How to measure organized crime?
A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.
Read more on globalinitiative.netCriminal markets
5.45
An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.
Human trafficking
6.50
Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.
Human smuggling
6.50
Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.
Arms trafficking
5.50
The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.
Flora crimes
6.50
The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.
Fauna crimes
4.00
The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.
Non-renewable resource crimes
6.00
The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.
Heroin trade
2.00
The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.
Cocaine trade
8.00
The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cannabis trade
6.00
The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.
Synthetic drug trade
3.50
The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Criminal actors
6.00
An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.
Mafia-style groups
8.00
Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.
Criminal networks
6.00
Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.
State-embedded actors
7.00
Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.
Foreign actors
3.00
State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.
Political leadership and governance
2.00
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
2.00
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
3.00
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
4.00
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
3.00
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
2.00
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
2.00
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
3.00
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
2.00
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
1.50
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
3.00
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
4.50
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Political leadership and governance
2.00
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
2.00
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
3.00
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
4.00
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
3.00
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
2.00
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
2.00
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
3.00
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
2.00
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
1.50
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
3.00
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
4.50
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Haiti is a source and destination country for human trafficking, a crime that affects a large portion of the population due to the tradition of restavek, whereby poor children (usually from the countryside) are loaned by their parents to so-called rich families to be taken care of, while in practice they are subjected to slavery-like living conditions. Haitian women and children have also been the victims of sexual exploitation by corrupt foreign peacekeepers, representatives of NGOs and other international organizations operating in Haiti.
Human smuggling is very common in the country, mainly because its poor economic and political conditions provide an optimal platform for smugglers. The market is focused mainly on smuggling Haitians to foreign destinations such as the Dominican Republic, Cuba, the Unites States, Canada, Brazil and Chile.
Although the United States has an arms embargo on Haiti, illicit firearms continue to flow from there into the country. Haiti's local arms-smuggling market is facilitated by corruption, porous borders and a lack of inspections. It is fostered by political elites who seek to grow their power through armed gangs. Haiti is also a transit country for illegal arms, particularly those going to Jamaica.
Haiti’s flora-crimes market is focused largely on the destruction and trafficking of trees for the production of charcoal, the main source of energy in the country. A combination of socio-economic conditions, natural disasters and lack of government control have had a negative effect on the country’s forests. Haiti is the second-largest exporter of wildlife to the United States, after Mexico, which suggests that this is a relatively valuable market. The most prominent illegal activity related to non-renewable resources is fuel smuggling, mainly from the Dominican Republic, due to severe shortages caused by Venezuela’s suspension of its PetroCaribe aid programme in Haiti.
Haiti is a key transit country for cocaine because of its numerous uncontrolled points of entry and its internal instability. Criminal organizations transport the drug to Haiti via sea or air, then store it locally before shipping it in small vessels to Puerto Rico, Miami, Europe or Canada, or transporting it by land to the Dominican Republic. Haiti is both a transit and source country for cannabis. Local producers supply the domestic market, which is small because most of the population does not have the resources to buy drugs. While heroin is sometimes transported alongside larger cocaine shipments, the heroin market is very limited in the country. There is also evidence of some minor trafficking of synthetic drugs through the country.
*This indicator was first included in the 2023 iteration of the tool
*This indicator was first included in the 2023 iteration of the tool
Haiti’s most prominent criminal groups are mafia-style gangs, which overshadow all other illicit networks. Given the almost complete absence of state power in many places across Haiti, these highly institutionalized gangs have stepped in to fill the void and provide some degree of order in the communities in which they operate.They have significant territorial control and deep connections with government officials at all levels – so much so that the Haitian authorities seem to rely on them to control civil unrest, particularly as the country has not had a military force since 1995. These mafia-style groups carry guns openly, confront the police and fight each other for territorial control. They are behind most organized-crime activities in the country, including drug and arms trafficking, racketeering, extortion, kidnappings, armed robberies and assaults. They draw power from their alliances with government officials, and state-embedded criminal actors provide them with weapons and other kinds of support as a way of trying to control electoral zones.
Foreign actors also operate across Haiti, particularly in the cocaine-trafficking and human-smuggling markets. However, they do not exert a significant impact on the country as its instability and socio-economic situation makes it unattractive to most transnational-crime groups.
Haiti is the poorest and most unequal country of the Americas. As such, it is a very fragile state. Government institutions are extremely weak and electoral results are routinely called into question. The authorities fail to see organized crime as a rule-of-law issue and do nothing to tackle it. Politicians allow criminal groups to operate freely and collaborate actively with them. The state’s failure to meet people’s most basic needs has opened the door for criminal groups to fill the void by providing services such as garbage collection, road maintenance and water distribution. They also enforce evictions and even collect payments for building permits.
Collusion between the authorities and criminal groups has resulted in Haiti being assessed as one of the most corrupt countries in the Americas, despite the existence of laws and institutions that, on paper, are meant to tackle and punish the issue. The signing of a number of international treaties and conventions related to the fight against organized crime, trafficking and corruption does not seem to have had much impact.
Haiti’s heavy dependence on international cooperation has proven challenging. Relations with international agencies have been difficult due to distrust and cases of sexual abuse at the hands of foreign organizations operating in the country.
A lack of independence coupled with the absence of a functioning oversight mechanism, inadequate resources, and poor coordination and training make Haiti’s judiciary extremely weak. The country is home to one of the most overcrowded and under-resourced penitentiary systems in the world. A lack of fresh water, food and adequate sanitation has resulted in widespread malnutrition and infectious diseases among inmates. Since Haiti dismantled its military in 1995, the country’s law-enforcement function has been left largely in the hands of the police, who were aided between 2004 and 2017 by the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti, a force of several thousand. As is the case with its other institutions, the Haitian police force is under-resourced. It is overwhelmed by the power of local gangs and lacks the capacity to carry out investigations. Haiti’s porous borders and weak controls are exploited by trans-border criminal networks involved in drug and weapons smuggling, document fraud, and human smuggling and trafficking.
While Haiti is not yet a major financial centre for money laundering and terrorism financing, its inadequate controls, weak judiciary and lack of political interest put it at high risk of becoming one. As the poorest country in the Americas, it also has the lowest human-development index, with at least a third of the population relying on remittances to survive. Its outdated legal framework, the few protections it offers to investors, the small number of people who pay taxes, and the limited services provided by the state make doing business in Haiti extremely difficult.
The protection of victims and witnesses is almost non-existent in Haiti, aside from some programmes run by civil society. An environment of fear exists throughout the lower levels of society. Even though Haiti passed a new anti-trafficking law in 2014, aimed at guaranteeing support and protection for victims and witnesses, it has not yet been implemented due to the deficiencies of the judiciary. There have been some small-scale public-awareness campaigns to tackle drug use, but their effectiveness is yet to be measured. Haiti's lack of resources generally limits civil-society participation, but a number of human-rights organizations attempt to carry out programmes aimed at reducing violence across the country. The absence of resources also affects media outlets, with the vast majority of Haitians not able to access the internet or afford a newspaper. Media outlets struggling to finance their independent reporting are often the targets of threats and violence, the risk of which increased further amid the COVID-19 pandemic. In recent years, multiple journalists have either been killed or have disappeared in Haiti.
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The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to 10. The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel.
A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.
Read more on globalinitiative.net
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This report was funded in part by a grant from the United States Department of State.
ENACT is funded by the European Union and implemented by the Institute for Security Studies and INTERPOL, in affiliation with the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.
The opinions, findings and conclusions stated herein are those of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State.