Lebanon

People

Human trafficking remains a deeply embedded and complex criminal market in Lebanon, driven by systemic legal vulnerabilities and weak institutional action, compounded by ongoing conflict and economic crisis. The sponsorship framework known as the Kafala system forms the legal foundation for exploitative labour conditions, blurring the line between legality and criminality. Migrant workers, primarily from South East Asia and Africa, are vulnerable to domestic servitude and modern slavery. Lebanese employers and private recruitment agencies – often involving brokers, sub-agents and travel agencies – play a central role in perpetuating the cycle of exploitation. The prevalence of sex trafficking is notable, with women from various countries including but not limited to Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Morocco and Tunisia employed under artist visas in entertainment venues. Child trafficking is also prevalent, particularly among Syrian refugee communities, where children are exploited through forced labour, coerced begging and criminal activities. While trafficking is normalized in some contexts, such as under the Kafala system, sex trafficking and child exploitation are widely condemned, triggering periodic enforcement efforts. Although legislative reforms have been proposed, including a standard unified labour contract, resistance from recruitment agencies has delayed meaningful change. Recent conflict-related displacement and growing anti-refugee sentiment have exacerbated vulnerabilities, placing thousands at elevated risk of exploitation.

Lebanon has recently experienced a significant expansion in its human smuggling market, particularly along the northern coastline and the Syrian–Lebanese border, with Lebanon serving primarily as a source and transit country for irregular migration routes to Europe. The worsening economic collapse, compounded by regional instability, has spurred large-scale maritime departures, often organized by criminal networks and involving foreign actors, mafia-style groups and people associated with Hezbollah. Smuggling operations frequently involve forged documentation, complex financial transfers and coordination across state borders, including interactions with Lebanese and Syrian military personnel. Smugglers target people fleeing persecution, economic despair, or forced repatriation, charging varying sums depending on the route. Irregular sea crossings from Tripoli to Cyprus or Italy have been a major conduit, with Syrians comprising the majority of those smuggled, followed by Lebanese and Palestinians. Many Syrian refugees have also paid high fees to smugglers to return clandestinely to north-western Syria amid rising anti-Syrian sentiment and deportations. Smuggling networks also intersect with other illicit trades, including narcotics and arms trafficking, further embedding them in Lebanon's criminal landscape. Despite occasional arrests and international cooperation, state efforts to address human smuggling remain piecemeal and largely ineffective, while corruption undermines enforcement.

Extortion and protection racketeering is prevalent across Lebanon, particularly in territories influenced by mafia-style groups and politically affiliated non-state actors. These practices thrive in areas where state authority is limited or compromised. Victims – often members of marginalized or economically disadvantaged communities, including refugees – are targeted through coercion for payments or favours in exchange for perceived protection. Extortion is frequently accompanied by other crimes, such as robbery and kidnapping, and is further sustained by institutional weaknesses and selective law enforcement.

Trade

Arms trafficking in Lebanon is a well-established and regionally embedded market, driven by domestic insecurity, active conflict and external geopolitical interests. With nearly two million firearms in civilian possession, local demand for weapons remains high, particularly in areas like Tripoli and Akkar where violence is frequently used to resolve disputes. Criminal actors involved include both domestic networks and foreign entities, with Hezbollah playing a dominant role in facilitating arms transfers. Weapons are smuggled into Lebanon from countries including Iran as well as Türkiye, primarily through the Syrian border. The port of Tripoli has been a notable transit hub, with recent seizures highlighting the scale of the trade. Arms trafficking is closely linked with other criminal markets, including drug trafficking, human smuggling and money laundering. Despite sporadic seizures and occasional crackdowns, the state’s response remains constrained by the influence of non-state actors and systemic corruption.

Lebanon has a notable counterfeit goods market, exacerbated by the country’s economic collapse. Scarcity of essential goods and weakened state enforcement have made counterfeit commodities, especially medicines, a widespread substitute for legal products. This market is transnational, with goods smuggled across the Syrian border and sourced from Türkiye and Syria, while domestic actors – including criminal groups, state-embedded actors like Hezbollah and private retailers such as pharmacies – facilitate distribution. High-cost counterfeit medicines, such as cancer drugs, are sold for significantly more than their legal counterparts, exacerbating health risks and deepening public distrust. The black market also affects baby formula, food and other essential items. Corruption at border checkpoints and inconsistent pricing further sustain the market, which undermines legitimate commerce and tax revenue collection.

