How to measure organized crime?
A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.
Read more on globalinitiative.netCriminal markets
5.65
An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.
Human trafficking
6.50
Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.
Human smuggling
6.50
Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.
Arms trafficking
4.50
The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.
Flora crimes
8.00
The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.
Fauna crimes
8.00
The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.
Non-renewable resource crimes
1.50
The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.
Heroin trade
7.00
The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.
Cocaine trade
2.50
The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cannabis trade
4.00
The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.
Synthetic drug trade
8.00
The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Criminal actors
5.38
An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.
Mafia-style groups
1.50
Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.
Criminal networks
6.00
Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.
State-embedded actors
6.00
Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.
Foreign actors
8.00
State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.
Political leadership and governance
3.00
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
2.50
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
3.50
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
4.00
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
3.00
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
4.00
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
2.50
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
3.50
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
4.00
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
4.00
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
3.50
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
3.50
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Political leadership and governance
3.00
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
2.50
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
3.50
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
4.00
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
3.00
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
4.00
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
2.50
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
3.50
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
4.00
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
4.00
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
3.50
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
3.50
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
The majority of human-trafficking cases identified in Laos involve the trafficking of individuals to other countries in the region, mainly Thailand. Men and boys from Laos and neighbouring countries are vulnerable to forced labour in the fishing, construction and agricultural sector in Thailand. However, internal trafficking of both Lao and foreign nationals is also pervasive, driven in large part by a combination of irregular labour migration, lack of economic opportunities and rising rates of poverty. Internally, young women and girls from Laos and neighbouring countries are vulnerable to forced labour, particularly in the illicit logging and construction sectors, as well as to sexual exploitation, the demand for which is often fuelled by external sources such as tourists and businesspeople. Traffickers often recruit through personal connections. Additionally, foreign-owned companies and corrupt officials also facilitate the market.
Human smuggling in Laos largely involves the movement of employment-seeking individuals from across South-eastern Asia and other developing countries in Asia through Laos into Thailand. Corruption among law-enforcement, military and immigration officials plays a key role in supporting the market.
Laos is a transit country for arms trafficking into Myanmar, in particular to Wa State, where active insurgent groups operate. The weapons trafficked through the country are believed to originate primarily from China, with considerable state involvement playing an important role in the illicit trade. Although civilian arms-possession is banned in the country, some individuals in rural areas do own guns, mainly for traditional hunting purposes.
Illicit logging is one of Laos’ most significant and profitable criminal markets, featuring significant involvement of highly organized and transnational criminal groups. The market is largely driven by high demand for protected wood, such as Siamese rosewood, in Vietnam and China. Illicit logging has had a severe impact on the country’s ecosystem, including the destruction of entire forest areas in the provinces of Saravan and Sekong.
Laos also has one of the world’s most notable illegal wildlife trade markets, serving as a major transit point for wildlife trafficking, in particular of ivory, from Africa to Vietnam and China. Laos is also an important transit, as well as origin, country for other wildlife products such as tigers, pangolins and bears, among others. High-level corruption plays a significant role in this market, with reports from 2016 revealing that officials at the highest levels of the state apparatus were involved in cutting deals with leading wildlife traffickers to move millions of dollars’ worth of wildlife through select border crossings. Conversely, there are no significant non-renewable resource crime markets in Laos, although some liquified petroleum gas has been smuggled into the country from Thailand in recent years.
Heroin trafficking is among the most profitable criminal markets in Laos, largely due to increasing domestic opium production as well as its shared borders with Myanmar and Thailand. Laos also has one of the fastest-growing synthetic-drug markets in South-eastern Asia, driven by wide accessibility, low prices and growing demand in surrounding economies. In recent years, methamphetamine has become especially popular among Lao youth. Laos also has a domestic cannabis-cultivation industry, which supplies domestic and Vietnamese markets, and has retail sales mainly concentrated in Laos’ urban and tourist areas. Cannabis is also trafficked from Cambodia and Thailand through Laos. The cocaine trade in the country is relatively small and mostly involves foreign actors. Corruption among law-enforcement and border officials facilitates trafficking in most of the country’s drug markets, particularly heroin and cannabis.
