Criminal markets
3.93-0.27
An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.
Human trafficking
4.00-0.50
Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.
Human smuggling
3.500.00
Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.
Extortion and protection racketeering
2.00-0.50
Crimes linked to exerting control over a territory/market including as a mediator and/or requesting a benefit in exchange for protection.
Arms trafficking
2.000.00
The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.
Trade in counterfeit goods
3.00-1.00
The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands.
Illicit trade in excisable goods
4.50-0.50
The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits.
Flora crimes
2.500.50
The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.
Fauna crimes
1.50-0.50
The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.
Non-renewable resource crimes
2.50-1.00
The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.
Heroin trade
2.50-0.50
The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.
Cocaine trade
4.500.50
The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cannabis trade
5.50-0.50
The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.
Synthetic drug trade
7.000.00
The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cyber-dependent crimes
7.000.00
Organized crimes that rely solely on using information communications technology with the aim of obtaining a monetary/material benefit.
Financial crimes
7.000.00
Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance.
Criminal actors
3.80-0.50
An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.
Mafia-style groups
3.00-0.50
Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.
Criminal networks
3.50-1.00
Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.
State-embedded actors
2.000.00
Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.
Foreign actors
5.500.00
State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.
Private sector actors
5.00-1.00
Profit-seeking individuals/entities who own/control a part of the legal economy free from the state, that collaborate with criminal actors.
Political leadership and governance
8.500.50
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
8.000.50
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
8.500.00
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
8.000.00
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
8.000.00
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
7.500.00
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
8.500.50
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
8.000.00
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
7.500.00
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
7.500.00
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
8.500.50
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
8.000.00
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Political leadership and governance
8.500.50
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
8.000.50
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
8.500.00
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
8.000.00
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
8.000.00
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
7.500.00
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
8.500.50
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
8.000.00
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
7.500.00
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
7.500.00
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
8.500.50
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
8.000.00
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Estonia serves as a destination country for human trafficking, with victims primarily subjected to labour and sexual exploitation. The market is fragmented, involving multiple small-scale networks rather than a single dominant actor. Key participants include international smuggling syndicates, recruiters, corrupt officials and financial intermediaries who facilitate illicit transactions. Vulnerable populations, such as labour migrants from Central Asia and Ukrainian refugees, face heightened risks due to exploitative recruitment practices. The market often intersects with other criminal activities, including document falsification and illicit financial flows. Reports suggest that traffickers use fraudulent job offers and visa schemes to lure victims, making detection and prevention more difficult for authorities.
Although relatively limited in scope, the human smuggling market in Estonia is well-organized, particularly in relation to migration-related crimes facilitated by transnational networks. Primary actors include criminal organizations, corrupt officials and financial intermediaries involved in money laundering. Smuggling networks support cross-border migration, especially from Ukraine, Russia and Belarus. Concerns have also been raised about possible state-backed involvement in irregular migration. In response, Estonia has tightening border controls and developed measures to address hybrid threats involving migration manipulation. Despite these efforts, smuggling networks remain resilient, leveraging advanced logistical capabilities and transnational cooperation to sustain their operations.
There is little evidence of an entrenched extortion market in Estonia and instances of protection racketeering are rare, typically appearing to be opportunistic rather than organized.
Arms trafficking in Estonia remains limited and is primarily transit-oriented, with illicit weapons smuggled through the country, often en route to Russia. Although the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict has heightened the risk of surplus weapons entering illicit markets and raised concerns about potential spillover across Europe, recent legal reforms to Estonia’s firearms regulations have largely mitigated these risks and further tightened access to firearms.
Counterfeit goods are a minor issue in Estonia with the last major customs seizure, mainly involving cigarettes and clothing, taking place several years ago. The sale of fake products is largely limited to tourist areas, such as markets near ferry terminals.
