Criminal markets
5.370.30
An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.
Human trafficking
6.500.50
Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.
Human smuggling
5.500.50
Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.
Extortion and protection racketeering
5.000.50
Crimes linked to exerting control over a territory/market including as a mediator and/or requesting a benefit in exchange for protection.
Arms trafficking
6.500.00
The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.
Trade in counterfeit goods
6.00-0.50
The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands.
Illicit trade in excisable goods
5.001.00
The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits.
Flora crimes
4.500.00
The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.
Fauna crimes
5.500.50
The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.
Non-renewable resource crimes
3.500.50
The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.
Heroin trade
2.000.00
The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.
Cocaine trade
7.500.00
The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cannabis trade
7.000.00
The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.
Synthetic drug trade
5.500.00
The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cyber-dependent crimes
5.500.50
Organized crimes that rely solely on using information communications technology with the aim of obtaining a monetary/material benefit.
Financial crimes
5.001.00
Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance.
Criminal actors
5.600.30
An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.
Mafia-style groups
5.001.00
Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.
Criminal networks
6.000.00
Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.
State-embedded actors
5.500.00
Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.
Foreign actors
6.500.50
State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.
Private sector actors
5.000.00
Profit-seeking individuals/entities who own/control a part of the legal economy free from the state, that collaborate with criminal actors.
Political leadership and governance
6.50-0.50
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
7.000.00
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
8.000.00
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
6.500.50
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
5.00-0.50
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
4.500.00
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
4.000.00
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
6.500.00
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
6.500.50
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
6.000.00
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
6.500.00
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
7.000.00
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Human trafficking in Chile has escalated markedly, affecting both domestic and foreign individuals, particularly migrants from Latin America and Asia. Traffickers, often from Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, Colombia or Venezuela, exploit vulnerable migrants. The surge is driven by criminal organizations, notably Venezuela’s Tren de Aragua, which has expanded its reach within the country and focuses on sexual and labour exploitation. Sexual exploitation cases, especially involving young women and children, have notably increased, with some regions reporting alarmingly high rates. Labour trafficking is widespread across various sectors, including mining, agriculture, domestic work and construction. The involvement of law enforcement personnel, including officers who facilitate trafficking, perpetuates the problem. The growing influx of migrants from Venezuela and Colombia has exacerbated Chile’s role as a source, transit and destination country for trafficking and complicated efforts to address the crisis.
Chile has emerged as a key destination for people from neighbouring and distant countries, attracted by its economic stability. This has fuelled a growing and lucrative migrant smuggling market that includes foreign and domestic actors, including transnational criminal networks. Smugglers use organized routes via Argentina, Bolivia and Brazil, sometimes employing digital platforms for coordination. Some cases have exposed corruption within state institutions. Rising concerns over crime and security have led to increased public opposition to migration, contributing to stricter measures and deportations, particularly of Venezuelans.
Extortion and protection racketeering have become increasingly widespread, particularly in the northern regions and parts of Santiago. Extortion is closely tied to drug trafficking, with businesses, especially street vendors, being coerced into paying for protection. The primary beneficiaries of these illicit profits are foreign criminal groups, though some Chilean nationals are also involved. A prominent rise in kidnapping for ransom has also been linked to foreign criminal organizations, particularly Tren de Aragua, which primarily targets its own expatriates. Local gangs and independent actors exploit the group’s reputation to carry out similar crimes.
Chile faces major challenges with firearm circulation, closely linked to rising insecurity. Criminal groups primarily obtain weapons through diversion from legally registered civilian stockpiles, alongside illicit imports from the United States and Argentina. Chile serves as both a destination and a transit point for firearms moving towards the tri-border region of Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay, with criminal networks in northern Chile facilitating transport. Criminal groups such as Tren de Aragua exploit weak regulatory controls to move weapons across the borders with Peru and Bolivia. State-embedded actors, including police and military personnel, have been implicated in black market sales. Gun shops also have inadequate oversight, exacerbating the proliferation of illicit firearms. Firearms trafficking is intertwined with other forms of organized crime, particularly drug trafficking, as armed violence is used for territorial control.
The trade in counterfeit goods is widespread in Chile, where such items can be commonly found in retail outlets. Counterfeit goods, particularly clothing, footwear and consumer goods, are primarily sourced from China. Large retail outlets have been implicated in selling such products, though they often deny awareness of their origins. Other counterfeit items include electrical tools, jewellery, food products and alcohol, with some falsely branded as well-known manufacturers. Chile’s open economy and trade ties with Asia facilitate this influx, while demand for cheaper alternatives sustains the market. The counterfeit trade has a significant impact on legitimate businesses and consumers.
Contraband cigarettes are a major issue in Chile. Primarily sourced from Paraguay, they account for about half of the illicit excise goods market and over a third of the country’s cigarette market. Cigarettes enter through its northern borders with Bolivia and Argentina. There are also significant quantities of contraband cigarettes from Asia, mainly China, arriving by sea. Organized domestic and transnational networks facilitate distribution nationwide, sometimes alongside counterfeit goods. High tobacco taxes contribute to demand, as illicit cigarettes are considerably cheaper. Chile has the highest rate of illegal cigarette trade in South America, which undercuts the legal industry and reduces state revenue while fuelling organized criminal activity.
