




MOZAMBIQUE



6.53 CRIMINALITY SCORE

21st of 193 countries
7th of 54 African countries
2nd of 13 Southern African countries



CRIMINAL MARKETS 6.05

HUMAN TRAFFICKING	4.00
HUMAN SMUGGLING	5.00
ARMS TRAFFICKING	5.50
FLORA CRIMES	8.00
FAUNA CRIMES	8.00
NON-RENEWABLE RESOURCE CRIMES	8.00
HEROIN TRADE	7.50
COCAINE TRADE	3.50
CANNABIS TRADE	4.00
SYNTHETIC DRUG TRADE	7.00



CRIMINAL ACTORS 7.00

MAFIA-STYLE GROUPS	3.50
CRIMINAL NETWORKS	8.00
STATE-EMBEDDED ACTORS	9.00
FOREIGN ACTORS	7.50



3.29 RESILIENCE SCORE

160th of 193 countries
32nd of 54 African countries
10th of 13 Southern African countries




Funding provided by the United States Government.



ENACT is funded by the European Union and implemented by the Institute for Security Studies and INTERPOL, in affiliation with the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.



MOZAMBIQUE



3.29

RESILIENCE SCORE

160th of 193 countries
32nd of 54 African countries
10th of 13 Southern African countries

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE	3.00
GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY	3.50
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION	5.00
NATIONAL POLICIES AND LAWS	5.50
JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND DETENTION	2.00
LAW ENFORCEMENT	2.00
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY	3.50
ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING	3.00
ECONOMIC REGULATORY CAPACITY	4.00
VICTIM AND WITNESS SUPPORT	3.00
PREVENTION	2.00
NON-STATE ACTORS	3.00



6.53

CRIMINALITY SCORE

21st of 193 countries
7th of 54 African countries
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CRIMINAL MARKETS 6.05



CRIMINAL ACTORS 7.00



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CRIMINALITY

CRIMINAL MARKETS

PEOPLE

Mozambique is a waypoint and destination market for people trafficked from various countries in Asia and Africa. Victims are trafficked to work in small businesses and hotels, especially in northern Mozambique. Recently, the country has begun to see the emergence of child trafficking, as well as of trafficking for organ harvesting (a practice that at this stage is mostly ad hoc and opportunistic).

Mozambique is part of a major route for human smuggling, with a significant number of Pakistanis arriving in the country on their way to South Africa. It is also a transit country for migrants being smuggled overland from Somalia and Kenya, once again bound for South Africa. Corruption is a key facilitator of migrant smuggling – however, the smuggling networks, which consist mainly of foreign actors, operate at a relatively low level and there is minimal violence involved.

TRADE

There are reports of arms coming into small ports in the northern part of Mozambique and then being used in insurgencies in Cabo Delgado province – in particular, and in Mocimboa da Praia in August 2020. Mozambique's long-running internal conflict between the ruling FRELIMO and opposition RENAMO parties has resulted in cycles of arms proliferation spanning decades. The main sources of arms have been direct imports and cross-border smuggling from neighbouring countries. Stockpiles of illegal weapons in Mozambique currently exceed demand. As a result, many of these weapons have made their way into South Africa, where the demand is higher.

ENVIRONMENT

Mozambique has a substantial market for illegal logging, which has resulted in extensive deforestation across the country. The driving force behind illegal logging, as in other African countries, is China's high demand for timber. All actors in the illegal logging industry operate with almost complete impunity and there are allegations of collusion between criminal networks and government officials, who facilitate the shipment of illicit wood out of the country by issuing false licenses and authorizations. With over two-thirds of Mozambique's population being dependent on smallholder farming, the long-term environmental impact of illicit logging makes the country especially vulnerable. Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing is prevalent off the coast of Mozambique. The country is also one of the principal suppliers of ivory and rhino horn to Asia. Political

protection for southern poachers is provided by mid- to high-level state officials. There has been a distinct reduction in horn-smuggling seizures, possibly due to the severe decrease in global mobility in 2020 and the crackdown on the wildlife trade in China in the wake of COVID-19.

Mozambique has an active market for non-renewable-resource crimes. Mining operations in the country generally lack transparency, with most profitable mining concessions being owned by those with powerful political connections. Mozambique is a transit country for smuggled Zimbabwean diamonds and illicit gold from South Africa that is on its way to the United Arab Emirates, while Maputo's port and airport are also used in the smuggling of precious stones from South Africa to Asia. The South African police suspect the involvement of some of Mozambique's political elite in this trade.

DRUGS

Mozambique is an integral part of a major heroin transit route, which is operated by a tightly regulated network of families that is believed to be backed by the political class in the country. The heroin market is almost entirely under the control of the state, which explains the low levels of violence associated with the heroin trade in Mozambique. The insurgency in Cabo Delgado has created greater challenges for heroin importers, but in spite of this, northern Mozambique has emerged as a major landing point for Afghan heroin. From here, it goes to other parts of Africa, as well as to Europe. There is a growing domestic market for heroin in the coastal Indian Ocean states and seizures have reportedly increased. Mozambique is a destination and transit country for cocaine. It is understood that small shipments arrive by air and overland routes, while larger shipments arrive by sea. There is speculation that because of international clampdowns on West African transit routes, countries like Mozambique have emerged as attractive alternatives.

