The Organized Crime Index | ENACT
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Somalia
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    Profile

    Somalia

    Capital

    Mogadishu

    Income group

    Low income

    Population

    15,442,905

    Area

    637,660 km²

    Geography type

    Coastal

    5.79

    Criminality score

    54th of 193 countries

    18th of 54 countries in Africa

    6th of 9 countries in East Africa

    Criminal markets

    4.45

    An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.

    Human trafficking

    8.00

    Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.

    Human smuggling

    7.50

    Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.

    Arms trafficking

    8.50

    The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.

    Flora crimes

    6.00

    The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.

    Fauna crimes

    4.50

    The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.

    Non-renewable resource crimes

    2.00

    The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.

    Heroin trade

    2.00

    The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.

    Cocaine trade

    2.00

    The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.

    Cannabis trade

    2.00

    The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.

    Synthetic drug trade

    2.00

    The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.

    Criminal actors

    7.13

    An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.

    Mafia-style groups

    9.50

    Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.

    Criminal networks

    7.50

    Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.

    State-embedded actors

    7.00

    Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.

    Foreign actors

    4.50

    State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.

    1.67

    Resilience score

    192nd of 193 countries

    53rd of 54 countries in Africa

    9th of 9 countries in East Africa

    Political leadership and governance

    1.00

    The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.

    Government transparency and accountability

    1.00

    The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.

    International cooperation

    2.00

    A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.

    National policies and laws

    2.00

    A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.

    Judicial system and detention

    2.00

    Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.

    Law enforcement

    1.50

    The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.

    Territorial integrity

    1.50

    The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.

    Anti-money laundering

    2.50

    A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.

    Economic regulatory capacity

    1.50

    The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.

    Victim and witness support

    1.00

    Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.

    Prevention

    1.50

    Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.

    Non-state actors

    2.50

    The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.

    1.67 7.13 4.45 1.67 7.13 4.45

    1.67

    Resilience score

    192nd of 193 countries

    53rd of 54 countries in Africa

    9th of 9 countries in East Africa

    Political leadership and governance

    1.00

    The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.

    Government transparency and accountability

    1.00

    The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.

    International cooperation

    2.00

    A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.

    National policies and laws

    2.00

    A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.

    Judicial system and detention

    2.00

    Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.

    Law enforcement

    1.50

    The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.

    Territorial integrity

    1.50

    The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.

    Anti-money laundering

    2.50

    A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.

    Economic regulatory capacity

    1.50

    The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.

    Victim and witness support

    1.00

    Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.

    Prevention

    1.50

    Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.

    Non-state actors

    2.50

    The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.

    Analysis

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    People

    Human trafficking is a significant and growing area of concern in Somalia, with children, women and men being forced into sexual exploitation and labour. Most victims come from south-central Somalia, and are destined mainly for Europe, the Gulf states and Southern African states. Ethiopians transiting Somalia are also vulnerable to victimization. It is common for women in the country to act as recruiters and intermediaries. Al-Shabaab also participates in these practices, particularly to recruit child soldiers, as well as engaging in sexual slavery and forced marriage.

    Given the decades of conflict in Somalia, human smuggling is a well-entrenched practice, with little resistance from the state. On the contrary, smuggling rings have a long reach and often collude with authorities. Human smuggling is thus considered a viable source of income for Somali citizens, especially those living in the northern part of the country. It is primarily a source country for human smuggling, with many people smuggled across East Africa to Libya, and on towards Europe, as well as a major transit hub for the smuggling of Ethiopian migrants. Pirates often act as smugglers for people moving across the Gulf of Aden to Yemen. Due to regional threats and the current humanitarian situation in Yemen, many Somali expats are also seeking to return home. Although being a less violent market, the COVID-19 pandemic has reduced the influx of migrants, which has caused clans to clash.

    Trade

    Due to armed violence and political instability since the early 1990s, a significant number of illegal weapons are available in Somalia, ranging from pistols to machine guns and explosive devices, and are commonly trafficked by clan militias, al-Shabaab, governmental groups, and transnational trafficking networks based in the north, particularly Puntland and eastern Somaliland. Criminal groups also receive weapons from local security forces. Overall, arms trafficking in Somalia is endemic and only seems to be growing.

    Environment

    Despite a 2012 ban on charcoal exports from Somalia, the commodity is still consistently smuggled out of the country. The cutting of trees for the illicit charcoal trade has contributed to deforestation and land degradation, which further exacerbates the problems of food insecurity and cyclical drought. Additionally, charcoal and other timber products may be taxed by criminal syndicates at certain border crossings, which may contribute to terrorism financing in an indirect way. In regard to fauna crimes, there are reports of ivory and rhino-horn smuggling in the country. Somalia is also a hub for the illegal cheetah trade, with animals arriving from Ethiopia destined for Saudi Arabia or the UAE. Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing is also prevalent. Furthermore, there is evidence of considerable corruption related to the issuance of prospecting and mining rights and concessions, particularly in the hydrocarbon exploration industry.

    Drugs

    The domestic heroin market is non-existent in Somalia but heroin shipments reportedly pass through Somali territorial waters. Similarly, there is no evidence of high-volume trafficking of cocaine, cannabis, or synthetic drugs. This is in large part because neighbouring states have far more stable security environments and networks that are easily co-opted. Moreover, the threat of al-Shabaab executing any drug traffickers remains.

