Chad

People

Human trafficking in Chad is pervasive, involving forced labour, child labour, sex trafficking and other forms of exploitation. Most victims are Chadian nationals, though some forms of exploitation at mining sites may also involve Sudanese and other nationalities. Trafficking is linked to extractive sectors, particularly in northern gold mining areas, where indentured labour agreements and geographic remoteness heighten workers’ vulnerability. In urban centres, exploitation includes child labour and domestic servitude, while in rural areas it is tied to agriculture and herding. Regional instability, including conflicts in Libya and Sudan, has intensified displacement, exposing refugees and returnees to trafficking risks. Increased arrivals from Sudan since 2023 might increase the vulnerability of people falling victim to trafficking, affecting the market’s scale or value.

Human smuggling is persistent, shaped by porous borders and longstanding regional migration patterns. The country is primarily a transit hub for northbound movement towards Libya and Tunisia by migrants from Chad, Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Cameroon and Nigeria. Restrictions on internal travel, especially from south to north, have increased reliance on smugglers, particularly among gold miners and refugees. Efforts to formalize gold mining in Kouri Bougoudi and a decrease in risks of rebel incursions in the north resulted in lower restrictions on northbound travel in 2024. The renewed Sudan conflict significantly increased smuggling demand. Migrants face high risks along smuggling routes, which are often marked by abuse and fatalities and can expose them to human trafficking risks.

Kidnapping for ransom and extortion are prominent criminal markets, particularly in the southern tri-border region with Cameroon and CAR. Targets include traders, herders, civil servants and migrants, and incidents often go unreported due to fear and mistrust of authorities. Armed groups, including violent extremists and cross-border criminal networks, are responsible, and there are reports of collusion with security actors. Rising kidnappings have driven the formation of vigilante groups and heightened local tensions. In the Lake Chad region, criminal networks and extremist groups engage in racketeering linked to fishing permits and resource access.

Trade

Arms trafficking is driven by regional conflicts and porous borders with Sudan, Libya and neighbouring states. Chad is a transit and destination point for illicit arms and key corridors connect to conflict zones in the Sahel, Lake Chad Basin and CAR. Flows of small arms and light weapons are linked to insurgent groups and criminal networks. Demand and supply have intensified since the Sudanese conflict began in 2023, fuelling cross-border trafficking and bolstering non-state armed groups. However, northern Chad has seen a slight decline in armed violence, partly due to the redeployment of Chadian fighters from southern Libya to Sudan and the demobilization of some rebel groups.

Counterfeit goods trafficking is widespread, particularly in N’Djamena, where falsified medicines dominate the illicit market. A significant number of pharmacies in the capital stock expired or counterfeit medicines, including fake tramadol and antimalarials, often imported from India, Nigeria, Libya and Cameroon. Consumption of adulterated alcohol by young people is rising, with products primarily sourced from Cameroon. Corruption, porous borders and limited healthcare access drive the trafficking of counterfeit drugs. Efforts to assess the scale of this market are limited, hindered by capacity constraints and a lack of prioritization by authorities.

Illicit trade in excisable goods, particularly tobacco and alcohol, is widespread due to weak border controls and limited regulatory enforcement. Products such as cigarettes, vehicles, cosmetics and adulterated whisky are frequently smuggled from Nigeria, Cameroon, Sudan and Libya. In N’Djamena, illegal alcohol consumption is notably prevalent. Proxy indicators suggest a high risk of illicit trade, as Chad performs poorly in anti-money laundering and customs effectiveness assessments. This issue is compounded by the absence of secure product marking or traceability systems for excisable goods and limited institutional capacity to curb smuggling networks.

Environment

Illicit flora trade is limited compared with other central African states. Most activity is linked to subsistence wood and charcoal use for household cooking. Chad is a transit country for illicit timber, particularly rosewood from Cameroon and CAR, though its landlocked position raises logistical barriers for traffickers. Maritime ports elsewhere in the region are preferred for consolidation and export. Despite warnings from the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, Chad has not fully implemented restrictions on endangered rosewood trade, and evidence suggests smuggling from Cameroon persists. However, data limitations hinder accurate assessment of the market’s scope.

Fauna crimes pose a threat, particularly through poaching of large mammals such as elephants and giraffes. Despite conservation efforts, the illicit trade is profitable, driven by transnational demand for ivory and wildlife trophies. Armed poachers from neighbouring countries contribute to insecurity in protected areas. Elephant populations in Zakouma National Park declined sharply in the early 2000s but have begun to recover due to improved protection and management by African Parks. The reintroduction of black rhinos and rising elephant births mark conservation progress. Northern Chad also experiences falcon trafficking linked to external markets.