Illicit trade in excise goods, particularly tobacco, represents a significant component of Lebanon’s shadow economy. The country serves as both a source and destination for illicit tobacco, with criminal networks leveraging porous borders and economic hardship to sustain operations. Hezbollah plays a central role in this market, using smuggling networks to supply cigarettes to and from neighbouring countries, including Syria, Iraq and Jordan. The high cost of legal goods, coupled with subsidy removals, has driven local demand for cheaper, illicit alternatives. The economic impact is substantial, with tax evasion because of illicit tobacco estimated to cost the state tens of millions of dollars annually.

Environment

Flora crimes in Lebanon, particularly illegal logging, are limited and primarily driven by heightened demand for firewood due to the ongoing energy crisis. Although organized groups are involved in the illicit timber trade, their activities often depend on the complicity of corrupt actors and private sector buyers. Despite these dynamics, the overall scope of the market remains somewhat contained. Fauna crimes in Lebanon revolve primarily around the trafficking of exotic wildlife for private ownership and unregulated zoos. Lebanon occasionally serves as a source and transit point for animals smuggled into or through the region, with trafficked species including lions, tigers, parrots and primates, often originating from Africa and Asia. While some smuggling networks may intersect with broader illicit markets, including drugs, arms and human trafficking, the extent of organized crime involvement in wildlife trafficking remains uncertain. Isolated seizures, such as those involving birds and lion cubs, suggest that the issue exists but its overall scale is difficult to assess. In addition, unregulated and occasionally illegal fishing practices — including the use of dynamite — contribute to broader environmental concerns, though the direct involvement of organized crime in these activities is unclear.

Non-renewable resource crimes are well-established in Lebanon, with both criminal networks, including the so-called ‘generator mafia’ and state actors such as Hezbollah, exploiting worsening energy shortages by selling state-subsidized oil at inflated prices domestically or smuggling it into Syria for profit. The illicit trade is highly profitable, with estimated losses to the Lebanese state reaching hundreds of millions of dollars annually, and several millions of litres of oil reportedly smuggled daily. External actors, including Iran and Syrian militias, also benefit from this trade, which provides financial resources to circumvent international sanctions.

Drugs

The heroin market in Lebanon is relatively limited in scope, with the country acting primarily as a transit point for shipments destined for the Gulf and European countries, as well as Türkiye. Local consumption remains low, although some reports suggest a slight increase in demand and the use of heroin in the country. Prices have risen sharply in recent years, while quality remains poor. Some reports indicated a divergence in the heroin trafficking routes from the Balkan corridor into Lebanon and Syria.

The cocaine trade is more consolidated than heroin, with Lebanon serving as a strategic transit country for shipments from Latin America to Western Asia. Cocaine is generally regarded as a luxury drug, with local demand limited by high prices. Seizures in 2023 and 2024, particularly at ports and airports, highlight Lebanon’s role in the supply chain. Criminal actors include non-state groups, foreign networks and Hezbollah, whose involvement links the market to broader international trafficking structures. Despite limited domestic consumption, Lebanon’s position in the global cocaine network is increasingly prominent.

Cannabis trade, specifically hashish production, is among Lebanon’s most established illicit markets. The Bekaa Valley is a major cultivation zone, with Lebanon ranked as the third-largest producer of hashish globally. Actors involved range from local farmers to non-state groups like Hezbollah, as well as state-embedded actors. Although Lebanon legalized industrial medical cannabis production, the recreational trade remains illicit and highly profitable. Despite periodic enforcement – including high-profile seizures – hashish cultivation continues to provide livelihoods for thousands, though recent economic hardship has reduced profitability. Violent clashes between traffickers and security forces further underscore the market’s destabilizing impact.

Synthetic drug trade, particularly Captagon, is a growing market tied closely to Syria. Lebanon is a key transit hub for pills destined for Gulf countries, and the trade involves non-state actors, criminal networks and foreign regimes. Captagon production labs have been identified near the Lebanon–Syria border, and seizures – some exceeding 10 million pills – have drawn international attention. Captagon is increasingly consumed domestically, alongside reports of rising use of methamphetamine and crystal meth. The trade is highly profitable, with prices fluctuating dramatically based on enforcement pressure, and profits sustaining both Hezbollah and the Syrian Assad regime. The implications of regional instability, including the ousting of the Assad regime, remain uncertain in terms of their impact on Lebanon's synthetic drug market.

Drug markets more broadly are financially connected to transnational money laundering operations, with Hezbollah and affiliated diaspora communities in West African nations for example, reportedly involved in laundering drug trafficking proceeds.