Chile’s timber sector, vital to its economy, is contending with incidents of illegal logging, especially in the south, where organized networks exploit weak oversight. These groups steal timber from legal operations, falsify documents and illegally export the wood, notably to Japan. Some radical Mapuche factions engage in these activities to fund political causes. Certain companies knowingly trade in illicit timber, and domestic markets, particularly real estate, also absorb illegal timber. Weak enforcement by regulatory agencies has allowed these trends to persist, further entrenching conflicts in Araucanía and Biobío, where violence against forestry operations has intensified. Chile’s Atacama Desert, known for its unique endemic cactus species, is a hotspot for international flora smuggling. Recent high-profile cases revealed the operation of trafficking networks involved in the illegal export of these species to Europe and Asia, where collector demand remains strong.
The country is a key destination for trafficked wildlife, with high demand among local collectors for birds from the Amazon, Australia and the United States, as well as other exotic animals and elephant trophies from Africa. Domestically, poaching threatens species such as foxes, otters and lynxes. Illegal wildlife trafficking involves small networks that smuggle animals via ports and land routes. Overfishing remains a serious issue, with national and foreign fishing fleets contributing to declining fish stocks. Many fisheries are now depleted or overexploited. Unregulated foreign vessels, particularly from China, further drain resources and threaten marine ecosystems.
Chile’s mining sector is highly regulated, and illegal mining is limited, compared with neighbouring Peru and Bolivia. However, Chile is a transit hub for gold smuggling, facilitating its movement from Bolivia and Peru to international destinations such as the United Arab Emirates and Switzerland. Organized networks, some linked to transnational trafficking groups, smuggle gold into Chile through unauthorized crossings, refining and laundering it before onward export. Copper theft is a persistent issue, with stolen material smuggled abroad or sold informally. Authorities have successfully intercepted shipments and dismantled networks, yet the criminal groups employ increasingly sophisticated tactics, including signal jammers and drones.
Chile serves as a key destination and transit hub for cocaine due to its proximity to major producing countries, Peru and Bolivia, and its high consumption per capita. The country also functions as a re-export point for shipments to Europe, the United States, Asia and Oceania, with traffickers increasingly using non-traditional coastal ports to evade detection. Transnational groups, including Colombian cartels, dominate the trade, with local distribution managed by Chilean and foreign networks. Authorities report consistent record drug seizures, with the northern border regions as primary entry points
Chile hosts a large cannabis market, with high domestic consumption driving a complex trafficking network. Historically supplied by Peru, Bolivia and Paraguay, cannabis imports now increasingly include high-potency varieties from Colombia that are transported by land and sea along with other drugs. The country’s northern regions serve as key entry points. Large foreign groups dominate importation and local gangs control distribution, which contributes to heightened violence. There is also local production of cannabis, facilitated by smaller domestic networks. While local cultivation is typically conducted indoors, it can also occur outdoors in mountainous and desert regions, often guarded by armed personnel.
The country is also emerging as a key destination market for synthetic drugs, primarily sourced from Europe, particularly the Netherlands. The country also serves as a transit point for shipments destined for other Latin American nations, and possibly Oceania and Asia. Factors such as porous northern borders, an extensive port network and growing youth demand contribute to its vulnerability. Here as well, international criminal networks are involved in trafficking, with smaller local groups managing distribution. Transport occurs via air, sea and land routes from neighbouring countries. Seizures underscore the market’s scale, yet enforcement efforts appear to be insufficient to counteract rising consumption, especially in nightlife venues where substances like ecstasy, ketamine and fentanyl are increasingly prevalent.
Though the market remains limited compared to other illicit drugs, heroin is trafficked into Chile. Reportedly, existing smuggling routes for other narcotics facilitate its entry into the country.
Chile has been a target for cyber-dependent crimes, with a sharp rise in incidents over the past four years. Ransomware and malware attacks remain the dominant threats, often orchestrated by foreign criminal networks. The fragmentation of larger ransomware groups has led to more agile, smaller-scale operations. Large companies are primary targets, particularly in government, agriculture, industry, health and education. Recent incidents highlight the persistence of cyberthreats, with financial institutions also experiencing major breaches.
Chile is experiencing a notable rise in financial crime, particularly in online fraud, phishing and tax evasion. Phishing attacks have escalated sharply, often orchestrated by foreign networks that exploit corporate and individual financial vulnerabilities. These schemes typically involve impersonation tactics, such as fraudulent parcel-delivery notifications or scams leveraging verification codes to hijack accounts. Meanwhile, tax evasion remains a persistent issue, with a substantial portion of corporate and VAT revenue lost due to false invoicing and under-reporting. The scale of tax evasion reflects broader compliance challenges.