    Cyber Crimes

    *This indicator was first included in the 2023 iteration of the tool

    Financial Crimes

    *This indicator was first included in the 2023 iteration of the tool

    Criminal Actors

    In Somalia, al-Shabaab operates under the ranks of a transnational crime syndicate, and is sponsored through engaging in a number of criminal activities, including extortion and racketeering as well as trafficking. In particular, al-Shabaab employs mafia-style tactics of violence and intimidation to collect taxes on various goods. Many other militant actors function on Somalia’s territory, ranging from warlord and clan militias to different militant groups. Moreover, criminal networks operating in Somalia, frequently work with al-Shabaab. Criminal entrepreneurs appear to be the primary drivers of criminal networks in the country, with a number of prominent and internationally connected figures taking the foreground. They control ethnic or clan-based networks that coordinate to smuggle commodities to East African and Gulf countries. Pirate networks have more fluid structures and two major groups can be identified – one operating in the north-eastern part of the country, in Puntland, and the other one controlling central Somalia. They tend to share personnel, resources, territory and most importantly, profits.

    The resources controlled by the government in Somalia are minimal due to the state’s weakness. At the same time, corruption is widespread. Evidence shows that state officials and government authorities are also involved in organized criminal activities, specifically in taxing flows or gatekeeping illegal activities in return for bribes. As for foreign actors, North and East African traffickers tend to control many trafficking networks in Somalia. Horn of Africa foreign entrepreneurs and business interests in Somalia often employ techniques that skirt legality. Qatar and the UAE have influenced Somali electoral processes through dark money and bribery. A high number of foreign fighters have also joined al-Shabaab. Lastly, the sustainability of Somalia’s fisheries is under threat by the presence of foreign fishing vessels, many of which operate illegally.

    Leadership and governance

    Somalia is a fragmented country and is characterized by internal tension, violent extremism, extensive displacements, and weak governance. After decades of conflict, there is still no formal legitimate authority in place that has complete control over the entire territory. The lack of functioning state institutions has led to scant interest in developing or promoting political and economic processes that could lead to peace and stability. Al-Shabaab continues to function largely undisturbed and launches strikes targeting both military and civil targets in the country.

    At an international level, Somalia has ratified three of the 10 relevant international treaties on organized crime. Notably, the country has ratified the protocol on the involvement of children in armed conflict, the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and the Convention on Narcotic Drugs. Gulf countries and especially the UAE have strengthened their political and military support for Somalia. Most NGOs and all UN agencies are banned from territories that are controlled by al-Shabaab. On the domestic level, while Somalia has several laws related to organized crime, it is the worst performing country in the world when its come to rule of law. Somalia's penal code has not been updated since 1964. Currently, there is no legislation that explicitly criminalizes sex trafficking and forced labour.

    Criminal justice and security

    Somalia’s federal judiciary has become increasingly active and includes a unit tasked with prosecuting terrorism offences, as well as financial and economic crimes. The country also has local courts that work with a combination of traditional and Islamic law. Nevertheless, access to justice is low and the formal justice system faces challenges and criticism. Military courts are still used throughout Somalia to try civilians, primarily suspected members of al-Shabaab and Islamic State. This fragmentation and contestation, coupled with long-standing corruption and impunity, ensures that there is little public credibility in the overarching rule of law. Currently, there is no functioning judicial system in Somalia capable of prosecuting organized crime. Moreover, Somalia has a weak police force that has been receiving sustained technical assistance, capacity building, strategic support, and equipment from different UN Agencies. In addition, the government accepts bilateral support for its policing and security. Overall, the penetration and legitimacy of the Somali national police is limited to the communities in which it serves, and professionalism and integrity of individual police officers is similarly restricted. In regard to territorial integrity, the government controls an extremely minor part of the territory and its influence varies among the semi-autonomous regions. The country's significant coastline and land borders are porous and smuggling activities are common.

    Economic and financial environment

    The popularity of private sector mobile money transfer operators has contributed to the weakening of the Central Bank of Somalia. In addition, robust informal money systems, known as hawala, serve the vast Somali diaspora, and allow transactions to flow across borders without surveillance. Money transfer operators have no real anti-money laundering infrastructure, which means most transactions fall outside of the formal financial system’s capacity to regulate. Al-Shabaab routinely uses domestic financial institutions, including commercial banks and mobile money services, to collect, store and distribute revenue, also using mobile money to make salary payments to its soldiers and officials. The government relies on the international community to play an active role in clarifying counterterrorism and anti-money laundering regulations to financial institutions, though this means that attention is more often focused on narrow Combating the Financing of Terrorism concerns rather than combating illicit financial flows related to criminal acts. In general, the commercial sector, as well as public procurement, international aid and concessions in the country are based on patronage networks and tight monopolies that dominate the market.

    Civil society and social protection

    Most of Somalia’s population live in a situation of almost permanent food insecurity. The central state essentially has no capacity to provide basic services, and is reliant on the provision of food, shelter and medical supplies from the international community. International assistance is taxed by al-Shabaab, and the distribution of aid is politicized to reinforce local power. Meanwhile, the government has introduced several national and international policies that aim to prevent transnational organized crime. Somalia also has low-level and high-level defector programmes, aimed at bringing and keeping individuals out of al-Shabaab. However, these have been extensively infiltrated by al-Shabaab and are generally considered to be ineffective. In regard to the media, Somalia ranks among the most dangerous countries for journalists in the world. Journalists who express themselves freely are potential targets of al-Shabaab militants or are exposed to arbitrary detention and torture. At the same time, social engagement and civil society are active in Somalia, and have played an important role in providing local services and peace building.

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    The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to 10. The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel.

    How to measure organized crime?

    A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.

    Read more on globalinitiative.net
    How to measure organized crime?

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    This report was funded in part by a grant from the United States Department of State.

    ENACT is funded by the European Union and implemented by the Institute for Security Studies and INTERPOL, in affiliation with the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.

    The opinions, findings and conclusions stated herein are those of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State.