How to measure organized crime?
A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.
Read more on globalinitiative.netCriminal markets
4.25
An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.
Human trafficking
4.50
Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.
Human smuggling
5.50
Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.
Arms trafficking
6.00
The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.
Flora crimes
2.00
The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.
Fauna crimes
3.50
The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.
Non-renewable resource crimes
2.00
The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.
Heroin trade
4.00
The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.
Cocaine trade
4.50
The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cannabis trade
5.00
The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.
Synthetic drug trade
5.50
The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Criminal actors
4.88
An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.
Mafia-style groups
5.50
Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.
Criminal networks
5.50
Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.
State-embedded actors
2.50
Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.
Foreign actors
6.00
State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.
Political leadership and governance
7.00
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
9.00
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
8.50
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
7.00
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
7.00
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
6.50
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
8.00
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
7.50
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
7.50
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
6.00
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
7.00
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
8.50
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Political leadership and governance
7.00
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
9.00
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
8.50
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
7.00
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
7.00
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
6.50
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
8.00
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
7.50
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
7.50
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
6.00
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
7.00
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
8.50
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Overall, the human trafficking market in Sweden is of limited scope and scale. However, there have been cases of forced prostitution, and individuals smuggled into Sweden have been exploited in sub-standard work conditions. Women from Eastern Europe - mainly from Romania, Ukraine and Russia - and West Africa are most vulnerable to sexual exploitation in Sweden. Although many of them are aware that they will work in the sex industry, they are misled over the actual conditions. Minors have also been victims of trafficking for sexual exploitation and forced to commit other crimes or engage in begging. Organised crime networks from Bulgaria and Romania operate in Sweden as well, trafficking people into the country and forcing them to beg. Victims of forced begging have increasingly been forced to commit other offences, such as assaults, car theft, fraud and labour or sexual exploitation. Labour exploitation also occurs in the berry-picking, hospitality and construction industries. Although more human-trafficking cases have been detected in Sweden in recent years, this is believed to be a result of increased investigation into human trafficking rather than an expansion of the market.
Human smuggling is a significant issue in Sweden’s political landscape. Sweden is a highly favoured destination for refugees and asylum seekers due to favourable family reunification policies, support for integration and a generous welfare state. While refugees and migrants are smuggled into Sweden, the number of such illicit entries has decreased since the peak of the European refugee crisis. However, smugglers residing in Sweden continue to provide a base for the human-smuggling market, often aided by the foreign diaspora in the country, formed over past decades. The growing presence of foreign diasporas in Sweden has also sparked an increase in chain migration through human smuggling. Fraud is also common in human smuggling. Organized crime groups who facilitate the market may pose as employers, thereby facilitating work permits that allow persons to be smuggled in.
Arms trafficking has contributed to an increase in violence in Sweden, and public shootings linked to criminal gangs have gone up in recent years. An escalation in firearms seizures and illegal gun possession also suggests the presence of an illicit arms trade, although increased funding for border patrol prorgammes also plays a part in the rising rates of seizures. Arms are trafficked into Sweden from the Western Balkans, mostly coming from military surpluses left from the conflicts in the Former Yugoslavia during the 1990s. Arms trafficking appears to be inextricably linked to drug trafficking. Smugglers traffic illegal arms into Sweden via passenger vehicles but there have been seizures of larger consignments, concealed in trucks as well. In addition, online purchases of weapon parts and modified guns have also gone up over the recent years.
Illicit logging is likely to occur in Sweden, but the degree to which organized crime groups engage in the market is either limited or non-existent. On the other hand, exotic timber and other rare plant species have been smuggled into Sweden, albeit on a limited scale. More importantly, however, there are allegations of Swedish companies failing in their due diligence and sourcing illegally harvested wood from the Ukraine. Wildlife crimes such as illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and poaching, and to a lesser extent wildlife trafficking, also occur in Sweden. Most wildlife crimes target protected species but concern violations that occur outside of designated hunting areas. The most prevalent wildlife crimes in Sweden include eel theft and the theft of eggs from protected bird species, such as rare owls. Wolf poaching also occurs, however, there is no evidence to support that organized crime groups are involved in it. In addition, great grey owls have been sold on the dark web. Exotic wildlife, wildlife parts and wildlife products such as tiger teeth, wolf pelts and crocodile skin are also trafficked into Sweden, and ivory demand is believed to be on the rise.