*This indicator was first included in the 2023 iteration of the tool
*This indicator was first included in the 2023 iteration of the tool
There is evidence suggesting that criminal networks in Laos collude and cooperate with foreign groups in the region. Laos has especially struggled to tackle these networks since the country moved towards a more open economy in 1986, which allowed for closer ties to China and other regional countries, such as Vietnam and Thailand, and thereby opened the door for several foreign criminal actors from these countries to operate in Laos. These foreign criminal actors are mainly involved in the illegal wildlife trade; however, there have also been reports linking them to sex- and drug-trafficking in Laos.
State-embedded actors facilitate some criminal markets in Laos through corruption, in the form of accepting bribes and sharing profits from criminal actors, particularly in the illegal wildlife trade and illicit logging markets. Cooperation with criminal actors occurs at all levels of the state apparatus, from low-level officials and law-enforcement personnel to the highest office in the country. Mafia-style groups, while present in Laos, are far less prevalent than other criminal-actor types.
Corruption exists at all levels of government in Laos, despite the government maintaining an anti-corruption agenda. Political patronage also pervades Laos’ business sectors, and bribery is widespread. Meanwhile, the government’s Ministry of Public Security has several branches aimed at tackling transnational organized crime and leads the National Steering Committee on Human Trafficking, which brings together all relevant governmental anti-trafficking stakeholders. In 2020, the government also introduced positive measures to protect victims of human trafficking.
Laos has ratified several international treaties related to transnational organized crime, corruption and the illegal wildlife trade. Laos also cooperates with regional organizations on programmes and conventions aimed at tackling drug production and trafficking, arms trafficking, human trafficking and human smuggling. At the domestic level, the country lacks legislation to criminalize organized-criminal groups en masse but has addressed human trafficking under the 2016 Anti-Trafficking Law and the criminalization of sex- and labour-trafficking under the 2018 Penal Code. The government also has several laws addressing environmental crimes, including illicit wildlife trade and illicit logging. Nevertheless, legal loopholes remain. In 2016, the Laos Cabinet approved a national plan on narcotics control for 2016–2020.
Although due process is enshrined in Lao law, it is routinely denied in practice, and long procedural delays are common. Rural communities are also encouraged to settle non-criminal disputes outside the formal judicial system. Furthermore, the country’s prison system suffers from inadequate facilities and torture is occasionally reported, though the independent monitoring of prisons has been refused. Specialist law-enforcement and government bodies exist to curb all major criminal markets. However, Laos’ porous borders with five countries make inspections and management difficult, particularly in the area of illegal wildlife trade. The porous borders also render the country highly susceptible to criminal actors, who often explicitly target border areas.
Laos is among the countries with the highest risk of money laundering and terrorist financing in the world. Money laundering is relatively easy in the country because of its limited legal framework, poor financial regulation, weak border controls and reduced investigative capacity. However, in 2018, Laos’ penal code set forth specific penalties for money laundering and, in 2019, Lao officials from various agencies completed training on basic financial investigations and anti-money-laundering techniques. The rise in corruption, organized crime and money laundering related to criminal markets has had a negative impact on Laos’ economic development and regional integration. Furthermore, various factors, including difficulties in accessing finance and poor enforcement of regulations, have led to the proliferation of the informal economy in Laos, which, as a proportion of the country’s economy, is one of the largest in the region.
The Laos government has made improvements in offering official assistance to trafficking victims through cooperation with international and local non-governmental organizations, as well as the 2016 Anti-Trafficking Law, which entitles victims – although not foreign victims– to assistance programmes. The Lao government has also increased its organized-crime-prevention efforts and supported training on transnational organized crime for various stakeholders. Nevertheless, efforts to prevent human trafficking and other crimes remain disjointed amid resource challenges and limits placed on civil society actors, who often face kidnappings and government intimidation. Moreover, the majority of the country’s media is state-owned, although some independent media outlets have emerged in recent years and Laos has joined other ASEAN countries in defending a free press. Additionally, although population surveillance has diminished in recent years, public dissent continues to be monitored. Overall, press freedom in Laos is among the worst in the world.
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The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to 10. The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel.
A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.
Read more on globalinitiative.net
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This report was funded in part by a grant from the United States Department of State.
ENACT is funded by the European Union and implemented by the Institute for Security Studies and INTERPOL, in affiliation with the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.
The opinions, findings and conclusions stated herein are those of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State.