How to measure organized crime?
A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.
Read more on globalinitiative.netCriminal markets
4.53-0.02
An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.
Human trafficking
4.000.00
Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.
Human smuggling
5.001.00
Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.
Extortion and protection racketeering
3.00 n/a
Crimes linked to exerting control over a territory/market including as a mediator and/or requesting a benefit in exchange for protection.
Arms trafficking
5.500.00
The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.
Trade in counterfeit goods
5.00 n/a
The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands.
Illicit trade in excisable goods
4.00 n/a
The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits.
Flora crimes
4.50-0.50
The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.
Fauna crimes
4.000.50
The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.
Non-renewable resource crimes
8.50-0.50
The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.
Heroin trade
1.500.00
The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.
Cocaine trade
8.500.00
The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cannabis trade
2.00-0.50
The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.
Synthetic drug trade
3.001.00
The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cyber-dependent crimes
5.00 n/a
Organized crimes that rely solely on using information communications technology with the aim of obtaining a monetary/material benefit.
Financial crimes
4.50 n/a
Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance.
Criminal actors
5.00-0.25
An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.
Mafia-style groups
3.000.50
Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.
Criminal networks
5.000.00
Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.
State-embedded actors
7.50-0.50
Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.
Foreign actors
5.500.00
State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.
Private sector actors
4.00 n/a
Profit-seeking individuals/entities who own/control a part of the legal economy free from the state, that collaborate with criminal actors.
Political leadership and governance
3.000.00
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
2.000.00
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
4.501.50
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
3.501.50
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
3.001.00
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
3.001.00
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
2.000.00
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
2.001.00
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
2.000.50
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
3.001.00
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
5.002.50
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
3.50-0.50
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Political leadership and governance
3.000.00
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
2.000.00
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
4.501.50
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
3.501.50
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
3.001.00
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
3.001.00
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
2.000.00
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
2.001.00
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
2.000.50
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
3.001.00
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
5.002.50
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
3.50-0.50
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Suriname serves as both a transit and destination point for human trafficking. Foreign women and girls are most vulnerable to sex trafficking, while men and boys are more susceptible to exploitation in agriculture, construction, coastal fishing boats and gold mines. There is an increasing influx of people from the Caribbean, Brazil, Haiti and Venezuela, who are at risk of falling victim to this crime. Child labour, especially in small-scale gold mines, is a particular concern in Suriname. Some children are trafficked to informal mining camps, where they are also subjected to commercial sexual exploitation. Human trafficking networks are believed to be international, working through local, small, mafia-style ethnic groups. Chinese- and Hong Kong-based groups are trafficking workers to Suriname for forced labour in gold mines and service-based professions.
Suriname is also both a transit and destination country for human smuggling, with weak immigration policies, gold and timber mining, and inadequate labour conditions contributing to the issue. Although human smuggling from China previously accounted for the largest numbers, there has been an increase in Haitian-smuggled individuals who find their way to Europe or the US via Suriname. The boom in Suriname’s construction sector, associated with Chinese investment, has largely faded, and many Chinese workers have left the country. However, the human smuggling market in Suriname may be larger than indicated due to the country’s remote and dense jungle regions, and due to limited government presence or oversight. Moreover, the human smuggling market is often intertwined with the human trafficking market, with undocumented individuals being more vulnerable to traffickers who promise employment. There are suggestions that officials facilitate criminal groups involved in human smuggling. There have been few cases of extortion related to organized crime.
Suriname is a hub for arms trafficking, with Brazilian mafias controlling the trade due to the large number of unregistered landing strips in the country. The continuous absence of armed conflicts, along with its strategic geographical location, makes it an ideal transit country. There have been reports of high-level authorities directly profiting from the arms trade and seeking to expand its operations. Arms smuggling is closely related to drug trafficking, and weapons from Venezuela often end up in Suriname through intermediaries involved in cocaine and gold trafficking.