Sweden’s non-renewable-resource-crimes market is limited. However, oil profits are an important source of income for criminal groups in southern Sweden. Companies involved in oil-related crimes use legitimate businesses as fronts. Boat ownership has also been used as a cover to purchase untaxed oil products for resale. Illegal oil discharge also remains an issue in Sweden. A Swedish-owned company was accused of purchasing smuggled oil from the Balkans, as well as engaging in corruption to gain access to African petroleum markets. However, this is not believed to be a systemic issue.
Cannabis is the most commonly used drug in Sweden, and both marijuana and hashish seizures have increased in recent years. Cannabis cultivation is also on the rise, but for the most part, the drug is imported from continental Europe. Foreign actors control trafficking channels and once in the country, the product is broken up into smaller consignments and sold to smaller domestic groups for them to distribute. Although Sweden’s heroin trade was historically a major issue, it has significantly declined in recent years, largely due to increased law-enforcement efforts against heroin trafficking. The drug is imported from Afghanistan via the Balkan route but as mentioned, heroin is making way to synthetic opioids, including fentanyl, coming from China.
The country’s synthetic-drug trade, on the other hand, is rapidly expanding. Amphetamines are the second most-seized illicit drug in Sweden but Ecstasy/MDMA is also popular. There have been reports of small-scale production of amphetamines in the country, but synthetic drugs are for the most part smuggled from the Netherlands and Lithuania. Trafficking of precursor chemicals has been on the rise as well. Similar to cannabis, continental groups control trafficking and sell synthetic drugs to smaller domestic groups who handle the distribution. The use of anabolic steroids and other performance-enhancing drugs has declined, although anabolic steroid abuse runs rampant in criminal circles. Cocaine availability has also increased in recent years, although cocaine consumption is still relatively limited. The drug is for the most part smuggled in Sweden by road or train via the Oresund bridge that connects Copenhagen in Denmark with Malmo. Swedish ports are also vulnerable to shipments of cocaine.
*This indicator was first included in the 2023 iteration of the tool
*This indicator was first included in the 2023 iteration of the tool
Most organized crime groups in Sweden are dominated by foreign actors, primarily from the Balkans and the Middle East. They are involved in arms and drugs trafficking, as well as human trafficking and smuggling. Foreign criminal groups based predominantly in Eastern Europe also enter Sweden to conduct burglaries, and organized Roma criminal groups increasingly operate in the country. Sweden-based criminal groups rely on foreign cooperation, especially in transnational markets such as drug trafficking. Mafia-like structures also operate in the country. Motorcycle gangs, although not as prominent as during the 1990s, are still part of Sweden's illicit economy but have shifted their activities towards lower-risk ventures, such as financial crime. The most recognized mafia organization in the country is the Syriac mafia, based in the south of Stockholm. The group has smaller membership - 75 to 100 people - and is built on family ties and an ethno-religious identity. Smaller street gangs and other family-based groups also play a central role in Sweden's organized crime landscape today. The latter are poorly organized and lack a strong hierarchy and loyalty. Some of them, however, have sought to formalize and establish a stronger sense of belonging and identity. The main focus of these groups is drug distribution.
Criminal networks are also active in Sweden, with police estimates pointing to more than 200 active groups with around 5 000 members. Reportedly, these numbers are expected to only grow in the coming years. Loose networks operate in larger cities, but have started to move into rural areas and smaller cities as well. They have a strong propensity to violence, which has led to a heightened risk for security services. Thus, there are areas which the police cannot enter without special preparations and enhanced security presences. There is little evidence to suggest state-embedded actors play a role in organized crime. However, corrupt local officials in disadvantaged regions may engage in contract and permit irregularities. Occasional reports of corruption at central government institutions such as the Migration Agency have also occurred and are assumed to have links to organized crime, with the Syriac mafia reportedly managing to infiltrate certain government structures.
Sweden is among the least corrupt and most stable countries globally. State transparency and accountability is high, and the government has expressed genuine political will to combat organized crime. However, Swedish authorities have been slow to adapt to the emerging threat of organized crime. Although the government has recently implemented a 34-point programme against gang-related crime, an acute shortage of police officers hinders its efficacy. Moreover, Swedish police lack adequate resources to address low-priority crimes that contribute to the growth of organized crime. Sweden has also been somewhat reluctant to seek or receive aid from other states regarding organized-crime-related issues. However, the government’s willingness to cooperate seems to have increased in recent years, alongside an increase in gang shootings in Swedish cities.
