The Organized Crime Index | ENACT
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Mozambique
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    Profile

    Mozambique

    Capital

    Maputo

    Income group

    Low income

    Population

    30,366,036

    Area

    799,380 km²

    Geography type

    Coastal

    6.53

    Criminality score

    21st of 193 countries

    7th of 54 countries in Africa

    2nd of 13 countries in Southern Africa

    Criminal markets

    6.05

    An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.

    Human trafficking

    4.00

    Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.

    Human smuggling

    5.00

    Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.

    Arms trafficking

    5.50

    The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.

    Flora crimes

    8.00

    The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.

    Fauna crimes

    8.00

    The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.

    Non-renewable resource crimes

    8.00

    The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.

    Heroin trade

    7.50

    The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.

    Cocaine trade

    3.50

    The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.

    Cannabis trade

    4.00

    The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.

    Synthetic drug trade

    7.00

    The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.

    Criminal actors

    7.00

    An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.

    Mafia-style groups

    3.50

    Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.

    Criminal networks

    8.00

    Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.

    State-embedded actors

    9.00

    Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.

    Foreign actors

    7.50

    State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.

    3.29

    Resilience score

    160th of 193 countries

    32nd of 54 countries in Africa

    10th of 13 countries in Southern Africa

    Political leadership and governance

    3.00

    The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.

    Government transparency and accountability

    3.50

    The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.

    International cooperation

    5.00

    A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.

    National policies and laws

    5.50

    A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.

    Judicial system and detention

    2.00

    Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.

    Law enforcement

    2.00

    The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.

    Territorial integrity

    3.50

    The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.

    Anti-money laundering

    3.00

    A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.

    Economic regulatory capacity

    4.00

    The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.

    Victim and witness support

    3.00

    Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.

    Prevention

    2.00

    Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.

    Non-state actors

    3.00

    The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.

    3.29 7.00 6.05 3.29 7.00 6.05

    3.29

    Resilience score

    160th of 193 countries

    32nd of 54 countries in Africa

    10th of 13 countries in Southern Africa

    Political leadership and governance

    3.00

    The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.

    Government transparency and accountability

    3.50

    The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.

    International cooperation

    5.00

    A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.

    National policies and laws

    5.50

    A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.

    Judicial system and detention

    2.00

    Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.

    Law enforcement

    2.00

    The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.

    Territorial integrity

    3.50

    The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.

    Anti-money laundering

    3.00

    A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.

    Economic regulatory capacity

    4.00

    The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.

    Victim and witness support

    3.00

    Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.

    Prevention

    2.00

    Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.

    Non-state actors

    3.00

    The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.

    Analysis

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    People

    Mozambique is a waypoint and destination market for people trafficked from various countries in Asia and Africa. Victims are trafficked to work in small businesses and hotels, especially in northern Mozambique. Recently, the country has begun to see the emergence of child trafficking, as well as of trafficking for organ harvesting (a practice that at this stage is mostly ad hoc and opportunistic).

    Mozambique is part of a major route for human smuggling, with a significant number of Pakistanis arriving in the country on their way to South Africa. It is also a transit country for migrants being smuggled overland from Somalia and Kenya, once again bound for South Africa. Corruption is a key facilitator of migrant smuggling – however, the smuggling networks, which consist mainly of foreign actors, operate at a relatively low level and there is minimal violence involved.

    Trade

    There are reports of arms coming into small ports in the northern part of Mozambique and then being used in insurgencies in Cabo Delgado province – in particular, and in Mocimboa da Praia in August 2020. Mozambique's long-running internal conflict between the ruling FRELIMO and opposition RENAMO parties has resulted in cycles of arms proliferation spanning decades. The main sources of arms have been direct imports and cross-border smuggling from neighbouring countries. Stockpiles of illegal weapons in Mozambique currently exceed demand. As a result, many of these weapons have made their way into South Africa, where the demand is higher.

    Environment

    Mozambique has a substantial market for illegal logging, which has resulted in extensive deforestation across the country. The driving force behind illegal logging, as in other African countries, is China's high demand for timber. All actors in the illegal logging industry operate with almost complete impunity and there are allegations of collusion between criminal networks and government officials, who facilitate the shipment of illicit wood out of the country by issuing false licenses and authorizations. With over two-thirds of Mozambique's population being dependent on smallholder farming, the long-term environmental impact of illicit logging makes the country especially vulnerable. Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing is prevalent off the coast of Mozambique. The country is also one of the principal suppliers of ivory and rhino horn to Asia. Political protection for southern poachers is provided by mid- to high-level state officials. There has been a distinct reduction in horn-smuggling seizures, possibly due to the severe decrease in global mobility in 2020 and the crackdown on the wildlife trade in China in the wake of COVID-19.

    Mozambique has an active market for non-renewable-resource crimes. Mining operations in the country generally lack transparency, with most profitable mining concessions being owned by those with powerful political connections. Mozambique is a transit country for smuggled Zimbabwean diamonds and illicit gold from South Africa that is on its way to the United Arab Emirates, while Maputo’s port and airport are also used in the smuggling of precious stones from South Africa to Asia. The South African police suspect the involvement of some of Mozambique's political elite in this trade.

    Drugs

    Mozambique is an integral part of a major heroin transit route, which is operated by a tightly regulated network of families that is believed to be backed by the political class in the country. The heroin market is almost entirely under the control of the state, which explains the low levels of violence associated with the heroin trade in Mozambique. The insurgency in Cabo Delgado has created greater challenges for heroin importers, but in spite of this, northern Mozambique has emerged as a major landing point for Afghan heroin. From here, it goes to other parts of Africa, as well as to Europe. There is a growing domestic market for heroin in the coastal Indian Ocean states and seizures have reportedly increased. Mozambique is a destination and transit country for cocaine. It is understood that small shipments arrive by air and overland routes, while larger shipments arrive by sea. There is speculation that because of international clampdowns on West African transit routes, countries like Mozambique have emerged as attractive alternatives.