The illicit trade in excise consumer goods, particularly tobacco products, is a well-coordinated market involving transnational actors. Estonia acts as both a destination and transit country, with primary supply routes originating from Belarus and Russia. Smugglers use hidden compartments in vehicles and shipments to transport large quantities of illicit cigarettes into Estonia and neighbouring Finland. The market is structured, involving a range of criminal actors, including financiers and logistical facilitators. Demand for cheaper, untaxed cigarettes remains strong, especially among lower-income groups. Although the market share has declined due to the rise of alternative tobacco products and decreasing smoking rates, cigarette smuggling continues to generate substantial illicit revenues.
Flora crimes in Estonia are primarily linked to the illegal timber trade, with increased illicit logging driven by shifting supply chains and economic subsidies. Investigations have uncovered fraudulent schemes involving timber imports from sanctioned countries, where criminal networks use document falsification to bypass trade restrictions. Estonia has strengthened inspections and regulatory oversight, yet challenges persist in preventing timber laundering through third-party intermediaries. Reports indicate that illegally logged timber is sometimes mixed with legal shipments, complicating enforcement efforts.
Fauna crimes are relatively minor, though poaching and illegal wildlife trade have been reported. Smuggling networks have exploited weak enforcement mechanisms to traffic glass eels – a high-value commodity – prompting international concern. Domestic poaching incidents involving protected species such as moose and lynx surface regularly, driven by demand for exotic animal products. While enforcement agencies monitor wildlife crimes, limited resources restrict large-scale crackdowns. Illegal hunting of protected species remains an issue, particularly in rural areas where monitoring is more difficult. However, the illicit activity is primarily carried out by opportunistic individual actors, with no evidence indicating the involvement of organized crime groups.
Non-renewable resource crimes in Estonia primarily involve fuel smuggling and sanctions evasion, albeit to a limited scope and scale. Shadow fleets are reported to operate in Estonian waters, obscuring the origins of illicit fuel before resale. However, authorities have increased scrutiny of these operations, seizing such vessels. Fuel tax fraud has also been reported, with shell companies used to conceal illicit transactions, though such cases appear to be sporadic and historic.
The heroin market in Estonia has significantly declined, with consumer demand shifting to Fentanyl rather than heroin. Recent analyses of wastewater and used syringes have found no traces of heroin, underscoring its diminished presence in the country.
In contrast, wastewater analysis confirms a steady rise in cocaine consumption, with increased availability and higher product purity reportedly appealing to younger demographics. While Estonia has experienced several major cocaine seizures, it continues to play an increasingly prominent role in regional trafficking routes. Authorities have dismantled international trafficking networks operating between Estonia, Belgium and Finland, emphasizing the transnational nature of the market.
Sustained by local cultivation and smuggling operations, cannabis remains the most widely used illicit drug in Estonia, with growing demand among young people. Law enforcement agencies dismantle a few large-scale farms each year, alongside numerous smaller grow operations. Seizures along major transport routes confirm ongoing smuggling activity.
Estonia’s synthetic drug market is well-established, with the country historically serving as a key hub for Fentanyl trafficking. Amphetamines remain widespread, and the emergence of newer synthetic opioids, such as nitazenes, has contributed to a rise in overdose-related fatalities. Estonia also accounts for a significant share of methamphetamine seizures in Europe. Authorities have disrupted major trafficking networks moving synthetic drugs through the country to Scandinavian markets and have played a role in dismantling a multinational operation smuggling illicit pharmaceuticals to Finland.
Estonia has experienced a rise in cyber-dependent crimes, including distributed denial-of- service (DDoS) attacks, ransomware incidents and cryptocurrency fraud. High-profile cyberattacks have targeted government institutions, major corporations and financial entities. Estonia’s support for Ukraine has made it a target for politically motivated attacks, while traditional financially driven cybercrime continues to expand. Although the country has bolstered its cybersecurity capabilities, the rapid evolution of cyber threats present ongoing enforcement challenges.
Financial crime in Estonia is well-structured, with investment scams, insurance fraud and phishing attacks among the most prevalent offences. Fraud cases have surged in recent years, with phone scams and online investment schemes causing significant financial losses. Criminal networks use increasingly sophisticated tactics, including call centre operations and social engineering. While authorities have made arrests linked to international fraud schemes, enforcement remains difficult, particularly in cross-border cases.
