People

Brazil is both a source and destination country for human trafficking, with victims exploited for sex work and forced labour. Brazilian victims are targeted by organized criminal groups domestically and internationally and are frequently found in trafficking networks in Spain and Italy. Victims from elsewhere, primarily Bolivia, Venezuela, Haiti, Paraguay, the Philippines and China, are exploited within Brazil. Women and girls are particularly vulnerable to sex trafficking, especially in the states of Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina. Fraudulent recruitment for labour opportunities in South East Asia has led to forced labour in cyber-scam operations in Cambodia and China. Labour trafficking is rife within Brazil. In urban centres, Brazilian and foreign workers are subjected to servitude in construction, factories, restaurants and the hospitality industry. Forced labour is also widespread in sugarcane production, mining, logging, textile factories and wine production, as well as domestic work, which particularly affects migrant women and children. Brazilian children are vulnerable to clandestine adoption and sale to foreign buyers and to child sex tourism.

Brazil serves as a major hub for human smuggling in the region, acting primarily as a transit country for individuals – especially from Venezuela and Haiti – moving through South America. In recent years, Brazil has also become a waypoint for smuggled South Asian migrants, particularly men from Vietnam, India and Nepal en route to the United States. Taking their instructions from coyotes, these individuals travel through Europe or Western Asia before landing in Brazil. From there, they embark on a perilous route from Acre to Peru, traversing South and Central America via Panama and navigating the dangerous Darién Gap to reach Mexico. The journey continues through Mexico to the United States. Smuggled South Asian migrants also enter Brazil from its northern border with Guyana. South Asian smuggling networks often operate within their own countries, luring individuals with false job promises in Brazil before subjecting them to debt bondage or slave-like working conditions.

Extortion and protection racketeering are entrenched, particularly in urban centres where police-backed militias charge for protection services. They exploit police resources to coerce payments in extortion practices that target miners, business owners, local politicians and residents. While Brazil’s most influential mafia groups such as the Comando Vermelho (CV) and the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) particularly dominate this criminal market, they are known to refrain from involving regular citizens.

Trade

Arms trafficking is significant in Brazil, as the country is both a consumer of and a transit point for illicit firearms. Weapons are primarily sourced through theft from state stockpiles and private owners, with police officers often acting as intermediaries. Criminal groups like the PCC and the CV procure arms, often using legitimate companies that import arms from Croatia, Türkiye, Slovenia and the United States, using Paraguay as a key transit point. An increase in legal firearm ownership during the previous administration exacerbated the illicit arms trade, with criminal factions exploiting regulatory loopholes to acquire semi-automatic rifles. In fact, criminal groups used such loopholes to legally buy arms through individuals with no criminal records.

The counterfeit goods market has expanded, with the alcoholic beverage industry particularly affected in recent years. A significant portion of distilled spirits produced in the country is now made illegally, a trend that has grown notably in recent years due to high taxation on the domestic industry and the devaluation of the Brazilian real. Clothing, medicines, agrochemicals and electronic goods are also frequently counterfeited, with supply chains linked to China, Paraguay and Guyana. Criminal networks, including drug traffickers, are particularly involved in the counterfeit agrochemical trade. These networks control smuggling routes from Paraguay to Brazil, moving counterfeit pesticides alongside drugs, while goods from northern neighbours enter via river ports like Belém and those bound for Bolivia come by road. Counterfeit products are also produced domestically in Brazilian cities such as Ribeirão Preto, Franca, São José do Rio Preto, and Goiânia.

The illicit trade in excise goods, particularly cigarettes, remains a major issue in Brazil, driven by factors such as tax policies and the social acceptance of smuggled products. Brazil plays a key role in the illicit tobacco trade, especially in the tri-border region with Paraguay and Argentina, where most Paraguayan cigarettes are smuggled into Brazil. This trade is deeply intertwined with money laundering, political corruption, and gang activities within the region. Criminal groups like the PCC have become increasingly active in this highly lucrative market, reinvesting drug proceeds into contraband cigarettes, while militia groups in Rio de Janeiro profit from selling irregular cigarettes in their territories. In Brazilian cities, illegal cigarettes often outsell legal ones due to significant price differences. Smugglers have adapted to enforcement efforts by developing complex, multi-country routes, including via Bolivia, Suriname, and Panama, and rely on clandestine ports where workers are often co-opted by criminal networks to bypass inspections. E-cigarettes have also emerged as a growing segment of the illicit market, particularly in the cross-border area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, despite their sale being unauthorized in Brazil. Millions of e-cigarettes have been seized nationwide, yet demand continues to rise, with millions of Brazilians using unregulated products.