Gold mining in northern Chad, particularly in the Tibesti region, plays a significant role in regional illicit economies. Although efforts to formalize gold mining have progressed since the reopening of Kouri Bougoudi in 2022, some mining areas remain beyond state control. While gold flows primarily northward into Libya, these mining zones are hubs for organized crime, including drug and arms trafficking, fuel smuggling and labour exploitation. Miners, often recruited from southern Chad, may face debt bondage and harsh conditions. The sector involves local and foreign actors, including criminal networks and state-affiliated individuals. Conflicts over mining sites have historically contributed to regional instability and violence.

Drugs

Chad plays a minor role in the regional heroin trade as a transit country along Sahel trafficking routes. While linked to broader north African drug flows, the volume of heroin passing through Chad is relatively limited, indicating its peripheral position in this illicit market.

Cocaine trafficking is moderate, though the broader Sahel region has seen increased activity. While seizure data is scarce, criminal groups occasionally move cocaine through Chad using existing trafficking networks. Security vulnerabilities in the north, east and Lake Chad regions create conditions for potential expansion. Some evidence points to Chadian armed groups facilitating cocaine transit between Niger and Libya, and Chad is occasionally used as a corridor on these routes.

Cannabis trafficking has remained steady, involving cross-border movements primarily from Nigeria, Cameroon, Sudan and CAR, often transiting towards Egypt and Libya. Cannabis is locally cultivated – mainly in the south and the Lake Chad region – and imported. A significant share of trafficked cannabis originates from Nigeria. Since 2022, Chad has reported a marked increase in cannabis herb use, aligning with broader trends in the Sahel. Enforcement efforts continue, demonstrating active measures against the trade.

Tramadol consumption is a significant issue, driven by its affordability and availability. Efforts to curb its illegal sale through the closure of many pharmacies have done little to curb consumption. The drug is widely used by artisanal miners and agricultural workers to enhance endurance and relieve chronic pain. Trafficking routes pass through Chad from Niger and Cameroon, with onward movement to Libya, Egypt or Sudan, although some of the supply is for local use. The trade involves criminal and armed groups, foreign actors and corrupt state officials.

Cyber Crimes

Cyber-dependent crimes are a concern, and incidents of hacking and cryptocurrency scams have been reported despite high internet costs. A major incident in the past involved a cryptocurrency firm whose operators disappeared with substantial investor funds after falsely promising high returns. The case triggered widespread alarm and led to arrests domestically and abroad, including in Cameroon, through bilateral cooperation. Although the suspected ringleader remains at large and officials continue to warn about the cybercrime threat, there have been no reports of large-scale cyber-attacks.

Financial Crimes

Chad faces persistent large-scale corruption involving domestic officials and multinational corporations. Public taxation is particularly vulnerable and there are frequent cases of embezzlement and collusion between state and foreign actors. Cyber-enabled fraud is also prevalent, scammers exploiting hacked government social media accounts to solicit money under false pretences. Tax evasion and illegal tax collection have a serious impact on the economy. Recent significant cases illustrate the systemic nature of financial crime and weak institutional oversight.

Criminal Actors

Rebel groups, primarily in the north and on the border with Libya, have long engaged in armed conflict and criminal activities, including drug and arms trafficking and involvement in gold mining. These groups exploit Libya’s instability to maintain rear bases and control transnational smuggling routes, particularly between Chad, Libya and Niger. Despite recent setbacks that have weakened these groups – such as military crackdowns and defections – they remain active in illicit markets, escorting and trafficking drugs such as hashish, cocaine, tramadol and pregabalin. Their indirect role in gold mining – through financing and checkpoint taxation, and fundraising at gold sites – extends to Niger and Algeria. While not a primary source of instability, their presence fuels violence in remote mining areas and facilitates a broader criminal economy.

Chad hosts a diverse array of loosely organized criminal networks, many comprising current or former rebel fighters, independent combatants and local bandits. These actors, especially active in northern Chad and border areas with Libya, Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon and CAR, engage in drug trafficking (mainly pharmaceuticals, cannabis and cocaine), arms trafficking, fuel smuggling and illicit gold mining. The 2020 Libyan ceasefire disrupted Chadian mercenaries’ roles, pushing them towards criminal activities and banditry. The 2023 Sudan conflict renewed demand for mercenaries and has drawn in Chadian fighters previously engaged in Libya. In southern Chad, cross-border groups operate kidnapping-for-ransom and extortion rackets. Many criminal actors exploit their combat expertise and knowledge of remote smuggling routes to engage in lucrative regional illicit economies.