Chile’s organized crime landscape has undergone a transformation, with family clans and local gangs expanding their influence across both urban and rural regions. Once concentrated in Santiago, these groups now engage nationwide in drug trafficking, arms smuggling, human smuggling and money laundering. Law enforcement has identified a shift from decentralized operations to more structured and violent mafia-like structures. Gang leaders, traditionally discreet, now flaunt their power. Women have risen to leadership roles, orchestrating drug distribution structures and engaging in public displays of violence. Narco-funerals – often lasting for days – have become symbolic demonstrations of criminal dominance, with authorities struggling to contain them. Government assessments have previously underestimated the sophistication and growth of these groups, weakening the state’s response to them. Decentralized networks and small, loosely organized gangs also operate in Chile, engaging in a broad range of illicit activities including human trafficking, arms smuggling, environmental crimes and drug distribution. These networks have expanded nationwide, linking operations from northern border regions to the central and southern parts of the country. The violence perpetrated by loose networks, once limited, has escalated due to conflicts over drug routes and illicit markets. Transnational elements play a key role, particularly in cocaine re-export, gold trafficking and contraband trade, demonstrating how foreign and local actors collaborate to exploit regulatory weaknesses and geographic vulnerabilities in Chile’s security framework.
While organized crime has not deeply infiltrated state institutions or influenced democratic processes, corruption among law enforcement and military personnel has facilitated criminal activities. Officials from the militarized police force (Carabineros), the civil investigative police (PDI), national customs services, and the prison security force (Gendarmería) have been implicated in arms trafficking, migrant smuggling and drug-related offences, often collaborating with domestic and foreign criminal networks. Despite media exposure of police misconduct – including the manipulation of crime records and illicit dealings – many implicated officers retained their positions, revealing systemic weaknesses that enable organized crime’s expansion and transnational influence.
Chile has emerged as a critical hub for transnational organized crime, attracting foreign criminal organizations that exploit its strategic location for drug trafficking, human smuggling and illicit markets. Venezuelan groups, particularly Tren de Aragua, have expanded their influence through extortion, migrant smuggling and violent enforcement, including kidnappings and executions, destabilizing local security. Colombian and Mexican cartels leverage Chile’s ports for drug shipments to Europe, and the Cartel del Golfo and Cartel de Sinaloa have invested in high-potency cannabis cultivation. Chinese criminal networks contribute technological advancements in drug production. The Brazilian Primeiro Comando da Capital has also infiltrated Chile, with operatives coordinating from within the prison system. Northern regions, including Tarapacá and Arica y Parinacota, face escalating violence as rival groups compete for control. Chile’s stability, legal gaps and extensive trade routes have enabled foreign and local actors to form alliances, strengthening transnational crime networks. These dynamics underscore Chile’s evolving role as a key logistical and operational centre in the global illicit economy.
Private companies in Chile play a central role in laundering illicit funds through front, shell and paper companies that enable organized crime groups to integrate illegal proceeds into the legitimate economy. In the logging sector, fraudulent invoicing allows illegal timber to enter the legal market. Similarly, the trade in illicitly sourced gold exploits regulatory gaps in jewellery sales. Other industries, including casinos, real estate and businesses in free trade zones, are increasingly implicated in illicit activities.
Chile’s increasing organized crime challenges have prompted the government to adopt a firm stance. Initiatives such as the Calles sin Violencia project aim to enhance law enforcement capabilities, target arms trafficking and improve penal responses. Record seizures and destruction of illegal firearms have been reported. New legislation addresses drug trafficking and organized crime, reinforcing prosecutorial measures. Deportation policies for undocumented migrants are framed as a security measure. Chile remains institutionally and economically stable, although social unrest, distrust in government and constitutional reform setbacks persist. The long-standing Mapuche conflict exacerbates security concerns, with unverified claims linking indigenous groups to illicit activities. Weak border controls and limited intelligence capabilities have facilitated criminal expansion, sparking criticism of the government’s security strategy.
Chile is considered one of Latin America’s least corrupt countries, but recent scandals, including bribery cases involving public officials, have raised concerns about persistent corruption. In response, the government introduced an anti-corruption bill during the reporting period, proposing stricter conflict-of-interest regulations, prohibiting nepotism in senior roles, enforcing a ten-year office ban for convicted officials and centralizing public financial disclosures. Existing transparency measures regulate lobbying, require asset declarations and promote public accountability. Despite these frameworks and the absence of evidence that organized crime is infiltrating the political system, public dissatisfaction and perceptions of insecurity have grown. Fuelled by economic concerns and political mistrust, this reflects broader frustrations with governance and the perceived lack of significant anti-corruption progress.
Chile has integrated major international treaties on organized crime, narcotics, arms trafficking and corruption into its legal framework, demonstrating a strong commitment to global cooperation. The country maintains extensive extradition agreements, including a recent treaty with Argentina, and collaborates closely with regional and international law enforcement agencies such as INTERPOL and the US Drug Enforcement Administration. Efforts to enhance border security include participation in international anti-trafficking operations. Despite these advances, Chile has not ratified certain environmental and human rights protocols, leaving regulatory gaps in areas such as corporate accountability and protections against discrimination. While highly regarded for intelligence-sharing, Chile’s adherence to international norms remains selective in key sectors.