Environment

Illegal logging and deforestation cause severe economic and ecological damage, with losses from Amazon deforestation alone estimated in billions of dollars annually. Highly valuable timber species such as brazilwood and ipê are trafficked to North America, Europe and China, often through fraudulent documentation. Organized crime groups, including the PCC and the CV, engage in logging, land grabs and political corruption to maintain control over timber supply chains. The previous administration’s dismantling of environmental and indigenous protection agencies worsened the situation, creating a power vacuum to be filled by crime syndicates. Although the current administration has introduced improved policies aimed at reducing deforestation, resulting in some initial progress, systemic challenges remain. Ongoing collusion between corrupt officials and criminal actors continues to undermine the full effectiveness of these reforms. Fauna crimes are rampant, with Brazil serving as a source country for illegal wildlife trade. Parrots, exotic fish and endangered species such as Lear’s macaws and golden lion tamarins are smuggled internationally, often via Suriname, Guyana and Peru. Each year, millions of animals are illegally taken from the wild in Brazil, with around 90% dying during capture and transport and only 10% reaching the end consumer, highlighting the cruelty of the trade. Brazil is estimated to account for 5%–15% of global wildlife trafficking. The internet has become a critical tool for wildlife traffickers, enabling them to reach a wide audience while remaining anonymous. Digital platforms have fuelled the rise in wildlife trafficking, with major seizures revealing increasing links between criminal networks and international buyers. These animals were sold predominantly via social media, often accompanied by forged documents.

Illegal mining continues to be widespread in Brazil. Gold mining, particularly in Yanomami and Tapajós territories, is driven by high global prices, weak enforcement and sophisticated smuggling operations. Brazil’s gold supply chain lacks transparency, allowing illegally mined gold to enter the legal economy. The surge in gold prices over the past five years, coupled with weak law enforcement and a poorly regulated market, has exacerbated the issue. Estimates of illegal miners in indigenous Amazonian territories range from 4 000 (official) to as many as 20 000 (NGOs and indigenous leaders). Other illicitly extracted resources include diamonds, cassiterite and tantalum, with cross-border smuggling networks linked to Venezuela, Guyana and Colombia. Sand trafficking has also emerged as a lucrative crime, notably along the Preto River in São Paulo, in militia-controlled areas of Rio de Janeiro, and in Bahia and Paraíba.

Drugs

Brazil is a major hub in the global cocaine trade due to its location near key drug-producing countries and its extensive transport networks. The Amazon region has become a primary entry point, with traffickers using its rivers to move shipments toward Atlantic ports for export, mostly to Europe. Cocaine seizures have increased significantly, with authorities intercepting large shipments throughout the year. Ports and private aircraft are commonly used for smuggling, and international criminal networks collaborate with Brazilian groups to facilitate trafficking. Law enforcement efforts have led to arrests and asset seizures, but the trade remains highly active. Cocaine moves through two main routes: one integrates shipments into agricultural exports and the other exploits weak surveillance in the Amazon. Organized crime groups dominate the trade, using expanding networks to move drugs internationally. Brazil is also one of the largest consumers of cocaine and crack cocaine, with a widespread domestic market controlled by criminal organizations. The drug trade fuels violence and is linked to other illicit activities, including arms trafficking and vehicle theft. Criminal groups continue to expand their reach, using alternative routes and partnerships to evade law enforcement.

Brazil is a major consumer of cannabis, primarily sourced from Paraguay, though domestic cultivation is increasing. The cannabis trade plays a critical role in funding criminal organizations, particularly in urban centres. Most marijuana in Brazil is of low quality and often transported in compressed form for discretion, but demand for higher-grade cannabis, including imported varieties, is rising. Wealthier consumers drive demand for premium products from Europe, Africa and the United States. Criminal groups involved in the cocaine trade, such as the PCC and the CV, also control marijuana distribution, using the same channels as the cocaine trade, with production managed by Paraguayan and Colombian organizations. Law enforcement efforts have had an impact on the operations of criminal networks, yet marijuana remains widely accessible, with prices varying across regions.

Brazil is experiencing a rise in synthetic drug seizures, particularly fentanyl, which is increasingly produced in the country and distributed through postal services. Often mixed with other substances, fentanyl poses unknown risks to users. Synthetic drugs like ecstasy, pink cocaine and ketamine are becoming more prevalent, especially in party culture. Brazil plays a key role in international smuggling networks, with raw materials entering through ports, airports and land borders. Some synthetic drugs are diverted from pharmaceutical sources or smuggled from Mexico, highlighting ties between Latin American criminal organizations. Law enforcement and research institutions are working to improve detection and prevention efforts. Reports indicate an overall increase in synthetic drug seizures and overdoses in an evolving drug landscape.

The heroin market in Brazil is limited. It is not a common street drug and is rarely used due to its high cost and low market availability.

Cyber-dependent crimes

Brazil faces a growing cybercrime threat, with attacks increasingly targeting individuals and businesses. A major data leak in early 2024 exposed sensitive information about millions of people, and ransomware and banking trojans are persistent threats. Brazil is a key target for cyberattacks in Latin America, accounting for a significant share of regional incidents. Banking trojans originating in Brazil have come to dominate the global landscape, filling the gap left by Eastern European cybercriminals who have shifted to ransomware. Businesses report frequent breaches, often disrupting access to critical data. Efforts to counter cyberthreats continue, but vulnerabilities remain widespread across sectors.