Corruption is deeply embedded in Chad’s administration, enabling and sustaining organized crime. State-linked actors, including customs, police and intelligence officials, have been repeatedly implicated in protecting traffickers and facilitating illicit markets such as drug trafficking, gold smuggling and the trade in counterfeit goods. Civil society acknowledges the widespread and systemic nature of corruption across state institutions, including Chadian embassies abroad. Law enforcement agencies are often complicit, and suspicions extend to wildlife officers in the illicit ivory trade. A high-profile case in past years revealed the involvement of senior officials in tramadol trafficking, underscoring the extent to which corruption permeates enforcement bodies.

Chad is a key hub for cross-border organized crime, and there are frequent incursions by foreign actors from neighbouring countries such as CAR, Sudan, Cameroon and Nigeria. Activities include drug and arms trafficking, human and wildlife trafficking, and illicit trade. Groups formerly known as Boko Haram finance operations in the Lake Chad Basin through cattle theft along the Cameroon-Chad border, where attacks have surged. Their control of pastoralist routes supports organized crime and terrorism, complicating regional security efforts. In northern Chad, foreign nationals, including those from Sudan, Niger, Libya and possibly China, are involved in illicit gold mining and trafficking to Libya, and through N’Djamena to the UAE.

Organized crime has penetrated the private sector, particularly the mining, timber, fuel and pharmaceutical industries. Gold mining, including in prohibited zones such as Guéra and contested areas such as Miski, is linked to armed group activity, extortion and violent clashes involving state forces, local miners and foreign actors. Mining hubs are often platforms for trafficking and robbery. The fuel and pharmaceutical sectors are compromised by the open sale of adulterated goods, despite regulatory warnings. These dynamics reflect the broad entrenchment of organized crime in economic activities and highlight the role of domestic and cross-border actors in perpetuating instability and illicit trade.

Leadership and governance

Chad experienced political volatility during the reporting period, marked by a military-led transition after the former president’s death. Efforts to restore civilian rule, including a national dialogue and a constitutional referendum, were marred by exclusion and repression. A heavily contested presidential election resulted in Mahamat Idriss Déby’s victory, amid opposition claims of fraud and suppression. Parliamentary elections later confirmed the dominance of the governing party, the Patriotic Salvation Movement, despite allegations of irregularities and arrests of opposition figures. Legislation addressing organized crime has remained largely securitized, focusing on rebel activity and smuggling, with limited institutional reforms. Instability in neighbouring Sudan compounded Chad’s fragile humanitarian and security situation.

During the reporting period, governance in Chad was dominated by political, military and customary elites, with limited transparency and weak accountability mechanisms. The government relied on reactive approaches to organized crime, and patronage and corruption affected public administration. While rarely addressed in official discourse, money laundering and other illicit financial activities persist with minimal oversight. Nonetheless, security personnel were prosecuted for involvement in criminal activities, including drug trafficking. Broader institutional reforms were absent, and the economic slowdown, coupled with political and humanitarian instability, further undermined efforts to address organized crime and improve governance capacity.

Chad’s engagement in international cooperation on organized crime and terrorism decreased during the reporting period. Authorities threatened to withdraw troops from the G5 Sahel in late 2024, denouncing a lack of solidarity from the mixed international force. The government also questioned the conditions of US troop presence in Chad, resulting in the withdrawal of troops, and revoked its military partnerships with France, leading to the gradual withdrawal of French troops. These actions reflect a broader regional trend towards increased sovereignty and re-evaluation of foreign military partnerships. While organizations such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the World Food Programme, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the UN Children’s Fund and the International Organization for Migration are active in Chad, supporting the government in stabilization efforts and counter-trafficking, the country is not a state party to the UN Convention against Corruption. Despite ratifying most international treaties on organized crime, Chad has not ratified key protocols on migrant smuggling and firearms trafficking. Domestically, it adopted legislation to combat human trafficking, supported by international training efforts.