A robust legal framework to combat organized crime is in place, covering money laundering, terrorism, corruption and drug, arms and human trafficking. Rising violence has driven legislative reforms which include measures to improve prosecution, manage seized assets and reinforce social reintegration. The government’s security initiatives aim to enhance policing in high crime areas and address arms circulation, leading to record seizures and weapon destruction. Environmental crime laws have expanded, with new regulations targeting illegal fishing and ecocide. Economic crime legislation has increased corporate liability, while cybersecurity laws modernize digital protections. Efforts to combat human smuggling and the trade in counterfeit goods and illicit cigarette trade continue, though enforcement challenges persist. Some environmental protections remain weak, particularly regarding deforestation and resource exploitation.
Despite comparatively low crime rates, the Chilean judicial and penal systems contain structural deficiencies. The judiciary, under the Supreme Court and Ministry of Justice, struggles with resource shortages, low judicial investment and inefficiencies in prosecution and trials, contributing to widespread public distrust. The prison system, which operates beyond its capacity and with poor living conditions, fosters criminal networks that enable intra-prison drug trafficking and high recidivism. Pretrial detention rates exceed international recommendations. A new maximum-security prison is planned to counter organized crime. The state prosecutes economic and organized crimes, but enforcement remains weak. Despite meeting standards for human trafficking elimination, lenient sentencing and a lack of specialized prosecution hinder efforts. Corruption within prisons persists but is not systemic.
The public security framework relies on the Carabineros and the PDI. These institutions, alongside the Gendarmería in the prisons, face ongoing challenges such as corruption, inefficiency and allegations of human rights abuses. Intelligence operations are conducted by police units and the civilian national intelligence agency, although limited inter-agency coordination weakens their effectiveness. Recent government efforts include police reform initiatives and increased funding for risk management. Organized crime measures focus on border security, anti-drug operations and maritime monitoring, yet structural challenges persist. Human rights concerns also remain, particularly regarding police conduct and the treatment of marginalized communities.
Chile faces ongoing challenges in border security and transnational crime, particularly in its northern regions, which serve as primary transit points for drug and human trafficking from neighbouring countries. The Atacama Desert, with its numerous unregulated crossings, is a hub for migrant smuggling controlled by Venezuelan and Bolivian criminal groups. Northern ports such as Iquique serve as critical points for drug trafficking networks linked to Bolivia, Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil. Despite deploying military forces and declaring states of exception, criminal markets continue to grow, highlighting persistent weaknesses in enforcement. Chile’s extensive coastline presents further vulnerabilities, including maritime drug trafficking and illegal fishing, particularly with foreign fleets encroaching on national waters. Additionally, cybersecurity remains a pressing issue, with Chile ranking among the Latin American nations most affected by ransomware attacks. However, the country is recognized for its proactive stance in cybersecurity policy development.
Chile’s economic openness makes it a target for money laundering, primarily linked to drug trafficking but also involving arms trafficking and human trafficking. Evolving techniques exploit digital platforms, bypassing traditional banking systems, and criminal organizations use illicitly sourced gold to integrate profits into the legal economy. Authorities have responded with an action plan for 2023–2027, coordinated through an intersectoral advisory body that engages with 29 entities, including law enforcement and financial regulators. Chile has a long-standing regulatory framework, with anti-money laundering legislation dating back to the early 2000s. Despite legal advancements, laundering activities have increased. Online gambling and specific sectors such as legal accounting, retail and e-commerce are identified as particularly vulnerable.
Chile is a leading economy in Latin America, marked by strong macroeconomic policies, global trade integration and market-oriented reforms. Its accession to the OECD signified recognition of its economic governance, though recent crises have exposed vulnerabilities such as inequality and economic volatility. The country’s heavy reliance on raw-material exports makes it susceptible to external shocks and illicit financial flows. Its regulatory framework aligns with international standards, supporting both local and foreign investment, but environmental and tax regulations remain complex. Chile has strengthened corporate transparency and investor protections through legal reforms. The government’s 2025 budget prioritizes public security, disaster prevention and economic stabilization, with increased allocations for law enforcement and organized crime mitigation.
Chile has a structured anti-human-trafficking framework, ensuring victim access to housing, healthcare, legal aid and migration support. A second specialized shelter has been funded, but NGO services remain underfunded and reintegration programmes are insufficient. Identified foreign victims of trafficking cannot be deported and receive the same services as Chileans. Victim and witness units assist the Prosecutor’s Office and provide video interpretation in trafficking cases, and video testimonials are available for minors. Chile’s national crime victims policy supports victim participation in decision-making, restorative justice and the improvement of investigative systems. Anti-trafficking laws include witness protections. The human trafficking plan indeed aids victims but struggles against irregular migration, particularly in northern regions, due to resource constraints. A whistle-blower law was enacted, though concerns persist over judicial decisions which compromise confidentiality. Nevertheless, victim services remain inconsistent. Budget constraints affect shelters, especially those for child and male victims. Delayed shelter expansions and lenient sentencing hinder Chile’s anti-trafficking efforts. As for the drug users, Chilean state has a competent authority, the National Service for the Prevention and Rehabilitation of Drug and Alcohol Consumption (SENDA), working to promote treatment, rehabilitation and social reintegration for those affected by drug abuse. While the services provided include special treatment programmes for women, adults who are homeless, adolescents and those in prison, there are no needle and syringe programmes or opioid substitution therapy provided in the country.