Financial Crimes

Financial crimes in Brazil are widespread, encompassing corruption, tax evasion, embezzlement and fraud. Tax fraud remains significant, with mis-invoiced illicit flows representing a substantial portion of GDP. Authorities have dismantled schemes involving front companies and fraudulent income tax claims. Investment fraud has also increased, hitting pension funds, investors and state development agencies. Cyber-enabled financial crime, including identity fraud, online scams and financial fraud, has increasingly become prevalent, with many schemes operated from within prisons. Financial fraud has significantly impacted various sectors, including retail, e-commerce and insurance, with over USD 1.5 billion lost to scams during the reporting period. Fraudulent gambling apps and phishing scams exploit citizens. Such illicit financial flows support organized crime.

Criminal Actors

Organized crime in Brazil is dominated by the PCC and CV groups, which have expanded beyond prisons into transnational operations. They engage in drug and arms trafficking, smuggling, money laundering and illegal mining, and collaborate with foreign criminal organizations across Latin America, Europe and Africa. The PCC operates as a decentralized network, while the CV maintains a hierarchical structure with territorial control. Both groups recruit in prisons and exert political influence through corruption and money laundering. Their activities destabilize urban and border regions, fuelling violence and economic crime. Law enforcement faces ongoing challenges as these groups entrench themselves in international drug networks, financial systems and governance structures.

Brazil faces an escalating challenge from organized crime, with numerous criminal factions operating both inside and outside prisons. These groups display a range of structure and fluidity. Criminal networks are expanding activities in the Amazon region, which has intensified the violence and strengthened transnational connections, particularly in drug trafficking and environmental crimes. Beyond narcotics, criminal networks engage in illegal mining, arms trafficking, bank robbery and money laundering. Many maintain alliances with political figures, using illicit funds to influence elections.

Throughout the country, a range of law enforcement, military and civilian state officials form groups that profit from a variety of illicit trades, including drugs, mining, environmental crimes and financial crimes. Brazil’s paramilitary militias, primarily composed of current and former security forces, are the most influential state-embedded criminal actors. These have also become dominant actors, surpassing traditional gangs in territorial control. Concentrated in Rio de Janeiro’s marginalized areas, they exert de facto authority, extorting residents and monopolizing services such as utilities, transport and real estate. Collusion with other state officials allows these groups to evade law enforcement while infiltrating political institutions and shaping electoral outcomes. Some militias have recently allied with drug traffickers, expanding into the narcotics trade. Their capacity for wielding violence and co-opting administrative structures underscores their systemic entrenchment, making them a key driver of Brazil’s organized crime landscape and a significant factor in the country’s persistently high levels of violence.

The country’s organized crime landscape is deeply entangled with foreign criminal organizations which collaborate with or compete against domestic groups like the PCC and the CV. Italian mafias (notably the 'Ndrangheta) and Balkan networks facilitate transnational drug and arms trafficking, money laundering and territorial disputes. Venezuelan gangs exploit migration routes to expand into Brazil’s northern regions, forming alliances for drug and gold trafficking, as well as human exploitation. Peruvian and Bolivian groups, alongside dissidents from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, establish cocaine supply routes into Brazil. Nigerian, Chinese and Albanian mafias engage in diverse illicit activities, from financial crimes to illegal resource extraction. Diasporas play key roles in counterfeit markets and public-transit mafias, reflecting long-standing criminal-economic ties between Brazil and global actors.

The private sector in Brazil facilitates large-scale money laundering and illicit financial flows. Criminal organizations integrate illegal funds into legitimate sectors such as public transportation, agriculture and healthcare. Investigations reveal that bus operators, hospital suppliers and auto-parts businesses act as conduits for laundering illicit proceeds. The gold-mining sector, with international links, plays a key role in financial crimes, particularly through Guyanese actors. Banks, fintech firms and currency exchange companies facilitate these operations, with some institutions primarily engaged in illicit finance.

Leadership and governance

Brazil faces persistent challenges in combating organized crime, with lethal violence levels comparable to conflict zones. Although the country recorded its lowest homicide rate in over a decade in 2024, it still leads in absolute numbers, and violence remains concentrated in states like Bahia. Conviction rates for homicide remain low, and gang activity continues to fuel crime, particularly in urban centres and the Amazon. The current administration has prioritized security by reversing firearm deregulation and launching targeted programmes to counter organized crime, drug trafficking and environmental crimes. Initiatives such as the National Programme to Counter Organized Crime and the Security Action Programme aim to enhance policing and judicial cooperation. Federal law enforcement has also focused on curbing illegal gold extraction and smuggling. Despite these measures, police violence has surged in some regions, and organized crime networks maintain significant territorial control.

Corruption is a major issue, with political entanglements limiting enforcement against criminal groups. Militia influence in local governance and electoral interference by crime syndicates weaken the rule of law. Despite Brazil’s regulatory frameworks and systems to combat corruption, systemic weaknesses in transparency and accountability persist. With institutional complicity enabling criminal networks, perceptions of corruption in the country have worsened. Reports indicate that judges, prosecutors and law enforcement officials have ties to organized crime. Judicial decisions, including the suspension of fines and relaxed rules for political appointments, raise further concerns about setbacks. However, recent anti-corruption efforts include overturning secrecy orders and tax reforms to reduce bribery.

