How to measure organized crime?
A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.
Read more on globalinitiative.netCriminal markets
1.60
An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.
Human trafficking
1.50
Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.
Human smuggling
1.00
Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.
Arms trafficking
1.50
The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.
Flora crimes
1.00
The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.
Fauna crimes
1.00
The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.
Non-renewable resource crimes
1.50
The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.
Heroin trade
2.00
The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.
Cocaine trade
2.00
The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cannabis trade
2.50
The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.
Synthetic drug trade
2.00
The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Criminal actors
3.25
An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.
Mafia-style groups
1.00
Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.
Criminal networks
3.00
Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.
State-embedded actors
3.50
Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.
Foreign actors
5.50
State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.
Political leadership and governance
3.50
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
4.00
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
5.00
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
6.00
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
8.00
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
7.00
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
6.00
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
4.50
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
4.00
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
8.00
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
4.50
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
4.00
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Political leadership and governance
3.50
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
4.00
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
5.00
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
6.00
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
8.00
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
7.00
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
6.00
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
4.50
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
4.00
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
8.00
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
4.50
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
4.00
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
There does not appear to be a market for human smuggling or trafficking in Monaco. However, the principality’s borders are almost entirely frictionless and there is a possibility, albeit minimal, of trafficking for the purposes of sexual exploitation, especially during the Monaco Grand Prix, when the demand for sex workers rises.
The possession and sale of weapons is strongly regulated in Monaco. Individuals who own firearms require government licenses and are subject to rigorous background checks. Monaco therefore has a very low firearm offence rate and the arms trafficking market in the principality is negligible, with the only apparent involvement of the country in the transnational market being their hosting of a renowned arms dealer.
The French customs authorities in charge of border controls in Monaco have often made seizures of endangered and illicit flora species on luxury yachts in the port, but this appears to be the extent of the flora crimes market in the country. Monaco is totally urbanized and, with the exception of isolated incidents, there is very little evidence to suggest any sort of illicit fauna crimes market. There does not appear to be an active criminal market for smuggling of non-renewable resources, but allegations point to bribes being paid to officials in return for lucrative contracts in the oil industry.
Cannabis is a popular drug in Monaco and is used predominantly by young males. Reports suggest that, as with cocaine, individuals often travel to France to purchase the drug. While it is illegal in Monaco, discrete use seems to be tolerated by the authorities. There is no evidence that the cannabis market is any larger than small-scale individual distribution, though there is a trend towards cultivation. Monaco is a destination country for small quantities of cocaine that are brought in from France. In 2018, French police dismantled a cocaine trafficking route run by two brothers based in Menton and Monaco. However, the market is limited to episodic individual-level distribution.
The trafficking of heroin in Monaco is also extremely limited, with data suggesting that it is not a drug used by students or the wider population. The supply points for the small amounts of heroin brought into the country are located in neighbouring French cities. There appears to be a similarly small synthetic drug market, though there is concern that the growing use of ecstasy in Western and Central Europe may spread to Monaco.
*This indicator was first included in the 2023 iteration of the tool
*This indicator was first included in the 2023 iteration of the tool
There is no evidence to suggest that any domestic mafia-style groups operate in Monaco, but groups from nearby countries seem to be active. Due to Monaco’s history as a tax haven and its strict banking secrecy, it has attracted individuals with ties to organized crime. The majority of Monaco’s population is not native to the principality, and this facilitates the operations of foreign criminal actors and organizations. There is strong evidence that individuals with transnational organized crime links do business in Monaco, such as mafia groups from Italy, Russia and former Soviet states. Foreign actors allegedly use connections in Monaco to launder the oil profits of the Tambovskaya gang.
There is scant evidence for the presence of criminal networks in the country. It is likely that loose criminal structures cooperate with foreign criminal actors, and are involved in the laundering of criminal proceeds in Monaco. The only notable recent example of criminal activity by state-embedded actors was the so-called vast influence-peddling scandal of 2017, which involved Russian oligarchs and prompted the resignation of the principality’s minister of justice. Despite this, the state does not appear to have been infiltrated by criminal interests.
Organized crime is not a significant problem in Monaco, and there is no evidence to suggest any kind of state capture by organized criminals. There is a high level of confidence in the democratic and election processes; however, concerns have been raised about the principality's low level of compliance with anti-corruption recommendations. While there are anti-corruption squads in the principality's law enforcement agencies, corruption, although well-hidden, is present. Thus, GRECO has voiced concerns over the Monaco's compliance with international anti-corruption standards. Access to information in Monaco is extremely poor, and the principality faces pressure from the international community to reform its banking secrecy laws.
Monaco has signed international treaties and conventions related to all the major criminal markets. However, its progress from ratification to implementation has been slow. The principality has cooperation agreements in place with INTERPOL, Europol and Francopol. It also has bilateral extradition agreements with many countries in Western and Eastern Europe, as well as with the US and Australia. Monaco's national legislation, which is continually updated and improved, provides it with protection against the majority of criminal markets.
Individuals sentenced for common-law offences in Monaco are transferred to prisons in France and subject to French legislation. The vast majority of prisoners are foreign. It appears that the principality has complete control over its domestic prison system, with the rights of prisoners provided for and very low levels of corruption reported.
The policing system is strong in Monaco, with one of the highest officers-to-population ratios in the world. This, combined with the low level of organized crime in the principality, ensures that its criminal markets are policed effectively. Monaco customs duties fall under French jurisdiction, and capital is free to flow between the countries without restriction or tax collection. As a result, Monaco falls under the customs body of the EU. It appears to have some capacity for monitoring illicit cross-border activities, though this is proportionate to the low levels of threat.
Historically, Monaco has been seen as an uncooperative tax haven. It came under significant international pressure to adopt the OECD Model Tax Convention in 2009, and since then has pursued an active policy of combating money laundering and terrorist financing. Monaco has adopted mechanisms recommended by the Financial Action Task Force and has regularly amended and strengthened its compliance with international standards. The government created a financial investigation unit and is modernizing the country's banking and financial sector to make it more resilient to money laundering threats.
While Monaco is proactive and effective in its prosecution of domestic crimes of extortion, there are concerns that its tolerant regulatory environment with regard to transnational organized crime is extremely problematic.
Monaco has laws providing for the compensation and legal representation of victims of crimes, especially with regard to sexual violence. The Victims of Criminal Offences Help Association works to prevent violence against victims and witnesses, and operates free of charge, alongside other victim-support programmes and mental-health services. Monaco is a signatory to numerous international treaties designed to prevent organized crime; however, it appears unable to prevent authoritarian heads of state and corrupt individuals from entering its borders and operating within them. The principality seems to prefer ethical charters rather than robust legislation to guide its prevention efforts.
There are no restrictions on the formation of NGOs, but the civil-society sector is weak. Civil liberties, including freedom of expression within the media, are fully respected in Monaco. However, efforts on part of the state to suppress bad public relations related to corruption have been at times very aggressive.
Access the GI-TOC website for more content related to the Global Organized Crime Index
For a better experience, please rotate your device.
The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to 10. The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel.
A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.
Read more on globalinitiative.net
We're constantly working to improve the Index. By participating in this survey, you will be providing us with insights and suggestions that will help us make the Index an even better resource.
give us your feedback
This report was funded in part by a grant from the United States Department of State.
ENACT is funded by the European Union and implemented by the Institute for Security Studies and INTERPOL, in affiliation with the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.
The opinions, findings and conclusions stated herein are those of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State.