The national strategy against organized crime includes prevention initiatives and inter-agency coordination, but limited funding hampers effectiveness. Outreach efforts, mainly by external entities, are directed to the public and officials. Authorities run trafficking hotlines and train inspectors, and the tourism sector certifies businesses for child sex trafficking prevention. Efforts to reduce commercial sex demand are limited. Drug and alcohol prevention campaigns are led by a national service for the prevention and rehabilitation of drug and alcohol use. Police address environmental crimes. Chile joined global efforts against organ trafficking and launched a crime prevention initiative with municipalities and civil society.
Chile’s constitution guarantees press freedom, but practical constraints persist. Investigative journalism faces legal and physical threats. Attacks on reporters and strategic lawsuits against media outlets have increased, restricting critical coverage. Independent journalism remains active, although funding challenges limit emerging outlets. Media coverage of police violence during protests has been relatively open, but public demand for diverse and independent reporting continues to grow. Chile’s civil society remains strong. NGOs address organized crime, human trafficking and drug-related issues, often collaborating with the government, despite their resource limitations. While press freedom and journalist safety remain concerns, the country maintains democratic stability and a tradition of civic engagement.
Criminal markets
6.330.13
An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.
Human trafficking
7.000.00
Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.
Human smuggling
6.500.00
Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.
Extortion and protection racketeering
5.501.00
Crimes linked to exerting control over a territory/market including as a mediator and/or requesting a benefit in exchange for protection.
Arms trafficking
7.000.50
The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.
Trade in counterfeit goods
8.50-0.50
The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands.
Illicit trade in excisable goods
4.502.50
The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits.
Flora crimes
7.500.50
The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.
Fauna crimes
6.000.00
The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.
Non-renewable resource crimes
9.000.00
The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.
Heroin trade
4.50-1.00
The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.
Cocaine trade
9.000.00
The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cannabis trade
5.50-0.50
The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.
Synthetic drug trade
3.50-1.00
The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cyber-dependent crimes
5.000.00
Organized crimes that rely solely on using information communications technology with the aim of obtaining a monetary/material benefit.
Financial crimes
6.000.50
Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance.
Criminal actors
6.900.30
An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.
Mafia-style groups
7.000.00
Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.
Criminal networks
8.500.00
Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.
State-embedded actors
8.000.50
Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.
Foreign actors
6.500.50
State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.
Private sector actors
4.500.50
Profit-seeking individuals/entities who own/control a part of the legal economy free from the state, that collaborate with criminal actors.
Political leadership and governance
2.500.00
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
5.00-0.50
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
5.500.50
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
6.000.00
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
6.00-0.50
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
4.000.50
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
5.000.00
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
4.500.50
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
4.000.00
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
3.500.00
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
3.500.50
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
4.000.00
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Peru is both a source and destination for human trafficking, predominantly involving sexual and labour exploitation. Modern slavery is prevalent, with young girls the primary victims, especially in sexual exploitation. Foreign tourists are involved in these illicit activities particularly in Cusco, Lima and the Peruvian Amazon. Labour exploitation often targets vulnerable migrants, notably Venezuelans. Traffickers use social media to recruit and sexually exploit children online, with some involvement from foreign tourists. Victims suffer a variety of coercion strategies, including violence, debt, isolation, restriction of freedom of movement and withholding payment. Labour exploitation in Peru is facilitated by the endemic prevalence of informal labour. Forced labour occurs in sectors such as mining, agriculture, logging, manufacturing and domestic service, driven by the informal labour market. Corruption and official complicity undermine anti-trafficking efforts, as some officials, including specialized anti-trafficking unit members, have been implicated in bribery.
Peru serves as both a destination and transit country for human smuggling, attracting Venezuelans as a destination and Caribbean migrants, mainly Haitians and Cubans, en route to Brazil and Chile. Smuggling networks, including Venezuelan, Brazilian, Ecuadorian and Colombian groups, often overlap with human trafficking, exploiting travellers’ vulnerability. Some law enforcement officials have been implicated in facilitating smuggling through bribery. Migrants face increasing violence, including communal and police incidents, primarily targeting Haitians and Venezuelans. Recent measures have restricted legal entry and protection, prompting some Venezuelans to seek alternative destinations like the United States or Europe, reducing the numbers of Venezuelans in Peru.
Extortion in Peru has evolved into a lucrative and diversified market, with criminal organizations increasingly targeting businesses, transporters and residential complexes. Local and foreign groups, including the Venezuelan Tren de Aragua, dominate the market, particularly in Lima. Rivalries between foreign and local networks have fuelled violence, including grenade attacks and contract killings, with nearly half of Lima’s homicides linked to extortion in recent years. Businesses are confronted by demands for high monthly fees, profit-based charges and registration costs, hampering profitability and investment.