Recognizing the complexity and scale of the security crisis, the Brazilian government has begun mobilizing international support. Diplomatic efforts are underway to engage neighbouring countries and global partners in developing a coordinated and strategic approach to combat drug trafficking and organized crime. Joint operations with European law enforcement have led to arrests related to drug trafficking. In August 2023, Brazil revived a regional treaty organization to enhance multilateral efforts against illegal mining and logging, although gaps remain in addressing environmental crime. Agreements with Paraguay, Germany, Ecuador, China and France target drug and arms trafficking, money laundering and illegal deforestation. A continental police cooperation body was formally established in 2023, with Brazil in a leadership role.

Despite Brazil’s limits on federalist law enforcement, the current administration did enact security measures in its first year. Stricter arms controls reduced civilian firearm access, increased taxes and restricted certain weapons. Illegal mining crackdowns expelled miners, strengthened enforcement and improved gold-trade transparency. A security initiative established 34 Amazon police outposts to combat drug trafficking and environmental crimes. A national programme boosted policing, inter-agency cooperation and border security. A 2023 decree reinforced federal and military coordination against organized crime. Tougher human trafficking laws increased penalties, aligning with international protocols. Wildlife crime laws remain outdated, while drug policies face legal debates. New regulations target synthetic drugs, cybercrime, corruption and financial fraud.

Criminal justice and security

Brazil’s judiciary, while maintaining independence in several areas, struggles with inefficiency, external pressures and limited oversight, particularly in rural regions. Prosecutors rarely investigate police misconduct, contributing to a pervasive culture of impunity. Reports of judicial corruption, including judges linked to criminal organizations, further erode institutional integrity. The prison system, one of the world’s largest, is overcrowded and deeply infiltrated by organized crime, serving as a recruitment ground for criminal factions. Criminal groups operate across most states, exerting influence within and beyond prison walls. Despite efforts such as the creation of a national penal police force, authorities face persistent challenges in controlling prison-based organized crime.

Brazil’s law enforcement system has deep structural challenges, with police members often implicated in criminal activities. Police corruption and a lack of oversight contribute to widespread misconduct, including extrajudicial killings and collusion with militias. Where the government has taken legal action against human trafficking and cybercrime, a militarized approach to policing has led to violent clashes and continued abuses of power. Institutional divides between military and civil police exacerbate inefficiency. Public trust remains low due to perceptions of political bias, underfunding and systemic racial disparities. Despite efforts to bolster law enforcement, crime groups in many areas remain better equipped than the authorities.

Organized crime is a major issue in Brazil, particularly in border regions, cities and seaports. Vast, unmonitored land and river borders enable illicit activities. The Amazon’s dense forests and river networks facilitate organized crime. Tri-border areas, serve as hubs for transnational crime, including illegal mining and environmental offences. Criminal groups exploit poorly monitored waterways to transport illicit goods, with ports like Porto Vila do Conde linked to drug smuggling. The Amazon is now a focal point for crime, with increasing violence in key municipalities.

Economic and financial environment

Brazil has established a legal and institutional framework, led by the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, to combat money laundering through national strategies, training programmes and specialized units. Yet challenges persist, particularly in corruption-linked laundering schemes using trade-based methods and informal transfers. Enforcement has improved, but prosecutions are slow and gaps in coordination hinder effectiveness. Recent regulations that aim to curb illicit financial flows in gold transactions mandate stricter monitoring and compliance from mining and financial institutions.

Brazil’s high crime and violence levels are significant deterrents to investment. The challenging business environment also includes complex tax regulations and heavy state involvement in the economy. Economic policies dismantled under the previous administration have been reinstated, and a recent tax reform seeks to strengthen federal oversight and curb tax avoidance. Regulatory agencies at the federal level maintain strong oversight in key sectors, although state-level regulators are more vulnerable to criminal influence.

Civil society and social protection

Brazil’s victim assistance framework for human trafficking remains fragmented, with significant gaps in protection and support services. The country lacks a centralized database, making it difficult to track victims and assess service effectiveness. Multiple agencies collect victim data, but inconsistent methodologies limit coordination. There are no specialized shelters or funding for long-term victim support at the federal level. Instead, victims rely on general services, such as healthcare and literacy programmes, which vary by location. São Paulo does operate two trafficking victim shelters. The national drug policies encompass health promotion related to drugs, early intervention, treatment, social integration of marginalized communities and recovery support. The federal witness-protection programme covers a small number of individuals annually but lacks clear guidance for participants seeking anonymity.

The current approach to organized crime prioritizes enforcement over prevention, with limited awareness campaigns that address human trafficking, sex trafficking or child sex tourism. Localized initiatives have reduced violence, but broader strategies are lacking. In August 2024, Brazil introduced a new national plan targeting trafficking for forced labour and sexual exploitation, alongside new anti-trafficking units. Drug prevention campaigns face criticism for their repressive approach and lack of evidence-based strategies. The government is exploring social interventions in the Amazon, but their impact remains uncertain. The country’s central bank has introduced enhanced security measures, including new norms to improve fraud prevention by reducing information asymmetry. Recent reports have identified weaknesses in Brazil’s whistle-blower protections, particularly for private-sector employees reporting foreign bribery.

