The Organized Crime Index | ENACT
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Zambia
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    Profile

    Zambia

    Capital

    Lusaka

    Gross domestic product (GDP)

    USD 419,015.00 million

    Income group

    Low income

    Population

    19,473,125

    Area

    752,610 km²

    Geography type

    Landlocked

    GINI Index

    57.1

    4.73-0.19

    Criminality score

    116th of 193 countries -24

    36th of 54 countries in Africa-5

    5th of 13 countries in Southern Africa0

    Criminal markets

    4.47-0.13

    An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.

    Human trafficking

    5.000.00

    Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.

    Human smuggling

    3.000.00

    Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.

    Extortion and protection racketeering

    2.50 n/a

    Crimes linked to exerting control over a territory/market including as a mediator and/or requesting a benefit in exchange for protection.

    Arms trafficking

    3.50-0.50

    The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.

    Trade in counterfeit goods

    4.50 n/a

    The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands.

    Illicit trade in excisable goods

    5.00 n/a

    The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits.

    Flora crimes

    7.50-0.50

    The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.

    Fauna crimes

    5.000.50

    The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.

    Non-renewable resource crimes

    5.500.00

    The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.

    Heroin trade

    4.500.50

    The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.

    Cocaine trade

    3.500.50

    The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.

    Cannabis trade

    5.000.00

    The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.

    Synthetic drug trade

    3.50-0.50

    The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.

    Cyber-dependent crimes

    4.00 n/a

    Organized crimes that rely solely on using information communications technology with the aim of obtaining a monetary/material benefit.

    Financial crimes

    5.00 n/a

    Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance.

    Criminal actors

    5.00-0.25

    An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.

    Mafia-style groups

    3.000.00

    Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.

    Criminal networks

    5.000.00

    Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.

    State-embedded actors

    6.500.50

    Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.

    Foreign actors

    7.500.50

    State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.

    Private sector actors

    3.00 n/a

    Profit-seeking individuals/entities who own/control a part of the legal economy free from the state, that collaborate with criminal actors.

    4.540.21

    Resilience score

    110th of 193 countries 8

    17th of 54 countries in Africa4

    6th of 13 countries in Southern Africa0

    Political leadership and governance

    4.500.50

    The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.

    Government transparency and accountability

    3.500.50

    The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.

    International cooperation

    5.500.50

    A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.

    National policies and laws

    6.500.00

    A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.

    Judicial system and detention

    5.000.00

    Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.

    Law enforcement

    4.000.00

    The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.

    Territorial integrity

    3.500.00

    The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.

    Anti-money laundering

    5.500.50

    A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.

    Economic regulatory capacity

    5.500.50

    The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.

    Victim and witness support

    3.000.00

    Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.

    Prevention

    3.000.00

    Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.

    Non-state actors

    5.000.00

    The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.

    4.54 5.00 4.47 4.54 5.00 4.47

    4.540.21

    Resilience score

    110th of 193 countries 8

    17th of 54 countries in Africa4

    6th of 13 countries in Southern Africa0

    Political leadership and governance

    4.500.50

    The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.

    Government transparency and accountability

    3.500.50

    The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.

    International cooperation

    5.500.50

    A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.

    National policies and laws

    6.500.00

    A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.

    Judicial system and detention

    5.000.00

    Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.

    Law enforcement

    4.000.00

    The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.

    Territorial integrity

    3.500.00

    The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.

    Anti-money laundering

    5.500.50

    A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.

    Economic regulatory capacity

    5.500.50

    The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.

    Victim and witness support

    3.000.00

    Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.

    Prevention

    3.000.00

    Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.

    Non-state actors

    5.000.00

    The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.

    Analysis

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    People

    Human trafficking is a serious issue in Zambia, especially along its borders, where women and children from rural areas are forced into domestic servitude, begging or labour in various industries in urban areas. Victims are often coerced by relatives or trusted family acquaintances. Even children from affluent families can fall victim to human trafficking due to the belief that sending them to the city for work signifies social status. In most cases, human trafficking is an opportunistic crime rather than the work of organized criminal networks. Both boys and girls are sexually exploited by truck drivers and miners. Zambian boys are frequently victims of sex trafficking in Zimbabwe, and Zambian women and girls are often victims of sex trafficking in South Africa. Chinese women and girls are trafficked into the country in a more organized manner, with Chinese traffickers reportedly using travel agencies to lure victims to the country while coordinating with Zambian criminals and middlemen.