Peru is a key hub for arms trafficking, serving as both a source and transit point for weapons destined for Europe, Ecuador and Colombia. Smuggling routes originate near the Ecuadorian border, with weapons moving through Ecuador into Colombia. Foreign criminal groups, including Tren de Aragua and Ecuador’s Los Tiguerones, participate in alternating cooperation and conflict with local networks. Unregulated firearms, including unregistered and homemade firearms as well as ammunition and explosives, sustain organized crime, notably linked to illegal mining. The Tumbes and Piura regions have reported a surge in ammunition seizures, with a dramatic rise in recent years. Authorities also dismantled a clandestine factory in Villa El Salvador, revealing the prevalence of artisanal weapon production, which has been highly sought after due to their low costs.
Trade in counterfeit goods remains extensive in Peru, with major markets in Lima such as Gamarra Emporium and Polvos Azules serving as hubs. Despite police raids that seize significant quantities of counterfeit apparel, availability remains high. Online sales through websites and social media are also common. Counterfeit medicines are widespread, with notable seizures, such as a coordinated international operation near the Peru–Ecuador border. The value of smuggled goods has shown a general upward trend over the past decade, driven by activity in regions like Puno and northern areas. Legal advances have strengthened enforcement by granting investigative authority to police and prosecutors, but the trade continues to thrive amid persistent challenges. Peru also struggles with porous borders that facilitate the entry of excisable goods, often along the same routes used for drugs, gold and timber. Recent studies estimate that hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of excisable goods enter annually through its borders with Chile and Bolivia. The Puno region, bordering Bolivia, is a key hotspot for this trade, including Paraguayan cigarettes.
Illegal logging in Peru is widespread, exacerbating deforestation. It is driven by complex networks that falsify timber registries to transport wood regionally and internationally, notably to China. Human trafficking victims and indigenous communities are coerced into illegal logging and mining. Drug traffickers also exploit timber routes to disguise drug shipments, utilizing both Pacific and Atlantic ports for global distribution. Indigenous communities face increased vulnerability due to exploitation and environmental harm. Corruption within forestry management hinders enforcement. Sustainability certifications have been revoked amid human rights concerns that are linked to logging near isolated indigenous communities.
Peru serves as a major transit and export hub for illegal wildlife and shark fin trafficking. Driven by high demand, wildlife trafficking remains prevalent, especially of reptiles to Asia and exotic pets. Cultural factors also influence local wildlife commercialization. The export of shark fins, primarily sourced from Ecuador, has surged, making Peru one of the world’s largest exporters. The legal trade of Peruvian matamata turtles, facilitated by a 2015 change in the law, is exploited by Colombian traffickers who ‘launder’ turtles by means of cross-border smuggling. Enforcement gaps, corruption and resource limitations hinder effective regulation despite recent initiatives to strengthen monitoring.
Illegal mining in Peru has become a significant economic and social challenge. Illegal mining has intensified in recent years, with increasing volumes of illegally mined gold and other metals. This is particularly the case in the Amazon and protected areas like La Pampa, where operations resumed despite earlier crackdowns. Smuggling along the Peru–Bolivia border and the involvement of local and transnational criminal groups have heightened illegal mining and related crime, including human trafficking and violence. Foreign criminal organizations, including Venezuelan, Brazilian, Ecuadorian and Colombian networks, exploit vulnerable populations and engage in violent confrontations with law enforcement and mining companies.
To a limited extent, Peru serves as a source country for opium, which is cultivated in regions like Cajamarca and Amazonas, with transport routes extending to Ecuador. Peruvian groups mainly export opium, as they lack the laboratories needed to process it into heroin.
By contrast, it is the world’s second-largest coca producer, with trafficking routes originating in the country primarily going through the Amazon, where the cocaine is sent via rivers to Brazil. Cocaine is then sold on the local market or shipped to Europe, including Belgium and Türkiye. Domestic and foreign criminal groups, including remnants of Sendero Luminoso and foreign cartels, dominate trafficking networks, using remote airstrips and river routes. Criminal organizations vertically control the supply chain and frequently resort to violence, including murder. Foreign criminal networks include Colombian, Brazilian, Venezuelan, Mexican and Italian groups, coordinating shipments to North America, Europe and Asia. Cocaine production has severe impacts on indigenous communities, endangering isolated tribes and causing environmental destruction, particularly in the Amazon region.
Cannabis is grown alongside coca in Peru, but there has been no reported increase in cannabis cultivation. Despite limited data on the cannabis market’s size and value, it is known to operate through loosely organized domestic criminal networks with transnational connections. These networks transport cannabis from Peru’s La Libertad region to Chile, primarily via the Panamericana Sur highway, using trucks and vans.
The synthetic drug market remains limited in size and value, with occasional seizures of Tusi (‘pink cocaine’). Concerns of potential fentanyl smuggling from Ecuador have arisen recently, and pharmacies in Lima were alleged to sell fentanyl without prescriptions. Overall, Peru accounts for a small percentage of synthetic drug shipments originating from Latin America and the Caribbean on the darknet.
Peru has recently emerged as a target for cyberattacks, with most major breaches being ransomware attacks. The Peruvian police recently suffered a ransomware attack, but there is limited information on the authorities’ response. Regional and international cybercrime networks significantly influence these activities.