    Mozambique is a significant trans-shipment point for cannabis in the region. The country also has a domestic cannabis-production and consumption market, but it is relatively informal. While the production and use of synthetic drugs in the country is limited, there is evidence of Mozambican criminal actors trying to get involved in South Africa’s methamphetamine market. The manufacturing of synthetic drugs has increased, especially in Maputo. The northern Mozambique coast is an entry point for methamphetamine manufactured in Afghanistan. The trafficking of synthetic drugs tends to overlap with wildlife and human trafficking.

    Cyber Crimes

    *This indicator was first included in the 2023 iteration of the tool

    Financial Crimes

    *This indicator was first included in the 2023 iteration of the tool

    Criminal Actors

    Evidence shows that some state-embedded actors own legal ruby companies in Mozambique that are involved in tax evasion, as well as in taking advantage of local populations. They are also complicit in a number of illicit economies. There is virtual impunity for high-ranking politicians involved in criminal markets. Moreover, the police are described as the closest thing to a mafia group in the country, with law-enforcement officers often engaged directly in organized-crime activities and used as a hit squad by the government and ruling party. Foreign criminal actors are known to operate in Mozambique – for example, Chinese criminal actors play a significant role in the country's illicit timber industry as well as in illicit mining, ivory trafficking and illegal fishing. Tanzanian criminal groups are involved in the illegal ivory trade, while Somali nationals drive human smuggling operations and Thai networks have a stake in the smuggling of rubies. Vietnamese groups are reportedly involved in the illegal rhino trade and the local heroin market is linked to Pakistani organized crime networks.

    There are many local criminal networks in Mozambique, including powerful families who exercise control over some of the country's ports and have a strong presence in the biggest cities in the northern parts of the country. These groups have established tight relationships with Mozambique's political elite as well as international links to the Pakistani market for heroin. Loose insurgency-style Islamist groups that resemble mafia-style groups operate primarily in Cabo Delgado province, where criminality is rife and large-scale trafficking of wildlife, timber, heroin and ruby exist. However, links between the insurgents and criminal markets remain unproven.

    Leadership and governance

    The Mozambican government is seen as corrupt and has never taken a solid stance against organized crime. The revelation in 2016 of its secret multi-billion-dollar debt significantly reduced its credibility in decrying organized crime, while research suggests that the electoral process in Mozambique has been sponsored by criminal activities. There is very little transparency in Mozambique and the government has not implemented any oversight mechanisms. The hidden-debts scandal prompted the government to tighten up on transparency and accountability, but the result has been an increase in red tape that has not had any significant effect on hampering corruption.

    Mozambique engages in international cooperation to a limited degree and has ratified a number of treaties on organized crime. It has also entered into a joint commitment with China to combat illegal logging, but the document is largely unenforceable, and a bilateral agreement was signed between police forces in Mozambique and Tanzania to fight terrorism and organized crime. In 2019, the UNODC established an office in Maputo and a strategic plan on countering the drug trade and organized crime was agreed upon with the government, although the strategy is largely dependent on foreign donors. While Mozambique has several local laws related to organized crime, as well as various policies on its prevention, there is no official national strategy on the issue and evidence suggests that the state has obstructed attempts at trans-border law enforcement.

    Criminal justice and security

    Mozambique's judiciary has a very poor reputation. Its courts are under-resourced and several judges have been accused of corruption. There is also evidence of links between the country's judiciary, the FRELIMO party and organized crime. There are no specialized departments within the judiciary focused on countering organized crime, and the country also has no specific legislation that allows it to prosecute northern insurgents as terrorists. Mozambique's law enforcement agencies are poorly resourced and under-equipped, and therefore unable to investigate organized crime effectively. As with the judiciary, there are no specialized law-enforcement units dedicated to combating organized crime. There is strong evidence of corruption at Mozambique's border posts, with the free movement of illicit goods being allowed in exchange for bribes. In addition, the intensifying Cabo Delgado conflict also contributes to the increasingly vulnerable territorial integrity of the country.

    Economic and financial environment

    The macroeconomic stability of Mozambique is threatened by factors such as the feeble economic growth and a sharp decline in capital influx. The country has been assessed as being among those most at risk of money laundering and terrorist financing. Nevertheless, it has enacted strong legislation prohibiting corruption and money laundering, and the Bank of Mozambique appears to be taking a much firmer stance against money laundering by fining commercial banks on a fairly regular basis.

    Civil society and social protection

    Mozambique's victim- and witness-support programmes are poorly developed. Legislation to protect whistle-blowers is very broad and does not address situations that occur within the business environment. The Mozambican state is not involved in any significant community-based crime prevention activities, and the issue is discussed only in the context of countering violent extremism in Cabo Delgado and elsewhere in the north.

    There is a relatively new network of journalists and civil society organizations, based mostly in Maputo, who are vocal about and committed to fighting organized crime in Mozambique. The media is under-resourced, and journalists are often threatened and even assaulted. Most media organizations therefore practise self-censorship when reporting on organized crime. The government has banned foreign correspondents from covering the northern conflict.

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    The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to 10. The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel.

    How to measure organized crime?

    A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.

    Read more on globalinitiative.net
    How to measure organized crime?

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    This report was funded in part by a grant from the United States Department of State.

    ENACT is funded by the European Union and implemented by the Institute for Security Studies and INTERPOL, in affiliation with the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.

    The opinions, findings and conclusions stated herein are those of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State.