How to measure organized crime?
A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.
Read more on globalinitiative.netCriminal markets
3.45
An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.
Human trafficking
4.50
Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.
Human smuggling
3.00
Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.
Arms trafficking
3.00
The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.
Flora crimes
1.50
The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.
Fauna crimes
1.50
The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.
Non-renewable resource crimes
3.00
The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.
Heroin trade
3.00
The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.
Cocaine trade
3.50
The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cannabis trade
5.00
The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.
Synthetic drug trade
6.50
The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Criminal actors
3.75
An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.
Mafia-style groups
3.00
Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.
Criminal networks
5.00
Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.
State-embedded actors
2.00
Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.
Foreign actors
5.00
State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.
Political leadership and governance
8.00
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
8.00
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
8.50
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
8.00
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
8.00
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
7.00
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
8.00
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
7.50
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
8.00
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
7.50
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
8.00
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
7.50
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Political leadership and governance
8.00
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
8.00
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
8.50
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
8.00
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
8.00
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
7.00
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
8.00
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
7.50
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
8.00
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
7.50
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
8.00
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
7.50
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Estonia is a destination, source and transit country for human trafficking. There are reported cases of Estonian nationals being trafficked to northern and Western European countries, mainly Finland, Germany and the UK. Victims from Asia and Europe are also trafficked for exploitation in Estonia. Most victims are from Russia, Belarus, Moldova, the Ukraine, Bulgaria and Estonia itself. Sexual exploitation appears to be the most common cause of trafficking, though there is evidence indicating that the crime market for sex trafficking is becoming smaller. At the same time, however, there is evidence that the market for labour trafficking might be increasing.
Estonia is a transit country for smuggling migrants from Russia, Georgia and Vietnam, destined for Europe. Most smuggled persons enter Estonia through the country’s eastern border with Russia. Most human smugglers are members of Russian crime groups which work in tandem with Estonian networks.
Arms trafficking constituted a significant threat to Estonia and, throughout the 1990s, the country had a reputation as a major hotspot for illegal arms trafficking. However, efforts to curb the illegal trafficking of firearms have been effective, resulting in a sharp decline in the size of the crime market. Estonia is now mainly a destination country for illicit arms, albeit a limited one.
Environment crimes are not a major concern in Estonia and criminal markets in flora and fauna are not known to exist on a large scale. Illegal forestry was a concern in the past, but Estonia now faces a low risk of harvesting illegal timber. Illegal trade in reptile skins, corals, caviar and sturgeon meat has decreased in the past years and the crime market for fauna appears to be relatively small. The country's location and history of fuel smuggling sustain some concerns with regards to the proliferation of a non-renewable resource crime market. Additionally, instances of fraud in the fuel sector have been reported. Nevertheless, the illicit non-renewable resources market has a potentially limited but manageable influence.
Estonia is a transit country for heroin and a destination country for cannabis, synthetic drugs and, to a lesser extent, cocaine. It is a transit country for heroin trafficked into Europe via Russia (along the northern route). Domestic heroin consumption and trade is marginal as it has more or less been replaced first by fentanyl and, after successful action by law enforcement to combat suppliers, various synthetic drugs, including amphetamines, methamphetamines and gamma-hydroxy-butyrate (GHB). In 2020, however, something of a return of opiates, mainly fentanyl, was observed. Many of the synthetic drugs used in Estonia originate in Europe: Amphetamines and methamphetamines seized in the country often originate in Poland and the Netherlands; MDMA — also known as ecstasy or molly — is imported from the Netherlands. Fentanyl seized in Estonia often originates in China. A small proportion of Estonia’s demand for synthetic drugs have been fed by domestic production and authorities have dismantled small- and medium-scale laboratories making GHB, amphetamines and fentanyl.
Cannabis is consumed relatively widely in Estonia, particularly among young people. The exact criminal actors involved in the cannabis market are unknown but, in some cases, there are reports of mafia-style groups being linked to the trade. Estonia is a destination country for cocaine, though seizures indicate a moderately small market by global and European standards.