Peru faces significant challenges related to tax evasion, financial fraud and counterfeit currency production. High levels of informal labour contribute to substantial tax evasion. The country is ranked high globally for phishing. Additionally, Peru is a major producer of counterfeit US dollars. Clandestine operations exporting fake currency to neighbouring countries and the United States have recently been seized. Corruption and embezzlement involving law enforcement and local officials also result in significant financial losses.
Alongside an unknown number of mafia-style actors, remnants of the terrorist group Sendero Luminoso also operate a mafia-like structure. Domestic family clans are mostly engaged in the production of cocaine for foreign traffickers, particularly from Colombia, Mexico and Brazil. Mafia-style groups maintain partial control over local populations and frequently use violence against their opponents, including indigenous communities. Criminal syndicates maintain significant access to firearms, fostering an environment of intimidation and impunity.
Loosely organized networks are very influential and primarily concentrated in Lima, the Amazon region and near the Ecuadorian border. Criminal networks, including illegal mining groups, cooperate with private and foreign actors. These groups engage in human trafficking, extortion, illegal mining and contract killings in mining areas like Pataz. Transnational influences are prominent, with Peruvian networks collaborating with Ecuadorian groups in arms trafficking, Brazilian and Colombian organizations in wildlife smuggling and Chilean networks in cannabis distribution. The fluid, decentralized structure of such groups complicates enforcement and facilitates cross-border criminal enterprises. In the first two months of 2024, 1 405 criminal gangs were dismantled by the National Police, signalling an extensive presence of loosely organized criminal networks.
Organized crime in Peru is deeply entrenched within state institutions, with law enforcement, politicians and judiciary members frequently implicated in criminality. Corruption permeates various levels, cultivating an environment where criminal organizations operate with impunity. Systemic vulnerabilities are illustrated by high-profile cases, such as former presidents accused of influence peddling and money laundering. Law enforcement corruption is pervasive, from facilitating human trafficking within penitentiaries to ignoring falsified permits for illegal wildlife trade. Environmental and police authorities often fail to enforce regulations. Some officers manipulate evidence to coerce suspects’ cooperation. These practices reveal how state actors, even when not directly involved in criminal markets, significantly enable and sustain organized crime. Whether by complicity or negligence, they complicate efforts to dismantle criminal networks.
Foreign groups are also highly influential in the country. Actors from Venezuela, Ecuador, Colombia and the Balkans, as well as Mexican cartels, have expanded their presence in Peru, highlighting systemic vulnerabilities in border control and law enforcement and exacerbating transnational organized crime dynamics. Venezuelan criminal groups, notably Tren de Aragua, dominate multiple criminal markets, including human trafficking, extortion, arms trafficking and cocaine trade. Colombian groups, including remnants of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, exert significant influence over cocaine trafficking. Brazilian gangs, including the Comando Vermelho and the Primeiro Comando da Capital, are entrenched in border regions.
As for private-sector actors, legal logging and gold-mining companies in Peru are known to facilitate organized crime by falsifying certificates and faking transactions to launder gold and timber. Timber bosses exploit indigenous communities under the guise of employment, while illegal timber trafficking networks involving businessmen and public officials profit from labour exploitation. The illegal gold-mining sector operates as an intricate network of miners, intermediaries and concession owners. Financial institutions, such as fake cooperatives, are also involved in criminal activities, particularly through fraudulent schemes that exploit clients with false promises of high returns.
Peru faces a severe security crisis marked by escalating organized crime, with nearly half of the reported murders occurring in Lima. Contract killings and extortion have surged, prompting increased government funding for law enforcement and the inauguration of ballistic identification laboratories to track firearms. The government has deployed military and special police forces in response to rising violence and threats from Venezuelan extortion gangs. Despite these efforts, opposition parties criticize the administration’s measures as superficial and ineffective. Simultaneously, the country faces a constitutional crisis, with low approval ratings for both the president and Congress. Corruption allegations and controversial constitutional changes only intensify public dissatisfaction and political instability.
Corruption remains a pervasive issue, undermining public trust in government and political institutions. Most citizens identify corruption as Peru’s primary problem. During the reporting period, investigations targeted high-level politicians including the president, several former presidents and numerous legislators, with many facing corruption or related charges. Nevertheless, government officials often prevent and evade investigations into corruption allegations, including arbitrary removals of lead prosecutors in high profile cases. Transparency has declined, with reduced access to budget and procurement data and increased opacity under the current administration.
Peru actively addresses organized crime through international cooperation, legal frameworks and capacity-building initiatives. During the reporting period, Peru joined regional security efforts, including the Andean security network, which is intended to coordinate border operations against transnational crime with its neighbouring countries. It also participated in a US-led training initiative for law enforcement to enhance digital evidence handling. The United States supports elite police training, logistics and intelligence, with DEA presence in Lima. Peru has extradition treaties with 18 countries and collaborates with UN agencies and INTERPOL, hosting the UN Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean to bolster international law enforcement coordination.
