

5.10 **CRIMINALITY SCORE** 

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82<sup>nd</sup> of 193 countries 17<sup>th</sup> of 35 American countries 7<sup>th</sup> of 12 South American countries

CRIMINAL MARKETS	4.70
HUMAN TRAFFICKING	5.50
HUMAN SMUGGLING	4.00
ARMS TRAFFICKING	5.00
FLORA CRIMES	4.50
FAUNA CRIMES	3.50
NON-RENEWABLE RESOURCE CRIMES	8.50
HEROIN TRADE	2.50
COCAINE TRADE	8.00
CANNABIS TRADE	3.00
SYNTHETIC DRUG TRADE	2.50

CRIMINAL ACTORS	5.50
MAFIA-STYLE GROUPS	3.00
CRIMINAL NETWORKS	5.00
STATE-EMBEDDED ACTORS	8.00
FOREIGN ACTORS	6.00



**122<sup>nd</sup>** of 193 countries 27<sup>th</sup> of 35 American countries 9<sup>th</sup> of 12 South American countries



Funding provided by the United States Government.





ENACT is funded by the European Union and implemented by the Institute for Security Studies and INTERPOL, in affiliation with the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.











## 4.29 RESILIENCE SCORE

122<sup>nd</sup> of 193 countries
27<sup>th</sup> of 35 American countries
9<sup>th</sup> of 12 South American countries

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE	5.00
GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY	3.00
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION	5.00
NATIONAL POLICIES AND LAWS	3.00
JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND DETENTION	4.00
LAW ENFORCEMENT	2.50
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY	5.00
ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING	4.00
ECONOMIC REGULATORY CAPACITY	5.00
VICTIM AND WITNESS SUPPORT	5.00
PREVENTION	5.00
NON-STATE ACTORS	5.00



82<sup>nd</sup> of 193 countries 17<sup>th</sup> of 35 American countries 7<sup>th</sup> of 12 South American countries





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# CRIMINALITY

## **CRIMINAL MARKETS**

## PEOPLE

Guyana is a source and destination country for human trafficking, with Guyanese nationals falling victim to sexual and labour exploitation both in the country as well as in Jamaica and Suriname. Women and children from Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Suriname and Venezuela are also exploited in Guyana. Human trafficking is generally controlled by independent criminal networks.

Guyana is also a source and transit country for human smuggling, particularly of irregular migrants on their way to the United States and Canada. Guyana's porous borders, poor law-enforcement efforts and corrupt security forces facilitate this market.

## TRADE

Given its role as a transit and destination country for trafficked weapons, the arms-trafficking market in Guyana is substantial, with evidence of members of Guyana's security forces facilitating trafficking. Many illegal arms arrive in the country from France, Brazil and Venezuela, and then make their way to French Guyana, Colombia, Suriname and the Caribbean. Despite the wide availability of illegal weapons in the country, Guyana does not seem to have the same levels of armed violence as its neighbours or other Caribbean countries.

### **ENVIRONMENT**

Guyana is a source country for precious wood, which is mainly shipped to China and is a large driver of deforestation. Another driver is gold mining, an industry controlled by organizations that also benefit from the commercialization of timber. While comparably smaller, Guyana is also a source and transit country for the illegal trafficking of some of the world's most threatened species of fauna, including parrots, macaws, parakeets, songbirds, reptiles, arthropods and jaguars. Thousands of birds, mammals and reptiles from neighbouring Amazonian countries are transported through Guyana into Mexico, the United States and Singapore.

Guyana is also an important transit and destination country for the trafficking of non-renewable resources such as mercury and gold, which comes from Venezuelan mines controlled by criminal organizations. A large quantity of gold is trafficked every month and then moved into the international licit supply chain, where it is presented as Guyanese gold. Guyana is one of the few countries in Latin America that still grants mercury-import licenses, even though the chemical, which is still used in small-scale mining, is known to pose a significant threat to human health and the environment. This has encouraged buyers to import more mercury than the national market needs, either to stockpile or to traffic to neighbouring countries, where it is used in the illegal mining of gold. Oil and diamond trafficking have also been documented in Guyana.

