How to measure organized crime?
A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.
Read more on globalinitiative.netCriminal markets
7.05
An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.
Human trafficking
7.50
Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.
Human smuggling
6.00
Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.
Arms trafficking
8.00
The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.
Flora crimes
6.00
The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.
Fauna crimes
6.50
The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.
Non-renewable resource crimes
8.00
The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.
Heroin trade
6.00
The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.
Cocaine trade
6.50
The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cannabis trade
8.00
The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.
Synthetic drug trade
8.00
The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Criminal actors
7.25
An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.
Mafia-style groups
5.50
Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.
Criminal networks
9.00
Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.
State-embedded actors
7.50
Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.
Foreign actors
7.00
State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.
Political leadership and governance
5.50
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
5.00
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
7.00
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
7.00
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
4.50
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
4.50
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
4.50
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
5.00
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
6.50
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
5.00
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
5.00
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
6.50
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Political leadership and governance
5.50
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
5.00
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
7.00
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
7.00
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
4.50
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
4.50
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
4.50
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
5.00
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
6.50
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
5.00
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
5.00
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
6.50
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Nigerian human trafficking networks are infamous, primarily those engaged in sex trafficking and domestic exploitation, operating in West Africa and Europe. Nigerian networks also engage in labour trafficking, particularly of children who are exploited in domestic servitude, street vending, mining and farming all across West Africa. Other forms of human trafficking in Nigeria include increasingly prevalent ‘baby factories’, the recruitment of women and girls for prostitution and widespread forced domestic servitude. Hausa networks operating in the north are involved in transnational sexual and labour trafficking to Arab countries, particularly Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, the military has been known to informally recruit underage boys as vigilantes, a practice also common among non-state armed groups using child soldiers.
Human smuggling is less pervasive than trafficking, as free movement under the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) protocol has moderated the need for intra-regional smuggling. Historically, Nigeria has had high and sophisticated levels of migration, facilitated by the large diaspora communities. The market contributes to widespread corruption which enables the procurement of fake travel documents, and the country is a major hub for full-package style smuggling, serving the wider region. Nigerian smuggling networks connect people to Europe via Niger, and numerous smugglers operate from Lagos and Benin City.
Nigeria’s location, as well as its particularly porous northern and eastern borders, and access to the ocean in the south, has made it an ideal transit point for the trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW). Imports from Turkey and Iran have been recorded, and Boko Haram terrorism, armed movements, piracy and banditry have sustained demand. Nigeria has experienced widespread insecurity resulting from banditry, kidnapping, robbery and oil-related violence, often perpetrated using heavy weapons. Many weapons are legitimately procured but diverted into the illicit market from national stockpiles. It is also common for security forces to sell or rent their weapons. Furthermore, since 2011 there has been increased circulation of Libyan stockpiles across the region.
Nigeria has become a major transit hub for wildlife trafficking, particularly for Central African ivory and pangolin scales as well as for donkey hides destined for Vietnam and China, the primary markets for wildlife products. Local fauna has been widely destroyed due to the trade, which affects Nigeria’s populations of endangered species, including West African lions, Cross River gorillas, Cameroonian forest shrews and the white-throated and red-eared guenons. Fish stocks have also diminished due to water pollution, overfishing and illegal fishing, making Nigeria one of the largest global importers. There are allegation of local fishing nets being purposefully cut by foreign vessels who take the catch and load it for direct transportation to Europe or Asia, bypassing inspections. With regard to flora crimes, the illegal logging of rosewood in Cross River State is particularly prominent. The fall of crude oil prices coincided with a sudden growth in wood exports, and most wood export revenue is now generated illegally. The trade in rosewood, known locally as kosso, may have benefited Boko Haram, and a significant amount has been seized by Chinese customs officials. Since then, the trade has declined drastically due to depleted stock.
Illegal oil bunkering is a problem in Nigeria, with oil stolen directly from pipelines, predominantly in the Niger Delta region, processed through artisanal refineries and then sold locally or smuggled abroad to China, North Korea, Israel and South Africa, among others. Bunkering operations are professional, and have access to arms and ties to foreign criminal actors who have the means to transport crude oil to refineries in Cameroon, Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, before moving it to destination markets. Illegal oil bunkering, as well as piracy and armed robbery at sea, are therefore serious concerns. Additionally, some small-scale illicit gold mining occurs in Nigeria, with local populations vulnerable to exploitation and co-option by Islamist groups.