Peru’s legal framework against organized crime continues to be robust yet contentious. Legislation addresses drug trafficking and environmental crimes, including wildlife trafficking. Anti-drug efforts have been strengthened through specialized task forces and a long-term national strategy. However, illegal logging regulations were weakened by amendments despite widespread opposition. Relaxed gun laws led to increased arms smuggling, prompting a state of emergency at the border with Ecuador. Peru also lacks a national cyber security strategy, or policies related to countering cybercrime. Controversial laws restricted prosecutors’ ability to investigate certain low-penalty crimes as organized crime, raised crime classification thresholds and shifted preliminary investigations from prosecutors to police, sparking criticism for potentially undermining efforts against corruption organized crime.
Peru’s judiciary faces widespread corruption and a compromised rule of law, with constitutional guarantees unevenly upheld and inadequate legal representation for non-Spanish speakers. During the reporting period, a ruling diminished judicial review and enhanced congressional power, and political interference undermined judicial independence. Despite challenges, an integrity programme was introduced to combat corruption. Specialized courts address corruption crimes, and new flagrancy units aim to expedite justice. However, chronic underfunding hampers effectiveness and illegal mining investigations remain stalled. The prison system lacks state control, with criminal activities persisting within facilities, exacerbated by corruption and overcrowding. A planned mega-prison is meant to address severe overpopulation and poor living conditions.
While Peru made substantial efforts to combat organized crime, its law enforcement continues to face challenges related to the size, funding and training of specialized police units. Collaborative initiatives, such as the transnational criminal investigative unit and special joint anti-drug task operational groups, were established to strengthen anti-crime operations. Environmental crime measures were intensified through regional cooperation against illicit finance. Law enforcement funding increased, reflecting a prioritization of public security. However, trust in the police and armed forces remains low due to abuse and corruption. High turnover rates further hinder their effectiveness. Community policing in remote areas has proven ineffective. Despite anti-corruption measures, the deactivation of the division for investigating highly complex crimes raises concerns about political interference.
Peru’s geographical diversity of mountainous terrain, dense jungles and complex river systems poses significant challenges for border control. The country’s strategic location makes it a major criminal market and transit point for trafficking to Asia, North America and Europe. During the reporting period, border security measures were strengthened, including enhanced monitoring on the Ecuadorian border and the establishment of a tripartite border-control post at the juncture with Chile and Bolivia. Remote sensing and satellite technology are being employed to detect illegal activities. Despite these efforts, border porosity remains a critical issue, particularly in the Amazon and along the borders with Brazil, Colombia and Bolivia. Corruption within transport infrastructure exacerbates vulnerabilities.
Peru remains a focal point for money laundering concerns. While the Financial Action Task Force has not listed it as having strategic anti-money laundering (AML) deficiencies, it is categorized as ‘a jurisdiction of primary concern’ by the US State Department. During the reporting period, Peru strengthened its AML framework through public–private partnerships with major financial institutions and the development of investigative guidelines with European technical support. Legislative measures to enhance financial transparency and prevent illicit activity include regulations on gambling and crowdfunding. However, high-profile investigations continue to link former and current government officials to money laundering and illegal campaign financing. Peru’s commitment to addressing financial crime is evident, yet challenges persist in enforcement and accountability. Peru maintains economic regulations that support trade and investment to a certain extent. The government has invested in digital infrastructure to enhance regulatory efficiency and transparency, focusing on online business-registration and licencing systems. However, corruption and weak rule of law continued to impede property rights enforcement. Once a key driver of economic growth, the construction sector stagnated amid rising violence and increased extortion. Criminal control over land acquisition has surged, with illegal land sales generating significant illicit revenue due to heightened demand for industrial and commercial-use properties. Informal employment is still prevalent, and wage levels were mostly below the legal minimum.
Despite progress, challenges persist. There is limited funding and inadequate training for victim identification and protection. Victim care measures include identity protection, legal aid and psychological support, but resource disparities hinder consistent implementation. As indigenous communities face increased threats from illegal activities, the mechanisms to protect them are underfunded and poorly coordinated, pushing them to boost self-defence strategies. Civil society organizations assist victims and conduct investigations, with mobile units offering immediate support in remote areas. The Peruvian government implemented various measures to combat organized crime, focusing on human trafficking, wildlife trafficking and drug trafficking. Prevention efforts include a national policy against human trafficking and a strategy to reduce illegal wildlife trafficking. A national drug control strategy targets interdiction, eradication and demand reduction, with cooperation from the United States. The Interior Ministry’s Central Única de Denuncias allows anonymous crime reporting through multiple channels. Despite these initiatives, organized crime has surged, including trafficking and environmental violence. NGOs in Peru face challenges in promoting social inclusion, environmental protection and human rights. Despite cooperation between the government and civil society organizations in victim support, state interference hindered investigations into corruption and criminal markets. Proposed legislative changes threaten the right of association by allowing the executive branch to dissolve organizations receiving international funding without judicial oversight, raising concerns about misuse of power. Press freedom is constitutionally protected, yet it remains compromised as journalists face violence and harassment, particularly during protests. The government’s increasing repression of CSOs and the mainstream media’s negative portrayal of demonstrators have heightened tensions and weakened democratic principles.
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The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to 10. The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel.
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