Cyber Crimes

Cyber-dependent crimes in Lebanon remain relatively underdeveloped compared to more established criminal markets, though Hezbollah-affiliated entities have demonstrated increasing capabilities in cyber operations. These activities include targeted cyberattacks against foreign adversaries, often conducted through affiliated proxies and social media platforms. While these actions are of concern from a national security perspective, there is limited evidence to suggest that organized cybercrime in Lebanon is profit-driven. Notably, there was no significant increase in cyber-dependent crime incidents in recent years, though concerns about cyber vulnerabilities persist amid ongoing regional instability.

Financial Crimes

Financial crimes in Lebanon are deeply entrenched and have significantly contributed to the country's ongoing economic collapse. Corruption, embezzlement, fraud and various illicit financial activities are pervasive across state institutions, facilitated by state-embedded actors, criminal networks and people affiliated with non-state groups. High-level financial schemes – often shielded by political elites – persist despite their illegality and have played a central role in exacerbating Lebanon's financial crisis and widespread public discontent. Although some international legal actions have been initiated, including arrest warrants for high-ranking officials, domestic enforcement has remained largely ineffective. This has contributed to diminished public trust and continued economic instability, with efforts toward accountability facing considerable internal resistance despite mounting global scrutiny.

Criminal Actors

Mafia-style groups in Lebanon are deeply entrenched, particularly in the Bekaa Valley and the southern suburbs of Beirut. These groups, including powerful families, exert substantial territorial control, which enables a range of illicit activities such as drug and arms smuggling, extortion and protection racketeering. These areas are marked by checkpoints and roadblocks imposed by the groups. Surveillance and control are also common, and rival members face significant risks when entering these areas. The groups are frequently involved in violent clashes with each other and with Lebanese security forces, reflecting broader deficiencies in law enforcement and governance. The availability of weapons further intensifies these dynamics, with all major mafia-style actors possessing easy access to arms.

Loosely organized criminal networks are highly active in multiple illicit markets in the country. These networks are especially concentrated in Beirut, the Bekaa region, border areas with Syria and within refugee camps. Their primary operations involve human trafficking, human smuggling and drug trafficking, often accompanied by high levels of violence. Reports consist of kidnapping cases targeting Syrians, frequently involving torture and highlighting the brutality employed by these groups. These networks benefit from transnational linkages, including ties to Syria, the Gulf, Europe and Latin America. Despite their influence, many of these actors remain unnamed in local reporting, making them harder to identify or disrupt.

State-embedded actors play a pivotal role in Lebanon’s organized crime landscape. Political elites and public officials frequently provide protection to criminal enterprises, undermining efforts to combat illicit activity. While many of these relationships are informal and opaque, some actors have publicly claimed political protection, such as well-known arms dealers. Corruption is not limited to low-level operatives; elite actors – some under international sanctions – wield influence across security forces, ministries and judicial bodies. As both a militant group and a political party, Hezbollah exerts extensive influence over Lebanese institutions. This dual identity – militant and political – enables the group to exert significant authority within Lebanon, shaping national policies while engaging in criminal enterprises. Its control over border regions has enabled smuggling operations to persist despite intermittent army interventions. In response to financial constraints, Hezbollah has reportedly expanded its role in international criminal markets, including involvement in drug trafficking activities targeting Europe, further reinforcing its dual role as both a dominant political force and a transnational criminal actor. It is currently unclear how the death of Hassan Nasrallah in late 2024 has impacted the group’s criminal influence.

There are strong operational linkages between foreign actors and domestic groups, particularly in markets such as arms and drug trafficking, and the smuggling of non-renewable resources. Hezbollah’s collaboration with Iranian and Syrian actors exemplifies the integration of foreign influence into Lebanon’s criminal infrastructure. These partnerships facilitate the movement of arms and fuel across borders, as well as the illicit trade in excise goods. Connections with transnational criminal organizations, such as Brazil’s First Capital Command, further demonstrate Hezbollah’s embeddedness in international criminal supply chains. Although foreign actors do not exert unilateral control over Lebanon’s illicit markets, their involvement is substantial, especially in cross-border human smuggling operations.

Private-sector actors have become increasingly complicit in Lebanon’s illicit economy, particularly in the wake of the country’s 2019 financial collapse. Criminal organizations exploit sectors such as real estate, art galleries, banking and money exchange to launder proceeds from criminal activity. Notably, international authorities have sanctioned people for using high-end artwork sales to channel funds to Hezbollah. The electricity sector is particularly vulnerable, with the so-called generator mafia monopolizing power supply in many neighbourhoods. These operators, often affiliated with Hezbollah or its political allies, profit from Lebanon’s inadequate public infrastructure. Similarly, currency exchange services have been co-opted by organized crime, capitalizing on fluctuations in the Lebanese lira and collaborating with corrupt officials. Small businesses, particularly in areas controlled by Hezbollah, frequently serve as fronts for criminal operations, further embedding illicit activity within the country’s legitimate economy. These developments underscore the intersection of economic crisis and organized crime, where regulatory gaps and weakened oversight have enabled private-sector actors to play a central role in sustaining Lebanon’s illicit markets.

