The Organized Crime Index | ENACT
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Tuvalu
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    Profile

    Tuvalu

    Capital

    Funafuti

    Income group

    Upper middle income

    Population

    11,646

    Area

    30 km²

    Geography type

    Island

    1.54

    Criminality score

    193rd of 193 countries

    14th of 14 countries in Oceania

    3rd of 3 countries in Polynesia

    Criminal markets

    1.70

    An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.

    Human trafficking

    1.50

    Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.

    Human smuggling

    1.00

    Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.

    Arms trafficking

    1.00

    The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.

    Flora crimes

    1.00

    The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.

    Fauna crimes

    5.00

    The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.

    Non-renewable resource crimes

    1.00

    The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.

    Heroin trade

    1.00

    The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.

    Cocaine trade

    1.50

    The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.

    Cannabis trade

    2.50

    The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.

    Synthetic drug trade

    1.50

    The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.

    Criminal actors

    1.38

    An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.

    Mafia-style groups

    1.00

    Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.

    Criminal networks

    1.00

    Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.

    State-embedded actors

    1.50

    Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.

    Foreign actors

    2.00

    State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.

    6.04

    Resilience score

    37th of 193 countries

    3rd of 14 countries in Oceania

    1st of 3 countries in Polynesia

    Political leadership and governance

    5.50

    The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.

    Government transparency and accountability

    5.50

    The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.

    International cooperation

    5.00

    A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.

    National policies and laws

    6.50

    A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.

    Judicial system and detention

    8.00

    Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.

    Law enforcement

    7.00

    The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.

    Territorial integrity

    6.50

    The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.

    Anti-money laundering

    6.00

    A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.

    Economic regulatory capacity

    6.00

    The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.

    Victim and witness support

    4.50

    Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.

    Prevention

    5.00

    Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.

    Non-state actors

    7.00

    The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.

    6.04 1.38 1.70 6.04 1.38 1.70

    6.04

    Resilience score

    37th of 193 countries

    3rd of 14 countries in Oceania

    1st of 3 countries in Polynesia

    Political leadership and governance

    5.50

    The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.

    Government transparency and accountability

    5.50

    The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.

    International cooperation

    5.00

    A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.

    National policies and laws

    6.50

    A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.

    Judicial system and detention

    8.00

    Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.

    Law enforcement

    7.00

    The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.

    Territorial integrity

    6.50

    The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.

    Anti-money laundering

    6.00

    A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.

    Economic regulatory capacity

    6.00

    The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.

    Victim and witness support

    4.50

    Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.

    Prevention

    5.00

    Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.

    Non-state actors

    7.00

    The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.

    Analysis

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    People

    Aside from reports of the use of child labour in domestic contexts and in the fishing industry, and Tuvalu’s positioning halfway between Australia and Hawaii, which could render it a potential stopover on trafficking routes between those two countries, there is no evidence of organized criminal involvement in human trafficking within, to or from the country. Similarly, human smuggling is a relatively limited phenomenon in Tuvalu. As part of the Commonwealth, Tuvalu citizens enjoy a number of legal mobility opportunities and, although it is a poor country, there are few incentives to hire human smugglers.

    Trade

    There is no evidence of arms trafficking taking place in Tuvalu, largely because the country is neither strategically attractive nor economically permeable. Illicit firearms are not known to be in circulation in Tuvalu and the national police do not carry firearms.

    Environment

    Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing is the most pervasive environmental criminal market in Tuvalu, although the scale of the market is manageable. However, given the country’s heavy reliance on fishing revenues, IUU fishing might have a significant effect on Tuvalu if left unaddressed. In fact, less than 1% of Tuvalu’s exclusive economic zone is declared a marine protected area. Illicit trade pertaining to flora species or non-renewable resources, on the other hand, are virtually non-existent.

    Drugs

    The illicit markets for drugs appear limited in size. There is a steady and moderate demand for cannabis in Tuvalu but the supply of domestically grown cannabis is enough to feed this demand. Nevertheless, there is limited or no evidence to suggest any organized criminal involvement in any of the other drug markets in Tuvalu.

    Cyber Crimes

    *This indicator was first included in the 2023 iteration of the tool

    Financial Crimes

    *This indicator was first included in the 2023 iteration of the tool

    Criminal Actors

    With the exception of the illicit fauna trade, organized crime is negligible in Tuvalu and the presence of organized criminal groups is by extension almost non-existent. There are no mafia-style groups or loose criminal networks operating in the country. Similarly, there is limited evidence to suggest state-embedded actors exert influence on specific criminal markets. As the actor type monopolizing the largest criminal market in Tuvalu, albeit limited on a global comparison, foreign actors are most dominant in the country.

