplomatic ties and engaging in forced labour practices. Migrants smuggled into France are frequently exploited in delivery services, agriculture and domestic work, often in conditions that blur the lines between smuggling and trafficking. Smugglers frequently force migrants into drug transport, deepening the link between human smuggling and narcotics trafficking. The French state has intensified its response, but ongoing high smuggling rates challenge these efforts. In Mayotte, human smuggling networks have created a parallel economy, with traffickers moving individuals throughout the Comoros islands and coercing them into forced labour and sex work. Informal settlements in Mayotte provide a haven for these networks, a factor which complicates enforcement efforts.
Extortion and protection racketeering remain localized, mainly affecting specific regions such as Corsica and Ile-de-France. Organized crime groups have been involved in targeted extortion schemes, particularly in urban areas where drug-trafficking operations dominate. Corsica has witnessed cases of mafia-style extortion, involving coercion and intimidation of local business owners. In some cases, criminals have demanded regular ‘protection’ payments from shopkeepers. Extortion linked to jewellers has also emerged, with criminal groups targeting luxury industries in France. Also, online fraud schemes using extortion tactics have increased, where individuals are blackmailed into paying money. Despite these cases, there is no evidence of large-scale systemic extortion, and law enforcement actions have successfully disrupted several small-scale extortion networks in recent years.
France's arms trafficking market has expanded, with increasing seizures of automatic rifles such as Kalashnikovs. The violence in urban drug disputes, particularly in Marseille, is exacerbated by the availability of firearms, with shootings occurring frequently. Telegram has emerged as a key platform for illicit firearm transactions. French and Belgian authorities dismantled a major 3D-printed weapons network in 2024 – a notable example of the evolution of new trafficking methods. The trafficking of firearms in France is closely linked to other criminal markets, particularly drug-related violence, as gangs acquire weapons for use in territorial conflicts. The widespread presence of automatic weapons has intensified inter-gang conflicts, leading to record levels of homicides in cities such as Marseille and Grenoble.
The counterfeit goods trade is a well-organized criminal enterprise. Major hubs include markets in Saint-Ouen-Sur-Seine and La Réunion, where luxury and everyday counterfeit items are widely available. China remains the dominant source country, with Türkiye also gaining prominence. The proliferation of online sales has complicated enforcement efforts, while major international events like the 2024 Olympics have provided further opportunities for counterfeit goods distribution. The involvement of organized crime groups in counterfeiting has led to a diversification of products to include pharmaceuticals, luxury apparel and even industrial equipment. Clandestine factories, manufacturing products such as counterfeit cigarettes, have been dismantled in France in recent years. The financial losses for legitimate businesses caused by these illicit activities are substantial, with counterfeit goods undercutting authentic products and damaging brand reputations.
The illicit trade in excise consumer goods, particularly tobacco, is a highly profitable sector. Tunisia has been identified as a source country, with smuggling networks operating between Italy and France. The high taxation on legal tobacco has fuelled demand for contraband products, leading to significant financial losses for the state. The tobacco smuggling market is increasingly interconnected with other forms of organized crime, including drug trafficking and money laundering, as criminal groups use tobacco smuggling networks to launder proceeds from illicit activities.
France plays a role in the illegal timber trade, mainly as a transit and destination country. The demand for oak from China has driven illicit exports, with sawmills and shell companies facilitating laundering operations. Enforcement remains weak, with customs checks largely ineffective. Also, French Guiana faces high rates of illegal deforestation linked to organized criminal networks. The exploitation of timber resources contributes to broader environmental degradation, affecting biodiversity and accelerating deforestation in protected areas.
Wildlife trafficking is a major illicit market, with France acting as both a transit and destination country. High-value commodities such as elvers (juvenile eels), exotic birds and illegal pets like caracals are frequently trafficked. France's role as a key player in the global illegal wildlife trade is evidenced by large-scale operations targeting smuggling networks. France’s overseas territories, such as French Guiana, provide ideal conditions for trafficking, being fauna-rich environments with easy transit links to mainland France and elsewhere in Europe. Online marketplaces have a growing role in driving the illicit wildlife trade, allowing traffickers to connect directly with buyers across Europe and Asia.
The illegal gold-mining sector in French Guiana is a major criminal enterprise, imposing major economic losses for the French state. Brazilian illegal miners dominate extraction, while Surinamese and Chinese actors facilitate laundering. Despite large-scale enforcement operations, illicit gold mining remains a persistent issue, often linked to human trafficking and environmental degradation. The destruction of rain forest and the contamination of water sources due to illegal mining operations continue to pose significant environmental and health risks.