Suriname is both a destination and transit country for counterfeit goods, including cosmetic products, shoes, car parts and foodstuffs. These goods are produced in China and resemble top brands. Cases of these products being sold in the market are underreported due to the lack of supervision. The presence of counterfeit products, including foodstuffs, is generally tolerated in the informal sector linked to the criminal market. Guyanese fishermen are also known to smuggle goods from Suriname into Guyana.
Suriname is both a destination and transit country for illicit trade of Paraguayan cigarettes, with some sold in the local market, but most smuggled to Brazil. Surinamese gangs are partly dedicated to this illicit market and are active between Suriname and the Brazilian states of Maranhão and Belem. Smuggling is a moderate problem in Suriname, with evidence of contraband of other products including alcoholic beverages. Brazilian schooners are a major transportation method for these goods, with little to no control of this activity at the borders.
Illegal activities related to wood harvesting in Suriname involve various violations, such as conducting logging operations outside of approved plans, underreporting of harvested volumes, inaccurate log measurements and unauthorized commercial felling of trees. This is a difficult issue to tackle as corruption and the vast expanse of rainforest in the country make it difficult to detect illegal cutting despite the use of technology. More than half of the country’s logging concessions are owned by Asian companies, but tribal communities living in the forests also contribute to these illegal activities, largely due to poverty. Illegal logging creates tensions between tribes and the government, particularly regarding the government’s unwillingness to grant indigenous tribes concessions. The market for illegal logging serves both a domestic and international supply, with China and India being the main customers.
Jaguar poaching is a prominent form of fauna crime in Suriname, with over half of the jaguars poached in South America being killed in the country. Factors contributing to jaguar trafficking include a lack of oversight by local authorities, tribal populations and local miners hunting jaguars on a ‘kill-to-order’ basis, and hunters from Brazil and Guyana crossing into Suriname for poaching. Criminal networks are not typically involved in jaguar trafficking; rather, this is attributed to individual hunters, illegal miners or loggers taking advantage of a potential buyer. Jaguar smuggling to China mainly occurs by air, but there is also evidence that jaguars have been smuggled by being hidden inside hardwood logs sent by ship. In addition to jaguars, there is also a European market for songbirds from Suriname, which is a lucrative trade.
Illegal gold mining and trafficking are rampant in Suriname, with the country serving as a transit point for gold from nearby countries. Nearly all of the jobs related to mining are in the informal sector, partly because the government accepts payments from informal actors running small-scale illegal mines or larger formal actors subcontracting artisanal miners. The involvement of larger international networks in illegal gold trafficking is likely to come from neighbouring countries, while local tribes are also known to participate. Mass gold shipments from Suriname to the UAE are being facilitated in a manner that is both lucrative and ideal for money laundering. Also, the movement of gold not necessarily mined in Suriname could make this market the highest-valued criminal market in Suriname.
Heroin is not a significant drug of choice in Suriname, and there is no evidence of heroin smuggling from Suriname to other countries. However, Suriname is a major transit country for cocaine destined for various regions, including Europe, Africa and the US. Drug-related violence is prevalent, although cocaine use in the country is low. Cargo containers are the primary mode of transport for most illicit drugs smuggled through Suriname, but cocaine is also smuggled through commercial and private flights, and human couriers. Weak border controls and a lack of infrastructure make it challenging to detect and interdict drug trafficking, and there is evidence that high-level officials in Suriname might be involved in drug trafficking.
Suriname is a destination for cannabis from French Guiana, as evidenced by seizures made by Guyana’s authorities at its border. Suriname is also a trans-shipment point for the smuggling of cannabis to Europe. In relation to local consumption, cannabis use is prevalent in mining areas, where it is grown by individuals and local communities. Although cannabis remains illegal in Suriname, police do not generally enforce regulations against its use in public places, and there are ongoing efforts to legalize it.
The synthetic drugs trade is still considered to be a small market in the country. However, Suriname appears to be a transit point for ecstasy produced in the Netherlands for destinations in the US, Brazil, the Dutch Antilles, Aruba and French Guiana. Despite this, due to its isolation and size, Suriname is not believed to be a particularly attractive trans-shipment point for larger volumes of these drugs or to offer any competitive advantage over other Caribbean locations for the global market.