Chad has a basic legal framework to combat organized crime, including provisions targeting cybercrime and human trafficking, but enforcement is inconsistent. Laws address cyber offences such as data breaches and identity fraud and penalties range from fines to imprisonment. But weak state capacity, limited oversight, and cultural norms that legitimize exploitative practices – particularly in relation to trafficking – undermine implementation. Broader political and humanitarian pressures have diverted focus from criminal justice reform, reducing the likelihood of meaningful legal or institutional advancements against organized crime.

Criminal justice and security

Chad lacks specialized judicial or law enforcement units dedicated to combating organized crime, reflecting broader institutional weaknesses, particularly in areas affected by armed conflict. The absence of such units limits the state’s ability to investigate and prosecute complex criminal networks effectively. This institutional gap, compounded by a weak judicial presence in conflict-prone regions, undermines the rule of law and impedes the development of targeted legal responses to organized crime.

Law enforcement efforts during the reporting period were concentrated in major urban centres, with limited reach in peripheral regions influenced by customary or religious systems. Responsibilities for combating organized crime are fragmented across several agencies, including elite forces, intelligence services, military units and paramilitary police, and there is only partial specialization. The creation of a military unit to secure the Kouri Bougoudi goldfield is a modest step in addressing illicit gold mining. However, the absence of comprehensive, specialized structures and uneven resource allocation hinder effective responses to organized criminal activity.

Chad’s territorial integrity is compromised by porous borders and limited state presence, particularly in northern and border regions influenced by external conflicts and trafficking networks. Although the deployment to key areas of military forces and the national mining agency has slightly improved oversight, large zones – especially near Sudan, Libya and the Lake Chad Basin – remain under the influence of armed groups. The Sudanese conflict poses a risk of further destabilization. Although a peace agreement was signed with some armed groups, key factions remain outside the process. Severe flooding in late 2024 displaced more than 1.9 million people, compounding existing humanitarian and security challenges and overwhelming already limited national and international response capacities.

Economic and financial environment

Chad’s anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing framework, enacted in 2018, is limited in scope and lacks coordination. The country faces substantial vulnerabilities due to a dominant informal sector, widespread use of cash, low financial inclusion and weak border controls. These factors facilitate cross-border illicit financial flows and hinder oversight. Despite existing legislation, enforcement is largely reactive. Chad is considered at high risk for money laundering and terrorist financing, external assessments highlighting systemic deficiencies in preventative and monitoring mechanisms. These financial vulnerabilities challenge the state’s ability to combat transnational organized crime effectively.

Chad’s economic regulatory environment is weak and there has been little progress in integrating economic governance with efforts to combat organized crime. The business climate is constrained by regulatory inefficiencies, poor infrastructure and pervasive corruption. State priorities focused on security have sidelined reforms, while worsening poverty and food insecurity – exacerbated by severe flooding – have strained livelihoods. Corruption in critical sectors such as education and healthcare impedes development, highlighting persistent institutional fragility and limited state capacity for comprehensive economic transformation.

Civil society and social protection

Support mechanisms for victims and witnesses of organized crime are limited. Services are concentrated in a few geographic areas and rely heavily on international partners. While civil society organizations have emerged to raise awareness about human trafficking, significant legal or institutional developments have not materialized. Victim protection is inadequate, particularly in rural regions where entrenched customs and the influence of powerful actors shield trafficking practices from scrutiny. The lack of a comprehensive support system for victims underscores broader weaknesses in Chad’s capacity to respond effectively to human exploitation and related criminal markets.

During the reporting period, Chad made modest progress in addressing organized crime, notably through its first trafficking convictions in years and the launch of a national anti-trafficking plan. However, prevention efforts are weak and geographically limited. The national committee responsible for coordinating anti-trafficking efforts is underdeveloped. Efforts to counter cybercrime, fauna crimes, counterfeit fuel sales and adulterated products have had limited effect. Government initiatives are largely reactive and regulatory enforcement suffers from capacity constraints and limited institutional coordination.

The capacity of non-state actors to address organized crime is limited and localized, and only a few NGOs are engaged in issues such as human trafficking and wildlife crime. Press freedom is seriously constrained and journalists are subject to arrest, mistreatment and violence, particularly when reporting on protests or government criticism. Attacks, even murders, take place with impunity, as evidenced by the June 2024 assassination of a prominent journalist. Civil society groups have operated under increased pressure since the start of the transitional period. Political unrest and state crackdowns have significantly reduced civic space and prompted some activists and journalists to flee the country. Although the 2024 elections ended three years of transitional government, the president has yet to offer commitments to safeguard press freedom, and media repression continues unabated.