Mozambique is a significant trans-shipment point for cannabis in the region. The country also has a domestic cannabis-production and consumption market, but it is relatively informal. While the production and use of synthetic drugs in the country is limited, there is evidence of Mozambican criminal actors trying to get involved in South Africa's methamphetamine market. The manufacturing of synthetic drugs has increased, especially in Maputo. The northern Mozambique coast is an entry point for methamphetamine manufactured in Afghanistan. The trafficking of synthetic drugs tends to overlap with wildlife and human trafficking.

CRIMINAL ACTORS

Evidence shows that some state-embedded actors own legal ruby companies in Mozambique that are involved in tax evasion, as well as in taking advantage of local populations. They are also complicit in a number of illicit economies. There is virtual impunity for high-ranking politicians involved in criminal markets. Moreover, the police are described as the closest thing to a mafia group in the country, with law-enforcement officers often engaged directly in organized-crime activities and used as a hit squad by the government and ruling party. Foreign criminal actors are known to operate in Mozambique – for example, Chinese criminal actors play a significant role in the country's illicit timber industry as well as in illicit mining, ivory trafficking and illegal fishing. Tanzanian criminal groups are involved in the illegal ivory trade, while Somali nationals drive human

smuggling operations and Thai networks have a stake in the smuggling of rubies. Vietnamese groups are reportedly involved in the illegal rhino trade and the local heroin market is linked to Pakistani organized crime networks.

There are many local criminal networks in Mozambique, including powerful families who exercise control over some of the country's ports and have a strong presence in the biggest cities in the northern parts of the country. These groups have established tight relationships with Mozambique's political elite as well as international links to the Pakistani market for heroin. Loose insurgency-style Islamist groups that resemble mafia-style groups operate primarily in Cabo Delgado province, where criminality is rife and large-scale trafficking of wildlife, timber, heroin and ruby exist. However, links between the insurgents and criminal markets remain unproven.

RESILIENCE

LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE

The Mozambican government is seen as corrupt and has never taken a solid stance against organized crime. The revelation in 2016 of its secret multi-billion-dollar debt significantly reduced its credibility in decrying organized crime, while research suggests that the electoral process in Mozambique has been sponsored by criminal activities. There is very little transparency in Mozambique and the government has not implemented any oversight mechanisms. The hidden-debts scandal prompted the government to tighten up on transparency and accountability, but the result has been an increase in red tape that has not had any significant effect on hampering corruption.

Mozambique engages in international cooperation to a limited degree and has ratified a number of treaties on organized crime. It has also entered into a joint commitment with China to combat illegal logging, but the document is largely unenforceable, and a bilateral agreement was signed between police forces in Mozambique and Tanzania to fight terrorism and organized crime. In 2019, the UNODC established an office in Maputo and a strategic plan on countering the drug trade and organized crime was agreed upon with the government, although the strategy is largely dependent on foreign donors. While Mozambique has several local laws related to organized crime, as well as various policies on its prevention, there is no official national strategy on the issue and evidence suggests that the state has obstructed attempts at trans-border law enforcement.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND SECURITY

Mozambique's judiciary has a very poor reputation. Its courts are under-resourced and several judges have been accused of corruption. There is also evidence of links between the country's judiciary, the FRELIMO party and organized crime. There are no specialized departments within the judiciary focused on countering organized crime, and the country also has no specific legislation that allows it to prosecute northern insurgents as terrorists. Mozambique's law enforcement agencies are poorly resourced and under-equipped, and therefore unable to investigate organized crime effectively. As with the judiciary, there are no specialized law-enforcement units dedicated to combating organized crime. There is strong evidence of corruption at Mozambique's border posts, with the free movement of illicit goods being allowed in exchange for bribes. In addition, the intensifying Cabo Delgado conflict also contributes to the increasingly vulnerable territorial integrity of the country.

ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ENVIRONMENT

The macroeconomic stability of Mozambique is threatened by factors such as the feeble economic growth and a sharp decline in capital influx. The country has been assessed as being among those most at risk of money laundering and terrorist financing. Nevertheless, it has enacted strong legislation prohibiting corruption and money laundering, and the Bank of Mozambique appears to be taking a much firmer stance against money laundering by fining commercial banks on a fairly regular basis.

CIVIL SOCIETY AND SOCIAL PROTECTION

Mozambique's victim- and witness-support programmes are poorly developed. Legislation to protect whistle-blowers is very broad and does not address situations that occur within the business environment. The Mozambican state is not involved in any significant community-based crime prevention activities, and the issue is discussed only in the context of countering violent extremism in Cabo Delgado and elsewhere in the north.

There is a relatively new network of journalists and civil society organizations, based mostly in Maputo, who are vocal about and committed to fighting organized crime in Mozambique. The media is under-resourced, and journalists are often threatened and even assaulted. Most media organizations therefore practise self-censorship when reporting on organized crime. The government has banned foreign correspondents from covering the northern conflict.

This summary was funded in part by a grant from the United States Department of State. The opinions, findings and conclusions stated herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State.