Nigeria is an important transit, source and destination market for illicit drugs. Afghan heroin is moved through Nigeria en route to Europe, with domestic networks collaborating with Afghani and Pakistani drug cartels for trafficking and distribution. Aided by corruption, these networks also facilitate the sea transport of heroin directly to Europe, the United States and the Middle East. The domestic heroin market has not grown, due in part to high use of synthetic drugs among the youth, typically very cheap codeine-based cough syrups. The proliferation of psychotropic substances, especially tramadol, amphetamine and codeine, is on the rise, with the port of Lagos serving as a large transit hub for tramadol shipments from Benin and India. The drug is distributed domestically, especially to the Edo and Kano states, which are starting points for people travelling to Niger. Additionally, Nigerian criminal networks have reportedly collaborated with Mexican cartels to set up crystal meth production facilities, so that methamphetamine originating in Nigeria is now available in South Africa and throughout destination markets in Asia.
Nigeria is a major global cocaine destination and transshipment point. Its organized criminal groups are key contributors to the globalization of cocaine markets, and they retain a strong influence on the organization and determination of these markets. Nigerian actors control intra-African trade routes, and act as handlers for shipments to markets in Europe, the Middle East and Asia, using a diaspora network of co-conspirators. State corruption along with insecurity, particularly in the north, as well as the influence of violent non-state actors, who are becoming more centrally engaged as criminal competitors in the transiting of cocaine and other illicit drugs to consumer markets, all contribute to the massive cocaine trade. Cocaine, however, is an elitist drug, and as such only permeates specific levels of society within Nigeria.
Nigeria is also a top regional producer and exporter of cannabis to Europe, enabled by weak control of national borders, corruption as well as by criminal groups with transnational reach and ties to other groups abroad. Cannabis is widely consumed domestically, indicating a rise in cultivation. In fact, the country’s southwest region and southern states grow a significant percentage of the cannabis used in West Africa. However, there is evidence of a new type of cannabis from Ghana being sold on the domestic market, which is reportedly superior to the locally produced drug in terms of quality, processing and packaging.
*This indicator was first included in the 2023 iteration of the tool
*This indicator was first included in the 2023 iteration of the tool
Opportunistic loose criminal networks are common and operate in every state of the country. They engage in a number of markets, including trafficking, smuggling, corruption, money laundering, advanced fee fraud, oil bunkering, banditry, kidnap for ransom and car theft. These networks vary in size and their loose structure and often short-lived duration inhibits their effective disruption by law enforcement agencies. In addition, state-embedded actors and corruption are widespread at all levels of government, particularly in public procurement and contracting. People involved in criminal enterprises may also go into politics. Moreover, embezzlement and bribery scandals involving high-level officials and projects have been reported in Nigeria.
Foreign actors are also a significant part of the criminal landscape, especially at border areas. They are active in oil, gas, mining, arms trafficking, procurement overpricing, the supply of fake and substandard products, flora and fauna smuggling and practices associated with illicit financial flows. Most of these actors are from Asia, but criminal networks from Lebanon are also operating in Nigeria and throughout West Africa, using their connections and their legitimate businesses to aid trafficking activities. Additionally, Mexican cartels are allegedly working with Nigerian companies. While certain crime groups in Nigeria have known names and distinct identities, mafia-like groups remain relatively uncommon and are mostly engaged in oil bunkering. Violent mafia-style groups are also involved in kidnapping, armed robbery and smuggling. Nevertheless, Boko Haram also operates as a mafia-like group, evident in the recent appointment of leaders who would be responsible for the illicit taxation of communities. Other major sources of financing of terrorism for Boko Haram have been kidnap for ransom, illegal fishing and the protection rackets of politicians, especially in the north of the country.
Fighting organized crime and corruption has been at the forefront of the Buhari administration, but while banditry, armed robbery, smuggling, trafficking, cattle rustling and terrorism are commonly mentioned in political discourse, efforts remain entrenched at the federal level. Although the government is not considered transparent, measures to improve transparency and accountability have been introduced. President Muhammadu Buhariis recognized as less corrupt than his predecessors, and under his government, unprecedented convictions in high-profile cases of corruption have been recorded, and assets recovered. Furthermore, there has been a significant reduction in corruption among law enforcement and judicial officers, and a judicial panel is investigating allegations against the acting chairman of the foremost anti-corruption agency in the country.