While traditional mafia-style groups in Estonia have seen a decline in recent years, organized criminal groups with hierarchical structures continue to operate, often with transnational connections. Some maintain territorial control through financial structures such as the criminal mutual fund which pools illicit earnings and establishes operational rules for the underworld. These groups engage in a range of criminal activities, including drug trafficking, extortion and document forgery. However, law enforcement efforts targeting leadership structures, along with internal conflicts, have disrupted operations and weakened their influence. As a result, the long-term sustainability of these networks is uncertain, yet new actors continue to emerge, adapting to enforcement strategies and evolving criminal opportunities. Although loose criminal networks in Estonia are less prevalent than in other European countries, concerns persist regarding the potential rise of groups engaged in illicit activities. More broadly, Eastern European networks, including criminals from the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), collaborate to build and maintain strong connections across different markets.
State-embedded actors are primarily linked to facilitating financial crimes rather than directly engaging in violent or drug-related offences. Corrupt officials have enabled money laundering operations by allowing illicit financial flows from Russia and other Eastern European countries to pass through Estonia en route to Western markets.
Foreign criminal groups maintain a presence in Estonia, particularly those originating from Russia, Belarus and the Caucasus region. These groups engage in a range of illicit activities, including drug and arms trafficking, financial crimes and human smuggling. Some operate through established transnational networks, leveraging Estonia’s logistical infrastructure to facilitate trade routes extending into Scandinavia and Western Europe. Russian and Belarusian actors have also been linked to state-sponsored criminal activity, particularly in cybercrime and strategic smuggling operations. Estonia’s geopolitical position makes it a focal point for these foreign actors, requiring continuous monitoring and cross-border cooperation to mitigate their influence. Reports indicate that cybercriminal organizations with Russian and Eastern European ties frequently target Estonia’s financial and digital infrastructure, exploiting vulnerabilities in payment systems and cryptocurrency regulation.
Certain businesses and financial institutions in Estonia have been implicated in facilitating organized crime through inadequate regulatory compliance and weak due diligence. Some companies have been linked to illicit financial flows, enabling criminal actors to launder proceeds from various illegal enterprises. Additionally, foreign nationals banned from conducting business in their home countries have exploited Estonia’s business-friendly registration system to establish shell companies. Fraudulent financial practices have been observed in major commercial sectors, where opaque corporate structures and transactions are used to conceal illicit fund movements.
Estonia maintains a governance framework characterized by transparent institutions and robust anti-corruption mechanisms. The government has implemented policies to address a range of illicit activities, with a particular focus on cybercrime, financial offences and human trafficking. Legislative amendments have been introduced to close regulatory gaps previously exploited by criminal enterprises. While political stability and sound governance strengthen Estonia’s overall resilience, challenges remain in areas such as financial oversight and border security, which continue to be targeted by transnational criminal networks.
Government transparency and accountability are supported by e-governance initiatives that enable real-time monitoring of public sector transactions, increasing oversight and limiting bureaucratic inefficiencies that criminal networks may take advantage of. However, enforcement gaps remain, especially in financial services and real estate, where weak due diligence procedures have been exploited. While Estonia has implemented whistleblower safeguards, concerns persist about the effectiveness of these mechanisms in addressing high-level corruption. Some analysts note that although legislative protections exist, institutional constraints have limited the impact of transparency measures.
Estonia participates in international efforts to combat transnational organized crime, working with Europol, INTERPOL and regional security frameworks. Joint enforcement operations and information exchanges have targeted cybercrime, drug trafficking and financial crimes. Estonia has also signed bilateral agreements with key transit countries to counter human smuggling and illicit trade. However, regional geopolitical tensions have complicated law enforcement coordination, particularly with non-EU states, where collaboration on illicit trade route monitoring is limited.
