How to measure organized crime?
A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.
Read more on globalinitiative.netCriminal markets
4.40
An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.
Human trafficking
7.00
Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.
Human smuggling
5.50
Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.
Arms trafficking
6.50
The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.
Flora crimes
3.00
The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.
Fauna crimes
2.00
The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.
Non-renewable resource crimes
5.00
The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.
Heroin trade
4.00
The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.
Cocaine trade
2.00
The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cannabis trade
4.00
The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.
Synthetic drug trade
5.00
The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Criminal actors
5.75
An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.
Mafia-style groups
4.00
Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.
Criminal networks
5.00
Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.
State-embedded actors
9.00
Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.
Foreign actors
5.00
State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.
Political leadership and governance
3.50
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
2.00
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
3.00
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
4.00
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
3.00
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
5.00
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
4.50
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
4.50
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
5.00
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
3.00
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
5.00
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
3.00
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Political leadership and governance
3.50
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
2.00
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
3.00
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
4.00
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
3.00
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
5.00
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
4.50
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
4.50
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
5.00
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
3.00
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
5.00
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
3.00
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Belarus is a country of origin, transit point and destination for human trafficking. Traffickers exploit both Belarusian nationals and foreign victims domestically and abroad. Since 2011, most human trafficking violations have occurred domestically. Over the same period, the number of identified Belarusian human trafficking victims has decreased. Trafficking victims are primarily men who are subjected to labour exploitation in the Russian Federation. Meanwhile, Belarusian women who travel to work in the hotel or adult entertainment industries are subjected to sex trafficking. Human trafficking in Belarus appears to be carried out by a mix of individuals, mafia-style criminal groups, international criminal networks and state-embedded actors, such as low-level customs and border officials. There is a possibility that escort prostitution may increase due to limited work prospects and the introduction of simplified visa procedures from EU countries.
Belarus appears to be a source and transit country for illicit arms. The market is mainly structured around illegal arms stolen from former Soviet stockpiles, illicit flows from Ukraine distributed in Russia due to weak border controls, and/or illicit arms transported into the rest of Europe via Poland, in collaboration with Polish organized crime groups. There is also significant evidence of state facilitated arms trafficking into conflict zones or countries under sanctions. Additionally, the ongoing war in Ukraine remains a destabilizing factor in the proliferation of arms, with arms that are trafficked from Ukraine to Belarus usually crossing via the Chernihiv or Kyiv routes. Overall, the arms trade is a significant source of income for Belarus.
Flora crimes in Belarus are generally limited to cases of illegal logging that involve locals who need fuel. Perpetrators are often legitimate businesses that fell more trees than is legally allowed. Organized crime groups are present only to a limited extent. While there are no significant flows out of the country, if any market exists, it is of a small scale with Belarus serving as a source and transit country. Meanwhile, there are indications that Belarus acts as a transit for illegal wildlife trafficked from Poland to Russia, and possibly Ukraine. Experts have also speculated that animals may have been destined for medicinal markets in Asia.
In terms of non-renewable resource crimes, most are related to the illegal mining of sand and small-scale amber excavation. Irregular migrants carry out large-scale work, with possible links to human trafficking. Additionally, with a highly developed shadow economy and high rates of corruption, Minsk is said to be following the ‘amber fever’ in Ukraine, where government forces struggle to contain amber mafias. Similarly, coal from the Donbas is reportedly smuggled via the Russian Federation through Belarus and into the EU. Additionally, since the large-scale excavation of sand is labour-intensive and requires large machines, it is likely that groups involved possess equipment or are supported by companies owning the necessary machinery – indicating a mafia-style organization. Belarus has also been suspected, by Russian officials, of avoiding export duties on petroleum products by shipping them under different names.
Cannabis and synthetic drugs are the most common in Belarus. People growing cannabis for personal use dominate the country’s trade. Meanwhile, any transnational dimension appears to be limited, as local suppliers largely meet domestic demand. Synthetic drugs is the fastest-growing criminal market in Belarus. Local producers, consisting of smaller mafia-style groups, run the market, while larger transnational networks involving foreign producers retail the drugs online. There has been some success in locating stash houses, but authorities struggle to curb the trade.
