How to measure organized crime?
A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.
Read more on globalinitiative.netCriminal markets
6.40
An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.
Human trafficking
6.50
Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.
Human smuggling
7.00
Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.
Arms trafficking
5.50
The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.
Flora crimes
6.50
The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.
Fauna crimes
8.00
The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.
Non-renewable resource crimes
6.00
The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.
Heroin trade
7.50
The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.
Cocaine trade
4.00
The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cannabis trade
5.00
The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.
Synthetic drug trade
8.00
The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Criminal actors
5.13
An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.
Mafia-style groups
1.50
Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.
Criminal networks
5.00
Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.
State-embedded actors
6.50
Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.
Foreign actors
7.50
State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.
Political leadership and governance
5.00
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
4.50
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
6.00
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
5.50
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
4.00
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
5.00
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
4.00
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
4.50
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
4.50
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
4.50
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
5.00
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
3.50
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Political leadership and governance
5.00
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
4.50
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
6.00
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
5.50
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
4.00
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
5.00
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
4.00
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
4.50
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
4.50
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
4.50
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
5.00
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
3.50
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Thailand is a source, transit and destination country for human trafficking in South-eastern Asia, primarily for the purposes of forced labour and sexual exploitation. The market is believed to be among the largest globally. Due to its relative economic prosperity in the region, Thailand attracts large numbers of irregular migrants from South-eastern Asia who are often vulnerable to human trafficking in industries such as agriculture, fishing, domestic work, sex work, construction, manufacturing and hospitality. Trafficking involves a range of actors, from local, opportunistic entrepreneurs to well-structured, large-scale criminal networks, as well as corrupt state-embedded officials who facilitate trafficking operations across borders. There are fears that the COVID-19 pandemic has fuelled cybersex trafficking of women and children.
Thailand is considered a transit hub for individuals smuggled from neighbouring countries in South-eastern Asia, as well as Southern Asia. Thailand’s human-smuggling market is believed to among the largest globally. Often individuals smuggled through Thailand rely on networks that offer cheap and fast routes to desired destinations. Corrupt state-embedded actors and private-sector employees also facilitate the country’s human-smuggling market by providing fraudulent travel and identification documents.
Thailand is believed to have a significant arms-trafficking market, specifically as a transit country for arms trafficked to Myanmar and as a transit and destination country for arms trafficked from Cambodia. Thailand is also increasingly becoming a source country for illegal arms, as evidenced by the online black market and smuggling operations in neighbouring countries. Market actors largely consist of individual entrepreneurs and middlemen, although some criminal networks are also involved. Additionally, Thai law-enforcement and military officials have also been arrested for selling arms to non-state officials.
Flora crimes provide one of the most valuable criminal markets in Thailand. More specifically, Thailand is a source and transit country for the trafficking of Siamese rosewood from its Dong Phayayen-Khao Yai Forest Complex and neighbouring countries to China. Rosewood loggers mostly come from across the Cambodian border, often with the assistance of Thai or Cambodian guides/brokers as well as the Cambodian army. Armed rosewood loggers frequently confront Thai rangers, sometimes with fatal consequences. Additionally, since a 1989 ban on logging of natural forests, more than half of Thailand’s wood demand is met from imports, including illegally sourced wood. Thailand is also a key source, transit and destination country for illegal wildlife trafficking in the South-eastern Asia region, particularly the trade of African and Asian rhino horn, tiger skins, elephant ivory and pangolins. In terms of value accrued, the country’s fauna crime market is among the largest in the world. The market involves domestic and transnational actors, and is also facilitated bycorrupt state-embedded officials. Like the flora crimes market, the wildlife market is also marred by violence, including instances of law-enforcement officers, environmental activists and park rangers being killed by poachers.
With regard to non-renewable-resource crimes, Thailand has been exploited as a transit and destination country for oil and fuel markets. It is also one of the primary destination markets for gems, many of which may have been trafficked from their countries of origin by transnational organized-crime trafficking networks. Additionally, the massive gold market in Thailand is very opaque, while having clear links to money-laundering schemes.
Thailand’s synthetic-drug market is believed to be among the largest globally, and of higher value than other criminal markets in the country. It is both a transit and destination country in the region; however, domestic production is allegedly on the rise. Seizures of synthetic drugs have reached record highs in recent years. Domestic and foreign criminal groups are believed to be involved in the market, with support from corrupt police and border officials. Thailand is considered primarily a transit country for heroin and, to a lesser extent, a destination country in the region. There are also small amounts of poppy cultivation in its northern provinces that border Myanmar and Laos. Most of the heroin is trafficked across the Thai–Myanmar border, before being transported elsewhere. There are regular shootouts between drug traffickers and Thai law-enforcement officials in northern Thailand. Corrupt officials are also known to facilitate the trade. Volumes of heroin seizures have been increasingly consistently over the past few years, and heroin consumption is on the rise, in particular among youth populations amid the COVID-19 pandemic.