Civic space is relatively open, but NGOs working with land rights and environmental protection face significant risks, including harassment and violence. Environmental activists and journalists who investigate illegal activities in the Amazon are particularly vulnerable. With organized crime expanding its presence in the Amazon, indigenous communities also experience severe threats. International bodies have expressed concern over rights violations, particularly against indigenous and Afro-descendant populations. Press freedom is challenged by attacks on journalists as well as media concentration and disinformation, despite improved government relations. While the state investigates police violence and corruption, civil society plays a central role in crime prevention research, as authorities remain resistant to external input.

People

Human trafficking in Indonesia is a complex and pervasive issue, with the country serving as a source, transit point and destination for trafficking. Individuals from economically marginalized regions are especially vulnerable to various forms of exploitation, including forced labour, sexual exploitation and forced criminality. Victims are trafficked both domestically and abroad, particularly to other parts of South East Asia and Western Asia. A notable trend is the trafficking of Indonesian nationals into scam operations in neighbouring countries, where they are coerced into cyber-enabled fraud such as cryptocurrency scams and online gambling. Labour exploitation under coercion is common in sectors like domestic work, construction, manufacturing and fishing, especially in parts of East and South East Asia. Domestically, migrant workers face abuse in the agriculture, mining and processing industries. Child marriage and deceptive recruitment practices contribute to child labour and forced work through debt bondage. Sexual exploitation is facilitated through coercive methods such as sham marriages and fraudulent job offers, especially in urban centres and mining regions. Tourist hotspots have also witnessed child sex tourism. These trafficking operations persist due to weak oversight and the exploitation of legal and regulatory gaps in recruitment and labour systems.

Human smuggling is a significant part of the country’s criminal economy and involves a range of actors and transnational routes. Indonesia is both a source and transit country – individuals are smuggled primarily to neighbouring and Western Asian nations, while asylum seekers from countries such as Myanmar and parts of Western Asia transit through Indonesia on route to Australia. In recent years, there has been an increase in refugee arrivals, including a substantial proportion of women and children. Smuggling operations are sustained by criminal networks that exploit Indonesia’s porous maritime borders and extensive coastline. While authorities have blocked irregular migration attempts, enforcement efforts are undermined by persistent corruption and weak inter-agency coordination, reducing the overall effectiveness of disruption measures.

Extortion and protection racketeering are widespread. Local gangs and militias dominate street-level commerce and informal economies, with newer groups and other coercive actors continuing to extort small businesses and vendors through protection payments and the coercive control of territory.

Trade

Arms trafficking in Indonesia is concentrated in areas affected by internal conflict, particularly Papua, where the spread of homemade and trafficked firearms fuels violent confrontations between separatist groups and state security forces. Weapons are sourced both domestically and from neighbouring countries such as Cambodia, Myanmar and the Philippines, and enter Indonesia through maritime and land routes. Online platforms, including encrypted messaging apps and e-commerce sites, have become key channels for firearms transactions. Those involved include civilians impersonating military personnel, corrupt officials and intermediaries operating in Jakarta and conflict-affected provinces. While the issue is mostly localized to areas like Papua and parts of Sulawesi and Maluku, its overlap with other illicit markets – such as drug and wildlife trafficking – points to an interconnected criminal ecosystem.

Indonesia plays a dual role as both a producer and transit hub in the counterfeit goods trade, driven by its proximity to China and its large manufacturing base. A wide range of counterfeit products circulates domestically and abroad, including pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, automotive parts and luxury items. The growth of e-commerce and social media has significantly facilitated this trade, with platforms identified as enablers of illicit sales. Locations such as Mangga Dua and Batam are notorious for their counterfeit markets, where enforcement is minimal. Organized criminal groups exploit this low-risk, high-reward environment with impunity, often overlapping with other illicit economies such as money laundering and human trafficking.

The illicit trade in excisable goods, particularly tobacco and alcohol, continues to challenge authorities. Despite Indonesia being one of the world’s largest cigarette producers, the illicit cigarette trade is widespread, especially in East and Central Java. Rising excise taxes have further fuelled demand for cheaper, untaxed products. The illicit alcohol market, though smaller due to religious and cultural constraints, remains active and often involves mislabelled imports. Criminal actors, including corporate figures and political elites, are implicated in these markets, leveraging porous borders and weak institutional oversight to operate with relative freedom.

Environment

Indonesia is a global hotspot for flora crimes, particularly illegal logging and the illicit trade in high-value plants such as orchids and agarwood. These crimes are fuelled by high demand for land conversion for palm oil plantations and by the economic interests of powerful private and political actors. The sector is deeply embedded in corrupt networks involving local politicians, forestry companies and intermediaries. Illegal timber harvesting is organized and widespread, with profits often laundered through agribusiness and timber processing operations. Although law enforcement efforts, including high-profile container seizures, highlight the persistence of illegal logging, the expiration of key environmental moratoriums has weakened regulatory oversight. Despite recent court rulings against major corporate offenders, illegal logging remains a critical issue.

