How to measure organized crime?
A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.
Read more on globalinitiative.netCriminal markets
3.05
An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.
Human trafficking
4.00
Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.
Human smuggling
1.50
Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.
Arms trafficking
5.00
The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.
Flora crimes
2.00
The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.
Fauna crimes
1.00
The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.
Non-renewable resource crimes
1.00
The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.
Heroin trade
1.00
The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.
Cocaine trade
7.00
The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cannabis trade
7.00
The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.
Synthetic drug trade
1.00
The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Criminal actors
5.13
An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.
Mafia-style groups
5.00
Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.
Criminal networks
4.00
Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.
State-embedded actors
5.50
Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.
Foreign actors
6.00
State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.
Political leadership and governance
7.50
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
6.50
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
6.50
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
6.50
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
6.00
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
4.50
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
5.50
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
4.00
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
5.50
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
5.00
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
6.00
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
4.00
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Political leadership and governance
7.50
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
6.50
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
6.50
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
6.50
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
6.00
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
4.50
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
5.50
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
4.00
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
5.50
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
5.00
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
6.00
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
4.00
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
St. Lucia is affected by human trafficking, but the market continues to be small scale and primarily part of the sex worker industry. Nevertheless, it often sees people being forced into sexual and labour exploitation. Victims are both St. Lucia nationals as well as regular and irregular migrants from other Caribbean nations (Haiti, Jamaica and the Dominican Republic) as well as Guyana and South Asia. In addition, foreign women working in strip clubs are vulnerable to sex trafficking. Local children, especially those of economically disadvantaged families, are particularly vulnerable to victimization in sex trafficking. They are often encouraged or forced by parents and caretakers to enter exploitation. Reportedly, women or older teenagers are active in recruiting younger adolescents and the perpetrators are often entrepreneurs from St. Lucia, India, China, Cuba and Russia.
Given that it is accepted that sex workers travel to St. Lucia from poorer neighbouring island and other regions, there may be an element of smuggling, albeit on a small scale.
St. Lucia's proximity to Martinique ensures that strong illicit trade routes are established between the two. These routes are well documented as part of the cocaine trade and suspected as facilitating arms trafficking as well. Allegedly, Venezuelan drug networks smuggle firearms into St. Lucia along with cocaine. The weapons are then used by local crime groups to secure their drug stockpiles. Alternatively, illegal arms shipments coming into St. Lucia from the US are exported to Martinique for onward transportation to mainland France.
While an illicit market for orchids that are exported to France does exist, it does not appear to be a significant one. Similarly, there are indications to suggest that either fauna or non-renewable resources crimes markets exist in St. Lucia.
There is no evidence to suggest that an illicit heroin market exists, as there are no reported cases of heroin use or instances of seized heroin shipments coming into or through St. Lucia. The country is a key Caribbean transit hub for cocaine shipments bound mainly for the US, Europe or Canada. Crucial to St. Lucia's role in the cocaine trade is its proximity to Martinique (France), which has drawn Venezuelan crime groups. The latter usually deliver cocaine via fishing boats and offload the drugs at sea off the west coast of St. Lucia. Other groups may prefer offshore airdrops, but in both cases, local traffickers collect the goods in small boats and stockpile them along the island's coastline. Such shipments have recently decreased in frequency, but increased in quantity. Subsequently, cocaine is trafficked to Martinique or loaded on yachts destined directly for Europe. Notably, since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, Venezuelan cocaine traffickers have favoured St. Vincent and the Grenadines, displacing cocaine flows to these locations, likely in an effort to avoid interception. This is expected to be temporary throughout the pandemic. Cocaine is consumed locally, but its prevalence is not large and is arguably a by-product of cocaine transiting through the country, as is violence and murder.
Cannabis is produced and consumed on the island and is therefore a highly prevalent narcotic. In addition, cannabis smuggled from St. Vincent and the Grenadines on fishing vessels or inter-island freight vessels moves through St. Lucian territorial waters as well. With a third of the homicides in the country being drug-related, it is likely that the cannabis market contributes to that at least in part. Reports have noted sporadic seizures of Ecstasy coming from the UK in St. Lucia, but domestic use is likely very limited.
*This indicator was first included in the 2023 iteration of the tool
*This indicator was first included in the 2023 iteration of the tool
Mafia-style groups appear to be the most prevalent criminal actor type in St. Lucia. While international traffickers control drug routes, local gangs often provide services such as security and transport, for which they are paid in cash, arms or drugs. The latter feed domestic demand and contribute to increasing competition between different entities, which leads to violence, including homicide. Besides drug distribution, gangs are involved in robberies and extortion, and operate primarily in Castries, Gros Islet and Vieux Fort. Less organized gangs resembling criminal networks also feature heavily in the country. Similar to mafia-style structures in St. Lucia, criminal networks also engage in the drug trade, providing assistance to foreign traffickers.