## DRUGS

Cocaine trafficking is the largest illicit market in Guyana, which is a transit country for Colombian cocaine destined for the United States, Canada, the Caribbean, Europe and West Africa. A large percentage of cocaine enters Guyana from Venezuela, via air and sea routes, often disguised among legal goods. Cocaine is the second-most-used drug in Guyana, after cannabis, and local consumption is rising. Cannabis is produced in the country, mostly to meet local demand, although an apparent surplus suggests that it could also be exported.

Guyana is a transit country for heroin going north to the United States and to Europe, albeit on a smaller scale compared to other countries in the region. There is a growing market for the drug, which is linked closely to the cocaine trade and controlled mainly by Mexican and Italian organizations. Synthetic drugs such as Ecstasy and amphetamines are also transported through Guyana, and a local market is developing slowly.

## **CRIMINAL ACTORS**

Guyana's mafia-style organizations operate in both its legal and illegal economies, including the cocaine, heroin and arms trade, as well as construction. In both instances, criminal groups tend to have a low profile and keep the use of violence to a minimum, with some exceptions. Criminal networks focus primarily on cocaine trafficking. State actors at all levels facilitate the functioning of criminal markets and operate actively within them. Security officials regularly receive bribes or work within crime groups; highlevel state officials grant political favours in exchange for donations; and law-enforcement officials extort money from refugees and smugglers alike. Foreign actors – mainly from Mexico, Italy and Colombia – lead Guyana's main criminal economies (cocaine, fauna and arms trafficking) and interact with local gangs and state actors.



## RESILIENCE

### LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE

Trust in the political leadership and institutions of Guyana is low, with accusations of electoral fraud and government collusion with drug-trafficking organizations, as well as an apparent inability and unwillingness to carry out investigations. Guyana is believed to be the second most corrupt country in the region (after Haiti, one of the most corrupt states in the Western hemisphere), with law enforcement and the judiciary particularly affected. This widespread corruption, along with unenforced transparency laws, has created an environment in which crime organizations operate with ease.

Guyana has an array of laws that seek to tackle organized crime, at least nominally. The country is a signatory to a number of treaties aimed at fighting drugs, arms and people trafficking. It is also a participant in a range of international extradition and cooperation agreements. The country also adopted a national drug strategy, which sought to address among other things, supply and demand reduction as well as enhanced control measures and international cooperation. However, most of its national laws on organized crime require updating in order to facilitate effective prosecutions.

### **CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND SECURITY**

Guyana's judiciary suffers from a number of deficiencies, including a lack of independence and inadequate resources. There are accusations of the political appointment of highcourt judges. Corruption and a lack of resources are also common in law-enforcement institutions, and the prison system is overcrowded. These issues have a negative effect on the policing of Guyana's porous borders, which are highly attractive areas for criminal groups from countries including Suriname, Venezuela and Brazil. These groups also exploit Guyana's poorly monitored ports, remote airstrips and intricate river networks.

### ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ENVIRONMENT

Guyana has been assessed as having a high risk of money laundering. The proceeds of illegal activities are concealed in numerous ways – for example, large cash deposits are made for the so-called sale of non-existent precious minerals; compromised email accounts are used to commit wire-transfer fraud; and concealed precious metals are transported across Guyana's borders to avoid payment of the relevant taxes and duties. Unregulated currencyexchange houses, as well as dealers in precious metals and stones, also pose a risk to Guyana's financial system.

Guyana's authorities are trying to strengthen the country's capacity to tackle money laundering through training and

by signing agreements with relevant agencies. However, political uncertainty has had a negative impact on business and consumer confidence. Additionally, the lack of regulatory legislation in the country poses an obstacle to growth, despite the fact that newly found oil reserves are seen as a fresh source of potential revenue. Overall, doing business in Guyana is difficult as a result of the country's insolvency issues, cross-border trade, large informal sector and structural challenges.

## **CIVIL SOCIETY AND SOCIAL PROTECTION**

Guyana rates poorly when it comes to the protection of witnesses and victims, including survivors of slavery, gender-based violence and refugees. Its authorities run drug-prevention campaigns aimed at raising awareness in schools and communities, and a number of civil-society organizations offer rehabilitation programmes. Media freedom in Guyana is considered to be relatively good, although journalists, particularly those investigating organized crime, have reportedly been harassed, prosecuted, suspended and intimidated.

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