Suriname’s national cyber-security framework is vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Authorities have issued warnings that hackers are testing systems to identify countries with weak cyber-security, with the aim of paralyzing them on a large scale. Although there is no consolidated criminal market for cyber-dependent crimes in Suriname, recent distributed denial-of-service and ransomware attacks on newspapers and public institutions have brought these crimes to the attention of the authorities. In response to the high alerts relating to malware, law enforcement is working with internet providers to enforce security measures by installing specific brand routers.
There are concerns about financial crimes in Suriname. Corruption is rampant in all aspects of the country, including its institutions, economic sectors, transactions between domestic and foreign businesses, and among citizens. Former high-ranking government officials are currently being investigated and prosecuted for financial crimes. Evidence indicates that most of these crimes were committed by public officials in collaboration with private companies and international enterprises. Some very high-level authorities have already been sentenced to prison for fraud, embezzlement, and violations of banking and anti-corruption laws, as well as other offences.
The presence of state-embedded actors in Suriname poses a risk, as demonstrated by the country’s vice-president, who had been convicted of drug trafficking in Europe before becoming an elected official. A former government’s involvement in financial crimes and the creation of a criminal organization have also been uncovered. The state’s control over the gold trade and corruption at all levels of government enable criminal gangs to work closely with the state. The close correlation between wealth and political influence suggests that criminal actors embedded within the state engage in excessive resource exploitation.
A new type of criminal network has emerged in Suriname, with this involved in the cocaine smuggling business. These groups are well-structured and organized in all stages of drug transportation to Europe via French Guiana. Additionally, other local groups are involved in the trafficking of illegal commodities, such as cigarettes, people and drugs. It is likely that they operate across the entire country and in neighbouring countries and are part of supply chains that involve operators of brothels and illegal mines. Girls are ‘invited’ to work for these operators in exchange for payment in gold. These criminal networks typically use a friend-to-friend approach or connections between smaller criminal groups, working as part of a larger supply chain.
Suriname has been identified as a major trans-shipment point for drug trafficking and money laundering, with criminal organizations from the Netherlands believed to have strong ties to organized crime in the country. While foreign actors are not thought to control any other criminal markets in Suriname beyond drug and human trafficking, the largely demobilized Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces and Brazilian criminal organizations are also believed to operate in the country. The Asian diaspora is the most prominent and fastest-growing foreign criminal group in Suriname, with some involved in fauna-related criminal markets.
Private sector actors are involved in various criminal markets in Suriname, including human smuggling and informal Chinese labour and flora crimes. Large multinational corporations pressure government officials for lenient regulations, allowing the illegal flora market to flourish. In the mining sector, formal companies subcontract artisanal miners, and gold shops do not ask for paperwork for what they are buying. Export companies have also been involved in the transport of cocaine abroad. There are no notably powerful or well-structured mafia-style groups dominating important areas of criminal activity in Suriname.
While the Surinamese government is likely to have prevented larger cartels and organized crime groups from establishing a foothold in the country, the current government remains untested in this regard, facing challenges such as entrenched state corruption, limited power and a vice president who is a convicted drug trafficker. Although the current government has taken steps to combat corruption and financial crimes, nepotism is common in the government, regardless of the party in power, and overall faith in the government remains low.
The new government of Suriname aims to establish new relationships with the US after the previous government’s close ties with Russia, China, Venezuela and Guatemala. Suriname became part of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption and has received international cooperation on the fight against the criminal drug markets. However, there is a lack of political will to implement different international accords, strengthen institutions, and update laws and regulations. In fact, Suriname’s legal framework is largely outdated, unenforced and weak, with most laws relating to organized crime not being updated in the past two decades. The involvement of politicians and influential persons within the government, as well as the lack of political will, further hinder the country’s efforts to amend legislation and strengthen institutions. Despite recent reform efforts which reflect a level of commitment to long-term structural reform, Suriname is still lagging behind in implementing legislative amendments and strengthening institutions.