France is a major consumer and transit country for heroin, with supply routes shifting from Switzerland to France due to the influence of ethnic Albanian traffickers. Seizures have increased, reflecting a steady supply, though heroin remains less prevalent than cocaine or cannabis. The heroin trade has contributed to local violence, particularly in urban areas where distribution networks operate through hidden ‘bendos’. The heroin market is deeply entwined with other criminal activities, including money laundering and human trafficking, as traffickers often exploit migrants to transport and sell drugs. While heroin consumption in France is not as widespread as other substances, its social impact remains significant, with addiction contributing to healthcare burdens and social instability in affected areas.
Cocaine trafficking is one of the most lucrative and violent criminal markets in France. With the trade estimated at billions in annual revenue, the trade fuels gang violence, particularly in Marseille, where ‘narchomicide’ killings are on the rise. Cocaine enters France via West Africa, with methods including the recruitment of drug mules from French Guiana and maritime drop-offs. Despite record seizures, cocaine remains widely available, with high purity levels and stable retail prices. The involvement of Colombian criminal networks and West African intermediaries highlights France's critical role in the European cocaine supply chain. In urban centres, distribution is highly organized, with street-level dealers using encrypted messaging apps and social media platforms to drive sales. The scale of the market has led to intense territorial disputes between rival gangs, contributing to increasing rates of drug-related homicides.
Cannabis is the most widely consumed illicit drug in France, with an estimated 5 million regular users. Smuggling routes mainly begin in Spain, with large-scale seizures at the French-Spanish border. The market is structured into hierarchical criminal networks, with low-level ‘small hands’ handling distribution. The violence associated with cannabis trafficking has escalated, with rising homicide rates in cities like Marseille and Toulouse. In addition to imported cannabis, domestic cultivation has expanded, particularly in rural areas and through indoor hydroponic operations. The emergence of organized growing operations has led some criminal groups to diversify their activities to include high-potency cannabis production. Law enforcement crackdowns on trafficking networks have led to periodic disruptions, but the demand for cannabis remains consistently high. France’s illicit market also faces growing pressure from neighbouring countries in which cannabis laws have been relaxed.
Synthetic drugs, including MDMA, methamphetamine and ketamine, represent a growing segment of the French drug market. Seizures of synthetic substances have increased sharply in recent years, with production occurring mainly in the Netherlands and Belgium. Methamphetamine consumption is lower per capita in mainland France than in French overseas territories, notably in Polynesia. Authorities have struggled to combat the synthetic drug trade due to its decentralized nature, with small-scale production labs emerging in response to law enforcement efforts. The French government has intensified its response, implementing targeted operations to dismantle trafficking rings and curb distribution.
France has become a major target for cyber-dependent crime, with ransomware attacks posing significant threats. LockBit and other international ransomware groups operate extensively in the country. French institutions and businesses face frequent cyber-attacks, and this has led to heightened cybersecurity investments and law enforcement responses. The rise of cryptocurrency-based financial crimes has further complicated enforcement efforts, with cybercriminals using digital currencies to launder illicit proceeds.
Financial crimes in France are highly lucrative and involve highly organized networks. The "Cum-Cum" and "Cum-Ex" dividend tax fraud schemes have implicated major banks. Large-scale VAT fraud, money laundering and corporate embezzlement remain prevalent. Despite significant law-enforcement measures, France's criminal markets remain deeply entrenched, with organized networks adapting to enforcement pressures. Fraudulent investment schemes and corporate corruption have also emerged as significant concerns, with high-profile cases involving multinational corporations and political figures.
France has a moderate presence of domestic mafia-style groups. These groups prioritize financial gain rather than territorial control, differentiating them from traditional mafia organizations. However, they operate discreetly, with a high rate of infiltration in legitimate businesses, and engage in a range of criminal activities, including drug and arms trafficking, extortion, theft, money laundering, prostitution and human trafficking. Corsica has a particularly significant mafia presence. These groups exert notable influence in the political and administrative spheres, limiting the effectiveness of central government control. Intimidation and corruption are commonly used by these organizations to infiltrate legitimate businesses and public institutions.
Loosely organized criminal networks in France are diverse, highly adaptable and deeply embedded in society. However, although they maintain a local base, they frequently have strong transnational links. They operate with high levels of violence, engaging in kidnappings, torture and assassinations to maintain control over illicit activities. Urban and suburban centres such as Paris and Marseille serve as major operational hubs, with rural connections facilitating activities like clandestine cigarette production. Prisons serve as breeding grounds for criminal collaboration, fostering alliances that endure beyond incarceration.
State-embedded actors are present in France and mostly engage in money laundering, tax evasion and corruption. Various officials, including politicians, civil servants and law enforcement personnel, have historically been implicated in these crimes, often in connection with transnational networks. Recent high-profile corruption cases have deepened concerns about governance integrity.
