How to measure organized crime?
A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.
Read more on globalinitiative.netCriminal markets
4.70
An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.
Human trafficking
5.50
Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.
Human smuggling
4.00
Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.
Arms trafficking
5.00
The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.
Flora crimes
4.50
The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.
Fauna crimes
3.50
The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.
Non-renewable resource crimes
8.50
The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.
Heroin trade
2.50
The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.
Cocaine trade
8.00
The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cannabis trade
3.00
The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.
Synthetic drug trade
2.50
The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Criminal actors
5.50
An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.
Mafia-style groups
3.00
Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.
Criminal networks
5.00
Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.
State-embedded actors
8.00
Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.
Foreign actors
6.00
State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.
Political leadership and governance
5.00
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
3.00
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
5.00
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
3.00
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
4.00
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
2.50
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
5.00
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
4.00
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
5.00
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
5.00
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
5.00
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
5.00
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Political leadership and governance
5.00
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
3.00
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
5.00
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
3.00
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
4.00
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
2.50
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
5.00
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
4.00
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
5.00
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
5.00
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
5.00
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
5.00
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Guyana is a source and destination country for human trafficking, with Guyanese nationals falling victim to sexual and labour exploitation both in the country as well as in Jamaica and Suriname. Women and children from Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Suriname and Venezuela are also exploited in Guyana. Human trafficking is generally controlled by independent criminal networks.
Guyana is also a source and transit country for human smuggling, particularly of irregular migrants on their way to the United States and Canada. Guyana’s porous borders, poor law-enforcement efforts and corrupt security forces facilitate this market.
Given its role as a transit and destination country for trafficked weapons, the arms-trafficking market in Guyana is substantial, with evidence of members of Guyana's security forces facilitating trafficking. Many illegal arms arrive in the country from France, Brazil and Venezuela, and then make their way to French Guyana, Colombia, Suriname and the Caribbean. Despite the wide availability of illegal weapons in the country, Guyana does not seem to have the same levels of armed violence as its neighbours or other Caribbean countries.
Guyana is a source country for precious wood, which is mainly shipped to China and is a large driver of deforestation. Another driver is gold mining, an industry controlled by organizations that also benefit from the commercialization of timber. While comparably smaller, Guyana is also a source and transit country for the illegal trafficking of some of the world's most threatened species of fauna, including parrots, macaws, parakeets, songbirds, reptiles, arthropods and jaguars. Thousands of birds, mammals and reptiles from neighbouring Amazonian countries are transported through Guyana into Mexico, the United States and Singapore.
Guyana is also an important transit and destination country for the trafficking of non-renewable resources such as mercury and gold, which comes from Venezuelan mines controlled by criminal organizations. A large quantity of gold is trafficked every month and then moved into the international licit supply chain, where it is presented as Guyanese gold. Guyana is one of the few countries in Latin America that still grants mercury-import licenses, even though the chemical, which is still used in small-scale mining, is known to pose a significant threat to human health and the environment. This has encouraged buyers to import more mercury than the national market needs, either to stockpile or to traffic to neighbouring countries, where it is used in the illegal mining of gold. Oil and diamond trafficking have also been documented in Guyana.
Cocaine trafficking is the largest illicit market in Guyana, which is a transit country for Colombian cocaine destined for the United States, Canada, the Caribbean, Europe and West Africa. A large percentage of cocaine enters Guyana from Venezuela, via air and sea routes, often disguised among legal goods. Cocaine is the second-most-used drug in Guyana, after cannabis, and local consumption is rising. Cannabis is produced in the country, mostly to meet local demand, although an apparent surplus suggests that it could also be exported.
Guyana is a transit country for heroin going north to the United States and to Europe, albeit on a smaller scale compared to other countries in the region. There is a growing market for the drug, which is linked closely to the cocaine trade and controlled mainly by Mexican and Italian organizations. Synthetic drugs such as Ecstasy and amphetamines are also transported through Guyana, and a local market is developing slowly.
*This indicator was first included in the 2023 iteration of the tool
*This indicator was first included in the 2023 iteration of the tool
Guyana’s mafia-style organizations operate in both its legal and illegal economies, including the cocaine, heroin and arms trade, as well as construction. In both instances, criminal groups tend to have a low profile and keep the use of violence to a minimum, with some exceptions. Criminal networks focus primarily on cocaine trafficking. State actors at all levels facilitate the functioning of criminal markets and operate actively within them. Security officials regularly receive bribes or work within crime groups; high-level state officials grant political favours in exchange for donations; and law-enforcement officials extort money from refugees and smugglers alike. Foreign actors – mainly from Mexico, Italy and Colombia – lead Guyana’s main criminal economies (cocaine, fauna and arms trafficking) and interact with local gangs and state actors.
Trust in the political leadership and institutions of Guyana is low, with accusations of electoral fraud and government collusion with drug-trafficking organizations, as well as an apparent inability and unwillingness to carry out investigations. Guyana is believed to be the second most corrupt country in the region (after Haiti, one of the most corrupt states in the Western hemisphere), with law enforcement and the judiciary particularly affected. This widespread corruption, along with unenforced transparency laws, has created an environment in which crime organizations operate with ease.
Guyana has an array of laws that seek to tackle organized crime, at least nominally. The country is a signatory to a number of treaties aimed at fighting drugs, arms and people trafficking. It is also a participant in a range of international extradition and cooperation agreements. The country also adopted a national drug strategy, which sought to address among other things, supply and demand reduction as well as enhanced control measures and international cooperation. However, most of its national laws on organized crime require updating in order to facilitate effective prosecutions.
Guyana’s judiciary suffers from a number of deficiencies, including a lack of independence and inadequate resources. There are accusations of the political appointment of high-court judges. Corruption and a lack of resources are also common in law-enforcement institutions, and the prison system is overcrowded. These issues have a negative effect on the policing of Guyana’s porous borders, which are highly attractive areas for criminal groups from countries including Suriname, Venezuela and Brazil. These groups also exploit Guyana’s poorly monitored ports, remote airstrips and intricate river networks.
Guyana has been assessed as having a high risk of money laundering. The proceeds of illegal activities are concealed in numerous ways – for example, large cash deposits are made for the so-called sale of non-existent precious minerals; compromised email accounts are used to commit wire-transfer fraud; and concealed precious metals are transported across Guyana's borders to avoid payment of the relevant taxes and duties. Unregulated currency-exchange houses, as well as dealers in precious metals and stones, also pose a risk to Guyana’s financial system.
Guyana's authorities are trying to strengthen the country’s capacity to tackle money laundering through training and by signing agreements with relevant agencies. However, political uncertainty has had a negative impact on business and consumer confidence. Additionally, the lack of regulatory legislation in the country poses an obstacle to growth, despite the fact that newly found oil reserves are seen as a fresh source of potential revenue. Overall, doing business in Guyana is difficult as a result of the country’s insolvency issues, cross-border trade, large informal sector and structural challenges.
Guyana rates poorly when it comes to the protection of witnesses and victims, including survivors of slavery, gender-based violence and refugees. Its authorities run drug-prevention campaigns aimed at raising awareness in schools and communities, and a number of civil-society organizations offer rehabilitation programmes. Media freedom in Guyana is considered to be relatively good, although journalists, particularly those investigating organized crime, have reportedly been harassed, prosecuted, suspended and intimidated.
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The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to 10. The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel.
A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.
Read more on globalinitiative.net
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This report was funded in part by a grant from the United States Department of State.
ENACT is funded by the European Union and implemented by the Institute for Security Studies and INTERPOL, in affiliation with the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.
The opinions, findings and conclusions stated herein are those of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State.