Fauna crimes are similarly entrenched, with Indonesia functioning as both a source and consumer in the illegal wildlife trade. Species such as orangutans, parrots and Sumatran tigers are targeted for the pet trade and traditional medicine. Trade networks span from poachers to exporters, with social media platforms playing a major role in facilitating transactions. Wildlife smuggling is concentrated around ports and airports, particularly in East Java, where smuggling networks exploit short transit routes and weak enforcement. Corruption and inadequate legislation further hinder intervention efforts. International organizations have observed an increase in online wildlife trafficking and identified thousands of social media accounts involved in the sale of protected species.

The illegal exploitation of non-renewable resources – particularly through unlicensed mining – represents a major environmental crime market in Indonesia. Millions of individuals are estimated to be involved in illegal coal and mineral mining nationwide. These activities often occur with the complicity or direct involvement of state officials, including the police and political figures. Illegal mining contributes significantly to environmental degradation and is believed to finance political campaigns. While recent reforms have introduced stricter licensing requirements and penalty frameworks, illegal mining persists in key provinces such as East Java and South Sumatra.

Drugs

Heroin trafficking in Indonesia remains limited in scale compared to other narcotic markets, though the country still serves as both a destination and a transit point. International trafficking networks, primarily from South and South East Asia, typically employ concealment methods such as embedding heroin into carpet yarn fibres. Indonesian ports and airports are main entry points, with both foreign and domestic actors implicated in recent seizures. Corruption within law enforcement, including anti-narcotics agencies, is reported to facilitate heroin distribution.

Cocaine use is relatively low but increasing in tourist hubs like Bali. The drug is smuggled by maritime routes and postal services, often concealed in consumer goods. Distribution increasingly relies on social media platforms. While the cocaine market is small, its high price and appeal among expatriates and middle- to upper-class consumers sustain demand. Foreign syndicates dominate this trade, with Indonesian nationals occasionally involved in local distribution. Despite enforcement efforts, corruption and cocaine’s high profitability allow the market to persist.

Cannabis is a significant drug market, characterized by widespread cultivation and consumption. It remains deeply entrenched, driven by local demand and international trafficking networks. Aceh province is a primary cultivation area, with domestic syndicates dominating local production. Authorities have reported substantial seizures and increasing use of social media for distribution. Smuggling operations involve ports in Sumatra and major airports, where corruption – including officials accepting bribes – and weak oversight enable the trade to continue.

Synthetic drugs, especially methamphetamine and ecstasy, represent a complex and expansive market in Indonesia. The country serves as a major transit hub for methamphetamine from the Mekong region, with established distribution routes to Australia and New Zealand. Domestic consumption is rising, and foreign criminal networks – including from Western Asia, China and Mexico – are active in the market. Local production exists but remains limited in scale.

Cyber-dependent crimes

Cyber-dependent crimes in Indonesia have surged alongside the rapid growth of the digital economy. The country has experienced multiple cyberattacks annually, with ransomware and data breaches posing significant threats. Recent high-profile incidents have exposed the vulnerabilities in national infrastructure. Criminal actors include international hacker groups, individual fraudsters and terrorist networks exploiting online platforms. These cybercrimes are often linked to other illicit activities such as trafficking and financial fraud.

Financial Crimes

Indonesia’s financial crime landscape involves an array of offences, most prevalent being cyber-enabled scams. In recent years, a significant number of entities have been shut down for illegal lending and fraudulent investment schemes, many of which targeted younger people with promises of high returns. Criminal actors include organized forex broker networks and mafia-style groups involved in property fraud. The growth of digital financial services has increased platforms’ vulnerability to phishing, identity theft and social engineering. As more people use digital channels for financial transactions, criminals exploit these platforms to steal sensitive data and defraud users. These trends highlight the growing overlap between digital innovation and illicit financial activity in Indonesia.

Criminal Actors

Mafia-style groups in Indonesia are deeply embedded across various sectors of society, exerting considerable influence over the economy, politics and law enforcement. Over the past two decades, these groups have become increasingly mobile and adaptive in their operations. Initially involved in illicit activities, many members have expanded into industries such as forestry, manufacturing and online gambling. Some of these actors are often closely tied to powerful political or military families and continue to exert control through informal security provision and coercive tactics. For example, paramilitary-style groups known as ‘preman’ often act as enforcers, with some linked to political elites.

Indonesia’s criminal networks are expansive, loosely organized and frequently intersect with state actors and private interests. These networks play a central role in various illicit markets, including human trafficking, drug smuggling and illegal resource exploitation. They are active in major cities like Jakarta, Surabaya and Medan, as well as in tourist hubs such as Bali. These networks have been implicated in political manipulation, vote-buying and campaign financing, often operating through opaque alliances with elite actors. Human trafficking and terrorism networks also operate across the archipelago, with notable hotspots in regions including Aceh, West Java and Sulawesi. Their fluid and adaptive nature continues to pose challenges for law enforcement.

State-embedded actors wield significant influence over Indonesia’s organized crime landscape, often facilitating or directly participating in illicit markets. Corruption is widespread across all levels of government, with officials frequently accused of involvement in trafficking, smuggling, extortion and the counterfeit goods trade. Law enforcement officials have at times been linked to narcotics networks and efforts to undermine anti-trafficking operations. Reports have revealed that border control officers and prison staff have supported criminal activities, while internal restructuring within anti-trafficking agencies has exposed deeper levels of collusion.