Leadership and governance

Lebanon’s political leadership and governance environment remains highly volatile and fragmented, with serious challenges to rule of law, democratic norms and state legitimacy. Since the 2020 Beirut port explosion, Lebanon has continuously struggled with governance paralysis, deteriorating public services and mounting distrust in state institutions. Governance is largely dominated by entrenched elites, including former militia leaders and tribal figures, whose hold on power is reinforced through a consociational political system. This system, while aimed at preserving sectarian balance, limits opposition and hinders internal political competition. Policy actions against organized crime are often reactive and dictated more by external donor pressure or the desire to appease constituents than a genuine commitment to reform. In fact, political campaigns since 2022 have failed to prioritize organized crime. Prior to the inauguration of President Joseph Aoun in early 2025, Lebanon’s ruling class was widely regarded as illegitimate since 2019, and continues to operate with limited accountability. Lebanon’s persistent political deadlock has been exacerbated by internal and regional conflicts. Hezbollah’s role in criminal markets such as arms and drug trafficking contributes directly to funding its military activities, including involvement in the Gaza conflict. Repeated clashes, including with Christian factions and during protests, underscore heightened sectarian tensions. The continued escalation of the Lebanon–Israel conflict, marked by Israeli airstrikes and Hezbollah’s participation alongside other Iran-backed groups, has exacerbated displacement and humanitarian crises. These developments have further strained state structures and create an environment conducive to criminal exploitation.

Corruption remains a systemic issue across Lebanese institutions, exacerbated by political instability and a lack of institutional reform. Political elites continue to control the distribution of state resources through patronage networks. Recent years have seen the enactment of anti-corruption laws and the National Anti-Corruption Strategy. However, these measures are perceived as superficial efforts aimed at placating international observers. Implementation has been limited due to the complicity of the very political class responsible for the systemic issues. Notable investigations into government officials, such as the Beirut Port case, have been stymied by political interference. Judges pursuing corruption cases have faced dismissal or political obstruction, including attempts to replace the lead investigator in the port explosion case. Although oversight mechanisms such as the National Anti-Corruption Commission exist, their impact is limited. Lebanon’s governance is further compromised by its failure to produce reliable budgetary data, publish end-of-year reports, or ensure meaningful public oversight of public procurement. These gaps reinforce a lack of confidence in state integrity. While civil society initiatives like those by local NGOs aim to improve transparency, they operate within a context of institutional resistance and limited state cooperation.

Lebanon remains a recipient of substantial international aid and technical assistance, particularly in the security sector. Its involvement in international treaties targeting corruption, arms trafficking and human trafficking is notable, with ratifications including the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and related protocols. However, the practical implementation of these agreements has been hindered by domestic political and security challenges. While Lebanese law prohibits the extradition of nationals, some exceptions have occurred in practice. The presence of Hezbollah continues to complicate Lebanon’s international relationships. Many Western countries designate the group as a terrorist organization, which affects Lebanon’s credibility as a cooperative partner in transnational crime prevention. Despite these obstacles, Lebanon continues to receive support from various countries in anti-organized crime and security efforts, such as military aid, training programmes for the Lebanese Armed Forces, and financial packages linked to migration control and economic stabilization. Nevertheless, international confidence in Lebanon’s ability to act on organized crime is undermined by persistent corruption and political interference.

As for national policies, Lebanon’s legal framework addressing organized crime suffers from critical gaps in implementation and enforcement. While laws exist targeting drug trafficking, arms smuggling and human trafficking, political interference and institutional weakness have limited their effectiveness. Nevertheless, key areas remain unregulated or poorly enforced. The exploitative Kafala sponsorship system for migrant domestic workers continues to expose tens of thousands of people to abuse. Though minor administrative reforms have occurred, including changes in reporting mechanisms, the system remains intact. Moreover, Lebanon’s laws exclude certain vulnerable populations, such as migrant domestic workers and women in the sex industry, from labour protections. The country’s arms legislation is also outdated and insufficiently punitive. Meanwhile, legislation governing environmental protection and wildlife crime fails to account for the role of organized crime. Cybercrime enforcement exists, but the institutional framework is still evolving, with legal provisions covering defamation and information crimes more prominent than those targeting financial or digital fraud.