*This indicator was first included in the 2023 iteration of the tool
*This indicator was first included in the 2023 iteration of the tool
The frequent recurrence of large-scale, high-level corruption cases involving officials suggests there is a significant connection between criminal markets and state actors. State-embedded actors are responsible for major losses from both national and municipal budgets. Additionally, it is likely that customs and border officials are involved in the trafficking of goods in the region, and the government has been accused of smuggling arms to conflict zones and controversial regimes. Diplomatic cables have also labelled Belarus as a quasi-mafia state, where distinguishing between state and organized crime activities has been impossible. There is a lack of current information on mafia-style groups in Belarus, as a number of former members of mafia-style groups have, since the 1990s, incrementally moved their activities into the legal realm and become public officials and business owners. While active mafia-style groups still exist in various criminal markets, it is likely that they are keeping a low profile due to the harsh punishment and extensive resources spent on policing.
There is evidence that criminal networks in Belarus are involved in drug distribution and trafficking but mostly locally, while activities involving arms and human trafficking networks, as well as those active in cybercrimes, are more international in nature. Connections have also been found between criminal networks and travel agencies to provide fake documents. Nevertheless, there is a lack of information as to the names and defined leadership of criminal networks in the country. Criminal networks in Belarus are closely related to Russian organized crime groups. There is also cooperation with criminal networks from neighbouring countries, as well as other states and regions that do not share borders. Overall, foreign actors are likely active across all criminal markets in Belarus, with most of these engaging in operations using ethnic ties.
Belarus is characterized as having an authoritarian regime, where despite technically having a democratic process, there is no separation of powers and the president has full executive control and significant legislative power. While there is no proof of direct involvement by the government in ‘classic’ organized crime activities, there is evidence of practices akin to financial scams. European neighbours, international organizations, and opposition groups have also raised concerns about corruption, violations of human rights, and undemocratic activities in Belarus since the 1990s. The government has introduced laws to combat corruption and declared the fight against corruption the most important priority of the state. At the same time, the government retains power to shut down any corruption-related publications or reports, based on a range of restrictions. Additionally, most political decisions and legislative bodies are controlled and influenced by the presidential administration with no transparency and there is a complete lack of accountability within the security agencies.
Belarus’s judicial system lacks independence and is under the strict control of the president, who appoints the majority of judges and has allegedly used the system as a tool to crack down on opponents. Since the 2020 post-election protests, there have been several reports of Belarusian security forces arbitrarily detaining thousands of people and systematically subjecting hundreds to torture and other ill-treatment within the detention system. In terms of law enforcement services, Belarus has a ministry of internal affairs, as well as various national bodies responsible for specific aspects of national law enforcement and different types of police, including the organized crime and corruption police. The police force in the country suffers from widespread corruption, inadequate training, resource shortages and poor working conditions. With regards to territorial integrity, Belarus is a transit country for various criminal markets given its geographic location. However, it has significantly strengthened the control of its western and southern borders because of the conflict in Ukraine and NATO's reinforced presence in the Baltic States and Poland. Meanwhile, its border with Russia remains vulnerable.
Belarus established the Department of Financial Monitoring in 2003 to prevent money laundering via specialized working groups. The department maintains information sharing agreements with 39 other states and claims to comply with international standards. Nevertheless, it is difficult to assess whether authorities efficiently address money laundering given the structure of the political system and corruption allegations. For the moment, the government has tight control of the economy, with its jurisdiction covering both market and non-market institutions, as well as the ability to influence economic outcomes.
The government has put in place prevention strategies that cover human trafficking, money laundering, terrorism financing, corruption and general crime prevention. Some effort has also been made to prevent drug-related crimes. However, most resources are spent on developing law enforcement efficiency and related investigative units. Additionally, victims of drug-related crimes are perceived as enemies of the public and receive limited support. The media environment is severely restricted, with censorship, threats and violence against critical journalists and bloggers being the norm in the country.
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The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to 10. The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel.
A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.
Read more on globalinitiative.net
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This report was funded in part by a grant from the United States Department of State.
ENACT is funded by the European Union and implemented by the Institute for Security Studies and INTERPOL, in affiliation with the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.
The opinions, findings and conclusions stated herein are those of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State.