Foreign actors are major players in Indonesia’s criminal ecosystem, particularly in transnational trafficking operations. Lax immigration oversight has enabled foreign criminal groups to establish operations throughout the country, notably in Bali, Java and Sumatera. Western Asian, Chinese and Russian syndicates are actively involved in methamphetamine production and trafficking, often collaborating with Indonesian networks. The tourism sector further facilitates foreign criminal activity, including child trafficking and drug smuggling, particularly in Bali and Nusa Tenggara. Sabah and Aceh serve as major transit zones for human smuggling. Additionally, foreign cybercriminals target Indonesia through gambling and fraud schemes. These transnational threats underscore the porous nature of Indonesia’s borders and the need for stronger cross-border enforcement cooperation.

Private-sector actors also help perpetuate organized crime, particularly through collusion, regulatory evasion and corruption. Political-business alliances are a recurring issue, with deregulation under the previous administration benefiting entrenched business elites who shape policy and control market access. Moreover, legitimate businesses have been implicated in laundering profits from environmental and financial crimes. According to Indonesia’s financial intelligence agency, sectors such as motor vehicle sales, real estate, banking and foreign exchange trading are particularly vulnerable to money laundering. These dynamics highlight the structural overlap between Indonesia’s economic actors and criminal activity, emphasizing the need for enhanced corporate oversight and regulatory reform.

Leadership and governance

Indonesia’s political leadership and governance structures present a mixed picture of progress and persistent challenges. While the country has demonstrated relative strength in areas such as government effectiveness and regulatory quality, these developments are undermined by ongoing issues with political stability and corruption control. Despite government efforts to combat organized crime – particularly in the lead-up to the 2024 presidential elections – public trust has eroded due to systemic bribery, money laundering and vote-buying. Internal conflicts, especially in Papua, further undermine governmental legitimacy and contribute to regional instability. These governance issues leave Indonesian institutions vulnerable to exploitation by criminal actors.

Government transparency and accountability remain key weaknesses in Indonesia’s fight against organized crime. Although the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) continues to expose high-profile cases, its operational independence has been curtailed. The KPK’s declining credibility reflects broader challenges in enforcing anti-corruption measures. Initiatives such as e-budgeting, e-catalogue systems and public access to budget data demonstrates attempts to improve transparency, but implementation remains inconsistent. Moreover, right-to-information laws are undermined by legal loopholes that permit excessive classification of government information, limiting oversight. The 2024 election period was marked by widespread abuse of power, weakened public trust and the use of criminal proceeds to finance electoral influence operations.

Indonesia maintains strong international cooperation in the fight against organized crime. The country has ratified multiple international treaties related to corruption, drug trafficking and wildlife protection. It actively participates in regional frameworks under the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) focused on tackling transnational organized crime and radicalization. Indonesia also engages in joint operations, ministerial meetings and working groups on issues such as illicit drugs, human trafficking and border security. Extradition treaties with key countries and involvement in information-sharing mechanisms reflect its commitment to international legal cooperation. Indonesia’s recent accession to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) signals an effort to align with global standards. The country also works with bilateral partners and international organizations, including the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and the US, on initiatives ranging from drug demand reduction to cybercrime control. However, recurring incidents of cyberattacks and data breaches undermine trust in information-sharing practices with international partners. Domestically, Indonesia’s legal framework covers all major criminal markets, with laws addressing drug trafficking, environmental crimes and cyber-related offences. Recent reforms have introduced stricter penalties for wildlife crimes and prioritized maritime resource protection. Despite this, enforcement remains uneven, particularly in environmental regulation and intellectual property protection. Corruption and limited resources further hinder implementation. Additionally, the rollout of the new criminal code – which includes provisions on cybercrime and human trafficking – has sparked public protests, with critics arguing that it disproportionately empowers the state while limiting civil liberties.

Criminal justice and security

Indonesia’s judicial system faces institutional inefficiencies and lacks the capacity to effectively combat organized crime. While non-judicial bodies such as the KPK and the National Narcotics Agency are more active in tackling criminal activity, the judiciary suffers from low public trust and a reputation for corruption. Public perception suggests that media attention is necessary to spur legal action. Although the government has established a judicial reform team to review and expedite reforms in areas such as criminal justice and anti-corruption, meaningful impact is yet to be seen.

The judicial system also lacks sufficient training to handle complex cases such as human trafficking, which are often prosecuted under lesser charges. Inconsistent sentencing and a high rate of case dismissals further undermine the judiciary’s deterrent capacity. Detention facilities reflect vulnerabilities in the justice system. Overcrowding has pushed inmate populations to nearly double prison capacity, while poor conditions and systemic corruption among prison officers allow drug trafficking networks to operate from within prison walls. Inmates – particularly those convicted of low-level drug offences – often continue engaging in criminal activity due to the lack of effective rehabilitation programmes.