Nigeria has ratified many international agreements relevant to organized crime and the government cooperates with several international organizations and governments to fight trafficking, smuggling, corruption, money laundering and terrorism. The country is also a member of regional and global multilateral agencies and provides leadership in ECOWAS and the African Union. In 2019, Nigeria passed a law on the suppression of maritime crimes, and the country has also incorporated most United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) related legislation into its own statutes. While the relevant laws, policies and institutions are in place, coordination and capacity challenges exist.
The judicial system in Nigeria is severely compromised. Federal judges are commonly accused of corruption and have been targeted by alleged politically motivated arrests. Judicial processes are slow and sometimes politically motivated, and the judiciary is under-resourced with inadequate facilities. Moreover, the number of pre-trial prisoners is alarming. Meanwhile, although the Nigeria Police Force is the country’s leading police organization, several law enforcement agencies are responsible for policing duties. Despite accusations of politicization, some specialized agencies, such as the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission and the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission, have gained prominence under Buhari’s presidency. The National Drug Law Enforcement Agency, National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP), and National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control have also done important work in tackling organized crime. While law enforcement agencies are under-resourced, increased attention has been given to training. Nevertheless, allegations of torture, extrajudicial killings and other human rights abuses against both the military and law enforcement persist.
Nigeria is positioned along major transnational trafficking routes, and its terrestrial and maritime borders are porous and difficult to police. Despite these border issues, Boko Haram terrorism and armed militant groups, the country demonstrates reasonable capacity to protect its territory, and in 2019, Nigeria closed some land borders to movement of goods due to widespread smuggling.
Despite being one of the most at-risk countries for money laundering and terrorist financing, Nigeria has seen significant progress in the implementation of international standards. The government utilizes institutions, laws, regulations, law enforcement and the judicial system to tackle corruption and money laundering, and an independent financial intelligence unit was established in 2018. Money stolen by a former military head of state and stashed in foreign jurisdictions has also been transferred back from Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the US. While no economic areas are controlled by organized crime groups, levels of pervasiveness in regulatory capacity may be high. However, laws, anti-corruption measures, business process reforms and executive orders aiming to strengthen the investment climate in the country are an indication of a good economic regulatory capacity. A law regulating all aspects of the registration and governance of private corporations and charity organizations was also recently passed. The financial sector is under the oversight of the Central Bank of Nigeria, and while related crimes fall under several anti-corruption agencies, challenges exist pertaining to resources and corruption.
NAPTIP has increased activities geared towards stemming human trafficking and smuggling, and along with other law enforcement agencies, frequently arrests suspects andraids premises used to house victims. There is an increasing awareness of human trafficking and smuggling due to programmes led by the government and CSOs, and a combination of awareness raising, repatriation, victim rehabilitation and prosecution measures are currently employed. The government has also strengthened measures to raise awareness and curtail drug use. In 2019, harm reduction programmes were launched, but rehabilitation clinics are not available in Nigeria and alcohol- and drug-treatment throughout rehabilitation centres in the country have been criticized and dubbed ′inhumane′. Some CSOs also provide shelters, counselling and rehabilitation. There have been several awareness and partnership efforts to address the fallout from organized criminal activities, and a hotline was created to report acts of bribery. Prevention activities are carried out by the Immigration Service, via the enhancement of electronic platforms and passport security features.
Some local communities respond to organized crime, but mainly via vigilante groups, rather than CSO movements. These groups are sometimes supported by the government, and hand suspects over to the police or try them under extra-judicial procedures. Nigeria has an active civil society, and increasing government attempts to regulate associated activities are frequently resisted by CSOs. Some CSOs address drug prevention, treatment and care, but these initiatives lack funding. The country has a pluralist and vibrant media covering print, electronic, traditional and new media outlets. Historically, the Nigerian media has had a reputation for professionalism, trustworthiness and boldly engaging the government through criticism of policies and programmes. However, professionalism has declined, there is a perception of corruption among journalists and regulations have weakened. Fake and hate news are increasing and politicians own or exercise influence over newspapers. There is a significant level of distrust between the media and the government, especially law enforcement agencies, resulting in unwarranted arrests, detention and harassment of journalists. Nevertheless, there is still considerable press vitality and freedom.
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The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to 10. The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel.
A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.
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