The national policy and legal framework against organized crime incorporates European Union directives and includes laws addressing cybercrime, drug trafficking and financial crimes. Although compliance with international standards has been prioritized, enforcement, particularly in financial crime and anti-money laundering, has faced scrutiny. Ongoing legislative reviews aim to address these weaknesses and respond to emerging criminal threats. At the same time, law enforcement agencies are working to build the capacity needed to implement these laws effectively.
Estonia’s judicial system operates independently, ensuring that organized crime cases are prosecuted within a structured legal framework. Courts handle complex criminal cases, particularly those involving cybercrime and financial fraud. Specialized judicial units have been established to support the prosecution of cyber-enabled offences. However, procedural limitations, such as lengthy trials, and resource constraints, have at times affected judicial efficiency. While the judiciary is regarded as functional, efforts to strengthen prosecutorial capacity for organized crime cases are ongoing, particularly in response to increasingly complex cross-border activity.
Law enforcement agencies in Estonia are well-equipped and have successfully dismantled several organized crime groups. Specialized police units focus on transnational crime, cybercrime and drug trafficking. Estonia has also leveraged technology to enhance policing, particularly through advanced digital forensic capabilities. Despite these strengths, agencies face ongoing challenges in tackling cyber-dependent crimes and financial fraud due to their evolving nature. Furthermore, although trafficking-related prosecutions have increased in recent years, the number remains low overall due to ongoing law enforcement challenges.
Estonia’s geographic position has made it a transit country for illicit goods and irregular migration. The country has introduced measures to reinforce border security, including advanced surveillance technologies and biometric verification. Cooperation with neighbouring states has led to increased interceptions of contraband and migration attempts. While these measures have improved overall border control, vulnerabilities persist, especially along smuggling routes connected to neighbouring countries. Estonia continues to work with regional partners to strengthen border management, though remote areas remain susceptible to organized smuggling networks.
Estonia has made significant strides in strengthening its anti-money laundering framework. The government has implemented stricter compliance measures for financial institutions and increased penalties for money laundering violations. Regulators actively monitor financial transactions, and suspicious activity reporting mechanisms have improved. However, historical money laundering scandals involving major banks revealed regulatory weaknesses, prompting further reforms to enhance oversight. Gaps remain in this area, particularly in sectors vulnerable to financial abuse, such as cryptocurrency services and real estate.
Estonia’s economic regulatory environment is generally transparent, with clear legal frameworks supporting legitimate business activities. The country’s e-residency programme has facilitated business development but has also been exploited for financial crime. In response, authorities have introduced tighter regulations to prevent the misuse of digital business registrations for illicit purposes. While Estonia remains an attractive destination for foreign investment, concerns persist regarding the effectiveness of corporate oversight in detecting fraudulent enterprises.
Victim and witness support services in Estonia provide legal, financial and psychological assistance to those affected by human trafficking, cyber fraud and other forms of organized crime. The government collaborates with NGOs to facilitate access to these services. Although support is available, identifying and reaching all victims remains a challenge, especially in cases of labour exploitation and financial fraud. Witness protection programmes exist but are limited in scope, and some victims struggle to access long-term assistance, particularly when transnational crime is involved.
Prevention initiatives form part of Estonia’s broader strategy against organized crime. Public awareness campaigns, educational programmes and community engagement efforts have addressed vulnerabilities related to human trafficking, drug abuse and cyber fraud. Additionally, at-risk youth have been the focus of strategies aimed at reducing the appeal of organized crime. While experts have noted that these initiatives are widely implemented, their long-term sustainability depends on continued engagement from both public and private sector actors.
Non-state actors play a key role in building Estonia’s resilience to organized crime. Civil society organizations contribute to crime prevention, victim support and advocacy efforts, often cooperating with government agencies to inform national strategy. Estonia’s media landscape also supports transparency, with investigative journalists reporting on criminal activity and holding public institutions to account. Although the press operates with relative independence, concerns have been raised about online threats and harassment targeting journalists who cover organized crime. Protecting media professionals remains an ongoing challenge in safeguarding transparency and accountability.
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The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to 10. The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel.
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