Foreign criminal actors play a substantial role in France’s illicit markets. Albanian-speaking organized crime groups are especially prominent and are mainly involved in theft and the repatriation of stolen goods. Other Eastern European groups are predominantly engaged in skimming and jackpotting operations. The dismantling of an organized crime group originating from the Western Balkans in 2024, with arrests in France and Monaco, revealed the hierarchical structure of these groups, particularly one led by a Serbian national. Armenian criminal organizations are active in both France and Spain and investigations into the ‘Thieves in Law’ network uncovered an extensive Armenian presence in France, demonstrating the international reach of such networks. The economic influence of the Chinese mafia is significant, as their specialization in money laundering underpins broader criminal activities. Nigerian criminal groups are engaged in human trafficking and have attempted to infiltrate the drug trade, although their influence remains secondary to domestic actors. Italian mafia groups are well-established in southern France, where they co-operate with local criminal organizations in money laundering and drug trafficking. Marseille has become a focal point for violent territorial conflict, with groups such as the ‘Mocro Mafia’ (expanding from its Dutch and Belgian base) the DZ Mafia and Yoda controlling the drug trade. These turf wars frequently involve hitmen and heavy weaponry, resulting in significant casualties. Cybercrime linked to foreign actors has expanded, with China-based groups such as APT IronHusky, APT41 and APT31 conducting cyberattacks on French businesses and infrastructure. Ransomware groups like Lockean and Egregor have also been active, targeting corporations and critical systems. The increasing integration of foreign criminal elements into France’s illicit economy underscores the transnational nature of organized crime.
Legitimate businesses in France are frequently exploited by criminal organizations for money laundering and financial crime. Sectors such as real estate, hospitality and retail are particularly vulnerable. Corsican criminal groups have substantial investments in the hotel and casino industries, using these sectors to launder illicit profits. It was reported that two-thirds of corporate-owned real estate assets are held anonymously, exacerbating money laundering risks. Digital financial services and cryptocurrencies have further eased money laundering transactions, allowing criminal actors to move funds across borders discreetly. Organized crime has also penetrated the sports industry, with instances of match-fixing and corruption linked to major events such as Grand Slam tennis tournaments.
France's governance approach towards organized crime has evolved, with an increased focus on financial crimes and cybersecurity. While the government officially prioritizes combating organized crime, recent efforts have placed greater emphasis on counterterrorism and radicalization. As a result, organized crime is sometimes treated as a secondary priority, despite its impact on the country’s economy and security. The French Ministry of the Interior launched a major reorganization in January 2024, which included the creation of the Office anti-cybercriminalité within the Direction nationale de la police judiciaire. This move was aimed at enhancing cybercrime investigation capabilities. While these efforts demonstrate the state’s commitment to fighting organized crime, they have also been met with criticism. The restructuring of the Judicial Police has raised some concerns about the erosion of the separation of powers, particularly with departmental directorates falling under the authority of police commissioners who report to the prefect. In response to fiscal crime, France has proposed several measures to combat tax fraud and evasion, including lifting banking and commercial secrecy, targeting tax evasion and reducing access to tax havens. However, opposition groups argue that these measures lack ambition and fail to tackle the scale of the issue effectively. Similarly, the debate around drug policy is polarized, with some advocating harsher penalties, while others, including the Economic, Social and Environmental Council, call for a regulated legalization model for cannabis.
France has made some efforts in enhancing government transparency and accountability, through participation in international anti-corruption initiatives, the establishment of independent institutions, and the publication of budgets, procurement contracts and other documents. Despite efforts in combating corruption, France faces persistent deficits in transparency and public trust. The public perception of widespread political corruption – held by a majority of the population – remains critical and is fuelled by high-profile cases. Moreover, anti-corruption efforts are hindered by resource constraints and a stronger focus on international rather than national corruption issues. The transparency framework is also considered weak, applying only to the executive and excluding state-owned enterprises and private entities performing public functions. While specific exceptions align with international standards, they lack harm testing and a public interest override, with secrecy laws remaining intact.
France’s international cooperation efforts remain strong. The country is a state party to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its protocols on migrant smuggling, human trafficking and the illicit firearms trade. France has also played an active role in Europol, Eurojust and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, contributing to transnational law enforcement initiatives. Despite this, there have been shortcomings on cooperation on mafia-related cases, with some sources attributing difficulties to political reluctance. More recently, France has strengthened its international efforts, including a 2024 agreement with Italy to exchange information on migrant trafficking networks.
France has a comprehensive legal framework addressing various forms of organized crime, including drug trafficking, human trafficking, arms smuggling and money laundering. However, while these legal provisions are robust, enforcement remains inadequate. The country's legal code does not include a specific definition of organized crime, making certain investigations more difficult. Practitioners have called for the introduction of legislation similar to Italy’s ‘mafia-type association’ law to enhance investigative capabilities. Concerns have been raised about the balance between security measures and civil liberties, particularly following legislative proposals to increase state surveillance through interconnected databases.