    Zambia is both a transit and destination country for human smuggling. Human smuggling rackets in Zambia are increasing due to its position as a hub for transit routes to South Africa, where human labour opportunities are perceived to be in high demand. The Horn of Africa, particularly Ethiopia and Somalia, is the primary source of smuggled individuals to Zambia, with the ultimate destination being South Africa. Smugglers, including transport operators, assist people in entering and temporarily residing in Zambia. While many individuals come from other African countries, a significant portion also comes from South Asian countries such as Bangladesh, Pakistan and India. Reports suggest that Zambia is becoming more popular as a destination country due to labour opportunities. However, it is essential to note that the market has little impact on society. Even though there has been an increase in extortion and kidnapping for ransom cases in the country, this criminal market remains limited.

    Trade

    While the trafficking of firearms and small weapons in and out of Zambia exists, it is considered small. Historical trafficking of illicit arms into Zambia due to conflicts in neighbouring countries continues to some extent, with instability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) contributing to this trend. Over the past two decades, the overall reduction in conflict in the region has led to a decrease in the level of arms trafficking. Nevertheless, the acquisition of weapons by criminals in Zambia from corrupt members of the police and military is a significant concern. Additionally, firearms are exchanged between Zambian citizens and refugee militias from other countries, particularly at border areas where they serve as a form of currency.

    Counterfeit goods are a significant problem in Zambia, with a wide range of commodities, including medication and consumer goods, being counterfeited. Counterfeit food substances, such as sugar, are re-packaged in containers bearing the logo of legitimate producers, and counterfeit medication is marketed through both legitimate and informal pharmaceutical outlets. India is a prominent source country for counterfeit medication. Despite efforts by organizations and the police to confiscate and raid shops and houses where fake products are produced or sold, counterfeit products are still being sold both in the streets and in well-respected shops in the country. Counterfeit electronic gadgets, including mobile phones, are also being sold in Zambia. Registered outlets sell counterfeit mobile phones assembled in China and Taiwan, imitating most brands of smartphones. The high demand for affordable mobile phones is driving this trade. Smuggled cigarettes are the most seized products by law enforcement in relation to the illicit trade in excise goods. The trade in illicit tobacco annually causes a significant loss in terms of revenue to the state. Illegal cigarettes account for more than a quarter of the market.

    Environment

    The deforestation of primary forests in Zambia has increased significantly for over a decade. Although forest management legislation has improved, illegal logging remains widespread. High-value timber species, such as rosewood, blackwood and Zambezi teak, are endangered under international conventions, yet Zambia’s timber trade is mostly with China, with a large proportion of logs and sawn wood being illegally exported without valid licenses. Illegal logging in Zambia is increasingly facilitated by certain ministers and family members of a former president. Illicit timber is also trafficked from the DRC through Zambia, the Caprivi Strip and into Namibia before being shipped to Asian markets, especially China, through Dar es Salaam and Walvis Bay.

    Wildlife trafficking is also a significant issue in Zambia, as the country is a vital range state for many endangered species, including elephant, lions, leopards and cheetahs. Poaching for the domestic and international trade is widespread, and Zambia is also a transit route for illegal wildlife products from neighbouring countries, with products often ending up in Asia. The country’s highly informal and unregulated bushmeat industry, coupled with high demand for pangolin scales, poses a significant threat to the Zambian pangolin population. Although efforts to combat wildlife trafficking have been made, high border porosity exacerbates the country’s vulnerability to the illicit trade, especially due to shared borders with ivory source countries and substantial elephant populations.

    Copper, cobalt, gold and manganese are the predominant minerals extracted from Zambian mines. However, illegal mining networks and disparate artisanal miners target all these minerals. Their activities involve quarrying operations within concessions owned by large-scale mining companies, or in areas prohibited for mining. Output is sold to intermediaries for smuggling out of Zambia. Illicit mining is common, especially in relation to copper ore trafficking. Both Zambian and Chinese criminal networks are known to be involved in illicit copper and gold mining, particularly in the country’s eastern regions. Illicit fuel is reportedly smuggled into Zambia from neighbouring countries, such as Namibia and Mozambique. Much illegal activity surrounding the oil sector occurs due to attempts to avoid duty fees and taxes. Nonetheless, natural resource crimes are relatively small on a volume basis.

    Drugs

    The use of heroin in Zambia has been on the rise due to heroin-saturated markets in Southwest Asia. Zambia has become a significant transit country for heroin that is trafficked overland from Tanzania and Mozambique to heroin markets in West Africa and other parts of southern Africa. Heroin is primarily accessible in urban centres, and the lack of adequate counselling and rehabilitation services exacerbates the issue, lessening the potential for positive change in reducing drug consumption in Zambia. The cocaine market has also grown in the past decade, with rising rates of cocaine supply and consumption. There has been a rapid expansion in the overland transport of cocaine through West and East African continental entry points. Zambia has become a transit hub for cocaine trafficking in the region, and the cocaine market has soared over the years, with Chinese, Nigerians and other foreign nationals arriving in the country. Research suggests that Zambia’s cocaine market is also expanding alongside the illicit mining market, which reportedly provides an increase in cocaine demand.