Sweden also lacks organized-crime-related legislation that could adequately respond to current threats, although some trends, such as rising arms trafficking, have been recently addressed. Notably, membership in an organized-crime group is not a crime in Sweden, although association with terrorist groups was criminalized in March 2020. Moreover, there are no laws protecting the identities of witnesses, despite increasing rates of witness intimidation. Criminal sentences are also low by international standards, and individuals under the age of 15 cannot be charged with crimes, rendering Sweden an attractive location for organized criminals. Drug policies, on the other hand, are punitive, which has divided opinions in the country. However, the government’s 34-point programme against gang-related crime contains a number of proposals to empower law enforcement and longer-term crime prevention. Due to the light approach of the government to COVID-19 – it refrained from imposing lockdowns in the country – the pandemic is not believed to have had any noticeable, direct impact on organized crime in Sweden.
Sweden is in the process of strengthening its judicial capacity. As with the country's law-enforcement apparatus, the judiciary is understaffed and has been impacted by historically low exposure to organized crime. The government has also committed to increasing resources for the prison system. Overall, Sweden's judiciary is independent and free of corruption, despite a few high-profile incidents of organized criminals attempting to intimidate members of the judiciary. However, the COVID-19 pandemic has caused temporary delays in legal proceedings.
While largely viewed as incorruptible, Sweden's law-enforcement bodies are extremely understaffed. Nevertheless, there are structures in place focusing on organized crime. The centralization of police is also often perceived as problematic as this has led to lack of community policing and lack of police presence in neighbourhoods. Allegedly, this has been among the reasons which allowed street gangs to proliferate in socially deprived areas. Sweden's control of its borders is also relatively free from corruption, although free movement into the country as part of Schengen Agreement, as well as long borders relative to the size of the country’s population, render effective border control difficult..
Sweden is highly resilient to money laundering and terrorist financing. The Swedish parliament passed new anti-money-laundering legislation in January 2020, and a government committee has been appointed to further strengthen anti-money-laundering mechanisms by reviewing the capacity of the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority, information exchange between banks and government authorities, and the adequacy of government authorities, cooperation and delegation of responsibilities. There are, however, certain issues, such as the lack of a national AML/CFT coordination body, which in addition to Sweden being a financial centre in the Baltic region, makes it to some extent vulnerable to money laundering, tax and financial crime.
Organized crime does not serve as a serious impediment to doing business, although local businesses in disadvantaged regions have reportedly suffered to the consequences of organized crime. Extortion is also believed to be on the rise. High taxation, high regulatory burdens, and high general costs in the Swedish economy also provide significant incentives for criminals to cut corners at the expense of legitimate businesses. Nevertheless, Sweden’s economic regulatory environment remains highly conducive to doing business.
Victim support is not a central focus in Sweden. Sweden has serious shortcomings in treating drug abuse, and has one of the highest proportions of overdose deaths in Europe. Witnesses have also expressed increasing unwillingness to participate in criminal cases, suggesting shortcomings in witness-protection measures. However, enhanced witness-protection measures are under consideration as part of the government’s programme against gang-related crime. Moreover, the Swedish government has a fairly robust framework in place to provide support to human-trafficking victims. Sweden also has various crime-prevention strategies, although these have been criticized for being limited in relation to the scale of crime, and crime-prevention legislation remains less strict than in other states that have a longer history of dealing with organized crime. The government’s programme against gang-related crime also contains a number of proposals for crime-prevention reform.
Civil society in Sweden is free to operate unimpeded, although it does not yet play a very prominent role in crime-prevention efforts. In the wake of recent shootings, however, civil-society organizations have begun to play a more active role in reducing violence. Sweden’s media is among the freest worldwide, and law-enforcement officials actively combat attacks against journalists. Although many Swedish journalists face online harassment, resulting in self-censorship, this is believed to have declined in recent years.
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The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to 10. The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel.
A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.
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give us your feedbackThe opinions, findings and conclusions stated herein are those of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State.