Although there are strong indications that corrupt officials facilitate criminal operations (including, for example some customs officers at the Castries port allegedly facilitating the import of cocaine and firearms on a semi-regular basis), there is no evidence of state-embedded actors working with crime organizations. St. Lucia is a transit country for drug trafficking, and as already emphasized, foreign actors control the drug routes, but collaborate with local criminal networks.
The government holds a firm stance on serious crime, evident in the country’s development plan, spanning 2019–2022 as well as in the anti-gang legislation, passed in 2014. The democratic process is independent and protected from criminal influence, although corruption and inadequate transparency are recognized as problematic. International observers report corruption perceptions in St. Lucia to be low to moderate, in spite of allegations of corruption against some high-profile political figures in the country. Several national bodies are tasked with anti-corruption, however, they are somewhat constrained due to inadequate funding.
St. Lucia is party to a number of international treaties and conventions pertaining to organized crime and corruption. The country cooperates effectively with partners, albeit mainly on areas related to drug trafficking, including through membership in the Regional Security System. St. Lucia has a fairly strong and up-to-date legal framework, influenced by the UK legal system. St. Lucia’s legislation focuses mostly on drug trafficking and gang-related activity, but although there are anti-corruption laws in place, the latter are rarely enforced.
The judiciary is generally independent and corruption in the judicial system has not been identified as a major obstacle. The right to a fair trial in St. Lucia is also guaranteed but the legal system is notorious for its slow delivery of justice, which results in a growing backlog of cases and long stays of pre-trial detention. The prison system is also under pressure, with overcrowding reportedly being an issue. In spite of some instances of guards abusing inmates, the country's only prison meets international prison standards. The Royal St. Lucia Police Force (RSLPF) is the main agency responsible for maintaining law and order in the country. The force, unlike St. Lucia's customs, enjoys high levels of public trust, although police brutality and excessive use of force have damaged its reputation in recent years. Additionally, reports of a degree of political influence over law enforcement also persist. There are two specialized units within the RSLPF – the Drug Squad and the Marine Unit, which, along with Customs and Ports Police are responsible for curbing trafficking flows to and through St. Lucia. Allegedly, however, law enforcement agencies were under-resourced and lacked enough officers to keep up with the caseload. Additionally, the country faces the threat of porous borders and lack of intelligence, which prove to be the main issues related to the country's territorial integrity. St. Lucia's vulnerability to trafficking flows is all the more apparent in the country's proximity to Martinique – a direct path for drugs to Europe.
St. Lucia is for the most part in technical compliance with international anti-money laundering (AML) standards. The country has also made some progress in strengthening its AML regime and has an operational financial intelligence unit that is responsible for money laundering prevention. Nevertheless, the risk of money laundering is present. Money laundering that takes place in the country is mostly related to the drugs trade and the profits generated by domestic and foreign criminals. It is also alleged that financial institutions in the country are inadvertently involved in currency transactions that move proceeds from the international drug trade. St. Lucia has in place adequate policies and laws to promote fair competition, while setting a clear framework for both foreign and domestic investors. Thus, the economic regulatory environment is conducive to doing business, which is why St. Lucia has managed to draw foreign direct investment in a number of economic sectors, including offshore banking, transhipment and tourism.
There is no official register, operating standards or monitoring system for specialized facilities that provide treatment services for people with problems associated with drug use. Drug-related issues are addressed by the country's primary health care facilities. Support mechanisms for victims of trafficking are not well established either. There is no government shelter to provide assistance to victims, but NGOs shelter victims when need arises. Conversely, the country's anti-human trafficking legislation provides for victim protection when testifying against traffickers. The country also has a dedicated police unit – the Vulnerable Persons Unit (or Vulnerable Persons Teams), which deals with cases related to domestic violence. Prevention efforts, on the other hand, have been stepped up in recent years. A task force comprised of NGOs and relevant agencies was established and mandated to work on capacity building and awareness raising, particularly targeting vulnerable age groups. Civil society is also involved in interruption work with gang leaders in hotspots, working as intermediaries to reduce retaliation and use of violence. Reportedly, while labour laws are comprehensive enough, enforcing them is an issue, with few trained labour inspectors available to monitor the different sectors. Reportedly, no steps were taken on the part of authorities to reduce the demand for commercial sex. Drug abuse prevention programmes have also been undertaken by the government, targeting key populations. In addition, authorities have offered training on drug abuse prevention, treatment and research to police officers, counsellors, prison guards and other professionals. In general, however, NGO involvement in issues pertaining to organized crime is rather limited. NGOs that focus on crime-related issues tend to work mostly on drug-related issues. Freedom of the press is guaranteed by law and upheld in practice. Nevertheless, criminal libel laws are in effect and at times used against journalists.
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The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to 10. The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel.
A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.
Read more on globalinitiative.net
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This report was funded in part by a grant from the United States Department of State.
ENACT is funded by the European Union and implemented by the Institute for Security Studies and INTERPOL, in affiliation with the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.
The opinions, findings and conclusions stated herein are those of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State.