    Illicit cannabis cultivation in Zambia is largely driven by both national and regional cannabis consumption. Cannabis cultivation is perceived among southern African countries as a sustainable source of income, as well as a security net for the rural poor, and it is the most commonly trafficked narcotic. Cannabis grows more easily in the southern African climate than many legal crops that struggle to grow in hot and dry conditions. As such, cannabis cultivation is a crucial component of the country’s informal economy. Many rural Zambian women are known to cultivate and provide cannabis to sellers in urban markets. Cannabis is also reportedly imported into Zambia from Malawi and Zimbabwe.

    Synthetic drug production, trafficking and consumption are relatively low in Zambia. However, evidence suggests that methamphetamine and methaqualone are imported to Zambia from India and are also locally produced. A street drug referred to as Mandrax, which contains methaqualone as the main ingredient, is reportedly popular throughout the country, as it is across the region. Mandrax is also imported to Zambia from India and is known to be trafficked overland from Tanzania and Mozambique to both southern and West African markets. As with most drugs in the country, Mandrax consumption is prevalent among youth engaged in the informal sector and opportunistic crime. Nevertheless, the synthetic drug trade and its consumption remain small relative to the consumption of cannabis or heroin.

    Cyber Crimes

    While Zambia may not have experienced significant financial losses due to cyber-dependent crimes, the country faces the serious threat of reputational damage, service disruption and loss of data. Recently, there has been a notable increase in cyber-dependent crimes specifically involving ransomware and distributed denial-of-services attacks. The absence of a national legal framework, insufficient training opportunities for IT personnel and lack of awareness of potential cyber threats to critical infrastructure – such as the banking sector – make Zambia vulnerable to cyber-attacks.

    Financial Crimes

    Corruption generates the highest amount of criminal proceeds in Zambia, followed by tax evasion, and financial fraud. Recently, internet fraud has been on the rise, with money circulation and online investment scams being the most common types. Recently, the number of reports of suspicious financial transactions increased compared to previous periods. These transactions mainly involved large or unusual cash deposits and withdrawals, or inward remittances in sectors such as banking, construction, agriculture, and precious stones and metals. The transactions also involved politically influential persons, foreign nationals, legal persons and private individuals. However, limited resources and a lack of political will to combat financial crimes remain major challenges for Zambia.

    Criminal Actors

    Foreign actors, particularly Chinese nationals, play a major role in organized crime in Zambia. They smuggle ivory, cigarettes, liquor and fish into Zambia from Zimbabwe and use the country as a transit route for human smuggling and trafficking victims from the Horn of Africa to South Africa and Namibia. The demand for ivory in China has attracted Chinese criminal groups to the elephant ivory market in Zambia. Moreover, Chinese traffickers are also known to traffic Chinese women and girls for sexual exploitation in brothels and massage parlors. Foreign companies and governments have also allegedly influenced officials to prevent investigations into human trafficking cases.

    In Zambia, state-embedded actors are important in the criminal landscape, with corruption reaching the highest levels of law enforcement. Criminal networks exert strategic influence over state-embedded actors and businessmen, resulting in a complex triangular crime framework that is multi-dimensional, constantly evolving and highly interdependent. Recent arrests of former ministers and state-owned company managers have exposed suspected corrupt practices involving millions of dollars. Gaps in the oversight and regulation of political party funding have contributed to the durability of the triangular relationship. Private sector actors have also colluded with government officials and enabled significant forms of money laundering and illicit financial outflows. While there is no substantial evidence of a significant presence of mafia-style groups operating in Zambia, apart from gangs engaged in extortion practices in the capital, Lusaka, and other cities in the country, criminal networks are heavily involved in organized criminal activity. These networks are active in fuel smuggling, human trafficking, wildlife trafficking, counterfeit goods smuggling and drug trafficking. These groups have links to counterparts in other southern African countries and often exploit local communities for illegal activities.

    Leadership and governance

    The Zambian government faces significant challenges in combatting organized crime due to a lack of leadership, resilience and governance. Sustained international assistance is required to implement anti-crime initiatives effectively. Poverty is pervasive in rural areas due to subsistence farming, an inconsistent food supply, poor working conditions and deteriorating wages, with widespread job insecurity contributing to poverty in urban centres and mining towns. The disinvestment by foreign investors perpetually threatens Zambian livelihoods. Notwithstanding the transfer of power following the last election, notable improvements in democratic governance have been made. Zambia is struggling with corruption, with multiple allegations made against government and law enforcement officials. Additionally, the Zambian parliament lacks the necessary oversight to monitor government actions effectively. Although the anti-corruption agency has arrested several key figures suspected of fraud and corruption, accountability levels have been low. Zambia also has serious deficiencies in several social protection measures needed to tackle corruption.