Criminal justice and security

The Lebanese judiciary remains compromised by political interference, undermining efforts to address organized crime. Despite constitutional guarantees of judicial independence, political and sectarian actors exert significant influence over judicial appointments and case management. Corruption is widespread, with frequent reports of interference in high-profile cases, such as the stalled investigation into the Beirut port explosion. Specialized judicial units for organized crime are lacking, and existing courts face resource shortages, procedural inefficiencies and frequent strikes due to low salaries. Prisoners suffer from severe overcrowding, poor hygiene and inadequate access to healthcare. Reports of torture, drug use and smuggling within prisons are common, including the use of drones and other creative methods for trafficking narcotics. There are indications that prisons serve as recruitment grounds for organized crime. Although international assistance has been directed toward prison reform, conditions remain dire. Law enforcement is similarly constrained by lack of resources both in funding, staff and equipment as well as systemic corruption. Specialized units, such as those targeting human trafficking or narcotics, are often understaffed and lack sufficient resources. The Central Counter-Narcotics Office exists only nominally, with responsibilities falling to smaller, overwhelmed desks within the Internal Security Forces. Security personnel, including military officers, are frequently forced to take secondary jobs due to inadequate compensation. Operational challenges are compounded by a fragmented security apparatus, with multiple agencies operating with overlapping mandates and political loyalties. Hezbollah’s historical influence over agencies further complicates coherent policy enforcement. Public perception of the police remains low, marked by fear, mistrust and documented instances of police brutality. Lebanon’s territorial integrity is undermined by both internal and external factors. Border control is weak, especially along the porous Syrian frontier, where human, drug and arms trafficking are prevalent. The Beqaa Valley, in particular, remains a hotspot for smuggling. While military and donor-supported infrastructure projects, such as watchtowers and border regiments, have been deployed, their effectiveness is constrained by political realities and limited operational authority. Major ports and border posts, including Beirut Port and the airport, are reportedly subject to political and sectarian interference. Bribery among border officials is widespread, facilitated by low wages and economic instability. Control over certain enclaves remains contested, with organized criminal actors operating with relative impunity in some regions. Refugee camps and militia-controlled areas often function as hubs for smuggling and illicit trade.

Economic and financial environment

Lebanon’s anti-money laundering framework is partially compliant with international standards. The country operates a financial intelligence unit, the Special Investigation Commission, and has created coordination committees within the central bank. However, enforcement is weak, particularly concerning beneficial ownership transparency and cross-border asset freezing. Lebanon’s banking sector is closely scrutinized, especially for its links to Hezbollah financing networks. Lebanon’s inclusion on the Financial Action Task Force Grey List in 2024 underscores persistent deficiencies in combating money laundering and terrorism financing. The broader economic environment is marked by collapse and mismanagement. The Lebanese lira has lost over 90% of its value from 2019 to 2024, with high inflation and poverty affecting large portions of the population. Informal capital controls and a lack of access to credit have further strained businesses and households. International banks have severed ties with Lebanese institutions, exacerbating liquidity shortages. The country’s public debt remains among the highest globally. Smuggling of subsidized goods across the Syrian border has flourished, including black market medicine and fuel. Refugee camps often serve as hubs for untaxed counterfeit goods. Hezbollah-linked financial institutions operate quasi-banking systems outside of formal oversight, further complicating regulatory efforts.

Civil society and social protection

Victim and witness support mechanisms in Lebanon are largely inadequate. The government has made limited progress in identifying and assisting victims of human trafficking. NGOs bear responsibility and provide services such as shelter, mental health care and drug treatment, often with minimal state assistance. Witness protection programmes are legally permitted but are rarely activated, and there is limited follow-up on drug rehabilitation programmes by the judiciary. Similarly, prevention efforts remain fragmented and underfunded. While national hotlines exist for reporting abuse and trafficking, their impact is minimal due to lack of reporting data and limited investigations. The government’s drug policy is reactive and punitive and lacks a coherent public health strategy. Most prevention initiatives are conducted by NGOs or religious institutions, with little government coordination.

Non-state actors, especially civil society organizations, play a crucial role in filling service and information gaps. However, most are under-resourced and politically constrained. Press freedom has deteriorated, with journalists facing arrests, harassment and censorship. Political influence over the media is pervasive, and laws criminalizing defamation are used to silence dissent. Despite these challenges, civil society remains a vital force advocating for transparency and accountability in the face of declining state capacity.