Suriname’s judiciary system has made progress since the new government took office. There is greater autonomy, and an anti-corruption unit and a Judiciary Intervention Team have been established. However, the judiciary still faces challenges due to corruption and financial dependence on the executive branch. While the justice system has made some court decisions publicly available, progress is hindered by the lack of modernization and implementation, and the involvement of politicians and influential individuals in the government. The country’s prisons suffer from high rates of pre-trial incarceration and poor conditions, although they are not controlled by criminal organizations or gangs.
There is still evidence of corruption within the police force and other government offices, leading to international organizations expressing concern over the poor conditions of the Suriname Police. Police officers work below the poverty line, salaries have declined due to inflation, and there is no central network for police information. This lack of infrastructure may encourage corruption and hinder the fight against organized crime. Suriname also lacks a dedicated law enforcement unit to combat organized crime, and the Intelligence Unit’s ability to curb organized crime is severely hindered by a lack of resources, coordination, training and equipment.
Suriname’s borders are porous and virtually non-existent due to the thick jungle covering, making it almost impossible for under-resourced law enforcement to protect them. Indigenous peoples who travel by river between villages that cross countries, such as Guyana and Brazil, without identification create a significant loophole that criminals can exploit to transport their goods. Illegal crossings over the Corentyne River, which borders Guyana, are frequent, with corrupt law enforcement officials aiding the smuggling of food products. Gold is another commonly trafficked good from Guyana and French Guiana, and Chinese businesspeople can freely traffic goods into the Paramaribo seaport. Moreover, the thick vegetation provides a convenient cover from air reconnaissance, which is the only method by which these areas may be monitored due to the lack of infrastructure.
Suriname is facing substantial challenges related to money laundering, primarily associated with cocaine, gold and timber trafficking, as well as corruption. To address these issues, Suriname’s financial institutions are implementing controls for large cash deposits and proof of identity. The country’s Financial Intelligence Unit is also working to improve its financial skills with the support of the US. However, the discovery of oil resources in Suriname may create additional complications related to money laundering and corruption, as seen in other countries with similar resources. Gold mining in Suriname is also likely to attract transnational organized crime groups and some terrorist organizations, facilitating the flow of illicit funds and money laundering. Criminal groups are also setting up money laundering schemes through casinos and foreign exchange offices, highlighting the risks of increasing money laundering activities in Suriname.
Suriname’s economic regulatory environment is challenging, and it has poor protection of property rights. Corruption, personal contacts and lengthy licensing and business-launching procedures further undermine the rule of law, enabling organized crime. The lack of basic service delivery from the state, such as electricity and infrastructure, exacerbates the difficulties in the economic environment. Although new oil field discoveries have attracted foreign companies to invest in the sector, the system’s vulnerability to government influence and the country’s history of enriching those in power, along with their friends, make it easy for criminal groups with political connections to influence economic outcomes. The formal labour market is still being developed, making it difficult to find economic opportunities unless they involve mining concessions and natural resources. Additionally, the recent devaluation resulting from the Central Bank’s decision to implement a floating rate poses further challenges to the country’s economy.
The Surinamese government has made notable efforts to assist victims of human trafficking, despite the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The country has adopted a formal victim referral process, renovated a shelter for victims and published a new National Action Plan. However, the mechanisms identified to support victims in exiting modern slavery are still weak, and there are limited actions regarding victim support within the drug sector.
The Surinamese government has strategies in place to prevent crimes, including drug and human trafficking, money laundering and corruption. The country is part of regional initiatives on social crime prevention for at-risk youth. Although several initiatives for capacity building, prevention, monitoring and evaluation efforts are being conducted, none of these specifically target organized crime.
The country’s civil society is well-formed, with many groups and community organizations active across the country. Numerous NGOs are working on community and rural development issues, particularly in the underdeveloped interior. Additionally, environmental NGOs are taking action to reduce jaguar poaching, and reporting this illicit activity to the national authorities. Suriname highly values the freedom to inform, but a national defamation law that punishes journalists for expressing their views against the government is considered a great setback in this regard. Moreover, instances of press freedom violations in Suriname, such as assaults on journalists by security guards, have been reported.
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The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to 10. The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel.
A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.
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