Despite some progress, law enforcement efforts face structural inefficiencies. The Indonesian National Police, responsible for combating organized crime, lacks specialized units and struggles with internal corruption, as evidenced by scandals involving high-ranking officers. While joint task forces involving multiple ministries have been created to tackle crimes such as illegal finance, trafficking and intellectual property violations, their effectiveness is limited by weak accountability. To combat wildlife trafficking and illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, Indonesia launched the Indonesian Maritime Information Centre, which uses daily updates to identify suspected IUU fishing areas. In addressing illegal mining, the National Police’s Criminal Investigation Unit has developed strategies including location monitoring, regulatory guidance and process oversight. INTERPOL’s Jakarta office supports capacity-building initiatives, and regional intelligence-sharing agreements exist. However, public trust in law enforcement remains low due to politicization, a lack of transparency and ineffective cybercrime enforcement.

Indonesia’s territorial integrity faces challenges due to its vast and porous maritime and land borders. Smuggling routes, especially in Aceh and Sabah, are frequently exploited by traffickers. Limited infrastructure and weak surveillance capabilities hamper effective border monitoring. To address this, the government has implemented joint patrols and regional cooperation agreements with neighbouring countries such as Malaysia, Timor-Leste and Papua New Guinea. Participation in initiatives like the Container Control Programme and plans to develop border areas demonstrate a long-term commitment, although operational challenges remain. Political and security tensions in regions like Papua further complicate border governance, with the creation of new provinces triggering local opposition and sparking fears of escalating conflict. Since early 2024, Indonesia has seen a sharp increase in cyberattacks, with government institutions being particularly vulnerable. The Ministry of Information and Communications and the National Cyber and Crypto Agency oversee the country’s cybersecurity, but ineffective regulations have resulted in fragmented responsibilities among institutions. This disjointed framework has left Indonesia exposed to cybercrime, raising serious concerns about the effectiveness of its cybersecurity measures.

Economic and financial environment

Indonesia has taken several steps to combat money laundering through legislation, financial oversight and participation in international frameworks such as the FATF. The Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre is the primary institution responsible for overseeing compliance, risk assessment and reporting suspicious transactions. Legal reforms have expanded the range of entities required to report suspicious activities and enabled civil servants to conduct parallel investigations. However, the agency’s effectiveness is hampered by poor coordination with previously cooperative institutions, including the KPK. Indonesia has also identified growing financial risks linked to human trafficking and cybercrime. While efforts to block illicit financial flows exist, there is little attention paid to state-embedded actors and widespread under-reporting from major economic sectors.

Indonesia’s economic regulatory environment is moderately developed, marked by a mix of liberal reforms and persistent institutional challenges. While the Omnibus Law on Job Creation and related regulations aim to streamline business licensing and boost competitiveness, they have also raised concerns about environmental protections and labour rights. The country’s economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic has benefited from strong policies, but corruption, weak tax enforcement and regulatory inconsistencies continue to pose challenges. Authorities have promoted e-commerce and digital platforms, though these have also become channels for the sale of illicit goods. Data security and cybercrime present additional risks, especially in the financial services sector.

Civil society and social protection

Indonesia has taken steps to improve victim and witness protection, primarily through its national protection agency. To address the agency’s geographic and resource limitations, community-based programmes have been introduced, and Indonesia has supported regional declarations on protection within ASEAN frameworks. However, major implementation gaps remain. Victims of human trafficking – especially men and rural populations – are often overlooked due to fragmented identification systems and a lack of unified standard operating procedures. Victims of forced criminal activity, such as drug trafficking, are often prosecuted rather than protected, conflicting with the non-punishment principle. Compensation mechanisms for victims are limited, and reintegration support is insufficient. Although shelters and hotlines exist, services vary widely across regions and are not always well-resourced.

Indonesia employs a range of prevention strategies, including trafficking awareness campaigns, school-based anti-drug initiatives, community reporting mechanisms and restorative justice programmes. Thousands of cases have been resolved outside formal courts. However, these efforts are undermined by inconsistent legal definitions and uneven implementation – particularly concerning drug policy. Harsh penalties, including capital punishment for drug offences, as well as reports of torture and arbitrary detention remain serious concerns. While Indonesia has pursued rehabilitation alternatives and legal reforms, vulnerable groups continue to lack adequate protection. Preventative efforts targeting online crime and financial fraud are emerging but lack the necessary enforcement capacity. While awareness campaigns address some of these issues, prosecution and deterrence mechanisms remain weak.

Civil society and non-state actors play a vital role in Indonesia’s resilience ecosystem, particularly in advocacy, victim protection and public awareness. Organizations are active in areas such as trafficking, drug rehabilitation and cybercrime prevention. Despite their contributions, civil society operates in an increasingly restricted environment. Legal frameworks, surveillance and harassment have curtailed the influence of activists and journalists. The Omnibus Law and related regulatory changes have weakened labour unions and limited public participation in political decision-making. Press freedom is further constrained by self-censorship and targeted attacks on media professionals, especially those reporting on corruption and environmental issues. Additional challenges include restrictions on academic research and the arrests of foreign journalists. Nevertheless, social and digital media continue to play a crucial role in amplifying civil society voices and exposing injustices, despite the risk of censorship and retaliation.