Meanwhile, cocaine trafficking does not constitute a major criminal market in Thailand. However, there was a growing demand for the drug in the country due to its massive tourism industry, which was significantly diminished by the COVID-19 pandemic. Similarly, cannabis does not constitute a significant criminal market in Thailand. However, the legalization of cannabis for medical purposes in 2019 allegedly resulted in an increase of over illegal 130,000 cannabis users in the country.
*This indicator was first included in the 2023 iteration of the tool
*This indicator was first included in the 2023 iteration of the tool
Organized-crime groups are believed to exert significant influence over government officials in Thailand. As such, state-embedded corruption runs rampant in the country, with many officials at all levels of the state apparatus either directly or indirectly engaging in organized crime. In particular, there have been cases of corrupt government officials facilitating human trafficking through Thailand and state-embedded actors allowing organized criminals to significantly influence the country’s political elections. Loose criminal networks are believed to be involved in human smuggling, drug trafficking and other criminal operations in Thailand. They are particularly concentrated on the borders between Thailand and its neighbours. Criminal networks involved in drug-trafficking operations are not believed to perpetrate significant levels of violence against civilians, except for some conflicts among small drug-trafficking groups in the northern areas. Criminal networks who perpetrate a variety of online scams are also widespread throughout Thailand.
There is no evidence to suggest the existence of native Thai mafia-style groups. Rather, such groups operating in the country are linked to foreign actors from other Asian countries, as well as smaller groups from Europe. These foreign crime syndicates are involved in various criminal markets in Thailand, including drug trafficking, arms trafficking, human smuggling, wildlife trade, money laundering and cybercrime. Some foreign criminal groups are also believed to have significant influence over parliamentary elections.
Thailand’s political leaders have expressed a strong intention to combat organized crime, especially drug trafficking and human trafficking. However, reports indicate that only a small number of organized criminals face arrest and/or conviction in the country, in large part due to limited resources and rampant corruption among the authorities. Meanwhile, the government has established a commission to counter corruption; but it remains vulnerable to political interference and has only limited efficacy. Furthermore, ongoing conflicts within the country and the broader region have resulted in a flourishing arms market, increasing the fragility and vulnerability of the state. Additionally, there are high levels of mistrust in the Thai government, particularly since the 2014 coup. Currently, there are protests demanding more democratic reforms in the political system.
Thailand has ratified all international treaties related to organized crime, and takes part in the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species. It was also recently removed from the list of countries under observation due to illegal wildlife trade, after having become a global leader in the fight against ivory trafficking. The country is also involved in several international cooperation programmes aimed at tackling transnational organized crime. It has also called for greater regional cooperation to tackle drug trafficking. On a national level, Thailand has policies and laws addressing every criminal market. Thai law enforcement is also working to improve its capacity to combat organized crime operating on maritime routes. Despite this, the country continues to face rampant corruption among public officials and law-enforcement agencies, which has impeded its efforts against organized crime.
Thailand has lacked an independent judicial system since the 2014 coup, whenthe military junta scrapped the constitution, expanded censorship, detained several hundred activists, and announced that there would be no elections for a considerable period. Corruption also runs rampant throughout the judicial system, and public trust in it is low. Similarly, the law-enforcement system is viewed as one of the country’s most corrupt institutions. Despite specific laws to prevent organized crime and several specialized anti-trafficking officers, criminal markets such as drug trafficking and human trafficking remain at high levels. Additionally, slow reform in the police structure has contributed to a soaring crime rate, increased corruption and an overall lack of transparency. Furthermore, weak border-control measures and corruption among border official has made Thailand’s many land and sea borders vulnerable to traffickers and smugglers from neighbouring countries.
The Thai government has laws and a federal office dedicated to countering money-laundering and terrorism-financing crimes. However,the office allegedly lacks crucial resources and staff. The country also has a special unit for addressing illicit logging and wildlife crimes, which is also believed to be effective in addressing money-laundering issues. Meanwhile, institutionalized corruption, particularly in the judiciary, is believed to have had a negative impact on businesses in Thailand, with several cases and convictions in recent years revealing instances of extortion by organized criminal groups. Nevertheless, the country is perceived to have an economic regulatory environment that is highly conducive to doing business.
Thailand was one of the first countries in the region to implement a law protecting witnesses. Thailand also has a programme for assisting victims of human trafficking; however, it is accused of having serious limitations, in part due to the involvement of corrupt police officials. Meanwhile, the Thailand Institute of Justice has contributed to a new framework in crime prevention and supported in the shift towards development-led approaches to crime prevention and treatment of offenders. Additionally, the government has demonstrated efforts to increase the prosecution and conviction of human traffickers via the establishment of several anti-trafficking police units. As for non-state actors, they have limited power in Thailand due to the military’s severe restrictions on political and civil rights, which are presented under the guise of maintaining public order. Military and police forces have been used to curb the democracy-building activities of civil-society organizations since the 2014 coup. Similarly, freedom of press is limited in the country, with many journalists facing visa restrictions and self-censoring.
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The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to 10. The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel.
A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.
Read more on globalinitiative.net
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This report was funded in part by a grant from the United States Department of State.
ENACT is funded by the European Union and implemented by the Institute for Security Studies and INTERPOL, in affiliation with the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.
The opinions, findings and conclusions stated herein are those of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State.