France has eight specialized inter-regional jurisdictions (JIRS) dedicated to organized crime, financial crimes and complex economic offences. These jurisdictions operate with specialized magistrates and utilize extensive investigative tools, including wiretapping and infiltration techniques. But challenges remain, particularly regarding legal restrictions on the prosecution of crimes committed outside France. Furthermore, concerns about judicial independence persist, as public prosecutors are appointed by the Minister of Justice, raising potential conflicts of interest. The prison system in France faces serious challenges, with a 119% occupancy rate leading to hygiene and security risks, and restricting law enforcement’s ability to prevent illicit activities within prisons. The European Court of Human Rights has condemned France multiple times for detention conditions that violate human rights standards. While efforts have been made to improve prison management, overcrowding and inadequate facilities remain pressing problems.
Law enforcement efforts against organized crime are multifaceted, with specialized units targeting drug trafficking, financial crimes, cybercrime and human trafficking. The Central Directorate of the Judicial Police has achieved notable successes in combating counterfeiting and drug trafficking, while a specialized intervention unit, Search, Assistance, Intervention, Deterrence (commonly known by its French acronym RAID) has played a key role in tackling violent crime and terrorism. Even so, coordination between different agencies has proved difficult, and critics have questioned the effectiveness of operations in permanently dismantling organized criminal groups. Law enforcement efforts to curb human trafficking have been hindered by a lack of a national referral mechanism, which limits victim identification and protection.
France’s position as part of the Schengen zone poses problems related to territorial integrity, particularly in preventing the trafficking of illicit goods. French Guiana has emerged as a key transit point for cocaine smuggling, while border regions with Italy and Spain remain hotspots for human smuggling. The government has responded by increasing joint operations with neighbouring countries, but there are still some concerns about corruption and the influence of organized crime within some transport and trade infrastructure.
France has a strong anti-money laundering framework, reinforced by compliance with international standards set by the Financial Action Task Force. The country’s Financial Intelligence Unit – Traitement du renseignement et action contre les circuits financiers clandestins – plays a critical role in analyzing financial crimes and processing intelligence related to money laundering and terrorist financing. Nonetheless, money laundering through real estate, gambling and digital financial services continues to be prevalent. In October 2024, French authorities seized €70 million worth of luxury assets linked to Russian businessmen as part of a major money-laundering probe.
The economic regulatory environment in France remains highly structured, with government intervention historically shaping major sectors such as transport, telecommunications and energy. France’s economy is in fact assessed by OECD indicators as more regulated than that of many other EU countries. Recent efforts have been made to streamline regulatory processes and increase market competition. However, striking a balance between economic deregulation and financial security has proved difficult, particularly in sectors vulnerable to organized crime, such as finance and digital platforms.
France provides state and non-state support for victims of organized crime, with 192 local victim support associations operating across the country. These organizations receive funding from the ministry of justice and work in coordination with law enforcement agencies. Also, the French Victim Support and Mediation Institute serves as a federation of victim support associations. France has implemented various measures for victim care, including witness protection programmes. However, funding for victim support remains relatively low. Despite France's strong reputation for advocating for rights, it lags other European countries in funding victim assistance. Obtaining refugee status for trafficking victims also remains difficult, with inadequate access to shelters and protection services for victims of human trafficking. National attitudes in France toward drug users and crime victims are shifting toward a public health approach. Support includes dedicated services for extortion victims, compensation through the Victims Guarantee Fund, and planned reforms for chemical submission cases, such as free test kits and simplified hospital complaints by 2025.
France is highly proactive in combating and preventing organized crime at both European and international levels through the adoption of several national prevention strategies for specific threats such as drug trafficking, money laundering and cyber threats. But there are still insufficient training programmes for civil servants focused on the prevention of organized crime. In 2024, the country has introduced a comprehensive plan to tackle drug trafficking and gang violence, featuring increased police presence, judicial reinforcements and stricter anti–money laundering measures. New national measures also include a coordination unit, expanded specialized courts, and additional police and investigators in Marseille, which is a hub of gang activity. Lastly, France has made notable progress in combating financial crime through stronger legislation, targeted enforcement and enhanced international cooperation.
France has a strong civil society sector, with independent media and investigative journalists playing a significant role in exposing organized crime and corruption. On the other hand, media concentration and conflicts of interest within state-owned broadcasting networks are both notable risk factors. Anti-mafia activists in France argue that civil society lacks awareness about organized crime. Journalists covering organized crime have reported instances of police violence and intimidation, reflecting broader societal tensions about press freedom.
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The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to 10. The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel.
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