    While Zambia has ratified all relevant international treaties related to organized crime and engages in international cooperation to combat it, the capacity to implement these laws has not fully developed. The country has a relatively advanced legislative framework for combatting organized crime, including strict penalties for human trafficking, and the illegal killing and trafficking of elephants. Additional legislation addressing money laundering and crime proceeds is necessary, and there is a need to clarify some definitions in its anti-human trafficking legislation. Zambia’s Cyber Security Act is essential for the country’s digitalization, which connects various government services.

    Criminal justice and security

    Although the Zambian constitution allows the establishment of specialized courts, the country lacks a specialized judicial unit to address organized crime and corruption, relying instead on international resources and support. While the independence of the Zambian judiciary is guaranteed by law, it is subject to political pressure. Backlogs and limited resources result in pre-trial detainees being held for years without access to legal representation and frequent denial of bail. Overcrowding in prisons and detention facilities is a recurring problem. The slow-moving and highly centralized judicial system, outdated laws and increased incarceration for petty offences contribute to these issues.

    In recent years, Zambia’s law enforcement capacity in the fight against organized crime, especially against human trafficking, has reportedly expanded. Poor pay and funding gaps among law enforcement also contribute to corruption, with many officials known to succumb to profitable opportunities to engage in organized crime. This has led to high levels of corruption in the public sector, particularly in the police. Many people were required to pay bribes to police officers to receive services or avoid threats from the police. Zambia’s territorial integrity is weak, with the country having to manage borders shared with eight countries while lacking adequate border posts. Natural barriers such as the Luapula River, which borders the DRC, are difficult to monitor, and Zambia lacks the necessary resources to exert control over these barriers effectively. This high level of border porosity renders the country vulnerable to exploitation by organized criminals. Corruption among law enforcement and other officials further exacerbates cross-border organized crime. Without substantial technological support, it is inconceivable that Zambia will be able to manage all its frontiers. As a result, instances of cross-border smuggling of extractive and consumer commodities to and from neighbouring countries continue unabated.

    Economic and financial environment

    Zambia currently lacks a national strategy and plan specifically targeting illicit financial flows. To combat cross-border money laundering, Zambia has established a Transfer Pricing Unit that tackles transfer mispricing and ensures that companies’ tax bases reflect the economic activity they undertake. However, due to the increase in base erosion and profit shifting cases, the unit needs more staff. To prevent corrupt actors from concealing their business interests, companies and trusts must provide beneficial ownership information upon registration, which should be accessible to the public.

    While the Zambian government has regulatory agencies and public bodies to protect business interests, the legal framework has not adequately addressed key restrictions and obstacles facing the business-licensing environment. The country remains vulnerable to corporate tax evasion due to weaknesses in the tax system and regulatory oversight. Corruption is a primary concern, and non-competitive single sourcing of services without requisite regulatory procedures enables it. Overall, Zambia has made considerable development progress over the years, but, after the COVID-19 pandemic, poverty levels have slightly increased.

    Civil society and social protection

    Zambia lacks sufficient mechanisms for supporting victims and witnesses, and provides no incentives for witnesses to provide evidence in criminal matters. Both the Zambian government and law enforcement officials tend to conflate human smuggling and human trafficking, hindering efforts to protect victims and pursue offenders. Shelters across Zambia, particularly in rural areas outside of Lusaka and the Copperbelt Province, continue to lack available space, training for shelter staff, education opportunities and integration services due to low capacity and training of victim support. Authorities also continue to penalize victims for crimes their traffickers compel them to commit.

    The Zambian government and NGOs are actively involved in preventing human trafficking and wildlife crimes. NGOs receive trafficking indicator calls, and the government conducts regular investigations to prevent exploitation. Community mobilization efforts have been successful in preventing organized crime networks from engaging in wildlife trafficking. However, crime prevention efforts have been less effective in urban areas and among unemployed youth.

    The Zambian media faces restrictions and limited freedom due to government-imposed restrictions and intolerance towards media scrutiny. Police fail to investigate assaults on journalists, and ruling party officials have threatened media houses with closure for unfavourable coverage. Physical attacks against journalists and media outlets are common during elections. Moreover, Zambia’s civil society is reportedly shrinking due to legislative changes pertaining to NGOs. Despite this, NGOs continue to operate in the country and play a significant role in anti-trafficking and wildlife preservation efforts.

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    The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to 10. The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel.

    How to measure organized crime?

    A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.

    Read more on globalinitiative.net
    How to measure organized crime?

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    This report was funded in part by a grant from the United States Department of State.

    ENACT is funded by the European Union and implemented by the Institute for Security Studies and INTERPOL, in affiliation with the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.

    The opinions, findings and conclusions stated herein are those of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State.