*This indicator was first included in the 2023 iteration of the tool
*This indicator was first included in the 2023 iteration of the tool
Foreign groups, especially foreign mafias, have traditionally played a key role in most of Estonia’s crime markets, including trafficking drugs, people and arms. Since the 1990s, mafia-style groups of Russian, Belarussian and Ukrainian origin have had a strong presence in Estonia. Ethnic Estonian mafia-style groups also exist, but clearly identifying them is for the most part a difficult task. The most widely recognized Estonian mafia organization is the Assar Paulus group, known by the name of its leader. In general, mafia-style groups in Estonia, both domestic and foreign, have traditionally exercised a great deal of coordination. For instance, a number of them have established a mutual fund — общак in Russian — which functions as a committee that defines territorial divisions and settles disputes. Additionally, outlaw motorcycle gangs, such as the Hells Angels and Bandidos have also had a presence in Estonia. Recent years, however, have seen several convictions and murders of some of the most powerful individuals in Estonia’s crime underworld, including Nikolai Tarankov (murdered) and Assar Paulus (arrested) — two of the most influential criminals in the country. This might have significantly weakened the unity and influence of mafia-style actors in Estonia, both foreign and domestic, effectively putting the future of the crime mutual fund into question.
Criminal networks in Estonia also appear to collaborate to some extent with foreign actors. They have grown in prominence in the past years, operating predominately in the drug trafficking market but have a stake in human trafficking and smuggling as well. Cases involving state criminal actors mainly constitute white-collar crimes, such as money laundering and corruption. In general, rather than their involvement in violent and/or drug-related crimes, state-embedded actors seem to be working in collaboration with international organized-crime groups to launder the proceeds of their criminal activities.
Since independence, Estonia has become a consolidated democracy with a track record of clean elections, accountable governance and a respect for its citizens’ political rights that is unrivalled in any other former Soviet country. Estonia's government has shown leadership against organized crime and has adopted a number of strategies for countering key crime markets. Although corruption remains an issue, by global standards, the country performs relatively well in the fight against it. Its oversight mechanisms are generally adequate controls against corruption, though further steps to strengthen the anti-corruption framework could be taken. Transparent governance could be strengthened in a number of key areas, including political financing, lobbying, access to information and whistle-blower protection.
Estonia has ratified all international legal instruments relevant to organized crime. The country cooperates with international partners through a range of international bodies, including Europol, INTERPOL and various regional bodies and task forces. It has participated in joint operations with foreign law enforcement and has extradition agreements with many countries, including the Russian Federation, the Ukraine, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and the US. The Estonian legal framework criminalizes most forms of organized crime. Its Criminal Code contains legal provisions to criminalize those who participate in organized crime, as well as human smuggling, human, drug and arms trafficking and fauna and flora crimes.
Estonia's courts are independent in their activities and deliver justice with reliability. Those facing charges can generally expect a fair trial and due process. There is no evidence of corruption and organized-crime activities inside Estonian prisons. There have been a few allegations of excessive use of force by prison officers, but these issues are not symptomatic of wider issues and concern specific prisons. Law enforcement in the country has high levels of public trust and is considered relatively efficient. The Police and Border Guard Board is the main policing body, responsible for managing and coordinating the activities of various agencies of the police, including those specialized in investigating organized crime in general and units that are specialized in human trafficking, human smuggling and drug trafficking. Nevertheless, the small size of the law enforcement community in Estonia makes it hard for it to have the breadth of capabilities appropriate to respond to different types of organized crime.
The economic regulatory environment in Estonia is highly conducive to doing business and to private-sector development and at providing relatively strong protection for workers. The Estonian government has legal and institutional mechanisms in place to ensure that legitimate businesses operate free from criminal activities. Even though an Estonian branch of Danske Bank was implicated in one of the largest money-laundering scandals exposed, the country has a relatively resilient anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML-CFT) framework. The country has a solid Financial Intelligence Unit and Supreme Audit Institution and relatively transparent beneficial ownership disclosure practices.
The legal framework for witness protection in Estonia gives, among other things, witnesses of organized crime an opportunity to obtain a new identity. Rehabilitation treatment of drug users is provided by the public health system, though hospitals often provide patients seeking rehabilitation with outpatient rather than inpatient treatment. In cases of human trafficking, NGOs often take the lead, providing victims with various services. These are funded by the state, though NGOs often have to look elsewhere for further funding. Reintegration and repatriation services are provided by state municipalities. However, Estonia does not always provide victims of human trafficking with all the mechanisms needed to exit trafficking. Crime-prevention strategies have been adopted and implemented for drugs and human trafficking, but not for all crime markets. Civil society and independent media do not face any significant restrictions and are free to investigate, discuss and report on issues related to organized crime and corruption.
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The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to 10. The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel.
A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.
Read more on globalinitiative.net
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This report was funded in part by a grant from the United States Department of State.
ENACT is funded by the European Union and implemented by the Institute for Security Studies and INTERPOL, in affiliation with the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.
The opinions, findings and conclusions stated herein are those of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State.