    Leadership and governance

    Tuvalu’s government has been relatively disengaged from anti-organized crime efforts, largely because organized crime is not considered among the primary challenges facing the country (unlike, for instance, the effect of climate change). Tuvalu is generally regarded as a free and well-functioning democracy with consolidated civil liberties and, while corruption is an issue, legal and institutional safeguards against it are generally fit for purpose. Additionally, there are regional agreements in place, to which Tuvalu is party, aiming to improve transparency and accountability in the fishing industry.

    As a member of the Commonwealth of Nations and as a partner to a number of regional and bilateral agreements with the US and Australia, Tuvalu has a positive record in terms of cooperation, information and intelligence sharing on issues such as anti-money laundering, human smuggling and IUU fishing. Tuvalu cooperates within the framework of a number of regional law-enforcement cooperation networks and has entered into shiprider agreement with Australia and the US. At the same time, Tuvalu has not yet signed, ratified or acceded to a number of treaties pertaining to organized crime, including the United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime or any of its protocols (though it has legislation reflecting obligations set out in these instruments). The country has, however, ratified the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty and acceded to the UN Convention against Corruption.

    Tuvalu’s national legislation is in place and adapted to the needs of the state. The country's legislation criminalizes several acts related to transnational organized crime. Piracy and maritime crime are criminalized by the Tuvalu Penal Code, while IUU fishing is criminalized with specially dedicated legislation. One remaining issue is that of child labour, which, while limited in scope, continues to be practised in the country.

    Criminal justice and security

    Tuvalu has an independent and effective judiciary, which respects due legal process. Tuvalu’s detention system (consisting of one jail on the Fongafale islet off Funafuti) hosts between eight and 12 inmates at any given time and is believed to be well resourced. There are no reports of abuse in detention centres.

    Tuvalu has no military force, but the national police force headquartered in Funafuti cooperates with neighbouring states to counter criminal networks and organizations on its territory. Tuvalu does not have a specific or designated transnational organized crime police or intelligence unit, apart from the Maritime Surveillance Unit of the police, which has been successful in monitoring IUU fishing. Given its status as an island and islet microstate, Tuvalu’s maritime borders are hard to monitor and police. Maritime borders are naturally porous, which is why the country relies on law-enforcement collaboration across the Pacific region. Overall, Tuvalu is able to defend its territorial integrity relatively well, given its limited resources.

    Economic and financial environment

    Tuvalu is economically dependent on external sources of revenue, such as remittance payments, foreign assistance, fishing licences, small-scale exports and resale of rights to international telephone codes to the gambling industry. Tuvalu’s GDP (gross domestic product) growth is one of the strongest in the region, but economic growth is concentrated in the capital of Funafuti, leaving prospects for private-sector development limited in many parts of the country.

    With regard to money laundering, Tuvalu's implementation of anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) standards has not yet been assessed by a mutual evaluation report. The country holds an observer to the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) but has not made any effort to join the ranks of full membership. Notwithstanding, the APG has welcomed Tuvalu’s overall efforts to strengthen its AML/CFT system, which most recently has included the establishment of a Transaction Tracking Unit (a financial intelligence unit).

    Civil society and social protection

    Tuvalu is not sufficiently equipped to support victims of crime. While on the one hand, there are laws covering the full range of violent crimes, including legal provisions giving victim compensation and the legal representation of victims, there are no adult protective victim services in place in Tuvalu. Tuvalu has been criticized for child-labour practices, and child protective victim services have only recently been established. Tuvalu has no action plans, national frameworks or other strategies in place for organized crime prevention. This, however, should be seen in the light of the country's low-crime rates and what appears to be the absence of organized crime groups of any significant size.

    Civil liberties and personal freedoms are generally respected in Tuvalu and the country has a relatively vibrant civil society active in areas such as good governance and transparency, conservation, public health and human rights. Journalists and media outlets enjoy a great deal of freedom and independence from intimidation, with no reports of restrictions imposed by political interests.

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    The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to 10. The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel.

    How to measure organized crime?

    A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.

    Read more on globalinitiative.net
    How to measure organized crime?

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    This report was funded in part by a grant from the United States Department of State.

    ENACT is funded by the European Union and implemented by the Institute for Security Studies and INTERPOL, in affiliation with the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.

    The opinions, findings and conclusions stated herein are those of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State.